Information, nonexcludability, and financial market structure

Journal of Business

Volumn 73, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 357-402

  Anand, Bharat N ^a   Galetovic, Alexander ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHILE   (Chile)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040805988     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/209647     Document Type: Article

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