Transaction costs and crony capitalism in East Asia

Comparative Politics

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2003, Pages

  Kang, David C ^a  

^a DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041573190     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/4150189     Document Type: Review

References (116)

1. See Dani Rodrik, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich," Economic Policy, 20 (1995), 91; Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 12; Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 327; Karl Fields, "Strong States and Business Organization in Korea and Taiwan, " in Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, eds., Business and the State in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 126.
2. See Dani Rodrik, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich," Economic Policy, 20 (1995), 91; Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 12; Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 327; Karl Fields, "Strong States and Business Organization in Korea and Taiwan, " in Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, eds., Business and the State in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 126.
3. See Dani Rodrik, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich," Economic Policy, 20 (1995), 91; Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 12; Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 327; Karl Fields, "Strong States and Business Organization in Korea and Taiwan, " in Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, eds., Business and the State in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 126.
4. See Dani Rodrik, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich," Economic Policy, 20 (1995), 91; Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 12; Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 327; Karl Fields, "Strong States and Business Organization in Korea and Taiwan, " in Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, eds., Business and the State in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 126.
5. Cheng-Tian Kuo, "Taiwan's Distorted Democracy in Comparative Perspective," Journal of Asian and African Studies, 35 (2000), 85-111; Tun-jen Cheng and Brantly Womack, "General Reflections on Informal Politics in East Asia," Asian Survey, 36 (March 1996), 320-38; Mushtaq Khan and Jomo K. S., eds., Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); David Kang, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
6. Cheng-Tian Kuo, "Taiwan's Distorted Democracy in Comparative Perspective," Journal of Asian and African Studies, 35 (2000), 85-111; Tun-jen Cheng and Brantly Womack, "General Reflections on Informal Politics in East Asia," Asian Survey, 36 (March 1996), 320-38; Mushtaq Khan and Jomo K. S., eds., Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); David Kang, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
7. Cheng-Tian Kuo, "Taiwan's Distorted Democracy in Comparative Perspective," Journal of Asian and African Studies, 35 (2000), 85-111; Tun-jen Cheng and Brantly Womack, "General Reflections on Informal Politics in East Asia," Asian Survey, 36 (March 1996), 320-38; Mushtaq Khan and Jomo K. S., eds., Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); David Kang, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
8. Cheng-Tian Kuo, "Taiwan's Distorted Democracy in Comparative Perspective," Journal of Asian and African Studies, 35 (2000), 85-111; Tun-jen Cheng and Brantly Womack, "General Reflections on Informal Politics in East Asia," Asian Survey, 36 (March 1996), 320-38; Mushtaq Khan and Jomo K. S., eds., Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); David Kang, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
9. Richard Doner and Ansil Ramsey, "Rent-Seeking and Economic Development in Thailand," in Khan and Jomo, eds., p. 147.
10. Cronyism is used as a generic term to refer to corruption, rent-seeking, and personal relationships. For economists, such actions have the same effect: decision making on grounds other than pure economic efficiency.
11. See Kathleen Collins, "The Political Role of Clans," Comparative Politics, 35 (January 2003); Janet Landa, Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity: Beyond the New Institutional Economics of Ethnic Trading Networks, Contract Law, and Gift-Exchange (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994) ; Richard Doner and Ben Ross Schneider, "Business Associations and Economic Development: Why Some Associations Contribute More Than Others," Business and Politics, 2 (November 2000), 261-88; Paul Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Mushtaq Khan, "The Efficiency Implications of Corruption," Journal of International Development, 8 (1996), 683-96; Pranab Bardhan, "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1997), 1320-46; Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishney, "Corruption," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (1993), 599-617; Mushtaq Khan, "The Input-Output Function for Rent-Seeking: A Comparative Analysis of Differential Effects" (unpublished manuscript, University of London, 1997).
12. See Kathleen Collins, "The Political Role of Clans," Comparative Politics, 35 (January 2003); Janet Landa, Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity: Beyond the New Institutional Economics of Ethnic Trading Networks, Contract Law, and Gift-Exchange (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994) ; Richard Doner and Ben Ross Schneider, "Business Associations and Economic Development: Why Some Associations Contribute More Than Others," Business and Politics, 2 (November 2000), 261-88; Paul Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Mushtaq Khan, "The Efficiency Implications of Corruption," Journal of International Development, 8 (1996), 683-96; Pranab Bardhan, "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1997), 1320-46; Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishney, "Corruption," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (1993), 599-617; Mushtaq Khan, "The Input-Output Function for Rent-Seeking: A Comparative Analysis of Differential Effects" (unpublished manuscript, University of London, 1997).
13. See Kathleen Collins, "The Political Role of Clans," Comparative Politics, 35 (January 2003); Janet Landa, Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity: Beyond the New Institutional Economics of Ethnic Trading Networks, Contract Law, and Gift-Exchange (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994) ; Richard Doner and Ben Ross Schneider, "Business Associations and Economic Development: Why Some Associations Contribute More Than Others," Business and Politics, 2 (November 2000), 261-88; Paul Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Mushtaq Khan, "The Efficiency Implications of Corruption," Journal of International Development, 8 (1996), 683-96; Pranab Bardhan, "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1997), 1320-46; Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishney, "Corruption," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (1993), 599-617; Mushtaq Khan, "The Input-Output Function for Rent-Seeking: A Comparative Analysis of Differential Effects" (unpublished manuscript, University of London, 1997).
14. See Kathleen Collins, "The Political Role of Clans," Comparative Politics, 35 (January 2003); Janet Landa, Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity: Beyond the New Institutional Economics of Ethnic Trading Networks, Contract Law, and Gift-Exchange (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994) ; Richard Doner and Ben Ross Schneider, "Business Associations and Economic Development: Why Some Associations Contribute More Than Others," Business and Politics, 2 (November 2000), 261-88; Paul Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Mushtaq Khan, "The Efficiency Implications of Corruption," Journal of International Development, 8 (1996), 683-96; Pranab Bardhan, "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1997), 1320-46; Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishney, "Corruption," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (1993), 599-617; Mushtaq Khan, "The Input-Output Function for Rent-Seeking: A Comparative Analysis of Differential Effects" (unpublished manuscript, University of London, 1997).
15. See Kathleen Collins, "The Political Role of Clans," Comparative Politics, 35 (January 2003); Janet Landa, Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity: Beyond the New Institutional Economics of Ethnic Trading Networks, Contract Law, and Gift-Exchange (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994) ; Richard Doner and Ben Ross Schneider, "Business Associations and Economic Development: Why Some Associations Contribute More Than Others," Business and Politics, 2 (November 2000), 261-88; Paul Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Mushtaq Khan, "The Efficiency Implications of Corruption," Journal of International Development, 8 (1996), 683-96; Pranab Bardhan, "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1997), 1320-46; Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishney, "Corruption," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (1993), 599-617; Mushtaq Khan, "The Input-Output Function for Rent-Seeking: A Comparative Analysis of Differential Effects" (unpublished manuscript, University of London, 1997).
16. See Kathleen Collins, "The Political Role of Clans," Comparative Politics, 35 (January 2003); Janet Landa, Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity: Beyond the New Institutional Economics of Ethnic Trading Networks, Contract Law, and Gift-Exchange (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994) ; Richard Doner and Ben Ross Schneider, "Business Associations and Economic Development: Why Some Associations Contribute More Than Others," Business and Politics, 2 (November 2000), 261-88; Paul Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Mushtaq Khan, "The Efficiency Implications of Corruption," Journal of International Development, 8 (1996), 683-96; Pranab Bardhan, "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1997), 1320-46; Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishney, "Corruption," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (1993), 599-617; Mushtaq Khan, "The Input-Output Function for Rent-Seeking: A Comparative Analysis of Differential Effects" (unpublished manuscript, University of London, 1997).
17. See Kathleen Collins, "The Political Role of Clans," Comparative Politics, 35 (January 2003); Janet Landa, Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity: Beyond the New Institutional Economics of Ethnic Trading Networks, Contract Law, and Gift-Exchange (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994) ; Richard Doner and Ben Ross Schneider, "Business Associations and Economic Development: Why Some Associations Contribute More Than Others," Business and Politics, 2 (November 2000), 261-88; Paul Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Mushtaq Khan, "The Efficiency Implications of Corruption," Journal of International Development, 8 (1996), 683-96; Pranab Bardhan, "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1997), 1320-46; Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishney, "Corruption," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (1993), 599-617; Mushtaq Khan, "The Input-Output Function for Rent-Seeking: A Comparative Analysis of Differential Effects" (unpublished manuscript, University of London, 1997).
18. See Kathleen Collins, "The Political Role of Clans," Comparative Politics, 35 (January 2003); Janet Landa, Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity: Beyond the New Institutional Economics of Ethnic Trading Networks, Contract Law, and Gift-Exchange (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994) ; Richard Doner and Ben Ross Schneider, "Business Associations and Economic Development: Why Some Associations Contribute More Than Others," Business and Politics, 2 (November 2000), 261-88; Paul Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Mushtaq Khan, "The Efficiency Implications of Corruption," Journal of International Development, 8 (1996), 683-96; Pranab Bardhan, "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1997), 1320-46; Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishney, "Corruption," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (1993), 599-617; Mushtaq Khan, "The Input-Output Function for Rent-Seeking: A Comparative Analysis of Differential Effects" (unpublished manuscript, University of London, 1997).
19. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1985); Barry Weingast, "Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149 (March 1993), 286-311.
20. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1985); Barry Weingast, "Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149 (March 1993), 286-311.
21. See Paul Krugman, "What Happened to Asia?" (manuscript, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998).
22. See Douglass North, "Government and the Cost of Exchange in History," Journal of Economic History, 44 (1984), 255-64.
23. Doner and Schneider, p. 261.
24. Park Kyung-suk, "Taet'ongnyung kukhoe wiwun sungo chagum" [Campaign Funds for Presidential and Assembly Elections], Sindonga (May 1967), esp. 204-7; Kuo; Chalmers Johnson, "Tanaka Kakuei, Structural Corruption, and the Advent of Machine Politics in Japan," Journal of Japanese Studies, 12 (Winter 1986).
25. Park Kyung-suk, "Taet'ongnyung kukhoe wiwun sungo chagum" [Campaign Funds for Presidential and Assembly Elections], Sindonga (May 1967), esp. 204-7; Kuo; Chalmers Johnson, "Tanaka Kakuei, Structural Corruption, and the Advent of Machine Politics in Japan," Journal of Japanese Studies, 12 (Winter 1986).
26. Mushtaq Khan, "Rents, Efficiency, and Growth," in Khan and Jomo, eds., p. 39.
27. Michael Ross, "Indonesia's Puzzling Crisis," paper prepared for the conference Asian Political Economy in an Age of Globalization, Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College, May 10-11, 2002.
28. Andrew MacIntyre, ed., Business and Government in Industrializing East and Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Gary Gereffi and Donald Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
29. Andrew MacIntyre, ed., Business and Government in Industrializing East and Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Gary Gereffi and Donald Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
30. Williamson; Douglass North, "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2 (1990), 355-67; and David Kang, "South Korean and Taiwanese Develoment and the New Institutional Economics," International Organization, 49 (Summer 1995), 555-87.
31. Williamson; Douglass North, "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2 (1990), 355-67; and David Kang, "South Korean and Taiwanese Develoment and the New Institutional Economics," International Organization, 49 (Summer 1995), 555-87.
32. A. Breton, "Toward a Presumption of Efficiency in Politics," Public Choice, 11 (September 1993), 53-65.
33. Pranab Bardhan, "The New Institutional Economics and Development Theory: A Brief Critical Assessment," World Development, 17 (1989), 1389.
34. North, Structure and Change in Economic History.
35. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, "Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity," in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ha-joon Chang, The Political Economy of Industrial Policy (London: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
36. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, "Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity," in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ha-joon Chang, The Political Economy of Industrial Policy (London: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
37. Mushtaq Khan, "Rent-Seeking as Process," in Khan and Jomo, eds., pp. 114-17.
38. Theoretically, only the lowest cost firm could afford the highest bribe. Bardhan, p. 1322.
39. This argument is similar to the idea of bilateral monopoly in economics. See David Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 551-73; William Baumol, "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, 72 (March 1982), 1-15.
40. This argument is similar to the idea of bilateral monopoly in economics. See David Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 551-73; William Baumol, "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, 72 (March 1982), 1-15.
41. Robert Axlerod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
42. Gordon Tullock, "Rents and Rent-Seeking," in C. Rowley, R. Tollison, and G. Tullock, eds., The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking (Boston: Kluwer, 1988), p. 228.
43. Khan, "Rent-Seeking as Process," pp. 91-114.
44. Chang, p. 120.
45. There is, however, variation across sectors (for example, textiles versus steel). In relatively atomistic sectors that approximate pure market competition, rents will be lower, and the need for coordination among actors will also lower.
46. See Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
47. The argument presented here is similar to one advanced in Andrew MacIntyre, "Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia," International Organization, 55 (Winter 2001), 81-122.
48. Ronald Wintrobe, "The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship," American Political Science Review, 84 (September 1990), 849-72.
49. See Williamson, pp. 80-84, 211.
50. Tun-jen Cheng, Stephan Haggard, and David Kang, "Institutions and Economic Growth in South Korea and Taiwan: The Bureaucracy," Journal of Development Studies, 34 (August 1998), 87-111; and Doronila, p. 5.
51. Tun-jen Cheng, Stephan Haggard, and David Kang, "Institutions and Economic Growth in South Korea and Taiwan: The Bureaucracy," Journal of Development Studies, 34 (August 1998), 87-111; and Doronila, p. 5.
52. Park, "Taet'ongnyung' kukhoe wiwun sungo chagum," esp. pp. 204-7; Lee Young-suk, "Sungu chagum kwa chaebul" [Election Funds and Chaebols], Wolgan Chosun (November 1987), 222-39.
53. Park, "Taet'ongnyung' kukhoe wiwun sungo chagum," esp. pp. 204-7; Lee Young-suk, "Sungu chagum kwa chaebul" [Election Funds and Chaebols], Wolgan Chosun (November 1987), 222-39.
54. Seok-jin Lew, "Bringing Capital Back In: A Case Study of South South Korean Automobile Industrialization" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1992).
55. On bribes, see Yoon Young-ho, "Chung Tae-su wa kumun ton" [Chung Tae-soo and Black Money], Shindonga (March 1997), 201.
56. See Cheng, Haggard, and Kang.
57. Federation of South Korean Industry, Chunkyungnyun Samsipnyunsa [A Thirty Year History of the FKI] (Seoul: FKI, 1992).
58. Kang, Crony Capitalism.
59. Interview, October 22, 1996.
60. For an eyewitness account of lobbying with Park's regime, see Lee Byung-chull, Ho-am chachon [Ho-Am's Autobiography] (Seoul: Jungang Ilbo, 1986), p. 134.
61. Lee Young-hwan, "Hankuk eui kyongje tanch'e wa chungch'aek kyulchung kujo" [Corporatist Development and the Structure of Policymaking in South Korea], in Lee Young-hwan, ed., Hankuk kiupul segyehwa chullyak [Strategies to Globalize South Korean Industry] (Seoul: Chulpansa, 1995), p. 304.
62. Lee Sung-hyong, "Kukka kyekup mit chabon ch'ukchuk: 8, 3 chochi'reul chungsimeuro" [State, Class, and Capital Accumulation: The President's Decree of 8-3-72], in Jang-jip Choi, ed., Hankuk Chabon jueui wa kukka [South Korean Capitalism and the State] (Seoul: Hanwul, 1985), pp. 273-74.
63. Karl Fields, "Strong States and Business Organization in South Korea and Taiwan," in Maxfield and Schneider, eds., p. 136.
64. Pak Pyongyun, Chaebol kwa ckunch'i [Chaebol and Politics] (Seoul: Hanguk Yongusa, 1982).
65. Kyong-dong Kim, "Political Factors in the Formation of the Entrepreneurial Elite in South Korea," Asian Survey, 16 (May 1976), 470.
66. Pak, p. 210.
67. Kang, Crony Capitalism, pp. 158-70.
68. William Rempel, Delusions of a Dictator: The Mind of Marcos as Revealed in His Secret Diaries (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993).
69. Emmanuel De Dios, "A Political Economy of Philippine Policy-Making," in John W. Langord and K. Lome Brownsey, eds., Economic Policy-Making in the Asia-Pacific Region (Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1990), p. 111.
70. See Carl Lande, Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Series No. 6, 1964); Kit Machado, "Changing Aspects of Factionalism in Philippine Local Politics," Asian Survey, 11 (December 1971), 1182-99; Amando Doronila, "The Transformation of Patron-Client Relations and Its Political Consequences in Postwar Philippines," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 16 (March 1985), 99-116.
71. See Carl Lande, Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Series No. 6, 1964); Kit Machado, "Changing Aspects of Factionalism in Philippine Local Politics," Asian Survey, 11 (December 1971), 1182-99; Amando Doronila, "The Transformation of Patron-Client Relations and Its Political Consequences in Postwar Philippines," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 16 (March 1985), 99-116.
72. See Carl Lande, Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Series No. 6, 1964); Kit Machado, "Changing Aspects of Factionalism in Philippine Local Politics," Asian Survey, 11 (December 1971), 1182-99; Amando Doronila, "The Transformation of Patron-Client Relations and Its Political Consequences in Postwar Philippines," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 16 (March 1985), 99-116.
73. Gregorio A. Francisco, Jr. and Raul P. de Guzman, "The 50-50 Agreement," in Raul P. de Guzman, ed., Patterns in Decision Making: Case Studies in Philippine Public Administration (Manila: Graduate School of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1963), pp. 93-102.
74. Mark R. Thompson, The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1996).
75. David Wurfel, Filipino Politics, Development and Decay (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 80.
76. See Gabriella Montinola, "Politicians, Parties, and the Persistence of Weak States: Lessons from the Philippines," paper delivered at the American Political Science Association Annual Meetings, Washington, D.C., August 27-31, 1997.
77. Harvey Averich, John E. Koehler, and Frank H. Denton, The Matrix of Policy in the Philippines (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 101.
78. Edita Tan, "Interlocking Directorates, Commercial Banks, and Other Financial Institutions and Nonfinancial Corporations," (Discussion paper 9110, School of Economics, University of the Philippines, September 1991), p. 12.
79. John Doherty, "Who Controls the Philippine Economy: Some Need Not Try as Hard as Others," in Belinda A. Aquino, ed., Cronies and Enemies: The Current Philippine Scene (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, Philippine Studies Program, Philippine Studies Series No. 5, 1982), pp. 12-33, cited in Alfred McCoy, "Rent-Seeking Families and the State," in Alfred McCoy and Michael Cullinane, eds., An Anarchy of Families: Political Elites and the Philippine State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), p. 437.
80. John Doherty, "Who Controls the Philippine Economy: Some Need Not Try as Hard as Others," in Belinda A. Aquino, ed., Cronies and Enemies: The Current Philippine Scene (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, Philippine Studies Program, Philippine Studies Series No. 5, 1982), pp. 12-33, cited in Alfred McCoy, "Rent-Seeking Families and the State," in Alfred McCoy and Michael Cullinane, eds., An Anarchy of Families: Political Elites and the Philippine State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), p. 437.
81. McCoy and Cullinane, eds.
82. Paul Hutchcroft, "Predatory Oligarchy, Patrimonial State: The Politics of Private Domestic Commerical Banking in the Philippines" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1993), p. 321.
83. PAL, San Miguel, ABS-CBN, and Meralco are all examples of family-owned companies that have changed hands through government intervention.
84. Paul Hutchcroft, "Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State: The Politics of Patrimonial Plunder," World Politics, 43 (April 1991), p. 423.
85. Ibid., p. 426.
86. Anonymous interview, September 10, 1999.
87. Gary Hawes, The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics of Export (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 82.
88. Robin Broad, Unequal Alliance: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 45; and William H. Overholt, "The Rise and Fall of Ferdinand Marcos," Asian Survey, 26 (November, 1986), p. 1143.
89. Robin Broad, Unequal Alliance: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 45; and William H. Overholt, "The Rise and Fall of Ferdinand Marcos," Asian Survey, 26 (November, 1986), p. 1143.
90. Benedict Andersen, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Claire Holt, ed., Culture and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).
91. Benedict Andersen, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Claire Holt, ed., Culture and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).
92. MacIntyre, "Institutions and Investors," p. 115.
93. Ross, p. 24.
94. John T. Sidel, "Macet Total: Logics of Circulation and Accumulation in the Demise of Indonesia's New Order," Indonesia, 6 (October 1998), 160. See also Jeffrey Winters, Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesia State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
95. John T. Sidel, "Macet Total: Logics of Circulation and Accumulation in the Demise of Indonesia's New Order," Indonesia, 6 (October 1998), 160. See also Jeffrey Winters, Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesia State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
96. Dwight King, "Corruption in Indonesia: A Curable Cancer?," Journal of International Affairs, 53 (2000), 604, 612.
97. Winters; Andrew MacIntyre, "Investment, Property Rights, and Corruption in Indonesia," in J. E. Campos, ed., Corruption: The Boom and Bust of East Asia (Manila: Ateneo University Press, forthcoming).
98. Jonathan Pincus and Rizal Ramli, "Indonesia: From Showcase to Basketcase," Cambridge Journal of Economics, 22 (November 1998), 729.
99. Adam Schwartz, A Nation in Waiting (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), p. 151.
100. Sidel. p. 163, notes that "this pattern of fluid sirkulasi...witnessed a steady erosion of the personal loyalty owed by the military to the President himself."
101. Alex Irwan, "Business Patronage, Class Struggle, and the Manufacturing Sector in South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand," Journal of Contemporary Asia, 19 (1989), 398-434. See also Andrew MacIntyre, "Power, Prosperity, and Patrimonialism: Business and Government in Indonesia," in Andrew MacIntyre, ed., Business and Government in Industrialising Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 245.
102. Alex Irwan, "Business Patronage, Class Struggle, and the Manufacturing Sector in South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand," Journal of Contemporary Asia, 19 (1989), 398-434. See also Andrew MacIntyre, "Power, Prosperity, and Patrimonialism: Business and Government in Indonesia," in Andrew MacIntyre, ed., Business and Government in Industrialising Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 245.
103. Richard Robison and Andrew Rosser, "Contesting Reform: Indonesia's New Order and the IMF," World Development, 26 (August 1998), 1593-1609.
104. Richard Robison, "Authoritarian States, Capital-Owning Classes, and the Politics of Newly Industrializing Countries: The Case of Indonesia," World Politics, 41 (October 1988), 62.
105. Ross, p. 19.
106. Sofyan Wanandi, "The Post-Soehart Business Environment," in Geoff Forrester, ed., Post-Soehart Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1999), pp. 128-34; Kunio Yoshihara, The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in Southeast Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
107. Sofyan Wanandi, "The Post-Soehart Business Environment," in Geoff Forrester, ed., Post-Soehart Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1999), pp. 128-34; Kunio Yoshihara, The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in Southeast Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
108. Sidel, p. 166. See also Jamie Mackie, "Towkays and Tycoons: The Chinese in Indonesian Economic Life in the 1920s and 1980s," Indonesia (1991), 83-96.
109. Sidel, p. 166. See also Jamie Mackie, "Towkays and Tycoons: The Chinese in Indonesian Economic Life in the 1920s and 1980s," Indonesia (1991), 83-96.
110. Bob Hasan, in 1998, David Cole and Betty Slade, Building a Modern Financial System: The Indonesian Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 326.
111. Ross, p. 14.; and Ross McLeod, "Soeharto Indonesia: A Better Class of Corruption," The Indonesian Quarterly, 228 (2000), 16-27.
112. Ross, p. 14.; and Ross McLeod, "Soeharto Indonesia: A Better Class of Corruption," The Indonesian Quarterly, 228 (2000), 16-27.
113. J. Soedradjad Djiwandono, "Bank Indonesia and the Recent Crisis," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 36 (April 2000), 47-72.
114. See Linda Lim and Aaron Stem, "State Power and Private Profit: A Review Essay on the Political Economy of Corruption in Southeast Asia," Asia Pacific Economic Literature (November 2002).
115. Ibid., p. 10.
116. Jonathan Temple, "The New Growth Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, 37 (March 1999), 129, notes that "so many variables could be used to explain growth that it is difficult to find variables that are not only highly correlated with the endogenous variables but can also plausibly be excluded from the regression."