Optimal design of peer review and self-assessment schemes

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 27-51

  Baliga, Sandeep ^a   Sjöström, Tomas ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040485142     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2696396     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. AGHION, P. AND TIROLE, J. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105 (1997), pp. 1-29.
2. BAKER, G., GIBBONS, R., AND MURPHY, K.J. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Schemes." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109 (1994), pp. 1125-1156.
3. BALIGA, S. AND SJÖSTRÖM, T. "Optimal Design of Peer Review and Self-Assessment Schemes." Northwestern University Math Center Paper no. 1290, 1997 (www.kellogg.nwu.edu/research/math/Down-papers.htm).
4. CALVO, G.A. AND WELLISZ, S. "Hierarchy, Ability and Income Distribution." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 87 (1979), pp. 991-1010.
5. CARMICHAEL, H.L. "Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?" Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96 (1988), pp. 453-472.
6. COLEMAN, J.S. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990.
7. DEWATRIPONT, M. AND MASKIN, E. "Contractual Contingencies and Renegotiation." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 26 (1995), pp. 704-719.
8. GAMACHE, R.D. AND KUHN, R.L., The Creativity Infusion. New York: Harper and Row, 1989.
9. HOLMSTRÖM, B. "Moral Hazard in Teams." Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13 (1982), pp. 324-340.
10. _. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective." Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66 (1999), pp. 169-182.
11. ITOH, H. "Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations." Econometrica, Vol. 59 (1991), pp. 611-636.
12. LAZEAR, E.P. "Pay, Inequality and Industrial Politics." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97 (1989), pp. 561-580.
13. LEVITT, S.D. "Optimal Incentive Schemes When Only the Agent's 'Best' Output Matters to the Principal." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 24 (1995), pp. 744-760.
14. _ AND SNYDER, C.M. "Is No News Bad News? Information Transmission and the Role of 'Early Warning' in the Principal-Agent Model." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 28 (1997), pp. 641-661.
15. MASKIN, E. AND TIROLE J. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values." Econometrica, Vol. 60 (1992), pp. 1-42.
16. MILGROM, P. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient Organization Design." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96 (1988), pp. 42-60.
17. MYERSON, R. Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991.
18. PRENDERGAST, C. AND STOLE, L. "Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 104 (1996), pp. 1105-1134.
19. _ AND TOPEL, R. "Favoritism in Organizations." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 104 (1996), pp. 958-978.
20. ROTEMBERG, J. AND SALONER, G. "Overt Interfunctional Conflict (and Its Reduction Through Business Strategy)." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 26 (1995), pp. 630-653.
21. SCOTCHMER, S. "Puzzles: Professional Advice and Other Hazards." Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 4 (1990), pp. 189-195.
22. SIMON, H. "A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship." Econometrica Vol. 19 (1951), pp. 293-305.
23. TIROLE, J. "Collusion and the Theory of Organizations." In J.-J. Laffont, ed., Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
24. WILLIAMSON, O.E. Markets and Hierarchies, 2d ed. New York: Free Press, 1983.
25. _. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press, 1987.