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1
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34247980541
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Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis
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June
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From a “Comment,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, vi (January 1964), 195, as cited in J. S. Nye, “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,” American Political Science Review, lxi (June 1967), 417.
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(1967)
American Political Science Review
, vol.61
, pp. 417
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Nye, J.S.1
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3
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84964160756
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Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption
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November
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Nye (fn. i); Nathaniel Leff, “Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption,” American Behavioral Scientist, viii (November 1964), 8-15; James C. Scott, “The Analysis of Corruption in Developing Nations,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, xi (June 1969), 315-41. I regret that in the preparation of this article I was unable to consult James Scott's recent Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1972).
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(1964)
American Behavioral Scientist
, vol.viii
, pp. 8-15
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Leff, N.1
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4
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84948317708
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Modernization and Reform from Above: The Case of Iran
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February
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Cf. James Bill, “Modernization and Reform from Above: The Case of Iran,” Journal of Politics, xxxii (February 1970), 19-40.
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(1970)
Journal of Politics
, vol.32
, pp. 19-40
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Bill, J.1
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6
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84904516948
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Neotraditional Accommodation to Political Independence: The Case of Indonesia
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Boston
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Ann Ruth Willner, “Neotraditional Accommodation to Political Independence: The Case of Indonesia,” in Lucian Pye, ed., Cases in Comparative Politics: Asia (Boston 1970), 249. Cf. Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton 1971), esp. 100-102. The systemic parallels between Morocco and Iran are extraordinarily, although not coincidentally, close.
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(1970)
Cases in Comparative Politics: Asia
, pp. 249
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Willner, A.R.1
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7
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84974043853
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The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change since 1910
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James W. Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change since 1910 (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1967), 5-9.
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(1967)
Berkeley and Los Angeles
, pp. 5-9
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Wilkie, J.W.1
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8
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84970769008
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Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change
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December
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For a relevant analysis, see James C. Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” American Political Science Review, lxiii (December 1969), 1142-58.
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(1969)
American Political Science Review
, vol.63
, pp. 1142-1158
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Scott, J.C.1
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9
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33845759925
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Patronage in Sicily
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March
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For some excellent discussions of what has become the subject of a great deal of study among anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists, see Jeremy Boissevain, “Patronage in Sicily,” Man: Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 1 (March 1966), 18-33; René Lemarchand and Keith Legg, “Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis,” Comparative Politics, iv (January 1972), 149-78; Lemarchand, “Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-building,” American Political Science Review, lxvi (March 1972), 68-90; Alex Weingrod, “Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, x (July 1969), 376-400; James C. Scott, “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” American Political Science Review, lxvi (March 1972), 91-113; Richard Sandbrook, “Patrons, Clients, and Factions: New Dimensions of Conflict Analysis in Africa,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, v (March 1972), 104-19.
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(1966)
Man: Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute
, vol.1
, pp. 18-33
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Boissevain, J.1
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11
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84907619290
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For a useful discussion of the overlap between patronage and corruption, see Edward Van Roy, “On the Theory of Corruption,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, xix (October 1970), 86-110. Scott calls attention to the same overlap when he proposes “… that corruption may be viewed as a process of political influence such that similar practices may violate community norms at one place and time and not at another” (fn. 3), 317. I do not concur in the relevance of the distinction between “patron,” a person who controls resources, and “broker,” a person who controls access to resources—a distinction made by both Scott (fn. 9), 96-98, and Lemarchand (fn. 9), throughout. It would seem to me unlikely that any given patron would fail to combine some aspects of both functions, and, after all, connections are resources, as is the number of clients.
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Economic Development and Cultural Change
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13
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34247965881
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Situations of Contested Legitimacy in Morocco: An Alternative Framework
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January
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Boissevain (fn. 9), develops this theme with reference to Sicily, suggesting that Catholicism, a saint-oriented religion, gives an other-worldly impetus to the quest for intercession. It may be that saints are part and parcel of belief systems emerging out of situations of real material scarcity. Islam, while hostile to saints, has been forced to tolerate saindy cults most everywhere it has spread. For more on the interrelation of scarcity, state power, and patronage, see Lemarchand and Legg (fn. 8); A. Vingradov and J. Waterbury, “Situations of Contested Legitimacy in Morocco: An Alternative Framework,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, xiii (January 1971), 32-59.
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(1971)
Comparative Studies in Society and History
, vol.13
, pp. 32-59
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Vingradov, A.1
Waterbury, J.2
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14
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84974043849
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Personnel Processes of the Thai Bureaucracy
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William J. Siffin emphasizes this process with regard to Thailand. See his “Personnel Processes of the Thai Bureaucracy,” in Heady and Stokes, eds., Papers in Comparative Administration (Ann Arbor 1962), 207-28.
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(1962)
Papers in Comparative Administration
, pp. 207-228
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Siffin, W.J.1
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17
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84974066627
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Developmentalist Time and Leadership in Developing Countries
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Bloomington
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It may be hypothesized, although I have seen no systematic test of the hypothesis, that in many developing countries corruption fails to arouse mass moral indignation because the notions of public and private spheres are not highly developed. That is, when we speak of the use of public power for private ends, it is assumed that we can define what is private, and that public power is subject to universalistic criteria. It is also assumed that there is a kind of multiple role specialization whereby a bureaucrat is a “public” figure for eight hours a day and a “private” citizen the rest. In fact, it is common for bureaucrats in developing countries to carry role-playing to extremes by insulating themselves rigidly in the impartiality and rule-conscious role of the public official in order to stave off the importunities of clients who want to force them into the role of dispenser of particularistic favors. Variations on this theme are explored in Fred Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston 1964) ; Hahn-Bee Lee, “Developmentalist Time and Leadership in Developing Countries,” CAG Occasional Papers (Bloomington 1966) ; and José A. Silva Michelena, “The Venezuelan Bureaucrat,” in A Strategy for Research on Social Policy (The Politics of Change in Venezuela), I (Boston 1967), 86-119.
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(1966)
CAG Occasional Papers
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Lee, H.-B.1
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18
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84970169737
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The Peasant View of the Bad Life
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(emphasis in original).
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F. G. Bailey, “The Peasant View of the Bad Life,” Science and Culture (Calcutta), xxxiii (February 1967), 31-40 (emphasis in original).
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(1967)
Science and Culture (Calcutta)
, vol.33
, pp. 31-40
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Bailey, F.G.1
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19
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84974066624
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The La Paz Census of 1970
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(West Coast Latin American Series, Hanover, N.H.)
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See the graphic description of one such process in Richard Patch, “The La Paz Census of 1970,” American Universities Field Staff Report (West Coast Latin American Series, Hanover, N.H., 1970), 7-10.
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(1970)
American Universities Field Staff Report
, pp. 7-10
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Patch, R.1
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20
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34248985821
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Patterns of Rural Rebellion in Morocco: Tribes as Minorities
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Lemarchand (fn. 9), 68.
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Boissevain (fn. 9) sustains this point with regard to Sicily; see also Ernest Gellner, “Patterns of Rural Rebellion in Morocco: Tribes as Minorities,” European Journal of Sociology, 111, No. 2 (1962); Lemarchand (fn. 9), 68.
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(1962)
European Journal of Sociology
, vol.111
, Issue.2
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Gellner, E.1
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21
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84974072833
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The Coup Manqué
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Many Moroccan entrepreneurs combine elements of the Marxist notion of “comprador” as well as the more graphic expletive of “Lumpen-bourgeoisie” used by André Gunder Frank in Lumpen-bourgeoisie et lumpen-développement, Maspéro, Cahiers Libres 205-206 (Paris 1971). Omar Ben Messaoud, former attaché in the Royal Cabinet and go-between between Pan American and the Moroccan Ministry of Finance, is exemplary of the Moroccan bourgeoisie, although his arrest indicates that he overplayed his hand. See Waterbury, “The Coup Manqué,” American Universities Field Staff Report, North African Series, xv, No. 1 (1971).
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(1971)
American Universities Field Staff Report, North African Series
, vol.xv
, Issue.1
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Waterbury1
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