Democratizing bureaucracy: The political economy of environmental impact assessment and air pollution prevention fees in Taiwan

Comparative Politics

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 81-99

  Tang, Ching Ping ^a   Tang, Shui Yan ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040792281     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/422425     Document Type: Review

References (94)

1. For example, see Larry Diamond et al., eds., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
2. For example, see William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, 88 (March 1994), 14-32; Michael D. Ward and Kristian S. Gleditsch, "Democratizing for Peace," American Political Science Review, 92 (March 1998), 51-61.
3. For example, see William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, 88 (March 1994), 14-32; Michael D. Ward and Kristian S. Gleditsch, "Democratizing for Peace," American Political Science Review, 92 (March 1998), 51-61.
4. See, for example, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Economic Reform and Democracy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Jagdish Bhagwati, "Democracy and Development," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy Revisited (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1993); Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7 (1993), 51-71; Ramon Myers, The Wealth of Nations in the Twentieth Century: The Policies and Institutional Determinants of Economic Development (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1996).
5. See, for example, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Economic Reform and Democracy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Jagdish Bhagwati, "Democracy and Development," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy Revisited (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1993); Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7 (1993), 51-71; Ramon Myers, The Wealth of Nations in the Twentieth Century: The Policies and Institutional Determinants of Economic Development (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1996).
6. See, for example, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Economic Reform and Democracy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Jagdish Bhagwati, "Democracy and Development," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy Revisited (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1993); Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7 (1993), 51-71; Ramon Myers, The Wealth of Nations in the Twentieth Century: The Policies and Institutional Determinants of Economic Development (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1996).
7. See, for example, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Economic Reform and Democracy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Jagdish Bhagwati, "Democracy and Development," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy Revisited (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1993); Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7 (1993), 51-71; Ramon Myers, The Wealth of Nations in the Twentieth Century: The Policies and Institutional Determinants of Economic Development (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1996).
8. For example, see Sylvia Bashevkin, "Interest Groups and Social Movement," in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds., Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1997).
9. Environmental issues are those concerning the conditions of physical and biological resources. Examples include forms of air, water, soil, and noise pollution and ecological concerns such as biodiversity and global warming.
10. Roger Congleton, "Political Institutions and Pollution Control," Review of Economics and Statistics, 74 (1993), 412-21.
11. Eduardo Silva, "Democracy, Market Economics, and Environmental Policy in Chile," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 38 (1997), 1-33.
12. Daniel H. Cole, Instituting Environmental Protection: From Red to Green in Poland (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
13. Shui-Yan Tang et al., "Institutional Constraints on Environmental Management in Urban China: Environmental Impact Assessment in Guangzhou and Shanghai," The China Quarterly, 152 (1997), 863-74.
14. See Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Philippe Schmitter, "The Irony of Modern Democracy and Efforts to Improve Its Practice," Politics and Society, 20 (December 1992), 507-12.
15. See Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Philippe Schmitter, "The Irony of Modern Democracy and Efforts to Improve Its Practice," Politics and Society, 20 (December 1992), 507-12.
16. Adam Przeworski et al., Sustainable Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
17. Schmitter, "The Irony of Modern Democracy," p. 431.
18. John Dryzek, "Ecology and Discursive Democracy: Beyond Liberal Capitalism and the Administrative State," Capitalism, Nature, and Socialism, 3 (1992), 18-42.
19. Michael Saward, "Must Democrats Be Environmentalists?," in Brian Doherty and Marius De Geus, eds., Democracy and Green Political Thought (New York: Routledge, 1996).
20. Barbara Hicks, Environmental Politics in Poland: A Social Movement between Regime and Opposition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
21. For example, see Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997); Gretchen Casper and Michelle M. Taylor, Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996).
22. For example, see Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997); Gretchen Casper and Michelle M. Taylor, Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996).
23. In the past, for example, the KMT could directly channel government resources to support their candidates in elections and send pro-KMT soldiers to their home towns to vote for their candidates.
24. Hung-Mao Tien and Tun-Jen Cheng, "Crafting Democratic Institutions in Taiwan," The China Journal, 37 (1997), 1-27; see also Linda Chao and Ramon Myers, The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998).
25. Hung-Mao Tien and Tun-Jen Cheng, "Crafting Democratic Institutions in Taiwan," The China Journal, 37 (1997), 1-27; see also Linda Chao and Ramon Myers, The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998).
26. After winning the by-election for magistrate of Tao-Yuan county in early 1997, the Democratic Progressive Party has for the first time ruled more than half of the population in Taiwan at the county/city level. In the mayoral and magisterial elections in late 1997 the DPP took over twelve of twenty-three local jurisdictions, while the KMT won only eight.
27. For a more extensive discussion of the evolution of the environmental movement and its relations to the early democratization process in Taiwan, see Shui-Yan Tang and Ching-Ping Tang, "Democratization and Environmental Politics in Taiwan," Asian Survey, 37 (March 1997), 281-94.
28. Other factors can explain increased government efforts in environmental protection since the mid 1980s. For example, diplomatic considerations partly explain why the Taiwanese government vowed to conform to such international accords as the Kyoto agreement on global warming. But the Taiwanese government failed to undertake concrete action on major environmental issues before the beginning of democratization in the mid 1980s even though environmental conditions were known to be poor at that time. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that democratization played a significant role in encouraging government efforts in environmental protection. See Deborah Chan, "The Environmental Dilemma in Taiwan," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 12 (March 1993), 35-57; Chun-chieh Chi, "Growth with Pollution: Unsustainable Development in Taiwan and Its Consequences," Studies in Comparative International Development, 29 (Summer 1994), 23-47.
29. Other factors can explain increased government efforts in environmental protection since the mid 1980s. For example, diplomatic considerations partly explain why the Taiwanese government vowed to conform to such international accords as the Kyoto agreement on global warming. But the Taiwanese government failed to undertake concrete action on major environmental issues before the beginning of democratization in the mid 1980s even though environmental conditions were known to be poor at that time. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that democratization played a significant role in encouraging government efforts in environmental protection. See Deborah Chan, "The Environmental Dilemma in Taiwan," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 12 (March 1993), 35-57; Chun-chieh Chi, "Growth with Pollution: Unsustainable Development in Taiwan and Its Consequences," Studies in Comparative International Development, 29 (Summer 1994), 23-47.
30. Hwang Jiin-Tarng, "Taiwan diqu Huanjingfa zhi Jiantao" [A Critical Review of the Environmental Laws in the Taiwan Area], and "Huanjing baohufa zhong jingjiyouyin shouduan zhi yanjiu" [A Study of Economic Incentive Instruments in Environmental Protection Laws], in Taiwan diqu huanjingfa zhi yanjiu [Research on the Environmental Law in the Taiwan Area] (Taiwan: Yuedan Chubanshe, 1994).
31. See Richard Edmonds, "Taiwan's Environment Today," The China Quarterly, 148 (1996), 1224-59.
32. Environmental Protection Administration, Yearbook of Environmental Protection Statistics, Taiwan Area, The Republic of China (Taipei: The Executive Yuan, 1996), p. 107; Environmental Protection Administration, Huanjing paipishu [Environmental White Book] (Taipei: The Executive Yuan, 1998).
33. Environmental Protection Administration, Yearbook of Environmental Protection Statistics, Taiwan Area, The Republic of China (Taipei: The Executive Yuan, 1996), p. 107; Environmental Protection Administration, Huanjing paipishu [Environmental White Book] (Taipei: The Executive Yuan, 1998).
34. The survey asked respondents to rank twenty items of environmental quality. Each item ranged from one to five points, with higher numbers indicating worse environmental quality. By adding up the average score for each item, an index ranging from twenty to one hundred was constructed. The index fell to its lowest level, 74.74, in 1995 and rose to its highest level, 78.72, in 1996. The index in 1999 was 77.47.
35. Dr. Tsai, the administrator of the EPA, defended the policy performance of the agency by citing official statistics on environmental improvement. See http://www.epa.gov.tw/others/pain.htm, 1997.
36. See Shui-Yan Tang and Ching-Ping Tang, "Democratization and the Environment: Entrepreneurial Politics and Interest Representation in Taiwan," The China Quarterly, 158 (June 1999), 66-82.
37. Huang Chung-Huang, "Economic Valuation of Underground Water and Man-induced Land Subsidence in Aquaculture," Applied Economics, 22 (1990), 31-43.
38. Chiou Hua-Mei, "Zouguo Herbert Typhoon yi nian" [One Year after Typhoon Herbert], Tianxia [Commonwealth], 195 (August 1997).
39. See Ching-Ping Tang and Shui-Yan Tang, "Taiwan," in M. Janicke and H. Weidner, eds., National Environmental Policies: A Comparative Study of Capacity Building, vol. 2 (Berlin: Springer Verlag, forth coming).
40. See Tang and Tang, "Democratization and the Environment."
41. Their success at the local level, however, is not guaranteed. It depends on the political ecology of the particular local jurisdiction. See Ching-Ping Tang, "Environmental Protection and Democratization: Pollution Control and Local Self-governance in Taiwan" (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1998).
42. We are unaware of any news reports about big businesses objecting to the EIA Act during the legislative process.
43. See Tang and Tang, "Democratization and Environmental Politics."
44. The EPA was promoted from the Bureau of Environmental Protection within the department of health to a cabinet-level agency. Nevertheless, in comparison with other cabinet ministries, the EPA is smaller in size, and its head has a more junior status than other cabinet ministers.
45. It is a common practice for technocrats in the executive yuan to initiate a law by presenting a draft for legislative discussion.
46. The legislative yuan was notorious for its inefficiency at that time, because politicians were debating constitutional restructuring, and the opposition parties were strategically interrupting the legislativ process in order to attract public attention to their arguments.
47. These agencies include the ministry of education (in the case of golf course development), ministry of communication (in high speed railway projects), ministry of economic affairs (in industrial parks), and the Atomic Energy Council (in nuclear power plants).
48. Yeh Juinn-Rong, "Cong fangan dao falu - Huanjing yinxiang pinggu de guoqu yu weilai" [From Plans to the Law - The Past and Future of Environmental Impact Assessment], Huanbao yu jingji [Environmental Protection and Economy], 18 (December 1991), 10-12.
49. See Yeh Juinn-Rong, "Huanjing yinxiang pinggu de gunggung canyu: Faguifan de yaoqiu yu xianshi de kaolu" [Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment: The Demand for Regulations and Considerations of Reality], in Huanjing chengce yu falu [Environmental Policy and Law] (Taipei: Yuedan chubanshe, 1993).
50. There are two similar agencies in Taiwan. The first is the Panel on Environmental Protection under the executive yuan; it is headed by the vice prime minister and consists of fifteen to seventeen members, most of them ministers, agency heads, and specialists who meet once a month to discuss policy issues on environmental protection. See Ko San-Chi, Woguo huanjing boahu zhuzhi tixiji quanze tongyi quihua zhi yanjiu [On Designing Our Country's Integral Environmental Protection Organizations and Responsibilities] (Taipei: Committee of Research, Development and Evaluation, The Executive Yuan, 1990). The second is the Committee of Environmental Quality Advisors under the EPA. Functioning as a consulting council, this committee consists of part-time officers from related agencies and academic specialists. None of them appears still to be active.
51. Although sometimes the EPA administrator, together with other heads of agencies without the title of minister such as the head of the department of health, is included as a cabinet member, this position is inferior to ordinary ministers. According to the Organic Act of the executive yuan, the EPA administrator can attend cabinet meetings but has no voting right.
52. Some other suggestions by environmentalists were also adopted. First, at least two-thirds of the members of the review committee should be academics. Second, if the responsible agency for the project is at the same time the developer, its representatives in the review committee should not vote. Third, residents are allowed to have specialists represent their claims on their rights as specified in this law. Fourth, public hearings are extended to cases with minor environmental impacts. Finally, governmental policies are also required to go through the EIA process. See Secretary Department of the Legislative Yuan, Faluan quanji 178: Huanjing yinxiang pinggu faan [Bill Memoir 178: The Environmental Impact Assessment Bill] (Taipei: The Legislative Yuan, 1995).
53. See Lienhebao [United Daily News], Dec. 17, 1994; Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily], Dec. 23, 1994.
54. See Lienhebao [United Daily News], Dec. 17, 1994; Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily], Dec. 23, 1994.
55. On the economic rationale of levying such pollution fees, see Daigee Shaw et al., "Kongqi wuran fangzhifei shoufei banfa yu zhixing zhi jiantao" [A Review of the Air Pollution Prevention Fee Program in Taiwan], Jingshe Fazhi Luncong [Social Economic Law and Institution Review], 22 (July 1998), 203-27.
56. When a reporter challenged an EPA officer on this point in a public hearing, he awkwardly rtio-nalized the EPA's decision by replying that "there was no precedent in doing so in the world." See Legislative Yuan, Lifayuan Gongbao [The Legislative Yuan Communique], vol. 84, no. 23 (Taipei: The Legislative Yuan, 1995), 141-200.
57. For the argument that raising revenues for pollution control can be justifiable, see Hwang Jiin-Tarng, "Taiwan diqu huanjingfa zhi jiantao" [A Critical Review of the Environmental Laws in the Taiwan Area], and "Huanjing paohufa zhong jingji youyin shouduan zhi yan-jiu" [A study of the Instruments with Economic Incentives in Environmental Protection Laws], in Taiwan Diqu Huanjingfa zhi Yanjiu [Research on the Environmental Law in the Taiwan Area] (Taiwan: Yuedan Chubanshe, 1994). To judge justifiability, it is necessary to examine how revenues will be spent; according to many environmentalists, the EPA did not have a comprehensive plan for effective use of the revenues. See Kao Cheng-Yen, "Luoshi wuranzhe fufei! Zhanhuan kaizheng kongwufei!" [Reinforce Polluters Fees! Halt the Implementation of Air Pollution Prevention Fees!], Zhongguo Huanbao [Chinese Environmental Protection], 23 (1995). Environmentalists argue that mass transportation and biking paths in Taiwan are so poorly developed that residents have to depend on motorcycles and automobiles for transportation. See Shin Hsin-Min, "Kongwufei neng gaishan kongqi pingzhi ma?" [Can Air Pollution Prevention Fees Improve Air Quality?], Minzhong Ribao [People's Daily], May 12, 1995. Dependence on privately owned motor vehicles makes the demand for fuel less elastic.
58. For the argument that raising revenues for pollution control can be justifiable, see Hwang Jiin-Tarng, "Taiwan diqu huanjingfa zhi jiantao" [A Critical Review of the Environmental Laws in the Taiwan Area], and "Huanjing paohufa zhong jingji youyin shouduan zhi yan-jiu" [A study of the Instruments with Economic Incentives in Environmental Protection Laws], in Taiwan Diqu Huanjingfa zhi Yanjiu [Research on the Environmental Law in the Taiwan Area] (Taiwan: Yuedan Chubanshe, 1994). To judge justifiability, it is necessary to examine how revenues will be spent; according to many environmentalists, the EPA did not have a comprehensive plan for effective use of the revenues. See Kao Cheng-Yen, "Luoshi wuranzhe fufei! Zhanhuan kaizheng kongwufei!" [Reinforce Polluters Fees! Halt the Implementation of Air Pollution Prevention Fees!], Zhongguo Huanbao [Chinese Environmental Protection], 23 (1995). Environmentalists argue that mass transportation and biking paths in Taiwan are so poorly developed that residents have to depend on motorcycles and automobiles for transportation. See Shin Hsin-Min, "Kongwufei neng gaishan kongqi pingzhi ma?" [Can Air Pollution Prevention Fees Improve Air Quality?], Minzhong Ribao [People's Daily], May 12, 1995. Dependence on privately owned motor vehicles makes the demand for fuel less elastic.
59. For the argument that raising revenues for pollution control can be justifiable, see Hwang Jiin-Tarng, "Taiwan diqu huanjingfa zhi jiantao" [A Critical Review of the Environmental Laws in the Taiwan Area], and "Huanjing paohufa zhong jingji youyin shouduan zhi yan-jiu" [A study of the Instruments with Economic Incentives in Environmental Protection Laws], in Taiwan Diqu Huanjingfa zhi Yanjiu [Research on the Environmental Law in the Taiwan Area] (Taiwan: Yuedan Chubanshe, 1994). To judge justifiability, it is necessary to examine how revenues will be spent; according to many environmentalists, the EPA did not have a comprehensive plan for effective use of the revenues. See Kao Cheng-Yen, "Luoshi wuranzhe fufei! Zhanhuan kaizheng kongwufei!" [Reinforce Polluters Fees! Halt the Implementation of Air Pollution Prevention Fees!], Zhongguo Huanbao [Chinese Environmental Protection], 23 (1995). Environmentalists argue that mass transportation and biking paths in Taiwan are so poorly developed that residents have to depend on motorcycles and automobiles for transportation. See Shin Hsin-Min, "Kongwufei neng gaishan kongqi pingzhi ma?" [Can Air Pollution Prevention Fees Improve Air Quality?], Minzhong Ribao [People's Daily], May 12, 1995. Dependence on privately owned motor vehicles makes the demand for fuel less elastic.
60. Liang Chi-Yuan, "Kongqi wuran fangzhifei chengshou wenti zoutanhui" (A Symposium on Issues of Levying Air Pollution Prevention Fees), Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily], May 28, 1994. The EPA obviously manipulated data in its publications to justify its policies to charge the motorists. For example, the contribution of motor vehicles to total TSP dramatically increased from 12.19 percent in 1995 to 37.23 percent in 1996, unlikely in a single year. Similarly, the percentage of suspended particles increased abnormally from 14.04 to 40.61. See Environmental Protection Administration, Zhonghuaminguo Taiwan Diqu Huanjing Tzuxun [Environmental Information of the Taiwan Area, ROC] (Taipei: EPA, 1995), p. 57; Zhonghuaminguo Taiwan Diqu Huanjing Tzuxun [Environmental Information of the Taiwan Area, ROC] (Taipei: EPA, 1996), p. 57.
61. Liang Chi-Yuan, "Kongqi wuran fangzhifei chengshou wenti zoutanhui" (A Symposium on Issues of Levying Air Pollution Prevention Fees), Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily], May 28, 1994. The EPA obviously manipulated data in its publications to justify its policies to charge the motorists. For example, the contribution of motor vehicles to total TSP dramatically increased from 12.19 percent in 1995 to 37.23 percent in 1996, unlikely in a single year. Similarly, the percentage of suspended particles increased abnormally from 14.04 to 40.61. See Environmental Protection Administration, Zhonghuaminguo Taiwan Diqu Huanjing Tzuxun [Environmental Information of the Taiwan Area, ROC] (Taipei: EPA, 1995), p. 57; Zhonghuaminguo Taiwan Diqu Huanjing Tzuxun [Environmental Information of the Taiwan Area, ROC] (Taipei: EPA, 1996), p. 57.
62. Liang Chi-Yuan, "Kongqi wuran fangzhifei chengshou wenti zoutanhui" (A Symposium on Issues of Levying Air Pollution Prevention Fees), Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily], May 28, 1994. The EPA obviously manipulated data in its publications to justify its policies to charge the motorists. For example, the contribution of motor vehicles to total TSP dramatically increased from 12.19 percent in 1995 to 37.23 percent in 1996, unlikely in a single year. Similarly, the percentage of suspended particles increased abnormally from 14.04 to 40.61. See Environmental Protection Administration, Zhonghuaminguo Taiwan Diqu Huanjing Tzuxun [Environmental Information of the Taiwan Area, ROC] (Taipei: EPA, 1995), p. 57; Zhonghuaminguo Taiwan Diqu Huanjing Tzuxun [Environmental Information of the Taiwan Area, ROC] (Taipei: EPA, 1996), p. 57.
63. A polluting source is often referred to as machinery that produces pollutants.
64. See Tang and Tang, "Democratization and the Environment."
65. A survey indicated that the public believed the Democratic Progressive Party was the most trust-worthy party on environmental issues. See Minzhong Ribao [People's Daily], July 24, 1998.
66. The EPA argued that it needed a couple of years to build up a pollution data bank on the actual pollution amounts of individual plants.
67. See Hwang Jiing-Tarng, "Taiwan diqu."
68. Chen Hsiung-Wen, "Kongqi wuran fangzhifei zhengshou wenti zoutanhui" [A Symposium on Issues of Levying Air Pollution Prevention Fees], Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily], May 28, 1994.
69. Liu Ming-Lung, "Bianxiang jiashui, Yimaoqien ye buneng gei" [Pay Not Even One Dime for Camouflaged Illegal Taxes], Zhongguo Shibao [China Times], May 15, 1995.
70. The appropriation motion included both revenues and expenditures of the air pollution preventioi fees. Failure to pass the appropriation would revoke the legal authority of the EPA to implement the fee policy.
71. Zhonghua Ribao [Chinese Daily], May 18, 1995.
72. See Zhongguo Shibao [China Times], May 17, 1995. According to the constitution of the Republic of China, the control yuan is the highest ombudsman office of the central government, paralleling the executive yuan, legislative yuan, examination yuan, and judicial yuan as one of the five branches of government. The objects of an impeachment motion are specific officers, while the objects of a correction motion are policies.
73. Minzhong Ribao [People's Daily], June 8, 1995.
74. Minsheng Bao [Min Sheng Daily], June 18, 1995.
75. See Liu Chih-Chien, "Kongwufei zhixing chengguo shiwen" [Ten Questions on the Implementation Results of the Air Pollution Prevention Fees], on the websit http://ww.teputc.org.tw/issue/air/askl0-1.htm, 1997. The Environmental Protection Union continued to urge the government to cancel the policy after one year of implementation and challenged the official declaration of the fee's effectiveness by citing contradictory evidence.
76. Murray J. Horn, The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
77. Murray J. Horn, The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
78. See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies," Journal of Democracy, 9 (July 1998), 112-26; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy, 5 (January 1994), 55-69; Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries," World Development, 21 (1993), 1355-70; and Przeworski, Sustainable Democracy.
79. See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies," Journal of Democracy, 9 (July 1998), 112-26; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy, 5 (January 1994), 55-69; Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries," World Development, 21 (1993), 1355-70; and Przeworski, Sustainable Democracy.
80. See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies," Journal of Democracy, 9 (July 1998), 112-26; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy, 5 (January 1994), 55-69; Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries," World Development, 21 (1993), 1355-70; and Przeworski, Sustainable Democracy.
81. See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies," Journal of Democracy, 9 (July 1998), 112-26; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy, 5 (January 1994), 55-69; Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries," World Development, 21 (1993), 1355-70; and Przeworski, Sustainable Democracy.
82. Several cases illustrate the influence of such improper political interventions. For example, President Lee spoke publicly in favor of the sixth naphtha cracker project, even though the developer (the Formosa Plastics Group) failed to install a recommended environmental protection facility properly. He withdrew his support of the developer only after severe criticism by environmental groups and by a well-known foreign ecologist who persuaded him to support the establishment of the Environmental Protection Foundation. According to reports, this change in attitude allowed the specialists in ministry of economic affairs to veto the EIA of the sixth naphtha cracker project. See Taiwan Today News Network, at http://w3.ttnn.com/can/980216/p02/html, 1998.
83. Representatives of the business sector, such as Kao Yu-Jen, Wang Yu-Tsen, and Ku Chen-Fu, spoke for its interests in the central standing committee. Mr. Wang suggested that the government grant the industries targeted by the fee policy a one year grace period, while Ku expressed his concerns about the negative consequences of the fee policy on the competitiveness of domestic industries. Several environmental groups, including the Environmental Quality Protection Foundation, Green Consumption Foundation, and Taiwan Environmental Protection Union demonstrated in front of the KMT headquarters while the EPA administrator reported to the KMT central standing committee.
84. One indication of such legislative neglect is the lack of a subcommittee for environmental protection in the legislative yuan. Environmental policies are reviewed by joint committees for interior, economy, and related areas.
85. This move made political sense because the opposing legislators are the minority in the legislature and would have had difficulty winning a legislative vote.
86. This alliance reached its peak when the administrator, Chao Shao-Kang, one of the founders of the New Party, led the EPA to develop a strong position against economic ministries and polluters. When he left this position and was elected a legislator in 1993, he continued to promote the EIA Act in the legislative yuan by attracting support from environmental groups. See Legislative Yuan, Lifayuan Gongbao.
87. On the complex relationship between environmental groups and the environmental protection agencies, see Hsiao Hsin-Huang, Yige Jinzhang de Gungsheng Kuanxi: Huanbao Xingcheng Jiguan yu Minjien Tuanti de Hezuo Guanxi [A Nervous Symbiotic Relationship: The Cooperative Relationship between the Environmental Protection Administration and Civic Groups] (Taipei: EPA, 1997).
88. Tang and Tang, "Democratization and Environmental Politics."
89. Faithful reports on environmental incidents are also enhanced by the "media supervision" of environmental groups. For example, the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union regularly evaluates the performance of different newspapers. For illustration, see Taiwan Huanjing [Taiwan Environment], 91 (1996), 40-43.
90. For example, Professor Chou, the chief executive officer of the New Environmental Foundation, pointed out that in spite of her strong desire to express her concerns in public hearings she often received official notices in the late afternoon the day before the hearings. She was very suspicious that the bureaucrats withheld notice purposely until the very last minute, hoping that this "troublemaker" would be unable to change her schedule to attend the hearings, or at least have no time to prepare thoroughly for them. Personal communication.
91. Charles Lindblom, Politics and Market: The World's Political-Economic Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
92. Diamond et al., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies; Andreas Schedler, "What Is Democratic Consolidation?" Journal of Democracy, 9 (April 1998), 91-107.
93. Diamond et al., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies; Andreas Schedler, "What Is Democratic Consolidation?" Journal of Democracy, 9 (April 1998), 91-107.
94. Schmitter, "The Irony of Modern Democracy."