"Science," "common sense," and DNA evidence: A legal controversy about the public understanding of science

Public Understanding of Science

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 83-103

  Lynch, Michael ^a   McNally, Ruth ^b  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041317221     PISSN: 09636625     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0963662503012001246     Document Type: Article

References (86)

1. st Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, Judgment by Mr. Justice Potts (Panel: Lord Bingham, Chief Justice, Potts, Butterfield). Royal Courts of Justice, London, 16 October 1997; and Ronald Thwaites Q.C. and Marc Brittain, "Perfected Grounds of Appeal & Skeletal Argument," Denis John Adams v. Regina, in The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division. 25 September 1997. Ruth McNally attended the second appeal, and McNally and Lynch interviewed Peter Donnelly (24 November 1997), an expert witness for the defense, and Ian Evett (18 December 1998), an expert for the prosecution.
2. st Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, Judgment by Mr. Justice Potts (Panel: Lord Bingham, Chief Justice, Potts, Butterfield). Royal Courts of Justice, London, 16 October 1997; and Ronald Thwaites Q.C. and Marc Brittain, "Perfected Grounds of Appeal & Skeletal Argument," Denis John Adams v. Regina, in The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division. 25 September 1997. Ruth McNally attended the second appeal, and McNally and Lynch interviewed Peter Donnelly (24 November 1997), an expert witness for the defense, and Ian Evett (18 December 1998), an expert for the prosecution.
3. The judicial summary stated that the attack came from behind, and the victim only saw her assailant briefly. Donnelly (interview 24 November 1997, p. 12), provided a different version of witness's testimony, and stated that the day after the rape the victim told the police that she had a good view of her attacker and was confident that she would be able to recognize him again. In fact, according to Donnelly, she did claim to see him walking down the street a couple of years later, but the police were unable to locate the man at the time.
4. See note 1 for references to judicial summaries. The larger project is a continuing study of the history of legal, scientific, and public controversies about forensic DNA profiling. It examines other trials, appeal cases, and admissibility hearings in the United States and United Kingdom, which raised issues that are less prominent in the Adams case. The issues include practical and legal contingencies for the handling and formulation of DNA evidence, the continuity of evidence (or chain of custody), and the development of DNA databases in the U.S. and U.K. The most recent phase of the project examines the implications of closure in the controversy about DNA evidence and its implications for other forms of evidence (particularly fingerprint examination). Participants in the study include Kathleen Jordan, Ruth McNally, Simon Cole, and Michael Lynch. For a series of articles based on the study, see Michael Lynch and Sheila Jasanoff (eds.), "Science, law, and forensic practice," Social Studies of Science 28, nos. 5/6 (1998). Also see, Simon Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Linda Derksen, "Towards a sociology of measurement: making subjectivity invisible and negotiating measurement in the case of DNA fingerprinting," Social Studies of Science 30, no. 6 (2000): 803-845; Jennifer Mnookin, "Fingerprint evidence in an age of DNA profiling," Brooklyn Law Review 67, no. 1 (2001): 13-70; Michael Lynch and Ruth McNally, "Science, common sense, and common law: courtroom inquiries, and the public understanding of science," Social Epistemology 13, no. 3 (1999): 183-196; and Kathleen Jordan, Sociological Investigations into the Mainstreaming of the Polymerase Chain Reaction (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, Boston University, 1997).
5. See note 1 for references to judicial summaries. The larger project is a continuing study of the history of legal, scientific, and public controversies about forensic DNA profiling. It examines other trials, appeal cases, and admissibility hearings in the United States and United Kingdom, which raised issues that are less prominent in the Adams case. The issues include practical and legal contingencies for the handling and formulation of DNA evidence, the continuity of evidence (or chain of custody), and the development of DNA databases in the U.S. and U.K. The most recent phase of the project examines the implications of closure in the controversy about DNA evidence and its implications for other forms of evidence (particularly fingerprint examination). Participants in the study include Kathleen Jordan, Ruth McNally, Simon Cole, and Michael Lynch. For a series of articles based on the study, see Michael Lynch and Sheila Jasanoff (eds.), "Science, law, and forensic practice," Social Studies of Science 28, nos. 5/6 (1998). Also see, Simon Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Linda Derksen, "Towards a sociology of measurement: making subjectivity invisible and negotiating measurement in the case of DNA fingerprinting," Social Studies of Science 30, no. 6 (2000): 803-845; Jennifer Mnookin, "Fingerprint evidence in an age of DNA profiling," Brooklyn Law Review 67, no. 1 (2001): 13-70; Michael Lynch and Ruth McNally, "Science, common sense, and common law: courtroom inquiries, and the public understanding of science," Social Epistemology 13, no. 3 (1999): 183-196; and Kathleen Jordan, Sociological Investigations into the Mainstreaming of the Polymerase Chain Reaction (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, Boston University, 1997).
6. See note 1 for references to judicial summaries. The larger project is a continuing study of the history of legal, scientific, and public controversies about forensic DNA profiling. It examines other trials, appeal cases, and admissibility hearings in the United States and United Kingdom, which raised issues that are less prominent in the Adams case. The issues include practical and legal contingencies for the handling and formulation of DNA evidence, the continuity of evidence (or chain of custody), and the development of DNA databases in the U.S. and U.K. The most recent phase of the project examines the implications of closure in the controversy about DNA evidence and its implications for other forms of evidence (particularly fingerprint examination). Participants in the study include Kathleen Jordan, Ruth McNally, Simon Cole, and Michael Lynch. For a series of articles based on the study, see Michael Lynch and Sheila Jasanoff (eds.), "Science, law, and forensic practice," Social Studies of Science 28, nos. 5/6 (1998). Also see, Simon Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Linda Derksen, "Towards a sociology of measurement: making subjectivity invisible and negotiating measurement in the case of DNA fingerprinting," Social Studies of Science 30, no. 6 (2000): 803-845; Jennifer Mnookin, "Fingerprint evidence in an age of DNA profiling," Brooklyn Law Review 67, no. 1 (2001): 13-70; Michael Lynch and Ruth McNally, "Science, common sense, and common law: courtroom inquiries, and the public understanding of science," Social Epistemology 13, no. 3 (1999): 183-196; and Kathleen Jordan, Sociological Investigations into the Mainstreaming of the Polymerase Chain Reaction (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, Boston University, 1997).
7. See note 1 for references to judicial summaries. The larger project is a continuing study of the history of legal, scientific, and public controversies about forensic DNA profiling. It examines other trials, appeal cases, and admissibility hearings in the United States and United Kingdom, which raised issues that are less prominent in the Adams case. The issues include practical and legal contingencies for the handling and formulation of DNA evidence, the continuity of evidence (or chain of custody), and the development of DNA databases in the U.S. and U.K. The most recent phase of the project examines the implications of closure in the controversy about DNA evidence and its implications for other forms of evidence (particularly fingerprint examination). Participants in the study include Kathleen Jordan, Ruth McNally, Simon Cole, and Michael Lynch. For a series of articles based on the study, see Michael Lynch and Sheila Jasanoff (eds.), "Science, law, and forensic practice," Social Studies of Science 28, nos. 5/6 (1998). Also see, Simon Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Linda Derksen, "Towards a sociology of measurement: making subjectivity invisible and negotiating measurement in the case of DNA fingerprinting," Social Studies of Science 30, no. 6 (2000): 803-845; Jennifer Mnookin, "Fingerprint evidence in an age of DNA profiling," Brooklyn Law Review 67, no. 1 (2001): 13-70; Michael Lynch and Ruth McNally, "Science, common sense, and common law: courtroom inquiries, and the public understanding of science," Social Epistemology 13, no. 3 (1999): 183-196; and Kathleen Jordan, Sociological Investigations into the Mainstreaming of the Polymerase Chain Reaction (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, Boston University, 1997).
8. See note 1 for references to judicial summaries. The larger project is a continuing study of the history of legal, scientific, and public controversies about forensic DNA profiling. It examines other trials, appeal cases, and admissibility hearings in the United States and United Kingdom, which raised issues that are less prominent in the Adams case. The issues include practical and legal contingencies for the handling and formulation of DNA evidence, the continuity of evidence (or chain of custody), and the development of DNA databases in the U.S. and U.K. The most recent phase of the project examines the implications of closure in the controversy about DNA evidence and its implications for other forms of evidence (particularly fingerprint examination). Participants in the study include Kathleen Jordan, Ruth McNally, Simon Cole, and Michael Lynch. For a series of articles based on the study, see Michael Lynch and Sheila Jasanoff (eds.), "Science, law, and forensic practice," Social Studies of Science 28, nos. 5/6 (1998). Also see, Simon Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Linda Derksen, "Towards a sociology of measurement: making subjectivity invisible and negotiating measurement in the case of DNA fingerprinting," Social Studies of Science 30, no. 6 (2000): 803-845; Jennifer Mnookin, "Fingerprint evidence in an age of DNA profiling," Brooklyn Law Review 67, no. 1 (2001): 13-70; Michael Lynch and Ruth McNally, "Science, common sense, and common law: courtroom inquiries, and the public understanding of science," Social Epistemology 13, no. 3 (1999): 183-196; and Kathleen Jordan, Sociological Investigations into the Mainstreaming of the Polymerase Chain Reaction (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, Boston University, 1997).
9. See note 1 for references to judicial summaries. The larger project is a continuing study of the history of legal, scientific, and public controversies about forensic DNA profiling. It examines other trials, appeal cases, and admissibility hearings in the United States and United Kingdom, which raised issues that are less prominent in the Adams case. The issues include practical and legal contingencies for the handling and formulation of DNA evidence, the continuity of evidence (or chain of custody), and the development of DNA databases in the U.S. and U.K. The most recent phase of the project examines the implications of closure in the controversy about DNA evidence and its implications for other forms of evidence (particularly fingerprint examination). Participants in the study include Kathleen Jordan, Ruth McNally, Simon Cole, and Michael Lynch. For a series of articles based on the study, see Michael Lynch and Sheila Jasanoff (eds.), "Science, law, and forensic practice," Social Studies of Science 28, nos. 5/6 (1998). Also see, Simon Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Linda Derksen, "Towards a sociology of measurement: making subjectivity invisible and negotiating measurement in the case of DNA fingerprinting," Social Studies of Science 30, no. 6 (2000): 803-845; Jennifer Mnookin, "Fingerprint evidence in an age of DNA profiling," Brooklyn Law Review 67, no. 1 (2001): 13-70; Michael Lynch and Ruth McNally, "Science, common sense, and common law: courtroom inquiries, and the public understanding of science," Social Epistemology 13, no. 3 (1999): 183-196; and Kathleen Jordan, Sociological Investigations into the Mainstreaming of the Polymerase Chain Reaction (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, Boston University, 1997).
10. This focus on a particular case is inspired by Harold Garfinkel's idea of "perspicuous settings": specific occasions, cases, or practices that explicate fundamental concepts, themes, and distinctions that social theorists tend to address abstractly, often in endless debates with one another. The idea is to find a setting and embed a study in that setting, in order to explicate a relevant concept, theme, or distinction (in this case, the science/commonsense distinction). Our reliance on textual reconstruction, and our limited legal backgrounds, greatly limits the extent to which this study is "embedded," in the way that Garfinkel recommends, in the case and its legal circumstances. See Harold Garfinkel, Ethnomethoctology's Program: Working Out Durkheim's Aphorism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 181-184.
11. J. L. Austin devised the category of "performative utterance" to describe linguistic expressions that, when uttered in the appropriate circumstances institute or accomplish real-worldly events. J L. Austin, How to do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962). So, for example, under the appropriate ceremonial conditions, an official can christen a ship or pronounce a couple to be married. Such declarations do not describe preexistent conditions: instead, they perform, or contribute to the performance of, the state of affairs in question.
12. The term "boundary work" was coined by Thomas Gieryn as a way to respecify the science/non-science distinction as a social phenomenon. See Thomas Gieryn, "Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-science," American Sociological Review 48 ( 1983): 781-795; Thomas Gieryn, "Boundaries of science," in Handbook of Science, Technology & Society, ed. Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald Markle, James Petersen et al., (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 1994), 393-443; Thomas Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999). Unlike the philosophers who have attempted to formulate principled demarcation criteria. Gieryn recommends a social-historical orientation to efforts by scientific associations and courts to accord or deny scientific status to candidate fields such as phrenology, creation science, and various social sciences.
13. The term "boundary work" was coined by Thomas Gieryn as a way to respecify the science/non-science distinction as a social phenomenon. See Thomas Gieryn, "Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-science," American Sociological Review 48 ( 1983): 781-795; Thomas Gieryn, "Boundaries of science," in Handbook of Science, Technology & Society, ed. Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald Markle, James Petersen et al., (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 1994), 393-443; Thomas Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999). Unlike the philosophers who have attempted to formulate principled demarcation criteria. Gieryn recommends a social-historical orientation to efforts by scientific associations and courts to accord or deny scientific status to candidate fields such as phrenology, creation science, and various social sciences.
14. The term "boundary work" was coined by Thomas Gieryn as a way to respecify the science/non-science distinction as a social phenomenon. See Thomas Gieryn, "Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-science," American Sociological Review 48 ( 1983): 781-795; Thomas Gieryn, "Boundaries of science," in Handbook of Science, Technology & Society, ed. Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald Markle, James Petersen et al., (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 1994), 393-443; Thomas Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1999). Unlike the philosophers who have attempted to formulate principled demarcation criteria. Gieryn recommends a social-historical orientation to efforts by scientific associations and courts to accord or deny scientific status to candidate fields such as phrenology, creation science, and various social sciences.
15. As an anonymous reviewer of an earlier draft of this paper noted, judges, attorneys, and expert witnesses are in a different situation from that of a jury. Unlike jurors, judges and attorneys often encounter repeated presentations of similar types of evidence and repeated performances by the same expert witnesses. Witnesses, attorneys, and judges thus have an opportunity to learn from prior cases and to adjust their actions accordingly. It is not necessarily the case, however, that judges have superior understanding of technical issues than jurors. See Gary Edmond and David Mercer, "Scientific literacy and the jury: reconsidering jury 'competence'," Public Understanding of Science 6 (1997): 329-357.
16. For discussions of the general problems associated with the role of expert evidence in legal and legislative decisions, see Roger Smith and Brian Wynne (eds.), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989); Sheila Jasunoff, Science al the Bar: Law, Science and Technology in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996): and Gary Edmond and David Mercer, "Litigation life: law-science knowledge construction in (Bendectin) mass toxic tort litigation," Social Studies of Science 30, no.2 (2000): 265-316. Jury competence is a subject of divergent views. Peter Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), emphasizes the incompetence of jurors and other lay participants in trials to tell the difference between genuine and "junk" science. Lindsey and his colleagues suggest that jury understanding can depend upon how evidence (particularly probabilistic evidence) is presented. Samuel Lindsey, Ralph Hertwig, and Gerd Gigerenzer, "Communicating statistical evidence," Jurimetrics (2002), in press. For a similar suggestion made in an experimental study of probabilistic formulations of DNA evidence, see F. Taroni and C. Aitken, "Probabilistic reasoning in the law: part I: assessment of probabilities and explanation of the value of DNA evidence," Science & Justice 38, no. 3 (1998): 165-177.
17. For discussions of the general problems associated with the role of expert evidence in legal and legislative decisions, see Roger Smith and Brian Wynne (eds.), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989); Sheila Jasunoff, Science al the Bar: Law, Science and Technology in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996): and Gary Edmond and David Mercer, "Litigation life: law-science knowledge construction in (Bendectin) mass toxic tort litigation," Social Studies of Science 30, no.2 (2000): 265-316. Jury competence is a subject of divergent views. Peter Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), emphasizes the incompetence of jurors and other lay participants in trials to tell the difference between genuine and "junk" science. Lindsey and his colleagues suggest that jury understanding can depend upon how evidence (particularly probabilistic evidence) is presented. Samuel Lindsey, Ralph Hertwig, and Gerd Gigerenzer, "Communicating statistical evidence," Jurimetrics (2002), in press. For a similar suggestion made in an experimental study of probabilistic formulations of DNA evidence, see F. Taroni and C. Aitken, "Probabilistic reasoning in the law: part I: assessment of probabilities and explanation of the value of DNA evidence," Science & Justice 38, no. 3 (1998): 165-177.
18. For discussions of the general problems associated with the role of expert evidence in legal and legislative decisions, see Roger Smith and Brian Wynne (eds.), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989); Sheila Jasunoff, Science al the Bar: Law, Science and Technology in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996): and Gary Edmond and David Mercer, "Litigation life: law-science knowledge construction in (Bendectin) mass toxic tort litigation," Social Studies of Science 30, no.2 (2000): 265-316. Jury competence is a subject of divergent views. Peter Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), emphasizes the incompetence of jurors and other lay participants in trials to tell the difference between genuine and "junk" science. Lindsey and his colleagues suggest that jury understanding can depend upon how evidence (particularly probabilistic evidence) is presented. Samuel Lindsey, Ralph Hertwig, and Gerd Gigerenzer, "Communicating statistical evidence," Jurimetrics (2002), in press. For a similar suggestion made in an experimental study of probabilistic formulations of DNA evidence, see F. Taroni and C. Aitken, "Probabilistic reasoning in the law: part I: assessment of probabilities and explanation of the value of DNA evidence," Science & Justice 38, no. 3 (1998): 165-177.
19. For discussions of the general problems associated with the role of expert evidence in legal and legislative decisions, see Roger Smith and Brian Wynne (eds.), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989); Sheila Jasunoff, Science al the Bar: Law, Science and Technology in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996): and Gary Edmond and David Mercer, "Litigation life: law-science knowledge construction in (Bendectin) mass toxic tort litigation," Social Studies of Science 30, no.2 (2000): 265-316. Jury competence is a subject of divergent views. Peter Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), emphasizes the incompetence of jurors and other lay participants in trials to tell the difference between genuine and "junk" science. Lindsey and his colleagues suggest that jury understanding can depend upon how evidence (particularly probabilistic evidence) is presented. Samuel Lindsey, Ralph Hertwig, and Gerd Gigerenzer, "Communicating statistical evidence," Jurimetrics (2002), in press. For a similar suggestion made in an experimental study of probabilistic formulations of DNA evidence, see F. Taroni and C. Aitken, "Probabilistic reasoning in the law: part I: assessment of probabilities and explanation of the value of DNA evidence," Science & Justice 38, no. 3 (1998): 165-177.
20. For discussions of the general problems associated with the role of expert evidence in legal and legislative decisions, see Roger Smith and Brian Wynne (eds.), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989); Sheila Jasunoff, Science al the Bar: Law, Science and Technology in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996): and Gary Edmond and David Mercer, "Litigation life: law-science knowledge construction in (Bendectin) mass toxic tort litigation," Social Studies of Science 30, no.2 (2000): 265-316. Jury competence is a subject of divergent views. Peter Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), emphasizes the incompetence of jurors and other lay participants in trials to tell the difference between genuine and "junk" science. Lindsey and his colleagues suggest that jury understanding can depend upon how evidence (particularly probabilistic evidence) is presented. Samuel Lindsey, Ralph Hertwig, and Gerd Gigerenzer, "Communicating statistical evidence," Jurimetrics (2002), in press. For a similar suggestion made in an experimental study of probabilistic formulations of DNA evidence, see F. Taroni and C. Aitken, "Probabilistic reasoning in the law: part I: assessment of probabilities and explanation of the value of DNA evidence," Science & Justice 38, no. 3 (1998): 165-177.
21. For discussions of the general problems associated with the role of expert evidence in legal and legislative decisions, see Roger Smith and Brian Wynne (eds.), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989); Sheila Jasunoff, Science al the Bar: Law, Science and Technology in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996): and Gary Edmond and David Mercer, "Litigation life: law-science knowledge construction in (Bendectin) mass toxic tort litigation," Social Studies of Science 30, no.2 (2000): 265-316. Jury competence is a subject of divergent views. Peter Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), emphasizes the incompetence of jurors and other lay participants in trials to tell the difference between genuine and "junk" science. Lindsey and his colleagues suggest that jury understanding can depend upon how evidence (particularly probabilistic evidence) is presented. Samuel Lindsey, Ralph Hertwig, and Gerd Gigerenzer, "Communicating statistical evidence," Jurimetrics (2002), in press. For a similar suggestion made in an experimental study of probabilistic formulations of DNA evidence, see F. Taroni and C. Aitken, "Probabilistic reasoning in the law: part I: assessment of probabilities and explanation of the value of DNA evidence," Science & Justice 38, no. 3 (1998): 165-177.
22. The New York Times (2 March 2001, A-1, 17) reported that in the past 40 years, jury trials ending with verdicts in the United States had dropped from 5.4 to 1.5 percent of civil cases and from 10 to less than 5 percent of criminal trials.
23. rd ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1940), 29.
24. For a more elaborate description of DNA profiling techniques oriented to lay readers, see National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996). In the mid-1990s, the STR system began to replace the SLP technique, and the latter is rarely used anymore. However, because SLP was the key profiling technique used in Adams, it remains the focus of our discussion.
25. This capsule summary leaves out a great deal of technical detail. It also leaves out many of the contingent practices involved in collecting, transporting, and handling evidence. For more elaborate discussion of procedural descriptions of DNA profiling and their relations to practical contingencies, see Kathleen Jordan and Michael Lynch, "The dissemination, standardization, and routinization of a molecular biological technique," Social Studies of Science 28, nos.5/6 (1998): 773-800; and Saul Halfon, "Collecting, testing and convincing: DNA experts in the courts," Social Studies of Science 28, nos. 5/6 (1998): 801-828.
26. This capsule summary leaves out a great deal of technical detail. It also leaves out many of the contingent practices involved in collecting, transporting, and handling evidence. For more elaborate discussion of procedural descriptions of DNA profiling and their relations to practical contingencies, see Kathleen Jordan and Michael Lynch, "The dissemination, standardization, and routinization of a molecular biological technique," Social Studies of Science 28, nos.5/6 (1998): 773-800; and Saul Halfon, "Collecting, testing and convincing: DNA experts in the courts," Social Studies of Science 28, nos. 5/6 (1998): 801-828.
27. Recently, and partly as a result of the widespread recognition of DNA profiling as the new gold standard of criminal justice, the older gold standard - fingerprinting - has undergone more critical scrutiny than it had for decades. In U.S. Federal Court, and in an increasing number of state courts, starting with US v. Mitchell, No. 96-407 (E.D. Pa. 1999), fingerprint examination has been subject to admissibility hearings. Thus far, the courts have upheld the practice, but a decision by a prominent federal judge (Louis H. Pollak) in US v. Plaza, No. 98-362 (E.D. Pa. 2002) restricted the presentation of fingerprint "matches" in courts. This decision attracted a great deal of media attention, as well as strong protests from the forensic community. Judge Pollak was persuaded to reconsider the decision, and a few months later he retracted the part of the ruling that restricted fingerprint examiners from explicitly using the word "match" when presenting fingerprint evidence in court. Challenges to fingerprinting continued to be mounted, both in court and in the forensic literature. Ian Evett of the British Forensic Science Service (FSS) in a co-authored paper with Christophe Champod (also of the FSS) criticized the non-probabilistic way in which fingerprinting evidence is presented in court (Christophe Champod & Ian Evett, "A probabilistic approach to fingerprint evidence," Fingerprint World 27, no. 105 [July 2001]: 95-107). Evett also was involved in the Adams case, as an expert for the prosecution who consulted with Peter Donnelly (the expert for the defense) over the design of the questionnaire used in that case. The challenges to fingerprint examination do not contest the doctrine that each individual has unique fingerprints. Instead, they focus on the fallibility of fingerprint examination, insisting that the practice has unknown reliability and the method lacks a ''scientific" and/or probabilistic basis. See Simon Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001, 287ff), and Jennifer Mnookin, "Fingerprint evidence in an age of DNA profiling." The relationship between DNA profiling and fingerprinting is the subject of current research by Michael Lynch and Simon Cole.
28. Recently, and partly as a result of the widespread recognition of DNA profiling as the new gold standard of criminal justice, the older gold standard - fingerprinting - has undergone more critical scrutiny than it had for decades. In U.S. Federal Court, and in an increasing number of state courts, starting with US v. Mitchell, No. 96-407 (E.D. Pa. 1999), fingerprint examination has been subject to admissibility hearings. Thus far, the courts have upheld the practice, but a decision by a prominent federal judge (Louis H. Pollak) in US v. Plaza, No. 98-362 (E.D. Pa. 2002) restricted the presentation of fingerprint "matches" in courts. This decision attracted a great deal of media attention, as well as strong protests from the forensic community. Judge Pollak was persuaded to reconsider the decision, and a few months later he retracted the part of the ruling that restricted fingerprint examiners from explicitly using the word "match" when presenting fingerprint evidence in court. Challenges to fingerprinting continued to be mounted, both in court and in the forensic literature. Ian Evett of the British Forensic Science Service (FSS) in a co-authored paper with Christophe Champod (also of the FSS) criticized the non-probabilistic way in which fingerprinting evidence is presented in court (Christophe Champod & Ian Evett, "A probabilistic approach to fingerprint evidence," Fingerprint World 27, no. 105 [July 2001]: 95-107). Evett also was involved in the Adams case, as an expert for the prosecution who consulted with Peter Donnelly (the expert for the defense) over the design of the questionnaire used in that case. The challenges to fingerprint examination do not contest the doctrine that each individual has unique fingerprints. Instead, they focus on the fallibility of fingerprint examination, insisting that the practice has unknown reliability and the method lacks a ''scientific" and/or probabilistic basis. See Simon Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001, 287ff), and Jennifer Mnookin, "Fingerprint evidence in an age of DNA profiling." The relationship between DNA profiling and fingerprinting is the subject of current research by Michael Lynch and Simon Cole.
29. Recently, and partly as a result of the widespread recognition of DNA profiling as the new gold standard of criminal justice, the older gold standard - fingerprinting - has undergone more critical scrutiny than it had for decades. In U.S. Federal Court, and in an increasing number of state courts, starting with US v. Mitchell, No. 96-407 (E.D. Pa. 1999), fingerprint examination has been subject to admissibility hearings. Thus far, the courts have upheld the practice, but a decision by a prominent federal judge (Louis H. Pollak) in US v. Plaza, No. 98-362 (E.D. Pa. 2002) restricted the presentation of fingerprint "matches" in courts. This decision attracted a great deal of media attention, as well as strong protests from the forensic community. Judge Pollak was persuaded to reconsider the decision, and a few months later he retracted the part of the ruling that restricted fingerprint examiners from explicitly using the word "match" when presenting fingerprint evidence in court. Challenges to fingerprinting continued to be mounted, both in court and in the forensic literature. Ian Evett of the British Forensic Science Service (FSS) in a co-authored paper with Christophe Champod (also of the FSS) criticized the non-probabilistic way in which fingerprinting evidence is presented in court (Christophe Champod & Ian Evett, "A probabilistic approach to fingerprint evidence," Fingerprint World 27, no. 105 [July 2001]: 95-107). Evett also was involved in the Adams case, as an expert for the prosecution who consulted with Peter Donnelly (the expert for the defense) over the design of the questionnaire used in that case. The challenges to fingerprint examination do not contest the doctrine that each individual has unique fingerprints. Instead, they focus on the fallibility of fingerprint examination, insisting that the practice has unknown reliability and the method lacks a ''scientific" and/or probabilistic basis. See Simon Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001, 287ff), and Jennifer Mnookin, "Fingerprint evidence in an age of DNA profiling." The relationship between DNA profiling and fingerprinting is the subject of current research by Michael Lynch and Simon Cole.
30. In 1994, the Home Office announced an initiative to construct a national DNA profile database. This national database uses the STR system. The first profiles were entered in April 1995.
31. For a description of the database, see J. E. Allard, "Series sexual crimes identified by a DNA computerised database," Advances in Forensic Haemogenelics, 4 (1992): 295-297.
32. Melvin Pollner introduced the idea of "reality disjunctures" to describe incommensurable accounts of (arguably) the same experience (Melvin Pollner, "The very coinage of your brain: the anatomy of reality disjunctures," Philosophy of the Social Sciences 5 [1975]: 411-430). Examples include patient reports of experiences that psychiatrists attribute to hallucinations and contrary testimony about the speed of a particular automobile by defendant and arresting officer in traffic court. Paul Drew examines testimony at a rape case in which the victim and defendant give different versions of the circumstances leading to the alleged crime. See Paul Drew, "Contested evidence in courtroom cross-examination: the case of a trial of rape," in Talk at Work: Interaction in Institutional Settings, eds. John Heritage and Paul Drew (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 470-520.
33. Melvin Pollner introduced the idea of "reality disjunctures" to describe incommensurable accounts of (arguably) the same experience (Melvin Pollner, "The very coinage of your brain: the anatomy of reality disjunctures," Philosophy of the Social Sciences 5 [1975]: 411-430). Examples include patient reports of experiences that psychiatrists attribute to hallucinations and contrary testimony about the speed of a particular automobile by defendant and arresting officer in traffic court. Paul Drew examines testimony at a rape case in which the victim and defendant give different versions of the circumstances leading to the alleged crime. See Paul Drew, "Contested evidence in courtroom cross-examination: the case of a trial of rape," in Talk at Work: Interaction in Institutional Settings, eds. John Heritage and Paul Drew (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 470-520.
34. As a reviewer of an earlier draft noted, the defense also relied upon expert evidence (viz., the testimony of Peter Donnelly). The Appeal Court tended to draw a sharp distinction between expert and commonsense evidence, independently of Donnelly's role as an expert. Donnelly presented himself as an expert who assisted the defense with a critique of the prosecution's "expert" evidence and who offered to represent the "common sense" evidence with a Bayesian procedure.
35. Judgment, 1st appeal, p. 9 (page numbers are to a computer aided transcript by Smith Bernal, London).
36. We did not have direct access to the two trials, and so our reconstruction is limited by the partial and retrospective summaries, citations, and quoted portions of transcript provided by the Court of Appeal.
37. Quotations of witness statements by Dr. Harris, Ms. Lygo, and Mr. Lambert were taken from the document Thwaites and Brittain, (cit. no. 1), p. 2, sec. 3.1.
38. I b i d.
39. The reason that four probes would result in seven bands is that three of the probes identified heterozygous sites in the particular samples (two each for three probes) and one identified a homozygous site.
40. Thwaites and Brittain, (cit. no. 1), p. 3, sec. 3.5.
41. This is an instance in which the features attributed to "pathological science" are used as argumentative resources for discounting (in this case, reducing the weight of) particular evidence. The theme of pathological science was introduced by Irving Langmuir, Pathological Science. General Electric, R&D Center Report No. 68-C-035, (Schenectady, N.Y.). 1968. For a study of particularistic uses of arguments to support and discount evidence, see G. Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay, Opening Pandora's Box: An Analysis of Scientists' Discourse (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
42. This is an instance in which the features attributed to "pathological science" are used as argumentative resources for discounting (in this case, reducing the weight of) particular evidence. The theme of pathological science was introduced by Irving Langmuir, Pathological Science. General Electric, R&D Center Report No. 68-C-035, (Schenectady, N.Y.). 1968. For a study of particularistic uses of arguments to support and discount evidence, see G. Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay, Opening Pandora's Box: An Analysis of Scientists' Discourse (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
43. Judgment, first appeal, 1996 (cit. no. 1), p. 3.
44. Judgment, second appeal, 1997 (cit. no. 1). p. 3. The statement is confusing, because a match probability of 1 in 220 is much higher (and not lower, as the statement implies) than a probability of, for example 1 in 200 million. Perhaps the statement meant to say that including the brother would reduce the odds against the possibility of a profile from someone other than Denis John Adams matching the crime stain.
45. For an illuminating discussion of how burden of proof for including particular persons in the suspect pool is shifted from prosecution to defense in DNA profiling cases, see Michael Redmayne, "Doubts and burdens: DNA evidence, probability and the courts," Criminal Law Review (1995); 464-482.
46. Thwaites and Brittain, (cit. no. 1). p. 4.
47. Ibid., p. 5.
48. Donnelly, quoted in Judgment, 1st Appeal, 1996.
49. I b i d.
50. I b i d.
51. The 100 percent figure ignores the chance of a false negative (for example, a non-match between Adams's blood profile and the crime stain due to an error in the collection or analysis of the samples).
52. This calculation must assume that the series of estimates covers all of the relevant evidence. They must be exhaustive. Otherwise, it would be inappropriate to make a guilty or not-guilty judgment on the basis of the series of estimates. It is obvious that the four items of defense evidence can be divided further. One could, for example, treat the witness's misidentification of Adams in the police line-up as a separate item from the mismatch between Miss M's description of the perpetrator's age and Adams's age. According to Donnelly (interview, cit. no. 1, p. 21), as long as all of the evidence is represented in the series of estimates, the overall calculation should, in principle, not be affected by (he way it is parsed into separate items. Others, including a Mr. Lambert, who testified for the prosecution in the second trial, expressed misgivings on this point, arguing that the questionnaire that Donnelly prepared did not cover all of the relevant evidence, or all of the evidence that particular jurors might consider relevant (second appeal summary, cit. no. 1, p. 7).
53. Donnelly also criticized the forensic scientists for not adding a correction factor for sampling error. This had a relatively minor effect (1 percent) on the resulting estimate.
54. In a later case, R v. Watters (Court of Appeal [Criminal Division], October 19, 2000), the panel of judges on the Court held that DNA evidence without corroborating evidence was not sufficient to convict in that case. This judgment referred to the specific circumstances of the case: a burglary case in which an STR profile developed from a cigarette butt found at the crime scene matched the defendant's profile. The defendant had two brothers, and including them in the suspect pool greatly increased the probability that another person besides the defendant could have matched the crime scene evidence.
55. An anonymous reviewer of the draft of this article commented that we make too much of the "'ultimate issue," because, in practice, it is often ignored and easily circumvented. We have no reason to doubt such an assessment, and if it is so that the "ultimate issue" is less than ultimate, then the Appeal Court's insistence upon its relevance should be viewed as a contingent way of settling the case at hand, rather than as an invocation of an omnirelevant and binding judicial principle for any comparable case.
56. First appeal, (cit. no. 1), p. 15.
57. I b i d.
58. I b i d.
59. Summing up of His Honour Judge Pownall, quoted in Second appeal, 1997, p. 8.
60. A summary of Thwaitcs's arguments was presented in the Lord Chief Justice's summary, 2nd appeal, (cit. no. 1). pp. 5-8.
61. Second appeal, (cit. no. 2), p. 10.
62. R v Adams (1996) 2 Court of Appeal, R 467, cited in R v Doheny and Adams (1997) 1 Court of Appeal R 369. 374 G, which in turn is cited in Ibid., p. 11.〈AU: please add note number to #44 above〉
63. The theme of judicial bootstrapping deserves more attention than we give it within the frame of this paper. See Gary Edmond and David Mercer, "Litigation life: law-science knowledge construction in (Bendectin) mass toxic ton litigation."
64. Second appeal, (cit. no. 1), p. 12.
65. Interestingly, the court exemplified the "conventional" approach by describing how a juror might work through the various elements of the Adams case. This description included a sequence of probabilistic judgments, much as a Bayesian might describe them, except that the judgments would not be numerical.
66. Second Appeal, (cit. no. 1), p. 13.
67. See Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Gerd Gigerenzer, et al., Empire of Chance: How Probability Changed Science and Everyday Life (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
68. See Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Gerd Gigerenzer, et al., Empire of Chance: How Probability Changed Science and Everyday Life (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
69. See Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Gerd Gigerenzer, et al., Empire of Chance: How Probability Changed Science and Everyday Life (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
70. Ulrich Beck, Risk Society; Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage. 1992).
71. See Roger Smith and Brian Wynne (eds.), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989); and Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne (eds.), Misunderstanding Science? The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
72. See Roger Smith and Brian Wynne (eds.), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989); and Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne (eds.), Misunderstanding Science? The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
73. See Steven Shapin, "Cordelia's love: credibility and the social studies of science," Perspectives on Science 3 (1995): 255-275.
74. This distinction resonates with criticisms of artificial intelligence and expert systems. See Hubert Dreyfus, What Computers Can't Do (New York: Harper and Row, 1979); and H. M. Collins, Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990).
75. This distinction resonates with criticisms of artificial intelligence and expert systems. See Hubert Dreyfus, What Computers Can't Do (New York: Harper and Row, 1979); and H. M. Collins, Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990).
76. Readers familiar with the sociology of scientific knowledge may be reminded of the "equivalence postulate" advocated by Barry Barnes and David Bloor in their proposals for a Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Barry Barnes and David Bloor, "Relativism, rationalism and the sociology of knowledge," in Rationality and Relativism, ed. Martin Hollis and Stephen Lukes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982), 21-47. Their equivalence postulate states that "all beliefs are on a par with one another with respect to the causes of their credibility" (p. 23). Accordingly, sociologists of knowledge should give the same form of explanation to all instances of knowledge or belief, regardless of whether those beliefs presently enjoy the status of scientific truth. Bloor's better-known postulates of "symmetry" and "impartiality" are similar. David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976). It is possible to identify parallel themes between the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and the arguments in an adversary trial (see Michael Lynch, "The discursive production of uncertainty: the O. J. Simpson 'Dream Team' and the sociology of knowledge machine," Social Studies of Science 28, nos. 5/6 (1998): 829-868). However, it would be misleading to suppose that, in the Adams case, the participants in the trial are acting in accordance with the concepts and methodological strategies of SSK. It would be equally misleading to suppose that Thwaites and Donnelly lay out a position that is akin to a radically skeptical or "relativist" treatment of all knowledges as being "on a par with one another." Thwaites and Donnelly seek to trump one "scientific" card (forensic DNA evidence) with another "scientific" (or mathematical) card (Bayesian probability). Their questionnaire is designed to allow jurors to weigh "scientific" (legal) evidence and "common sense" (legal) evidence on the same scale, but this circumscribed strategy does not suggest or imply a general hypothesis about "the causes" of credibility. Instead, it is a calculative device for inscribing and weighing credibility judgments.
77. Readers familiar with the sociology of scientific knowledge may be reminded of the "equivalence postulate" advocated by Barry Barnes and David Bloor in their proposals for a Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Barry Barnes and David Bloor, "Relativism, rationalism and the sociology of knowledge," in Rationality and Relativism, ed. Martin Hollis and Stephen Lukes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982), 21-47. Their equivalence postulate states that "all beliefs are on a par with one another with respect to the causes of their credibility" (p. 23). Accordingly, sociologists of knowledge should give the same form of explanation to all instances of knowledge or belief, regardless of whether those beliefs presently enjoy the status of scientific truth. Bloor's better-known postulates of "symmetry" and "impartiality" are similar. David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976). It is possible to identify parallel themes between the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and the arguments in an adversary trial (see Michael Lynch, "The discursive production of uncertainty: the O. J. Simpson 'Dream Team' and the sociology of knowledge machine," Social Studies of Science 28, nos. 5/6 (1998): 829-868). However, it would be misleading to suppose that, in the Adams case, the participants in the trial are acting in accordance with the concepts and methodological strategies of SSK. It would be equally misleading to suppose that Thwaites and Donnelly lay out a position that is akin to a radically skeptical or "relativist" treatment of all knowledges as being "on a par with one another." Thwaites and Donnelly seek to trump one "scientific" card (forensic DNA evidence) with another "scientific" (or mathematical) card (Bayesian probability). Their questionnaire is designed to allow jurors to weigh "scientific" (legal) evidence and "common sense" (legal) evidence on the same scale, but this circumscribed strategy does not suggest or imply a general hypothesis about "the causes" of credibility. Instead, it is a calculative device for inscribing and weighing credibility judgments.
78. Readers familiar with the sociology of scientific knowledge may be reminded of the "equivalence postulate" advocated by Barry Barnes and David Bloor in their proposals for a Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Barry Barnes and David Bloor, "Relativism, rationalism and the sociology of knowledge," in Rationality and Relativism, ed. Martin Hollis and Stephen Lukes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982), 21-47. Their equivalence postulate states that "all beliefs are on a par with one another with respect to the causes of their credibility" (p. 23). Accordingly, sociologists of knowledge should give the same form of explanation to all instances of knowledge or belief, regardless of whether those beliefs presently enjoy the status of scientific truth. Bloor's better-known postulates of "symmetry" and "impartiality" are similar. David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976). It is possible to identify parallel themes between the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and the arguments in an adversary trial (see Michael Lynch, "The discursive production of uncertainty: the O. J. Simpson 'Dream Team' and the sociology of knowledge machine," Social Studies of Science 28, nos. 5/6 (1998): 829-868). However, it would be misleading to suppose that, in the Adams case, the participants in the trial are acting in accordance with the concepts and methodological strategies of SSK. It would be equally misleading to suppose that Thwaites and Donnelly lay out a position that is akin to a radically skeptical or "relativist" treatment of all knowledges as being "on a par with one another." Thwaites and Donnelly seek to trump one "scientific" card (forensic DNA evidence) with another "scientific" (or mathematical) card (Bayesian probability). Their questionnaire is designed to allow jurors to weigh "scientific" (legal) evidence and "common sense" (legal) evidence on the same scale, but this circumscribed strategy does not suggest or imply a general hypothesis about "the causes" of credibility. Instead, it is a calculative device for inscribing and weighing credibility judgments.
79. See Gieryn, "Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-science."
80. See Cole, Suspect Identities, for a discussion of appeal cases in the United States in the late 1920s and early '30s, in which the issue of jury usurpation pertained to the testimony of fingerprint examiners. In some cases, the appeal courts held that fingerprint examiners encroach upon the jury's province when they describe matching latent and rolled prints as matters of "fact" rather than expert "opinion." See State v. Steffen 230 N.W. 536 (Iowa, 1930).
81. For a sociological discussion of procedural and statistical problems associated with early versions of DNA profiling, see Derksen, "For a
82. For a sociological discussion of procedural and statistical problems associated with early versions of DNA profiling, see Derksen, "For a sociology of measurement." A key point in criticisms of court treatments of DNA profile evidence is that such evidence should be treated as "reports" by particular agents and agencies rather than simple scientific facts. Jonathan J. Kohler, "On conveying the probative value of DNA evidence: frequencies, likelihood ratios, and error rates,' University of Colorado Law Review 67 (1996): 859-886, at 868.
83. By the year 2000, probes were developed for as many as 13 DNA loci in the STR system. Estimates of more than one trillion to one were given against the odds against random matches between profiles from unrelated persons. With such impressive figures in hand, it has been argued that it will no longer be necessary even to consider the possibility that more than one person in the relevant suspect population could possibly match a given crime stain profile. Exceptions would be made for identical twins, and (with low likelihood) other very closely related persons. See Bruce Budowle, Ranajit Chakraborty, George Carmody, et al., "Source attribution of a forensic DNA profile," Forensic Science Communications 2. no. 3 (July, 2000) (available at: http://www.fbi.gov/programs/lab/fsc/backissu/july2000/source.htm).
84. Richard Lewontin, Harvard University, interviewed by Kathleen Jordan, 7 April 1998. The position he developed in the interview is consistent with one he has held all along. For a non-technical account of his argument, see his Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA (New York: Harper Collins, 1992). 78-83.
85. Ruth McNally, notes taken while attending second appeal. 17 October, 1997.
86. Jonathan Kohler ("On conveying the probative value of DNA evidence," p. 868) argues that "the possibility of laboratory error is substantially larger than the possibility of a coincidental match." For an argument against the policy of reporting match probabilities without taking laboratory errors (or evidence collection, mislabeling, etc.) into account, see William C. Thompson, "DNA evidence in the O. J. Simpson trial," University of Colorado Law Review 67 (1996): 827-857.