The future of international leadership

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 111, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 385-401

  Ikenberry, G John ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040518951     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2151968     Document Type: Article

References (71)

1. Erik Calonius, "Take Me to Your Leader," Hemispheres, April 1995, 39.
2. Should NATO Expand? Report of an Independent Task Force (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 21-22.
3. C. Fred Bergsten, "Managing the World Economy of the Future" in Peter Kenan, ed., Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years after Bretton Woods (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994), 349.
4. Sophisticated theories of power acknowledge that the most far-reaching types of power involve the ability to shape the ideas and thinking of other actors as well as the ability to bully and coerce. See Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical Perspective (London: Macmillan, 1974).
5. For a discussion of "social purpose" as an aspect of power and political order, see John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," International Organization 36 (Spring 1982): 379-416.
6. Discussion of leadership and hegemony in the academic study of international relations was rare until the 1970s, when Kindleberger presented his argument that the Great Depression was triggered by the absence of leadership and Gilpin analyzed the hegemonic experiences of Britain and the United States. See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-39 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975). More recent studies have expanded and refined conceptions of international leadership. See Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and Oran Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society," International Organization 45 (Summer 1991).
7. Discussion of leadership and hegemony in the academic study of international relations was rare until the 1970s, when Kindleberger presented his argument that the Great Depression was triggered by the absence of leadership and Gilpin analyzed the hegemonic experiences of Britain and the United States. See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-39 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975). More recent studies have expanded and refined conceptions of international leadership. See Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and Oran Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society," International Organization 45 (Summer 1991).
8. Discussion of leadership and hegemony in the academic study of international relations was rare until the 1970s, when Kindleberger presented his argument that the Great Depression was triggered by the absence of leadership and Gilpin analyzed the hegemonic experiences of Britain and the United States. See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-39 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975). More recent studies have expanded and refined conceptions of international leadership. See Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and Oran Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society," International Organization 45 (Summer 1991).
9. Discussion of leadership and hegemony in the academic study of international relations was rare until the 1970s, when Kindleberger presented his argument that the Great Depression was triggered by the absence of leadership and Gilpin analyzed the hegemonic experiences of Britain and the United States. See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-39 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975). More recent studies have expanded and refined conceptions of international leadership. See Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and Oran Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society," International Organization 45 (Summer 1991).
10. Structural leadership might be thought of as the potential for leadership, because it refers to the power resources at the state's disposal. As American policy in the interwar period indicates, this potential may not be turned into a strong role.
11. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
12. For an overview of theories and debates, see David P. Rapkin, ed., World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990).
13. George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987). See also Modelski, "Is World Politics a Learning Process," International Organization 44 (Winter 1990): 1-24.
14. George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987). See also Modelski, "Is World Politics a Learning Process," International Organization 44 (Winter 1990): 1-24.
15. See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). For an earlier formulation, see Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System," Comparative Studies in Society and History 16 (September 1974): 387-415.
16. See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). For an earlier formulation, see Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System," Comparative Studies in Society and History 16 (September 1974): 387-415.
17. Gilpin, War and Change, 34.
18. This argument is made in Robert Gilpin, "Economic, Interdependence and National Security in Historical Perspective" in Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, eds., Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 19-66. See also Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975), esp. 20-112.
19. This argument is made in Robert Gilpin, "Economic, Interdependence and National Security in Historical Perspective" in Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, eds., Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 19-66. See also Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975), esp. 20-112.
20. An important criticism of the hegemonic argument is that it overestimates American hegemonic power at its zenith and therefore sees more subsequent decline than is warranted. See Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, is Mark Twain Really Dead?" International Organization 39 (Spring 1985): 207-31; and Nye, Bound to Lead.
21. An important criticism of the hegemonic argument is that it overestimates American hegemonic power at its zenith and therefore sees more subsequent decline than is warranted. See Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, is Mark Twain Really Dead?" International Organization 39 (Spring 1985): 207-31; and Nye, Bound to Lead.
22. A recent World Bank study projects that the leading national economies in 2020 will be, in order of size, China, the United States, Japan, India, Indonesia, Germany, and Korea. France, Taiwan, Brazil, Italy, Russia, and Britain follow behind.
23. Gilpin raises the issue of nuclear weapons as a development that might alter the historical pattern of hegemonic rise and fall. See War and Change, epilogue.
24. G. John Ikenberry argues that the United States "got less than it wanted and more than it bargained for" after World War II in Europe. The United States was forced to modify and reorient its global and European postwar plans, while at the same time it was drawn into a more direct role in Europe than American officials desired or anticipated. See Ikenberry, "Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony," Political Science Quarterly 104 (Fall 1989): 375-400. See also Charles Maier, "Alliance and Autonomy: European Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives in the Truman Years" in Michael Lacy, ed., The Truman Presidency (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
25. G. John Ikenberry argues that the United States "got less than it wanted and more than it bargained for" after World War II in Europe. The United States was forced to modify and reorient its global and European postwar plans, while at the same time it was drawn into a more direct role in Europe than American officials desired or anticipated. See Ikenberry, "Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony," Political Science Quarterly 104 (Fall 1989): 375-400. See also Charles Maier, "Alliance and Autonomy: European Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives in the Truman Years" in Michael Lacy, ed., The Truman Presidency (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
26. Bergsten, "Managing the World Economy of the Future," 349.
27. This and other views of institutions or regimes are discussed in Steven Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
28. The major statement of this position is Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly 32 (December 1988). Also see Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
29. The major statement of this position is Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly 32 (December 1988). Also see Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
30. The major statement of this position is Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly 32 (December 1988). Also see Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
31. The most recent attack on neoliberal institutionalism is John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19 (Winter 1994/95): 5-49. For a vigorous argument that institutions "matter," see Oran Young, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables" in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 160-194.
32. The most recent attack on neoliberal institutionalism is John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19 (Winter 1994/95): 5-49. For a vigorous argument that institutions "matter," see Oran Young, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables" in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 160-194.
33. This is noted in a recent Financial Times editorial. It argued that the European opposition to the American trade action would have the most impact if it were backed by a consistent European trade policy: "The EU's arguments will carry weight, however, only if it adheres scrupulously to those rules, even when that is politically unpalatable." See "Defending Trade," Financial Times, 22 May 1995.
34. Karl Deutsch et al, Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956).
35. The literature on industrial society is huge. See, for example, Raymond Aron, The Industrial Society: Three Essays on Ideology and Development (New York: Clarion Books, 1966); and Clark Kerr, The Future of Industrial Societies: Convergence or Continuing Diversity? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). For an early attempt to extend these industrial society and modernization arguments to international relations, see Edward L. Morse, Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations (New York: Free Press, 1976).
36. The literature on industrial society is huge. See, for example, Raymond Aron, The Industrial Society: Three Essays on Ideology and Development (New York: Clarion Books, 1966); and Clark Kerr, The Future of Industrial Societies: Convergence or Continuing Diversity? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). For an early attempt to extend these industrial society and modernization arguments to international relations, see Edward L. Morse, Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations (New York: Free Press, 1976).
37. The literature on industrial society is huge. See, for example, Raymond Aron, The Industrial Society: Three Essays on Ideology and Development (New York: Clarion Books, 1966); and Clark Kerr, The Future of Industrial Societies: Convergence or Continuing Diversity? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). For an early attempt to extend these industrial society and modernization arguments to international relations, see Edward L. Morse, Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations (New York: Free Press, 1976).
38. This argument is made in Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). See also Thomas A. Schwanz, "The United States and Germany after 1945: Alliances, Transnational Relations, and the Legacy of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 19 (Fall 1995): esp. 556-60. For a collection of case studies, see Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
39. This argument is made in Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). See also Thomas A. Schwanz, "The United States and Germany after 1945: Alliances, Transnational Relations, and the Legacy of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 19 (Fall 1995): esp. 556-60. For a collection of case studies, see Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
40. This argument is made in Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). See also Thomas A. Schwanz, "The United States and Germany after 1945: Alliances, Transnational Relations, and the Legacy of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 19 (Fall 1995): esp. 556-60. For a collection of case studies, see Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
41. Pat Choate's book about the agents of Japanese interests that thrive in Washington and subvert American policy can be read as an evocative illustration of how the American hegemonic order works. The opportunities for "voice" have made the system remarkably stable and accessible. See Pat Choate, Agents of Influence (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990). See also John B. Judis, "The Japanese Megaphone: Foreign Influences on Foreign Policymaking,"7 The New Republic, 22 January 1990, 20-25.
42. Pat Choate's book about the agents of Japanese interests that thrive in Washington and subvert American policy can be read as an evocative illustration of how the American hegemonic order works. The opportunities for "voice" have made the system remarkably stable and accessible. See Pat Choate, Agents of Influence (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990). See also John B. Judis, "The Japanese Megaphone: Foreign Influences on Foreign Policymaking,"7 The New Republic, 22 January 1990, 20-25.
43. Oran Young refers to this type of leadership as "entrepreneurial" leadership. See Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation." This view of leadership is stressed in Ghita Ionescu, Leadership in an Interdependent World: The Statesmanship of Adenauer, De Gaulle, Thatcher, Reagan, and Gorbachev (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991).
44. Oran Young refers to this type of leadership as "entrepreneurial" leadership. See Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation." This view of leadership is stressed in Ghita Ionescu, Leadership in an Interdependent World: The Statesmanship of Adenauer, De Gaulle, Thatcher, Reagan, and Gorbachev (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991).
45. As Henry Kissinger writes: "Because of his magnificent grasp of the nuances of power relationships, Bismarck saw in his philosophy a doctrine of self-limitation. Because these nuances were not apparent to his successors and imitators, the application of Bismarck's lessons led to an armament race and a world war." Kissinger, "The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck," Daedalus 97 (Summer 1968): 919.
46. For a discussion of Britain's ascendant and multifaceted world position in the early nineteenth century, see Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1994).
47. This argument is made in G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," International Organization 44 (Summer 1990). On the generic problem of domination and legitimacy, see David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London: Macmillan, 1991).
48. This argument is made in G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," International Organization 44 (Summer 1990). On the generic problem of domination and legitimacy, see David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London: Macmillan, 1991).
49. This argument is made in John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-war Economic Order," International Organization 36 (Spring 1982). See also Ruggie, "Embedded Liberalism Revisited: Instituttons and Progress in International Economic Relations" in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, eds., Progress in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
50. This argument is made in John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-war Economic Order," International Organization 36 (Spring 1982). See also Ruggie, "Embedded Liberalism Revisited: Instituttons and Progress in International Economic Relations" in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, eds., Progress in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
51. See Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power."
52. See Charles P. Kindleberger, "The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe," The Journal of Economic History 35 (March, 1975): 20-55.
53. For a discussion of America's postwar orientation, see Charles Maier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II" in Maier, In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); see also John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution" in Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 3-47.
54. For a discussion of America's postwar orientation, see Charles Maier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II" in Maier, In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); see also John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution" in Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 3-47.
55. For the argument that ideas spread because of their merits but also because of their association with economic success and material rewards, see Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework" in Goldstein and Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 3-30.
56. This, of course, is the argument of Kindleberger in The World in Depression. The role of the market in the exercise and provision of leadership is also emphasized in the work of Susan Strange. See, in particular, States and Markets (London: Pinter, 1988).
57. This, of course, is the argument of Kindleberger in The World in Depression. The role of the market in the exercise and provision of leadership is also emphasized in the work of Susan Strange. See, in particular, States and Markets (London: Pinter, 1988).
58. See Scott C. James and David A. Lake, "The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846," International Organization 43 (Winter 1989): 1-29.
59. Stuart Auerbach, "The Ironies that Built Japan," Washington Post, 18 July 1993.
60. This argument has frequently been made. See Gerard Baker, "Benefits of Building a Bloc," Financial Times, 17 May 1995, 11.
61. This argument is stressed in David Fromkin, In the Time of the Americans: The Generation that Changed America's Role in the World (New York: Knopf, 1995). On the more general lessons learned by FDR from Wilson's experience, see Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Atheneum, 1979); and Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).
62. This argument is stressed in David Fromkin, In the Time of the Americans: The Generation that Changed America's Role in the World (New York: Knopf, 1995). On the more general lessons learned by FDR from Wilson's experience, see Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Atheneum, 1979); and Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).
63. This argument is stressed in David Fromkin, In the Time of the Americans: The Generation that Changed America's Role in the World (New York: Knopf, 1995). On the more general lessons learned by FDR from Wilson's experience, see Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Atheneum, 1979); and Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).
64. See Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), chap. 6.
65. On American and Western efforts to liberalize postwar German and Japanese political institutions, see John Montgomery, Forced to Be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); John Herz, ed., From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1982); Thomas A. Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987).
66. On American and Western efforts to liberalize postwar German and Japanese political institutions, see John Montgomery, Forced to Be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); John Herz, ed., From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1982); Thomas A. Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987).
67. On American and Western efforts to liberalize postwar German and Japanese political institutions, see John Montgomery, Forced to Be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); John Herz, ed., From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1982); Thomas A. Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987).
68. On American and Western efforts to liberalize postwar German and Japanese political institutions, see John Montgomery, Forced to Be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); John Herz, ed., From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1982); Thomas A. Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987).
69. Of course, the attempt to root out and replace the old fascist and imperialist elites in Germany and Japan was incomplete. Beyond the inherent limits to engaging in this sort of elite transformation, the onset of the cold war tempered the enthusiasm by American officials for doing so.
70. By hegemonic work, I mean the use of hegemonic resources to create new institutions and transform the social purposes of other states. Management of the American-led liberal order remains, including the operation of the American security relations with Western Europe and Japan.
71. Of course, families can be dysfunctional and some even fall apart. My argument is that the first step in preserving the semidomestic character of the Western industrial world is to recognize its historical and institutional dimensions as well as its many achievements. After this, it may be necessary to find ways to further "contain" and "domesticate" foreign policy and economic conflicts within this American system - a need that is underscored by the current American-Japanese trade dispute. This bolstering of the system may involve the creation of more explicit institutional structures for pan-Western policy cooperation and the development of greater reciprocity in market access and policy voice across the system.