The politics of privilege: Assessing the impact of rents, corruption, and clientelism on third world development

Political Studies

Volumn 45, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 639-658

  Hutchcroft, Paul D ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040454753     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00100     Document Type: Article

References (87)

1. New York Times, 5 June 1996. Lee was responding to a report that he and his son, Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, accepted discounts of more than $700,000 in a 'soft sale' of condominiums conducted before bids were opened to the public.
2. J. M. Buchanan, 'Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking', in J. M. Buchanan, R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock (eds), Toward A Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (College Station Texas A & M Press, 1980), p. 9.
3. P. Evans Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 24.
4. M. Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1988), p. 24.
5. Evans, Embedded Autonomy, p. 25. Fortunately, as Evans demonstrates, use of a rents framework does not require that one adopt the anti-statist perspective of a neo-utilitarian.
6. M. Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1978), p. 987.
7. Jomo K. S. and E. T. Gomez, 'Rents, Rent Seeking and Rent Deployment in Malaysia'. Unpublished ms., Kuala Lumpur (1995), p. 3.
8. P. D. Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism: the Politics of Banking in the Philippines (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, forthcoming 1998).
9. See for example, A. O. Krueger, 'The political economy of the rent-seeking society', The American Economic Review, 64 (1974), 291-303.
10. Evans, Embedded Autonomy, p. 24.
11. As one scholar noted thirty years ago, '[e]stimates of the extent of corruption practices in underdeveloped countries are, expectedly, very imprecise. Rumor abounds, facts are scarce', (D. H. Bayley, 'The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation', in A. J. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston and V. T. LeVine (eds), Political Corruption: a Handbook (New Brunswick NJ, Transaction, 1989 [1966]), p. 939.
12. J. S. Nye, 'Corruption and Political Development: a Cost-Benefit Analysis', in Heidenheimer et al., Political Corruption, p. 966. Alternative definitions are based on notions of the public interest and public opinion, but by far the most widely accepted definitions are based on legal norms. See the discussions of J. C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 3-5, and R. Theobald, Corruption, Development and Underdevehpment (Durham, Duke University Press, 1990). pp. 1-18.
13. J. S. Nye, 'Corruption and Political Development: a Cost-Benefit Analysis', in Heidenheimer et al., Political Corruption, p. 966. Alternative definitions are based on notions of the public interest and public opinion, but by far the most widely accepted definitions are based on legal norms. See the discussions of J. C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 3-5, and R. Theobald, Corruption, Development and Underdevehpment (Durham, Duke University Press, 1990). pp. 1-18.
14. J. S. Nye, 'Corruption and Political Development: a Cost-Benefit Analysis', in Heidenheimer et al., Political Corruption, p. 966. Alternative definitions are based on notions of the public interest and public opinion, but by far the most widely accepted definitions are based on legal norms. See the discussions of J. C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 3-5, and R. Theobald, Corruption, Development and Underdevehpment (Durham, Duke University Press, 1990). pp. 1-18.
15. In 1965, Leys noted that 'the question of corruption in the contemporary world has so far been taken up almost solely by moralists . . . Emotionally and intellectually, this seems to be in a direct line of descent from the viewpoint of those missionaries who were dedicated to the suppression of native dancing. The subject seems to deserve a more systematic and openminded approach.' C. Leys, 'What is the Problem about Corruption?', in Heidenheimer et al. Political Corruption, pp. 52-3. The term 'revisionist' is derived from Cariño, who argues the need to combine analysis with moral judgements. 'Compare,' she writes, 'the outrage of American scholars against Nixon's indiscretions and their near-approval of more blatantly corrupt regimes in countries where they have worked.' L. V. Cariño, 'Tonic or Toxic: the Effect of Graft and Corruption', in L. Cariño (ed.), Bureaucratic Corruption in Asia: Causes, Consequences and Controls (Quezon City: College of Public Administration, University of Philippines, 1986) . Among those who perceive at least occasional benefits to corruption are Nye and Scott (Nye, 'Corruption and Political Development'; Scott, Comparative Political Corruption); more systematic benefits are asserted in the work of Huntington and Leff: S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968); N. H. Leff, 'Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption', in Heidenheimer et al., Political Corruption.
16. In 1965, Leys noted that 'the question of corruption in the contemporary world has so far been taken up almost solely by moralists . . . Emotionally and intellectually, this seems to be in a direct line of descent from the viewpoint of those missionaries who were dedicated to the suppression of native dancing. The subject seems to deserve a more systematic and openminded approach.' C. Leys, 'What is the Problem about Corruption?', in Heidenheimer et al. Political Corruption, pp. 52-3. The term 'revisionist' is derived from Cariño, who argues the need to combine analysis with moral judgements. 'Compare,' she writes, 'the outrage of American scholars against Nixon's indiscretions and their near-approval of more blatantly corrupt regimes in countries where they have worked.' L. V. Cariño, 'Tonic or Toxic: the Effect of Graft and Corruption', in L. Cariño (ed.), Bureaucratic Corruption in Asia: Causes, Consequences and Controls (Quezon City: College of Public Administration, University of Philippines, 1986) . Among those who perceive at least occasional benefits to corruption are Nye and Scott (Nye, 'Corruption and Political Development'; Scott, Comparative Political Corruption); more systematic benefits are asserted in the work of Huntington and Leff: S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968); N. H. Leff, 'Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption', in Heidenheimer et al., Political Corruption.
17. In 1965, Leys noted that 'the question of corruption in the contemporary world has so far been taken up almost solely by moralists . . . Emotionally and intellectually, this seems to be in a direct line of descent from the viewpoint of those missionaries who were dedicated to the suppression of native dancing. The subject seems to deserve a more systematic and openminded approach.' C. Leys, 'What is the Problem about Corruption?', in Heidenheimer et al. Political Corruption, pp. 52-3. The term 'revisionist' is derived from Cariño, who argues the need to combine analysis with moral judgements. 'Compare,' she writes, 'the outrage of American scholars against Nixon's indiscretions and their near-approval of more blatantly corrupt regimes in countries where they have worked.' L. V. Cariño, 'Tonic or Toxic: the Effect of Graft and Corruption', in L. Cariño (ed.), Bureaucratic Corruption in Asia: Causes, Consequences and Controls (Quezon City: College of Public Administration, University of Philippines, 1986) . Among those who perceive at least occasional benefits to corruption are Nye and Scott (Nye, 'Corruption and Political Development'; Scott, Comparative Political Corruption); more systematic benefits are asserted in the work of Huntington and Leff: S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968); N. H. Leff, 'Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption', in Heidenheimer et al., Political Corruption.
18. In 1965, Leys noted that 'the question of corruption in the contemporary world has so far been taken up almost solely by moralists . . . Emotionally and intellectually, this seems to be in a direct line of descent from the viewpoint of those missionaries who were dedicated to the suppression of native dancing. The subject seems to deserve a more systematic and openminded approach.' C. Leys, 'What is the Problem about Corruption?', in Heidenheimer et al. Political Corruption, pp. 52-3. The term 'revisionist' is derived from Cariño, who argues the need to combine analysis with moral judgements. 'Compare,' she writes, 'the outrage of American scholars against Nixon's indiscretions and their near-approval of more blatantly corrupt regimes in countries where they have worked.' L. V. Cariño, 'Tonic or Toxic: the Effect of Graft and Corruption', in L. Cariño (ed.), Bureaucratic Corruption in Asia: Causes, Consequences and Controls (Quezon City: College of Public Administration, University of Philippines, 1986) . Among those who perceive at least occasional benefits to corruption are Nye and Scott (Nye, 'Corruption and Political Development'; Scott, Comparative Political Corruption); more systematic benefits are asserted in the work of Huntington and Leff: S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968); N. H. Leff, 'Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption', in Heidenheimer et al., Political Corruption.
19. Cariño, 'Tonic or Toxic'; Theobold, Corruption.
20. Cariño, 'Tonic or Toxic'; Theobold, Corruption.
21. Nye, 'Corruption and Political Development'. J. Waterbury, 'Endemic and planned corruption in a monarchial regime', World Politics, 25 (1973) 533-55. Theobald, Corruption.
22. Nye, 'Corruption and Political Development'. J. Waterbury, 'Endemic and planned corruption in a monarchial regime', World Politics, 25 (1973) 533-55. Theobald, Corruption.
23. Nye, 'Corruption and Political Development'. J. Waterbury, 'Endemic and planned corruption in a monarchial regime', World Politics, 25 (1973) 533-55. Theobald, Corruption.
24. See Fred Riggs' analysis of how 'the gulf between the study of politics and administration . . . became institutionalized' both in developed and in developing countries. F. W. Riggs, 'The inter-dependence of politics and administration', Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 31 (1987), 418-38, p. 429.
25. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, pp. 88-9.
26. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, p. 6.
27. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, pp. viii-ix.
28. Waterbury, 'Endemic and planned corruption', p. 555.
29. J. C. Scott, 'Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia', in S. Schmidt et al. (eds), Friends, Followers, and Factions (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1977 [1972]).
30. Waterbury, 'Endemic and planned corruption', p. 537.
31. See J. T. Sidel, 'Coercion, Capital, and the Post-Colonial State: Bossism in the Postwar Philippines', Ph.D thesis, Cornell University (1995), pp. 11-12.
32. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, pp. 34-5.
33. Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 240, 1095.
34. L. I. Rudolph and S. H. Rudolph, 'Authority and power in bureaucratic and patrimonial administration: a revisionist interpretation of Weber on bureaucracy', World Politics 31 (1979) 195-227, p. 198.
35. Scott, 'Patron-Client Polities'.
36. Scott concurs that more predictable corruption is 'less likely to seriously retard economic growth'. Not only is the price more certain, but there is also greater 'probability of receiving the paid-for "decision" '. This type of corruption is more likely when: (a) 'The political and bureaucratic elites are strong and cohesive' and (b) 'Corruption has become "regularized" - even institutionalized after a fashion - by long practice' (Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, pp. 90-1). These insights, I will seek to demonstrate, are strengthened by analysis of the relationship between power and authority.
37. J. L. S. Girling, Thailand: Society and Politics (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 37-8, 42.
38. S. Rose-Ackerman, 'Which Bureaucracies are Less Corruptible?', in Heidenheimer et al., Political Corruption, pp. 805, 816. Legal procedures, in fact, may be intentionally obscured in order to heighten the demand for illegal services. In such a system, moreover, those with specialized powers to interpret often opaque rules (i.e., lawyers) will likely play a prominent role.
39. Leff, 'Economic Development', pp. 396-7, 393.
40. Krueger, 'Political economy', pp.292, 195.
41. A. M. Mendoza, Jr, 'Notes for a Second Look at Rent-Seeking, Profit-Making, and Economic Change in the Philippines'. Unpublished ms, Quezon City (1995), p. 13.
42. J. E. L. Campos, 'The "Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society" Revisited: Cronyism, Political Instability, and Development', unpublished ms, Washington DC (1992), p. 15; see also Krueger, 'Political economy', p. 301 and E. S. De Dios, 'Parcelled capital and underdevelopment: a reinterpretation of the specific-factors model', Philippine Review of Economics and Business, 30 (1993), 141-55, p. 154. Other neo-classical economists, notes Mendoza in his review of the literature, acknowledge that rent-seeking is not always competitive yet nonetheless 'assert that a more competitive situation will reduce waste associated with rent-seeking' (Mendoza, 'Notes for a Second Look', p. 13).
43. J. E. L. Campos, 'The "Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society" Revisited: Cronyism, Political Instability, and Development', unpublished ms, Washington DC (1992), p. 15; see also Krueger, 'Political economy', p. 301 and E. S. De Dios, 'Parcelled capital and underdevelopment: a reinterpretation of the specific-factors model', Philippine Review of Economics and Business, 30 (1993), 141-55, p. 154. Other neo-classical economists, notes Mendoza in his review of the literature, acknowledge that rent-seeking is not always competitive yet nonetheless 'assert that a more competitive situation will reduce waste associated with rent-seeking' (Mendoza, 'Notes for a Second Look', p. 13).
44. J. E. L. Campos, 'The "Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society" Revisited: Cronyism, Political Instability, and Development', unpublished ms, Washington DC (1992), p. 15; see also Krueger, 'Political economy', p. 301 and E. S. De Dios, 'Parcelled capital and underdevelopment: a reinterpretation of the specific-factors model', Philippine Review of Economics and Business, 30 (1993), 141-55, p. 154. Other neo-classical economists, notes Mendoza in his review of the literature, acknowledge that rent-seeking is not always competitive yet nonetheless 'assert that a more competitive situation will reduce waste associated with rent-seeking' (Mendoza, 'Notes for a Second Look', p. 13).
45. J. E. L. Campos, 'The "Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society" Revisited: Cronyism, Political Instability, and Development', unpublished ms, Washington DC (1992), p. 15; see also Krueger, 'Political economy', p. 301 and E. S. De Dios, 'Parcelled capital and underdevelopment: a reinterpretation of the specific-factors model', Philippine Review of Economics and Business, 30 (1993), 141-55, p. 154. Other neo-classical economists, notes Mendoza in his review of the literature, acknowledge that rent-seeking is not always competitive yet nonetheless 'assert that a more competitive situation will reduce waste associated with rent-seeking' (Mendoza, 'Notes for a Second Look', p. 13).
46. Jomo and Gomez, 'Rents, Rent Seeking and Rent Deployment', pp. 3-4.
47. Jomo and Gomez do not provide a definition for their passing reference to the term 'rent deployment' (in their title as well as on pp. 21 and 22). I may be employing the term in a somewhat different sense than they originally intended, but I have taken the liberty to retain the term because it best suggests a systematic, purposive allocation of rents. The basic distinction between two types of rent allocation, however, derives from their discussion.
48. I am indebted to Jomo and Gomez for highlighting the important distinction between these two processes (Jomo and Gomez, 'Rents, Rent-Seeking and Rent Deployment', p. 5).
49. Nye, 'Corruption and Political Development', p. 967.
50. Indeed, one could argue that an entrepreneur who benefits from a deployed rent (and is thus probably close to the regime in power) is likely more secure than an entrepreneur who has won out in a process of competitive rent-seeking. If the regime as a whole is in danger of collapsing, however, neither category of entrepreneur is likely to have much sense of security.
51. R. F. Doner and A. Ramsay, 'An Institutional Explanation of Thai Economic Success', a paper prepared for the annual meetings of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington D.C., April 6-9 (1995), pp. 3-4. Scott Comparative Political Corruption, p. 91 .
52. R. F. Doner and A. Ramsay, 'An Institutional Explanation of Thai Economic Success', a paper prepared for the annual meetings of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington D.C., April 6-9 (1995), pp. 3-4. Scott Comparative Political Corruption, p. 91 .
53. R. H. Bates, Market and States in Tropical Africa: the Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1981).
54. World Bank, World Development Report 1991 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 9.
55. Huntington, Political Order, p. 69.
56. Scott, 'Patron-Client Polities', p. 67. Fegan offers a broadly similar distinction between 'facultative corruption' (in which the law is bent to the mutual benefit of both a bribing businessperson and a bribed bureaucrat, and neither has reason to complain to a third party) and 'obstructive corruption' (in which legitimate applications are blocked until a bribe is paid, and the business-person is likely to complain to a third party). The former is 'probably a necessary lubricant to capitalist development', while the latter is an impediment (B. Fegan, 'Contributions from Sir Arthur Conan Doyle and Mick Inder to a Theory of Bureacratisation and Corruption in Southeast Asia'. Unpublished ms, Sydney (1994), pp. 4-5).
57. Scott, 'Patron-Client Polities', p. 67. Fegan offers a broadly similar distinction between 'facultative corruption' (in which the law is bent to the mutual benefit of both a bribing businessperson and a bribed bureaucrat, and neither has reason to complain to a third party) and 'obstructive corruption' (in which legitimate applications are blocked until a bribe is paid, and the business-person is likely to complain to a third party). The former is 'probably a necessary lubricant to capitalist development', while the latter is an impediment (B. Fegan, 'Contributions from Sir Arthur Conan Doyle and Mick Inder to a Theory of Bureacratisation and Corruption in Southeast Asia'. Unpublished ms, Sydney (1994), pp. 4-5).
58. S. H. Alatas, The Sociology of Corruption: the Nature, Function, Causes, and Prevention of Corruption (Singapore, Times Books, 1980), pp. 31-5.
59. Theobald, Corruption, p. 46.
60. Theobald, Corruption, p. 131.
61. Huntington, Political Order, p. 69.
62. Leff, 'Economic Development', p. 399.
63. R. Wade, 'The system of administrative and political corruption: canal irrigation in south India', The Journal of Development Studies, 18 (1982), 287-328, pp.287-8.
64. Insights can also be drawn from comparisons of the incidence (and impact) of corruption at the national level versus the regional level, or Region A versus Region B. The more decentralized a polity, the more important such analysis would be.
65. Huntington, Political Order, p. 67, emphasis in original.
66. Evans, Embedded Autonomy, p. 61.
67. Doner and Ramsay, 'An Institutional Explanation', pp. 2-3. The relatively more efficient agencies may be more insulated from clientelistic pressures, but one should not presume that formal authority completely displaces informal networks of power. As Rudolph and Rudolph argue in their 'revisionist interpretation' of Weber's work on bureaucracy, effective administration depends not only on rational-legal authority but also on the persistence of patrimonial features able to '[mitigate] conflict and [promote] organizational loyalty, discipline, and efficiency' (Rudolph and Rudolph, 'Authority and power', p. 196). Evans argues that informal networks within developmentalist states 'reinforce the binding character of participation in the formal organizational structure rather than undercutting it in the way that informal networks based on kinship or parochial geographic loyalties would' (Evans, Embedded Autonomy, p. 59) .
68. Doner and Ramsay, 'An Institutional Explanation', pp. 2-3. The relatively more efficient agencies may be more insulated from clientelistic pressures, but one should not presume that formal authority completely displaces informal networks of power. As Rudolph and Rudolph argue in their 'revisionist interpretation' of Weber's work on bureaucracy, effective administration depends not only on rational-legal authority but also on the persistence of patrimonial features able to '[mitigate] conflict and [promote] organizational loyalty, discipline, and efficiency' (Rudolph and Rudolph, 'Authority and power', p. 196). Evans argues that informal networks within developmentalist states 'reinforce the binding character of participation in the formal organizational structure rather than undercutting it in the way that informal networks based on kinship or parochial geographic loyalties would' (Evans, Embedded Autonomy, p. 59) .
69. Doner and Ramsay, 'An Institutional Explanation', pp. 2-3. The relatively more efficient agencies may be more insulated from clientelistic pressures, but one should not presume that formal authority completely displaces informal networks of power. As Rudolph and Rudolph argue in their 'revisionist interpretation' of Weber's work on bureaucracy, effective administration depends not only on rational-legal authority but also on the persistence of patrimonial features able to '[mitigate] conflict and [promote] organizational loyalty, discipline, and efficiency' (Rudolph and Rudolph, 'Authority and power', p. 196). Evans argues that informal networks within developmentalist states 'reinforce the binding character of participation in the formal organizational structure rather than undercutting it in the way that informal networks based on kinship or parochial geographic loyalties would' (Evans, Embedded Autonomy, p. 59) .
70. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, p. 94. I prefer the term 'electoral system' to 'party system', since (as discussed below) well-institutionalized parties may or may not play an important role within a system centred around competitive elections.
71. Wade, 'The system of administrative corruption', pp. 318-9.
72. Wade, 'The system of administrative corruption', p. 288.
73. Theobald, Corruption, p. 18; see also Riggs, 'The interdependence of politics and administration'.
74. Theobald, Corruption, p. 18; see also Riggs, 'The interdependence of politics and administration'.
75. H. Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 40, 38.
76. Overall, this period is of course known as one in which corruption in Indonesia lacked any real limits (Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, pp. 80-4). To the extent that institutionalization was taking place, it was seemingly almost entirely within a military that - after 1965 - came to 'backbone' the rest of the bureaucracy (D. K. Emmerson, 'The Bureaucracy in Political Context: Weakness in Strength', in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (eds), Political Power and Communications in Indonesia (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1978); see also Crouch, The Army and Politics and B. Anderson, 'Old state, new society: Indonesia's new order in comparative historical perspective', Journal of Asian Studies, 42 (1983), 477-96.
77. Overall, this period is of course known as one in which corruption in Indonesia lacked any real limits (Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, pp. 80-4). To the extent that institutionalization was taking place, it was seemingly almost entirely within a military that - after 1965 - came to 'backbone' the rest of the bureaucracy (D. K. Emmerson, 'The Bureaucracy in Political Context: Weakness in Strength', in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (eds), Political Power and Communications in Indonesia (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1978); see also Crouch, The Army and Politics and B. Anderson, 'Old state, new society: Indonesia's new order in comparative historical perspective', Journal of Asian Studies, 42 (1983), 477-96.
78. Overall, this period is of course known as one in which corruption in Indonesia lacked any real limits (Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, pp. 80-4). To the extent that institutionalization was taking place, it was seemingly almost entirely within a military that - after 1965 - came to 'backbone' the rest of the bureaucracy (D. K. Emmerson, 'The Bureaucracy in Political Context: Weakness in Strength', in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (eds), Political Power and Communications in Indonesia (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1978); see also Crouch, The Army and Politics and B. Anderson, 'Old state, new society: Indonesia's new order in comparative historical perspective', Journal of Asian Studies, 42 (1983), 477-96.
79. Overall, this period is of course known as one in which corruption in Indonesia lacked any real limits (Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, pp. 80-4). To the extent that institutionalization was taking place, it was seemingly almost entirely within a military that - after 1965 - came to 'backbone' the rest of the bureaucracy (D. K. Emmerson, 'The Bureaucracy in Political Context: Weakness in Strength', in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (eds), Political Power and Communications in Indonesia (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1978); see also Crouch, The Army and Politics and B. Anderson, 'Old state, new society: Indonesia's new order in comparative historical perspective', Journal of Asian Studies, 42 (1983), 477-96.
80. Huntington, Political Order, pp. 70-1, emphasis added.
81. A. MacIntyre, 'Clientelism and Economic Growth: The Politics of Economic Policymaking in Indonesia', a paper prepared for the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies Washington, D.C., 6-9 April (1995), pp. 10-6.
82. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, pp. 79-80.
83. In P. D. Hutchcroft, 'Corruption's Obstructions: Assessing the Impact of Rents, Corruption, and Clientelism on Capitalist Development in the Philippines'. Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, 11-14 April 1996, Honolulu, Hawaii, I apply the various elements of this framework to the Philippines, a notoriously skewed, irregular political economic landscape long the playfield of both established oligarchs and favoured cronies. The country's particular configuration of political power, I conclude, has nurtured types of rent-seeking, corruption, and clientelistic ties that have proven generally obstructive to sustained economic development.
84. See for example Nye, 'Corruption and Political Development'. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, pp. 90-1. Theobald, Corruption, pp. 107-32.
85. See for example Nye, 'Corruption and Political Development'. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, pp. 90-1. Theobald, Corruption, pp. 107-32.
86. See for example Nye, 'Corruption and Political Development'. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, pp. 90-1. Theobald, Corruption, pp. 107-32.
87. Wade, 'The system of administrative corruption', p. 288.