Shirking and the choice of technology: A theory of production inefficiency with an empirical application

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 44, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 383-402

  Depken II, Craig A ^a   Redmount, Esther ^b   Snow, Arthur ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON   (United States)

^b Department of Psychology   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

D20; Kibbutz; L20; Labor hoarding; Shirking; Technical inefficiency

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041365489     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00146-3     Document Type: Article

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