Missile defence and the transatlantic security relationship

International Affairs

Volumn 77, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 485-507

  Bowen, Wyn Q ^a  

^a Joint Services Command and Staff College   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 0040334019     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2346.00203     Document Type: Article

References (123)

1. Shortly after taking office in 1993, the Clinton administration placed an emphasis on developing theatre missile defences (TMD) to protect deployed forces and regional allies against short-range missile attacks, as typified by Iraq's use of Scud derivatives during the 1991 Gulf War. In doing so, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Office was renamed the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), and the 1991 reorientation of SDI towards a Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) was scrapped. Strategic missile defence under the label of NMD was downgraded to a research and development effort directed at addressing longer-term threats to the United States. See D. Raikow, 'SDIO changes its letterhead to BMDO', Arms Control Today, June 1993, p. 1; 'BMD era requires vision, difficult choices', Defense News, 17-23 May 1993, p. 13.
2. Shortly after taking office in 1993, the Clinton administration placed an emphasis on developing theatre missile defences (TMD) to protect deployed forces and regional allies against short-range missile attacks, as typified by Iraq's use of Scud derivatives during the 1991 Gulf War. In doing so, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Office was renamed the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), and the 1991 reorientation of SDI towards a Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) was scrapped. Strategic missile defence under the label of NMD was downgraded to a research and development effort directed at addressing longer-term threats to the United States. See D. Raikow, 'SDIO changes its letterhead to BMDO', Arms Control Today, June 1993, p. 1; 'BMD era requires vision, difficult choices', Defense News, 17-23 May 1993, p. 13.
3. The Clinton administration had responded to Republican pressure during the election year of 1996 by announcing a 3+3 programme for NMD. This envisioned three years of research followed by a decision to deploy within another three years if justified by the threat.
4. President's Summary of DCI National Intelligence Estimate 95-19 (PS/NIE 95-19), 'Emerging missile threats to North America', Nov. 1995.
5. Rowan Scarborough and Bill Gertz, 'Missile-threat "politicized" GOP says', Washington Times, 30 Jan. 1996, pp. A1, A14.
6. Executive Summary, Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, pursuant to Public Law 201, 104th United States Congress, 15 July 1998.
7. See Richard L. Garwin, 'A defense that will not defend', Washington Quarterly 23: 3, Summer 2000, p. 113.
8. The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998, and other missile tests by Iran and Pakistan, had further exacerbated Republican perceptions that proliferation was totally out of control, thereby fuelling the quest for NMD deployment.
9. The rationale was that funds would be in place when the technology matured and the threat warranted a deployment decision. See Steven Lee Myers, 'Clinton to pledge $7 billion for missile defense system', New York Times, 7 Jan. 1999, p. 28.
10. In addition, the 3+3 schedule was replaced with a 4+5 timetable, partially in response to the 'rush to failure' warning of the Welch report in 1998, which had warned about pressures to accelerate deployment without adequate flight-testing. See Karl A. Lamers (rapporteur), NMD and implications for the alliance, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Political Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations, Interim Report, Nov. 2000, para. 9, http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/2000/at-265-e.html; Craig Cemiello, 'Cohen announces NMD restructuring, funding boost', Arms Control Today, Jan.-Feb. 1999, pp. 20, 30.
11. In addition, the 3+3 schedule was replaced with a 4+5 timetable, partially in response to the 'rush to failure' warning of the Welch report in 1998, which had warned about pressures to accelerate deployment without adequate flight-testing. See Karl A. Lamers (rapporteur), NMD and implications for the alliance, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Political Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations, Interim Report, Nov. 2000, para. 9, http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/2000/at-265-e.html; Craig Cemiello, 'Cohen announces NMD restructuring, funding boost', Arms Control Today, Jan.-Feb. 1999, pp. 20, 30.
12. The single designated American site for basing ground-based interceptors is Grand Forks, North Dakota.
13. President Clinton had agreed to sign the bill on the proviso it included two amendments. The first stated that deployment would be subject to the annual authorization of appropriations, and the second stated that 'it is the policy of the US to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces.' See Craig Cerniello, 'Clinton signs controversial NMD legislation', Arms Control Today, July-Aug. 1999, p. 22.
14. In addition to North Korea's Taepo-dong launch, Iran's test of the Shahab-3 was cited as evidence of long-range potential. See National Intelligence Council, 'Foreign missile developments and the ballistic missile threat to the United States through 2015', Sept. 1999, nie99msl.htm" http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nuie/nie99msl.htm.
15. See e.g. 'Clinton and Putin fail to close gap on missile barrier', New York Times, 5 June 2000, http://www.nyt.com; 'Russia says US antimissile plan means an arms race', New York Times, 6 Feb. 2001, http://www.nyt.com.
16. See e.g. 'Clinton and Putin fail to close gap on missile barrier', New York Times, 5 June 2000, http://www.nyt.com; 'Russia says US antimissile plan means an arms race', New York Times, 6 Feb. 2001, http://www.nyt.com.
17. Cerniello, 'Cohen announces NMD Restructuring', pp. 20, 30.
18. In 1996 it was reported that a Chinese official had claimed the United States would not intervene in a China-Taiwan dispute because American leaders 'care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan'. This remark was seen as a veiled nuclear threat by China to deter a future US intervention to protect Taiwan. It was made prior to a series of Chinese missile tests off the coast of Taiwan in March 1996 designed for intimidation purposes in the run-up to Taiwanese democratic elections. Patrick E. Tyler, 'As China threatens Taiwan, it makes sure US listens', New York Times, 24 Jan. 1996, p. A3. See also e.g. Bill Gertz, 'U.S. sternly warns China', Washington Times, 11 Mar. 1996, pp. A1, A10 and Martin Sieff, 'US blasts "reckless" missile tests by China', Washington Times, 8 Mar. 1996, p. A14.
19. In 1996 it was reported that a Chinese official had claimed the United States would not intervene in a China-Taiwan dispute because American leaders 'care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan'. This remark was seen as a veiled nuclear threat by China to deter a future US intervention to protect Taiwan. It was made prior to a series of Chinese missile tests off the coast of Taiwan in March 1996 designed for intimidation purposes in the run-up to Taiwanese democratic elections. Patrick E. Tyler, 'As China threatens Taiwan, it makes sure US listens', New York Times, 24 Jan. 1996, p. A3. See also e.g. Bill Gertz, 'U.S. sternly warns China', Washington Times, 11 Mar. 1996, pp. A1, A10 and Martin Sieff, 'US blasts "reckless" missile tests by China', Washington Times, 8 Mar. 1996, p. A14.
20. In 1996 it was reported that a Chinese official had claimed the United States would not intervene in a China-Taiwan dispute because American leaders 'care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan'. This remark was seen as a veiled nuclear threat by China to deter a future US intervention to protect Taiwan. It was made prior to a series of Chinese missile tests off the coast of Taiwan in March 1996 designed for intimidation purposes in the run-up to Taiwanese democratic elections. Patrick E. Tyler, 'As China threatens Taiwan, it makes sure US listens', New York Times, 24 Jan. 1996, p. A3. See also e.g. Bill Gertz, 'U.S. sternly warns China', Washington Times, 11 Mar. 1996, pp. A1, A10 and Martin Sieff, 'US blasts "reckless" missile tests by China', Washington Times, 8 Mar. 1996, p. A14.
21. China is already undergoing a strategic modernization programme involving the development of mobile and solid-fuelled missiles, as well as the incorporation of multiple warheads on individual rockets. See e.g. James Lamson and Wyn Bowen, '"One arrow, three stars": China's programme to develop multiple-warhead missiles, part I', Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1997, pp. 216-18; James Lamson and Wyn Bowen, '"One arrow, three stars": China's programme to develop multiple-warhead missiles, part II', Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1997, pp. 266-9.
22. China is already undergoing a strategic modernization programme involving the development of mobile and solid-fuelled missiles, as well as the incorporation of multiple warheads on individual rockets. See e.g. James Lamson and Wyn Bowen, '"One arrow, three stars": China's programme to develop multiple-warhead missiles, part I', Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1997, pp. 216-18; James Lamson and Wyn Bowen, '"One arrow, three stars": China's programme to develop multiple-warhead missiles, part II', Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1997, pp. 266-9.
23. The limited NMD concept envisions mid-course interception after an offensive missile has deployed its warhead(s) and any counter-measures. An initial deployment would involve the location of 100 ground-based interceptors, and the construction of an X-band radar, in Alaska. It would also involve upgrading five early-warning radars, including one in the United Kingdom and one in Greenland. Moreover, the system would use early-warning satellites and a battle management system would coordinate the various elements. This initial deployment would defend against a few tens of warheads launched from North Korea and a smaller attack from the Middle East. In later stages, the system would be expanded to include an additional interceptor site, more X-band radars and a new space-based infra-red system (SBIRS) of satellites. This would provide greater protection against missile attacks from the Middle East.
24. Walter B. Slocombe, 'The administration's approach', Washington Quarterly 23: 3 (Summer 2000), p. 80. Walter Slocombe wrote this article in his capacity as US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the Clinton administration.
25. This would involve modifying the treaty to permit national coverage and moving America's single interceptor site from North Dakota to Alaska. The ABMT provides for revisions to take account of changes in the strategic environment. It also permits a party to withdraw with six months notice. Ibid., p. 83.
26. The reasons given for the Senate's refusal to ratify the CTBT included the need to preserve a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent and concerns over whether it would be possible to verify that potential adversaries were living up to their commitments not to conduct nuclear tests.
27. William Drozdiak, 'Possible US missile shield alarms Europe; allies fear arms race, diminished security ties', Washington Post, 6 Nov. 1999, p. A1.
28. Bill Gertz, 'Cohen sees Russia, US allies as hurdles to a missile defense', Washington Times, 5 Oct. 1999, p. A1.
29. See Philip H. Gordon, 'Bush, missile defence and the Atlantic alliance', Survival 43: 1 (Spring 2000), p. 18; Joseph Cirincione, 'The missile defence divide', paper presented to Western European Union Institute for Security Studies Conference on 'National Missile Defence and the future of nuclear policy', 9 June 2000, Paris, http://www.ceip. org.
30. See Philip H. Gordon, 'Bush, missile defence and the Atlantic alliance', Survival 43: 1 (Spring 2000), p. 18; Joseph Cirincione, 'The missile defence divide', paper presented to Western European Union Institute for Security Studies Conference on 'National Missile Defence and the future of nuclear policy', 9 June 2000, Paris, http://www.ceip. org.
31. See e.g. David Buchan, 'US reassures NATO allies on defence', Financial Times, 16 Dec. 1999, p. 1; Drozdiak 'Possible US missile shield alarms Europe', p. A1.
32. See e.g. David Buchan, 'US reassures NATO allies on defence', Financial Times, 16 Dec. 1999, p. 1; Drozdiak 'Possible US missile shield alarms Europe', p. A1.
33. 'Putin bends Clinton's ear hoping to halt missile shield', New York Times, 22 July 2000, http://www.nyt.com.
34. Walter Pincus, 'Cohen urges missile defense delay; Clinton decision could preclude changes, Secretary says', Washington Post, 26 July 2000, p. A20.
35. Fact sheet: National Missile Defense, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Washington DC, 1 Sept. 2000.
36. Gordon, 'Bush, missile defence and the Atlantic alliance', p. 18.
37. See Wade Boese, 'Clinton NMD decision welcomed abroad, reactions at home are mixed', Arms Control Today, Sept. 2000, pp. 20, 23.
38. See Martin Kettle, 'Bush budget drives home missile shield priority', Guardian, 1 March 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
39. As a presidential candidate, Bush reacted to Clinton's deferral decision by citing it as evidence of how the Clinton-Gore administration had 'failed to strengthen America's defenses'. See 'Statement by Governor George W. Bush regarding President Clinton's announcement on a National Missile Defense system', 1 Sept. 2000; statements by Gore and Bush on NMD, Yorkshire CND website http://www.gn.apc.org/cndyorks/yspace/articles/nmd15.htm; Roberto Suro, 'Clinton defers missile defense; deployment decision left to successor; technical woes, diplomatic costs cited', Washington Post, 2 Sept. 2000, p. A1.
40. As a presidential candidate, Bush reacted to Clinton's deferral decision by citing it as evidence of how the Clinton-Gore administration had 'failed to strengthen America's defenses'. See 'Statement by Governor George W. Bush regarding President Clinton's announcement on a National Missile Defense system', 1 Sept. 2000; statements by Gore and Bush on NMD, Yorkshire CND website http://www.gn.apc.org/cndyorks/yspace/articles/nmd15.htm; Roberto Suro, 'Clinton defers missile defense; deployment decision left to successor; technical woes, diplomatic costs cited', Washington Post, 2 Sept. 2000, p. A1.
41. Kettle, 'Bush budget drives home missile shield priority'.
42. George W. Bush, 'Remarks by the President to the students and faculty at National Defense University, Fort Lesly J. McNair, Washington, DC, 1 May 2001', Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Washington DC, http://www.whitehouse.gov.
43. See Prepared Remarks by US Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld at the NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC-D), Brussels, Belgium, 7 June 2001 (http://www.nato.int/docu.speech/2001/s10607c.htm);
44. Ben MacIntyre, 'US aims to have early version of missile defence system by 2004', The Times, 2 May 2001, http://www.thetimes.co.uk.
45. Paul Mann, 'Next President faces a missile defense knot', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 18 Sept. 2000, pp. 27-8.
46. See e.g. 'Rumsfeld Directs DoD changes to raise profile of space control', Defense Daily, 9 May 2001, Vol.210: 28, p.1 and Edward Alden, 'US plans to consolidate space-based arms policy', Financial Times, 9 May 2001, p. 17.
47. See e.g. 'Rumsfeld Directs DoD changes to raise profile of space control', Defense Daily, 9 May 2001, Vol.210: 28, p.1 and Edward Alden, 'US plans to consolidate space-based arms policy', Financial Times, 9 May 2001, p. 17.
48. Bush's remarks to National Defence University, 1 May 2001.
49. George Jones and Ben Fenton, 'We'll back Star Wars, says Hague', Daily Telegraph, 12 Jan. 2001, http://www.telegraph.co.uk.
50. Ben MacIntyre, 'Bush prepares to slash the US nuclear arsenal', The Times, 10 Feb. 2001, http://www.thetimes.co.uk.
51. In 1997, a range of 2,000-2,500 was identified by the US and Russia as the possible basis for a START III agreement.
52. Michael Sirak, 'Briefing: US Ballistic Missile Defence: BMD takes shape', Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 April 2001, pp. 29-32. See also Toby Harnden and Toby Helm, 'Euro force complex and risky, says Robertson', Daily Telegraph, 6 Feb. 2001, p. 17; Martin Kettle, Ewen MacAskill and Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Nato chief's warning to Europe stirs row over missile defence', Guardian, 6 Feb. 2001, p. 8; Kerry Gildea, 'NATO Secretary General reports EU view shifting on missile defense', Defense Daily International, 9 March 2001, pp. 1-2.
53. Michael Sirak, 'Briefing: US Ballistic Missile Defence: BMD takes shape', Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 April 2001, pp. 29-32. See also Toby Harnden and Toby Helm, 'Euro force complex and risky, says Robertson', Daily Telegraph, 6 Feb. 2001, p. 17; Martin Kettle, Ewen MacAskill and Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Nato chief's warning to Europe stirs row over missile defence', Guardian, 6 Feb. 2001, p. 8; Kerry Gildea, 'NATO Secretary General reports EU view shifting on missile defense', Defense Daily International, 9 March 2001, pp. 1-2.
54. Michael Sirak, 'Briefing: US Ballistic Missile Defence: BMD takes shape', Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 April 2001, pp. 29-32. See also Toby Harnden and Toby Helm, 'Euro force complex and risky, says Robertson', Daily Telegraph, 6 Feb. 2001, p. 17; Martin Kettle, Ewen MacAskill and Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Nato chief's warning to Europe stirs row over missile defence', Guardian, 6 Feb. 2001, p. 8; Kerry Gildea, 'NATO Secretary General reports EU view shifting on missile defense', Defense Daily International, 9 March 2001, pp. 1-2.
55. Michael Sirak, 'Briefing: US Ballistic Missile Defence: BMD takes shape', Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 April 2001, pp. 29-32. See also Toby Harnden and Toby Helm, 'Euro force complex and risky, says Robertson', Daily Telegraph, 6 Feb. 2001, p. 17; Martin Kettle, Ewen MacAskill and Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Nato chief's warning to Europe stirs row over missile defence', Guardian, 6 Feb. 2001, p. 8; Kerry Gildea, 'NATO Secretary General reports EU view shifting on missile defense', Defense Daily International, 9 March 2001, pp. 1-2.
56. Bush, 'Remarks by the President to the students and faculty at National Defense University'.
57. See e.g. Camille Grand, 'Missile defense: the view from the other side of the Atlantic', Arms Control Today, Sept. 2000, http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/septoo/grandseptoo.htm; Gordon, 'Bush, missile defence and the Atlantic alliance', p. 24.
58. See e.g. Camille Grand, 'Missile defense: the view from the other side of the Atlantic', Arms Control Today, Sept. 2000, http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/septoo/grandseptoo.htm; Gordon, 'Bush, missile defence and the Atlantic alliance', p. 24.
59. Stephen Cambone, Ivo Daalder, Stephen J. Hadley and Christopher J. Makins, European views of National Missile Defense (Washington DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, Sept. 2000), p. 7.
60. Grand, 'Missile defense'.
61. See Jan Hoekema (rapporteur), National Missile Defence and the alliance after Kosovo, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Defence and Security Committee, Draft General Report, 3 Oct. 2000, para. 22, http://www.nato-pa.int/publications/comrep/2000/at-243-e.html.
62. Hubert Vedrine, quoted by Yves Boyer (Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, Pans), 'International perspectives on National Missile Defense', paper presented to the BASIC Forum at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 18 Sept. 2000, http://www.ceip.org.
63. François Heisbourg, 'Brussels' burden', Washington Quarterly 23: 3 (Summer 2000), p. 132.
64. Cambone et al., European views of National Missile Defense, p. 16.
65. Remarks by Alessandro Pohti (Italian ministry of defence) to the BASIC Forum at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 18 Sept. 2000, http://www.ceip.org.
66. Stephen Castle, 'North Korea freezes missile tests', Independent, 4 May 2001, p. 14; Don Kirk, 'US planning to resume talks with North Korea, policy review awaited, envoy tells Seoul', International herald Tribune, 10 May 2001, p. 8; Richard Lloyd Parry and Stephen Castle, 'EU talks with North Korea on diplomatic relations', Independent, 2 May 2001, p. 13.
67. Stephen Castle, 'North Korea freezes missile tests', Independent, 4 May 2001, p. 14; Don Kirk, 'US planning to resume talks with North Korea, policy review awaited, envoy tells Seoul', International herald Tribune, 10 May 2001, p. 8; Richard Lloyd Parry and Stephen Castle, 'EU talks with North Korea on diplomatic relations', Independent, 2 May 2001, p. 13.
68. Stephen Castle, 'North Korea freezes missile tests', Independent, 4 May 2001, p. 14; Don Kirk, 'US planning to resume talks with North Korea, policy review awaited, envoy tells Seoul', International herald Tribune, 10 May 2001, p. 8; Richard Lloyd Parry and Stephen Castle, 'EU talks with North Korea on diplomatic relations', Independent, 2 May 2001, p. 13.
69. These studies are in line with the alliance's 1999 Washington communiqué, which identified proliferation as a 'matter of serious concern' for NATO and outlined the WMD initiative as the alliance's response. The initiative is designed to coordinate non-proliferation efforts and to 'increase military readiness to operate in a WMD environment and to counter WMD threats'. See Karl A. Lamers, NMD and implications for the alliance, paras 25-6, 36.
70. Cambone et al., European views of National Missile Defense, p. 12.
71. In June 1999, for example, Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov described the ABMT as 'the cornerstone of further cuts in strategic offensive weapons'. See Daniel Williams, 'Russia rejects changes to ABM Treaty; Moscow sees US plan as initiation of a new arms race', Washington Post, 23 June 1999, p. A18.
72. Tomas Valasek, Europe's role in NMD, Center for Defense Information, Washington, DC, http://www.cdi.org/hotspots/issuebrief/ch8.
73. Joseph Fitchett, 'NATO allies shifting on missile shield', International Herald Tribune, 27 Feb. 2001, http://www.iht.com.
74. John Vinocur, 'Germany, despite skepticism, won't block US on missile shield', International Herald Tribune, 19 Feb. 2001, http://www.iht.com. See also Marcus Warren, 'Putin tries to exploit NATO rift on missiles', Daily Telegraph, 21 Feb. 2001, http://www.telegraph.co.uk; Nikolai Sokov, Russian missile defense for Europe: the Feb. 20 proposal is more serious than it seems, CNS Report, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, http://cns.miiis.edu/pubs/reports/sokrmd.htm.
75. John Vinocur, 'Germany, despite skepticism, won't block US on missile shield', International Herald Tribune, 19 Feb. 2001, http://www.iht.com. See also Marcus Warren, 'Putin tries to exploit NATO rift on missiles', Daily Telegraph, 21 Feb. 2001, http://www.telegraph.co.uk; Nikolai Sokov, Russian missile defense for Europe: the Feb. 20 proposal is more serious than it seems, CNS Report, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, http://cns.miiis.edu/pubs/reports/sokrmd.htm.
76. John Vinocur, 'Germany, despite skepticism, won't block US on missile shield', International Herald Tribune, 19 Feb. 2001, http://www.iht.com. See also Marcus Warren, 'Putin tries to exploit NATO rift on missiles', Daily Telegraph, 21 Feb. 2001, http://www.telegraph.co.uk; Nikolai Sokov, Russian missile defense for Europe: the Feb. 20 proposal is more serious than it seems, CNS Report, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, http://cns.miiis.edu/pubs/reports/sokrmd.htm.
77. Drozdiak, 'Possible US missile shield alarms Europe', p. A1.
78. Lamers, NMD and implications for the alliance, para. 40.
79. Grand, 'Missile defense'.
80. Slocombe, 'The administration's approach', p. 80.
81. Ibid.
82. Gordon, 'Bush, missile defence and the Atlantic alliance', p. 18.
83. Stephen J. Hadley, 'A call to deploy', Washington Quarterly 23: 3 (Summer 2000), p. 104.
84. Gordon, 'Bush, missile defence and the Atlantic alliance', p. 30.
85. Heisbourg, 'Brussels' burden', p. 130.
86. Grand, 'Missile defense'.
87. See Heisbourg, 'Brussels' burden', p. 129; Grand, 'Missile defense'.
88. See Heisbourg, 'Brussels' burden', p. 129; Grand, 'Missile defense'.
89. See e.g. Robert J. Art, 'To what ends military power?', International Security 4, Spring 1980.
90. Several senior members of the Bush administration are reported to support the pursuit of low-yield nuclear weapons designed to destroy hardened underground bunkers housing NBC stockpiles or command centres but without causing collateral damage. Proponents of such a capability claim that potential adversaries such as Saddam Hussein realize the United States would not target such sites with current nuclear weapons because the risk is too great in terms of collateral damage. It is also argued that a low-yield 'bunker-buster' could help to deter aggression or the use of NBC by future adversaries. See MacIntyre, 'Bush prepares to slash the US nuclear arsenal'; and MacIntyre, 'US studies plan for missile to blast bunkers', The Times, 16 April 2001, http://www.thetimes.co.uk.
91. Several senior members of the Bush administration are reported to support the pursuit of low-yield nuclear weapons designed to destroy hardened underground bunkers housing NBC stockpiles or command centres but without causing collateral damage. Proponents of such a capability claim that potential adversaries such as Saddam Hussein realize the United States would not target such sites with current nuclear weapons because the risk is too great in terms of collateral damage. It is also argued that a low-yield 'bunker-buster' could help to deter aggression or the use of NBC by future adversaries. See MacIntyre, 'Bush prepares to slash the US nuclear arsenal'; and MacIntyre, 'US studies plan for missile to blast bunkers', The Times, 16 April 2001, http://www.thetimes.co.uk.
92. Remarks by Sir Timothy Garden (Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London) to the BASIC Forum at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 18 Sept. 2000, http://www.ceip.org.
93. 'Executive summary', Countermeasures: a technical evaluation of the operational effectiveness of the planned US National Missile Defense System, April 2000, report of a study group organized by the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pp. xix-xxiv, http://www.ucsusa.org/arms.
94. Ibid., p. xx.
95. See e.g. Lisbeth Gronlund, 'The planned US National Missile Defense system: obsolete before deployment', in Burkhard Schmitt and Julian Lindley-French, eds, National Missile Defence and the future of nuclear policy (Brussels: Institute for Security Studies of WEU 2000, Sept. 2000), http://www.weu.int/institute/index.html.
96. Hoekema, National Missile Defence and the alliance after Kosovo, para. 34.
97. See e.g. Garden, remarks to BASIC Forum.
98. Lamers, NMD and implications for the alliance, para. 81.
99. See e.g. Heisbourg, 'Brussels' burden', pp. 128-9.
100. Alexander Nicholl, 'Europe's defence spending continues to fall', Financial Times, 17 May 2001, http://www.ft.com/ft.
101. For brief summaries of the official French and German positions see Joschka Fisher, German minister of foreign affairs, speech to the German parliament (official text), 8 June 2000; 'Deployment of an NMD system', reply by Hubert Vedrine, French minister of foreign affairs, to a written question in the National Assembly, Paris, 26 Feb. 2001, http://www.info-france-usa.org/news/statmnts/nmd.html.
102. For brief summaries of the official French and German positions see Joschka Fisher, German minister of foreign affairs, speech to the German parliament (official text), 8 June 2000; 'Deployment of an NMD system', reply by Hubert Vedrine, French minister of foreign affairs, to a written question in the National Assembly, Paris, 26 Feb. 2001, http://www.info-france-usa.org/news/statmnts/nmd.html.
103. 'US will build missile shield, EU allies told', Los Angeles Times, 4 Feb. 2001.
104. 'Chirac sees US plan triggering arms race', International Herald Tribune, 30 Jan. 2001, http://www.iht.com; 'France insists US missile shield raises worries', Reuters, 28 Feb. 2001.
105. 'Chirac sees US plan triggering arms race', International Herald Tribune, 30 Jan. 2001, http://www.iht.com; 'France insists US missile shield raises worries', Reuters, 28 Feb. 2001.
106. Cambone et al., European views of National Missile Defense, p. 8.
107. Vedrine, quoted by Yves Boyer, BASIC Forum.
108. Heisbourg, 'Brussels' burden', pp. 128-9.
109. Grand, 'Missile defense'.
110. The two facilities include RAF Fylingdales, where an early warning radar would need to be upgraded initially and a new X-band radar constructed at a later stage, and RAF Menwith Hill, where a ground station for the future Space-Based Infra-Red System of satellites would eventually relay data on missile launches.
111. Andrew Parker, 'Cook praises US missile plan', Financial Times, 8 Feb. 2001, http://news.ft.com/ft.
112. 'US National Missile Defence and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty', joint memorandum prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence for the inquiry into weapons of mass destruction, eighth report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, Session 1999-2000 (London: Stationary Office, 25 July 2000), pp. 131-2.
113. Toby Helm, 'Germany retreats on missile shield', Daily Telegraph, March 2000, http://www.telegraph.co.uk.-
114. Reassuring Beijing, on the other hand, could be a very different prospect given the Bush administration's description of China as a 'strategic competitor' and rumoured additions of Chinese locations to America's nuclear targeting list as part of a refocused nuclear doctrine. Indeed, given these developments it is not difficult to see why China views America's BMD plans as aimed specifically at them and not the likes of North Korea.
115. The administration appears committed to 'layered' defences combining various interception methods to maximize the chances of successful engagement. The Bush administration is considering numerous architecture options including space-based, sea-based, ground-based and airborne assets, BPI technologies, mid-course interception and extended TMD systems.
116. See e.g. Cambone, et al., European views of National Missile Defense, p. 16.
117. See e.g. remarks by Sverre Lodgaard (Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Oslo) to the BASIC Forum at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 18 Sept. 2000, http://www.ceip.org.
118. The issue of cost will also have a major influence in the United States. For example, if the Democrats retake control of Congress in the 2002 mid-term elections, doubts about pumping vast sums of money into unproven technologies, in response to an uncertain threat, could result in reduced budgetary outlays making it difficult for the Bush administration to pursue a multifaceted BMD concept. This situation could be exacerbated by budgetary constraints imposed by an economic recession. Moreover, if the Democrats retake the White House in 2004 a new president could act to significantly narrow the scope of BMD.
119. Donald Macintyre, 'Mr Cook's mission is not as impossible at it seems', Independent, 6 Feb. 2001, p. 3.
120. Joint statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, 23 Feb. 2001, http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/.
121. For example, the Bush administration could decide against offering Russia the carrot of a new START agreement in order to preserve America's ability to expand its strategic arsenal in future by not being locked into such a treaty.
122. See for example, Ivo Daalder and James H. Lindsay, 'Unilateral Withdrawal from ABM Treaty is a bad idea', International Herald Tribune, 30 April 2001 http://www.iht.com.
123. At a meeting of defence ministers in Brussels on 7 June 2001, Donald Rumsfeld told his NATO counterparts that a broader 'layered deterrence' strategy was required 'that can deal with a variety of emerging threats at different stages'. Although Rumsfeld said the United States did not want to abandon nuclear deterrence, he said it should be 'one layer of a broader deterrence strategy that includes several mutually reinforcing layers of deterrence'. According to Rumsfeld, this strategy would aim to 'dissuade countries from pursuing dangerous capabilities in the first place, by developing and deploying capabilities that reduce their incentives to compete'. It would also 'discourage them from investing further in existing dangerous capabilities that have emerged, but are not yet a significant threat', as well as 'deter them from using dangerous capabilities once they have emerged to threaten us all, with the threat of devastating retaliation'. See Prepared Remarks by US Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld at the NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC-D), Brussels, Belgium, 7 June 2001 (http://www.nato.int/docu.speech/2001/s010607c.htm).