Chinese foreign policy in the twenty-first century: Insights from the "two-good" theory

Issues and Studies

Volumn 35, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 35-60

  Morgan, T Clifton ^a   Palmer, Glenn ^b  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040288869     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science 35 (1991): 904-33.
2. Scott Wohlander, T. Clifton Morgan, and Glenn Palmer, "Give or Take: Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Portfolios" (Unpublished manuscript, 1998). This seems to be especially true in the Chinese case, which is our interest here. See Harry Harding, "China and the Third World: From Revolution to Containment," in The China Factor, ed. Richard H. Solomon (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 257-95, for a discussion of the motivations for Chinese foreign aid.
3. Scott Wohlander, T. Clifton Morgan, and Glenn Palmer, "Give or Take: Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Portfolios" (Unpublished manuscript, 1998). This seems to be especially true in the Chinese case, which is our interest here. See Harry Harding, "China and the Third World: From Revolution to Containment," in The China Factor, ed. Richard H. Solomon (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 257-95, for a discussion of the motivations for Chinese foreign aid.
4. Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, "International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitutability, and 'Nice' Laws," World Politics 36 (1984): 383-406.
5. The precise substitutability relationships expected from this model are actually quite complex. They are presented in T. Clifton Morgan and Glenn Palmer, "A Model of Substitutability in Foreign Policy: Selecting the Right Tools for the Job(s)," Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 1 (Forthcoming, February 2000).
6. T. Clifton Morgan and Glenn Palmer, "Room to Move: Security, Proaction, and Institutions in Foreign Policy Decision Making," in Strategic Politicians, Institutions, and Foreign Policy, ed. Randolph Siverson (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 193-220.
7. The initiation of a militarized conflict may on occasion be a maintenance-seeking act designed to preempt an attack by another country. While more likely is that the initiator of a particular conflict is the state most interested in altering the status quo, the exceptions to this make our model harder to prove but they do not invalidate the empirical applications of the model.
8. Daniel M. Jones, Stuart Bremer, and J. David Singer, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns," Conflict Management and Peace Science 15 (1996): 163-213.
9. China's share of the world economy using this measure is around 15 percent, although this figure has grown dramatically in the last ten years, at least according to Chinese accounts.
10. In the past we have used a different measure of power in our empirical tests. While that measure is good for measuring cross-national differences in power, over a short period of time it fluctuates relatively little for one country.
11. See note 9 above; T. Clifton Morgan and Glenn Palmer, "A Two-Good Theory of Foreign Policy: An Application to Dispute Initiation and Reciprocation," International Interactions 22 (1997): 225-44; T. Clifton Morgan and Glenn Palmer, "To Protect and to Serve: Alliances and Foreign Policy Portfolios" (Unpublished manuscript, 1998).
12. See note 9 above; T. Clifton Morgan and Glenn Palmer, "A Two-Good Theory of Foreign Policy: An Application to Dispute Initiation and Reciprocation," International Interactions 22 (1997): 225-44; T. Clifton Morgan and Glenn Palmer, "To Protect and to Serve: Alliances and Foreign Policy Portfolios" (Unpublished manuscript, 1998).
13. The work on symmetrical and asymmetrical alliances is relatively recent. The central works would include Michael F. Altfeld, "The Decision to Ally: A Theory and a Test," Western Political Quarterly 37 (1984): 523-44; Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry"; D. Scott Bennett, "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration," American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 846-78; Morgan and Palmer, "A Two-Good Theory of Foreign Policy" and "To Protect and to Serve"; Glenn Palmer and J. Sky David, "A Comparison of Two Models in Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Alliances: One Goal or Two?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 6 (Forthcoming, December 1999).
14. The work on symmetrical and asymmetrical alliances is relatively recent. The central works would include Michael F. Altfeld, "The Decision to Ally: A Theory and a Test," Western Political Quarterly 37 (1984): 523-44; Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry"; D. Scott Bennett, "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration," American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 846-78; Morgan and Palmer, "A Two-Good Theory of Foreign Policy" and "To Protect and to Serve"; Glenn Palmer and J. Sky David, "A Comparison of Two Models in Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Alliances: One Goal or Two?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 6 (Forthcoming, December 1999).
15. The work on symmetrical and asymmetrical alliances is relatively recent. The central works would include Michael F. Altfeld, "The Decision to Ally: A Theory and a Test," Western Political Quarterly 37 (1984): 523-44; Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry"; D. Scott Bennett, "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration," American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 846-78; Morgan and Palmer, "A Two-Good Theory of Foreign Policy" and "To Protect and to Serve"; Glenn Palmer and J. Sky David, "A Comparison of Two Models in Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Alliances: One Goal or Two?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 6 (Forthcoming, December 1999).
16. The work on symmetrical and asymmetrical alliances is relatively recent. The central works would include Michael F. Altfeld, "The Decision to Ally: A Theory and a Test," Western Political Quarterly 37 (1984): 523-44; Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry"; D. Scott Bennett, "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration," American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 846-78; Morgan and Palmer, "A Two-Good Theory of Foreign Policy" and "To Protect and to Serve"; Glenn Palmer and J. Sky David, "A Comparison of Two Models in Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Alliances: One Goal or Two?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 6 (Forthcoming, December 1999).
17. The work on symmetrical and asymmetrical alliances is relatively recent. The central works would include Michael F. Altfeld, "The Decision to Ally: A Theory and a Test," Western Political Quarterly 37 (1984): 523-44; Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry"; D. Scott Bennett, "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration," American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 846-78; Morgan and Palmer, "A Two-Good Theory of Foreign Policy" and "To Protect and to Serve"; Glenn Palmer and J. Sky David, "A Comparison of Two Models in Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Alliances: One Goal or Two?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 6 (Forthcoming, December 1999).
18. Examples of large states forming alliances with smaller states in this way are numerous. The United States joining in the formation of NATO in 1949 is one example. NATO made