Ownership and trade from evolutionary games

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 183-197

  Yee, Kenton K ^a  

^a The Sanford C Bernstein Co Center for Leadership and Ethics   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolutionary games; Money; Property rights; Trade

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041382735     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(03)00026-7     Document Type: Article

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