Bush, missile defence and the Atlantic alliance

Survival

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 17-36

  Gordon, Philip H ^a  

^a BROOKINGS INSTITUTION   (United States)

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EID: 0007266965     PISSN: 00396338     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/survival/43.1.17     Document Type: Article

References (38)

1. See, for example, Bush's 23 May 2000 statement at the National Press Club, 'New Leadership on National Security', available at www.georgebush.com. Bush's critique of the Clinton administration was that it 'at first denied the need for a national missile defense system. Then it delayed. Now the approach it proposes is flawed - a system initially based on a single site, when experts say that more is needed.'
2. For Bush's remarks, see 'Comments by Bush and Rumsfeld on Selection for the Secretary of Defense', New York Times, 29 December 2000. Rumsfeld made a strong case for the need for NMD in his confirmation hearings, saying that the United States 'must develop the capabilities to defend against missiles, terrorism and newer threats against our space assets and information systems'. See 'Statement of the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Prepared for the Confirmation Hearing Before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services', 11 January 2001; and 'Rumsfeld urges missile defense system during confirmation hearing', 11 January 2001, www.cnn.com. After his own nomination, Powell described NMD as 'an essential part of our overall strategic force posture' and asserted that 'we're going to go forward'. See 'Remarks at Announcement of Powell's Nomination as Secretary of State', New York Times, 17 December 2000.
3. For Bush's remarks, see 'Comments by Bush and Rumsfeld on Selection for the Secretary of Defense', New York Times, 29 December 2000. Rumsfeld made a strong case for the need for NMD in his confirmation hearings, saying that the United States 'must develop the capabilities to defend against missiles, terrorism and newer threats against our space assets and information systems'. See 'Statement of the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Prepared for the Confirmation Hearing Before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services', 11 January 2001; and 'Rumsfeld urges missile defense system during confirmation hearing', 11 January 2001, www.cnn.com. After his own nomination, Powell described NMD as 'an essential part of our overall strategic force posture' and asserted that 'we're going to go forward'. See 'Remarks at Announcement of Powell's Nomination as Secretary of State', New York Times, 17 December 2000.
4. See Steven Lee Myers, 'Bush's Security Team is All for Missile Shield', New York Times, 30 December 2000.
5. See the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 15 July 1998.
6. See, for example, Robert D. Walpole, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States through 2015, National Intelligence Council, September 1999.
7. See Congressional Budget Office, Budgeting for Defense: Maintaining Today's Forces (Washington DC: CBO, September 2000); and Michael O'Hanlon, Defense Policy Choices for the Bush Administration (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, forthcoming).
8. See Congressional Budget Office, Budgeting for Defense: Maintaining Today's Forces (Washington DC: CBO, September 2000); and Michael O'Hanlon, Defense Policy Choices for the Bush Administration (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, forthcoming).
9. In a May 2000 New York Times/CBS News poll, 58% of those Americans asked favoured building a missile defence system, but this figure fell to 48% when respondents were told that the United States had already spent $60bn trying to develop the system, and to 25% when respondents were asked how they would feel if many scientists concluded that the system would be unlikely to work. See 'Building a Missile Defence ... and Public Opinion', The New York Times, 23 June 2000.
10. See Public Law 106-38,106th Congress, 22 July 1999.
11. See Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Goldgeier and James M. Lindsay, 'Deploying NMD: Not Whether, But How', Survival vol. 42, no. 1 (Spring 2000).
12. For a good, recent assessment of European attitudes on NMD, see Stephen Cambone, Ivo Daalder, Stephen J. Hadley, and Christopher J. Makins, European Views of National Missile Defence, The Atlantic Council of the United States Policy Paper, September 2000.
13. See 'Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères M. Hubert Védrine avec la Revue Trimestrielle Politique Internationale' (French Foreign Ministry Press Office, November 2000); and Hubert Védrine, France in an Age of Globalization (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming).
14. See 'Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères M. Hubert Védrine avec la Revue Trimestrielle Politique Internationale' (French Foreign Ministry Press Office, November 2000); and Hubert Védrine, France in an Age of Globalization (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming).
15. See Report of the British Foreign Affairs Committee (London: House of Commons, 25 July 2000).
16. See, for example, the concern that 'in the near term, NMD could call into question the operational effectiveness of our deterrent' in the report of the National Defence and Armed Forces Commission of the French Parliament, authored by Pierre Lellouche, Guy-Michel Chauveau, and Aloyse Warhouver, Rapport d'information no. 2788, p. 259. A French Senate report on NMD did not foresee any direct impact on the French deterrent itself, but did warn that NMD deployments could affect the French concept of deterrence. See Xavier de Villepin, Les Enjeux de la Défense Nationale Anti-Missiles aux Etats-Unis, Commission des Affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées', report no. 417 (1999-2000), p. 48.
17. See, for example, the concern that 'in the near term, NMD could call into question the operational effectiveness of our deterrent' in the report of the National Defence and Armed Forces Commission of the French Parliament, authored by Pierre Lellouche, Guy-Michel Chauveau, and Aloyse Warhouver, Rapport d'information no. 2788, p. 259. A French Senate report on NMD did not foresee any direct impact on the French deterrent itself, but did warn that NMD deployments could affect the French concept of deterrence. See Xavier de Villepin, Les Enjeux de la Défense Nationale Anti-Missiles aux Etats-Unis, Commission des Affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées', report no. 417 (1999-2000), p. 48.
18. In summer 2000, for example, Stephen J. Hadley, now Deputy National Security Adviser in the Bush White House, argued that 'A president truly committed to defending the nation against these threats would ... develop on a crash basis some interim or even experimental capabilities to defend the United States against ballistic missiles'. Hadley suggested the possibility of adapting Aegis cruisers with upgraded Standard Missile interceptors and land-or seabased radars to at least give the United States a chance of intercepting threatening missiles during an interim period until a more capable NMD system could be deployed. See Stephen J. Hadley, 'A Call to Deploy', The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2000), pp. 99-101. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank in Washington DC, also advocates an accelerated decision to deploy seabased national missile defences. See Defending America: A Plan to Meet the Urgent Missile Threat (Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1999).
19. In summer 2000, for example, Stephen J. Hadley, now Deputy National Security Adviser in the Bush White House, argued that 'A president truly committed to defending the nation against these threats would ... develop on a crash basis some interim or even experimental capabilities to defend the United States against ballistic missiles'. Hadley suggested the possibility of adapting Aegis cruisers with upgraded Standard Missile interceptors and land-or seabased radars to at least give the United States a chance of intercepting threatening missiles during an interim period until a more capable NMD system could be deployed. See Stephen J. Hadley, 'A Call to Deploy', The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2000), pp. 99-101. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank in Washington DC, also advocates an accelerated decision to deploy seabased national missile defences. See Defending America: A Plan to Meet the Urgent Missile Threat (Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1999).
20. See former CIA Director R. James Woolsey, 'The Way to Missile Defence', National Review, 19 June 2000.
21. While stopping short of advocating the militarisation of space, the report called future space conflict a 'virtual certainty' and called on the United States 'to develop the means both to deter and defend against hostile acts in and from space'. See Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security, Space Management and Organization, 11 January 2001.
22. 3 capability, which would include eight more radars, a constellation of sensor satellites, and an additional base of interceptor missiles in North Dakota, would be roughly twice as much.
23. See Richard L. Garwin, 'The Wrong Plan', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 56, no. 2 (March/April 2000), pp. 36-41); and Garwin, 'A Defence that will not Defend'. Garwin estimates the weight of such a boost-phase interceptor, which need not carry a heavy payload, at 14 tons; by contrast, existing US ICBMs and SLBMs generally weigh 30-100 tons. Other good discussions of boost-phase defences and their potential advantages can be found in James M. Lindsay and Michael O'Hanlon, Defending America Against the Ballistic Missile Threat (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming); Dean A. Wilkening, Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability, Adelphi Paper 334 (London: IISS, May 2000); and John Deutch, Harold Brown, and John P. White, 'National Missile Defense: Is There Another Way?', Foreign Policy, Summer 2000.
24. See Richard L. Garwin, 'The Wrong Plan', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 56, no. 2 (March/April 2000), pp. 36-41); and Garwin, 'A Defence that will not Defend'. Garwin estimates the weight of such a boost-phase interceptor, which need not carry a heavy payload, at 14 tons; by contrast, existing US ICBMs and SLBMs generally weigh 30-100 tons. Other good discussions of boost-phase defences and their potential advantages can be found in James M. Lindsay and Michael O'Hanlon, Defending America Against the Ballistic Missile Threat (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming); Dean A. Wilkening, Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability, Adelphi Paper 334 (London: IISS, May 2000); and John Deutch, Harold Brown, and John P. White, 'National Missile Defense: Is There Another Way?', Foreign Policy, Summer 2000.
25. See Richard L. Garwin, 'The Wrong Plan', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 56, no. 2 (March/April 2000), pp. 36-41); and Garwin, 'A Defence that will not Defend'. Garwin estimates the weight of such a boost-phase interceptor, which need not carry a heavy payload, at 14 tons; by contrast, existing US ICBMs and SLBMs generally weigh 30-100 tons. Other good discussions of boost-phase defences and their potential advantages can be found in James M. Lindsay and Michael O'Hanlon, Defending America Against the Ballistic Missile Threat (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming); Dean A. Wilkening, Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability, Adelphi Paper 334 (London: IISS, May 2000); and John Deutch, Harold Brown, and John P. White, 'National Missile Defense: Is There Another Way?', Foreign Policy, Summer 2000.
26. See Richard L. Garwin, 'The Wrong Plan', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 56, no. 2 (March/April 2000), pp. 36-41); and Garwin, 'A Defence that will not Defend'. Garwin estimates the weight of such a boost-phase interceptor, which need not carry a heavy payload, at 14 tons; by contrast, existing US ICBMs and SLBMs generally weigh 30-100 tons. Other good discussions of boost-phase defences and their potential advantages can be found in James M. Lindsay and Michael O'Hanlon, Defending America Against the Ballistic Missile Threat (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming); Dean A. Wilkening, Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability, Adelphi Paper 334 (London: IISS, May 2000); and John Deutch, Harold Brown, and John P. White, 'National Missile Defense: Is There Another Way?', Foreign Policy, Summer 2000.
27. See Richard L. Garwin, 'The Wrong Plan', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 56, no. 2 (March/April 2000), pp. 36-41); and Garwin, 'A Defence that will not Defend'. Garwin estimates the weight of such a boost-phase interceptor, which need not carry a heavy payload, at 14 tons; by contrast, existing US ICBMs and SLBMs generally weigh 30-100 tons. Other good discussions of boost-phase defences and their potential advantages can be found in James M. Lindsay and Michael O'Hanlon, Defending America Against the Ballistic Missile Threat (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming); Dean A. Wilkening, Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability, Adelphi Paper 334 (London: IISS, May 2000); and John Deutch, Harold Brown, and John P. White, 'National Missile Defense: Is There Another Way?', Foreign Policy, Summer 2000.
28. Theodore A. Postol, 'A Russian-US Boost-Phase Defence to Defend Russia and the US from Postulated Rogue-State ICBMs', the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA; briefing paper presented at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 12 October 1999.
29. Theodore Postal, 'Hitting Them Where It Works', Foreign Policy, no. 117, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 132-133.
30. The coverage zone of the boost-phase defence would be about 1,000 kilometres beyond where interceptors were based, since the interceptors would have only two to three minutes to destroy their targets. They might be launched 60-90 seconds after the enemy ICBM was fired, and would accelerate for 70-100 seconds before travelling at roughly 8 to 9 kilometres per second thereafter. See Postol, 'Hitting Them Where It Works/ pp. 132-133.
31. Alessandra Stanley, 'Putin Goes to Rome to Promote Russian Arms Control Alternative', New York Times, 6 June 2000, p. A1.
32. A classified National Intelligence Estimate in August 2000 warned that an American NMD deployment could prompt China to expand its nuclear arsenal tenfold and lead Russia to place multiple warheads on ballistic missiles that now carry only one. See Steven Lee Myers, 'Study Said to Find US Missile Shield Might Incite China', New York Times, 10 August 2000.
33. See the comments by Carnegie Moscow Center expert Dmitri Trenin cited in Peter Baker and Susan B. Classer, 'Focus Shifting in US-Russia Relations', Washington Post, 15 January 2001.
34. See Yakovlev's comments that since it would be 'very difficult' to stop the political momentum behind NMD in the United States, Russia should 'trade' an American build-up in defences for deeper offensive cuts. See Patrick E. Tyler, 'With US Missile Defense, Russia Wants Less Offense', New York Times, 15 November 2000.
35. The following develops ideas first put forward in Ivo H. Daalder and Philip H. Gordon, 'There's Time Now for Serious Talking About Missile Defence', International Herald Tribune, 7 September 2000.
36. See the Atlantic Council's report usefully suggesting the initiation of a 'Track 1 Vi process' to bring governmental and non-governmental analysts and opinion leaders together, Cambone, Daalder et al., European Views, p. 23.
37. See George Bunn, 'Does NMD Stand for "No More Disarmament" As Well As "National Missile Defense?"', Disarmament Diplomacy no. 42, The Acronym Institute, December 1999; and Camille Grand, 'Missile Defence: The View from the Other Side of the Atlantic', Arms Control Today, September 2000, p. 16.
38. See George Bunn, 'Does NMD Stand for "No More Disarmament" As Well As "National Missile Defense?"', Disarmament Diplomacy no. 42, The Acronym Institute, December 1999; and Camille Grand, 'Missile Defence: The View from the Other Side of the Atlantic', Arms Control Today, September 2000, p. 16.