Security communities in the Baltic Sea region: Real and imagined

Security Dialogue

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 297-310

  Mouritzen, Hans ^a  

^a DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES   (Denmark)

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EID: 0041075764     PISSN: 09670106     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0967010601032003003     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. Arne Olav Brundtland, 'Nordisk balanse før og nå' [Nordic Balance Then and Now], Internasjonal Politikk, vol. 25, no. 5, 1966, pp. 491-541.
2. Poul Villaume, Allieret med forbehold: Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949-1961 [Allied with Reservation: Denmark, NATO and the Cold War. A Study of Danish Security Policy 1949-1961] (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995).
3. The term 'Nordism' and its derivative 'Nordistic' refer to the ideology behind Nordic cooperation. 'Norden' refers to Scandinavia plus Finland and Iceland.
4. Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', in Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett, eds, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 29-66.
5. Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', in Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett, eds, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 29-66.
6. Håkan Wiberg, 'The Nordic Security Community: Past, Present, Future', in Bertel Heurlin & Hans Mouritzen, eds, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2000 (Copenhagen: DUPI, 2000), pp. 121-137.
7. Scandinavianism was facilitated by the emergence of Prussia (later Germany) as a Great Power during the 19th century. Likewise, the subsequent addition of Finland to the club was facilitated by the Great Power status of the Soviet Union.
8. For example, Hans Mouritzen, 'The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument: Its Rise and Fall', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 32, no. 1, February 1995, pp. 9-21.
9. Evert Vedung, Unionsdebatten 1905: En jämförelse mellan argumenteringen i Sverige och Norge [The Union Debate 1905: A Comparison Between the Debates in Sweden and Norway] (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971).
10. Clive Archer, 'The Nordic Area as a "Zone of Peace"', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 33, no. 4, November 1996, pp. 451-467.
11. Wiberg (note 5 above).
12. Ibid.
13. Unless, of course, the regime in question breaks down in the process, as for instance did Nazi Germany in 1945. Then a counter-reaction is likely to take place that makes nationalism and national self-assertion politically incorrect. See, for example, Jack Snyder, 'Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State', Survival, vol. 35, no. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 5-26; Hans Mouritzen, External Danger and Democracy: Old Nordic Lessons and New European Challenges (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997).
14. Unless, of course, the regime in question breaks down in the process, as for instance did Nazi Germany in 1945. Then a counter-reaction is likely to take place that makes nationalism and national self-assertion politically incorrect. See, for example, Jack Snyder, 'Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State', Survival, vol. 35, no. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 5-26; Hans Mouritzen, External Danger and Democracy: Old Nordic Lessons and New European Challenges (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997).
15. The pattern described here has been exacerbated by 20th-century events. Finland fought two wars with the Soviet Union - in 1939-40 and in 1941-44 - and remained afterwards somewhat in the shadow of Soviet power. Norway and Denmark were occupied by Germany in 1940-45.
16. For my view of the interplay between domestic and external (geopolitical) factors in conditioning foreign policy, see Hans Mouritzen, Theory and Reality of International Politics (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), ch. 6.
17. For example, Jakob L. Balling & Poul G. Lindhardt, Den nordiske kirkes historie [A History of the Nordic Churches] (Copenhagen: Nyt nordisk forlag, 1967), ch. III; Tim Knudsen, Den danske stat i Europa [The Danish State in Europe] (Copenhagen: DJØF, 1993), ch. 7.
18. For example, Jakob L. Balling & Poul G. Lindhardt, Den nordiske kirkes historie [A History of the Nordic Churches] (Copenhagen: Nyt nordisk forlag, 1967), ch. III; Tim Knudsen, Den danske stat i Europa [The Danish State in Europe] (Copenhagen: DJØF, 1993), ch. 7.
19. Balling & Lindhardt (note 15 above).
20. Also influential in this regard was the temperance movement.
21. During the 20th century, Sweden developed the strongest workers' movement in the Western world.
22. Archer (note 9 above).
23. Without drawing the parallel too far, the role of West Germany as a generous actor was probably a necessary condition for European integration's gaining momentum in the postwar period. Germany, having lost the war and shifted regime, had to be the 'nice guy', paying the Community's bill at critical moments in the process.
24. There are nuances, of course, that space prevents me from delving into here; see Hans Mouritzen, 'High Politics in Northern Europe: Recent Developments and their Interpretation', in Lars Hedegaard & Bjarne Lindström, eds, The NEBI Yearbook 1999 (Berlin: Springer, 1999), pp. 259-275.
25. Denmark also worked for Baltic NATO memberships, although that was hardly realistic owing to Great Power resistance within NATO.
26. See, for example, Ole Wæver, 'Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community', in Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett, eds, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 69-118.
27. Adler & Barnett (note 4 above).
28. Wæver (note 23 above), p. 101.
29. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).
30. Think of the earthquakes in Greece and Turkey (1999, 2000), creating at least an embryo of goodwill and cooperation between the two countries. No party could justifiably suspect the other of having orchestrated the earthquakes, and the usual zero-sum assumption between the two countries (i.e. that the gain of one party means a corresponding loss for the other) was invalid for this delimited field.
31. Mouritzen (note 14 above), pp. 103-108; Lykke Friis, ed., An Ever Larger Union? EU Enlargement and European Integration (Copenhagen: DUPI, 1999).
32. Mouritzen (note 14 above), pp. 103-108; Lykke Friis, ed., An Ever Larger Union? EU Enlargement and European Integration (Copenhagen: DUPI, 1999).
33. See, for example, Graeme P. Herd, 'Russia's Baltic Policy After the Meltdown', Security Dialogue, vol. 30, no. 2, June 1999, pp. 197-212.
34. Clive Archer, 'Security Aspects of the EU's Northern Dimension', in Lars Hedegaard & Bjarne Lindström, eds, The NEBI Yearbook 2000 (Berlin: Springer, 2000), pp. 315-327; Agnieszka Mazur-Baranska, 'The Northern Dimension of the EU', Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, vol. 9, no. 2, Spring 2000, pp. 31-44.
35. Clive Archer, 'Security Aspects of the EU's Northern Dimension', in Lars Hedegaard & Bjarne Lindström, eds, The NEBI Yearbook 2000 (Berlin: Springer, 2000), pp. 315-327; Agnieszka Mazur-Baranska, 'The Northern Dimension of the EU', Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, vol. 9, no. 2, Spring 2000, pp. 31-44.
36. On the Baltic Sea rim space as a future grey zone, interpreted as a positive scenario through its blurring of sharp dividing lines, see Clive Archer, 'Prospects for Europe's Baltic Rim', in Hans Mouritzen, ed., Bordering Russia: Theory and Prospects for Europe's Baltic Rim (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 259-281. On the beneficial, often unintended, consequences flowing from the sheer existence of international organizations, see Mouritzen (note 14 above), pp. 126-130.
37. On the Baltic Sea rim space as a future grey zone, interpreted as a positive scenario through its blurring of sharp dividing lines, see Clive Archer, 'Prospects for Europe's Baltic Rim', in Hans Mouritzen, ed., Bordering Russia: Theory and Prospects for Europe's Baltic Rim (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 259-281. On the beneficial, often unintended, consequences flowing from the sheer existence of international organizations, see Mouritzen (note 14 above), pp. 126-130.
38. Håkan Wiberg, 'Adaptive Patterns and Their Deep Roots: A European Overview', in Hans Mouritzen, Ole Wæver & Håkan Wiberg, European Integration and National Adaptations (New York: Nova Science, 1996), pp. 43-63, on p. 48.
39. Bertel Heurlin, 'Military Command Structures in the Baltic Sea Area', in Lars Hedegaard & Bjarne Lindström, eds, The NEBI Yearbook 1998 (Berlin: Springer, 1998), pp. 405-422.
40. Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, no. 2, Spring 2000 (special issue).
41. See, for example, Vygaudas Usackas, 'Lithuania and Russia: Knowing the Past, Building Genuine Partnership for the Future', Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, no. 2, Spring 2000, pp. 9-26.
42. Ibid.
43. Emanuel Adler, 'Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE's Security Community-Building Model', in Adler & Barnett (note 4 above), pp. 119-160.