Federalist institutions, voting behavior, and party systems in Spain

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 111-136

  Hamann, Kerstin ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040205732     PISSN: 00485950     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a030004     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. The author does not include the Spanish territories in Africa-Ceuta and Melilla-in this analysis.
2. See Joanne Bay Brzinski, Thomas D. Lancaster, and Christian Tuschhoff, "Federalism and Compounded Representation: Key Concepts and Project Overview," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 29 (Winter 1999): 1-16.
3. This section is informed by ibid.
4. See ibid.
5. Joanne B. Brzinski, Thomas D. Lancaster, and Christian Tuschhoff, "Federalism and Compounded Representation in Western Europe," (paper presented at the First Workshop of the Federalism and Compounded Representation in Western Europe project, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, October 1996): 3.
6. I code as regional those parties whose names have a reference to the region in which they run and which compete only in that particular region. (The exceptions are some Basque parties, which also field candidates in Navarra, where parts of the population identify as Basques. Some parties that are subregional in focus are also coded as regional. Spanish scholars frequently use the term PANE, partidos de ambito no estatal, or non-statewide parties.) Parties that are merely the regional branches of national parties are not coded as regional. If a regional party ran together with the regional branch of a national party (e.g., the Socialists of Catalonia in the 1977 election, which comprised the Catalan Socialist Party, PSC, and the Catalan branch of the PSOE), it is not coded as regional.
7. William H. Riker, "Federalism," Handbook of Political Science: Governmental Institutions and Processes, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, vol. 5 (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), p.101.
8. Juan Linz, "Democracy, Multinationalism and Federalism," (Estudio/Working Paper, CEACS, Instituto Juan March, Madrid, Spain: 1997), 3-4.
9. See Montserrat Guibernau, "Spain: A Federation in the Making?" Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge, ed. Graham Smith (New York: Longman, 1995) and Audrey Brasloff, "Spain: The State of Autonomies," Federalism and Nationalism, ed. Murray Forsyth (Leicester and London: Leicester University Press, 1989). The Senate has a weak role in the legislative process, and even though the regions can formally initiate legislation, they have effectively little power to influence legislation. See Michael T. Newton, Institutions of Modern Spain (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chapter 7.
10. See Montserrat Guibernau, "Spain: A Federation in the Making?" Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge, ed. Graham Smith (New York: Longman, 1995) and Audrey Brasloff, "Spain: The State of Autonomies," Federalism and Nationalism, ed. Murray Forsyth (Leicester and London: Leicester University Press, 1989). The Senate has a weak role in the legislative process, and even though the regions can formally initiate legislation, they have effectively little power to influence legislation. See Michael T. Newton, Institutions of Modern Spain (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chapter 7.
11. See Montserrat Guibernau, "Spain: A Federation in the Making?" Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge, ed. Graham Smith (New York: Longman, 1995) and Audrey Brasloff, "Spain: The State of Autonomies," Federalism and Nationalism, ed. Murray Forsyth (Leicester and London: Leicester University Press, 1989). The Senate has a weak role in the legislative process, and even though the regions can formally initiate legislation, they have effectively little power to influence legislation. See Michael T. Newton, Institutions of Modern Spain (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chapter 7.
12. Paul Heywood, The Government and Politics of Spain (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 162. Dieter Nohlen and Andreas Hildenbrand, "Regionalismus und der historische Prozess der politischen Dezentralisierung," Der Staat der Autonomen Gemeinschaften in Spanien, eds. Dieter Nohlen and José Juan González Encinar (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1992), p. 9, discuss the differences between a federal state and a state of autonomies.
13. Paul Heywood, The Government and Politics of Spain (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 162. Dieter Nohlen and Andreas Hildenbrand, "Regionalismus und der historische Prozess der politischen Dezentralisierung," Der Staat der Autonomen Gemeinschaften in Spanien, eds. Dieter Nohlen and José Juan González Encinar (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1992), p. 9, discuss the differences between a federal state and a state of autonomies.
14. José Amodia, "A Regional Battle Fought on National Issues: The Spanish Elections of 28 May 1995," Regional and Federal Studies 5 (1995): 24.
15. Gerhard Held, "Konstitutiver Regionalismus-Ein spanisches Modell für das mediterrane Europa?" Die Politik der dritten Ebene: Regionen im Europa der Union, ed. Udo Bullmann (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994).
16. In contrast, I use the terms "national" or "central" to refer to state-level or statewide institutions, actors, or policies.
17. By "compounded identity" I mean the simultaneous existence of identities based on regional entities within an individual. See Thomas D. Lancaster, "Compounded Identity and Representation in Federal Systems," (paper presented at the workshop Federalism and Compounded Representation in Western Europe, Emory University, Atlanta, 4-5 October 1996), 7-8.
18. Nohlen and Hildenbrand, "Regionalismus," pp. 21-22.
19. This point has been made by Andrés de Blas Guerrero, "El problema nacional-regional español en la transición," La transicíon democrática española, eds. José Felix Tezanos, Ramön Cotarelo, and Andrés de Blas (Madrid: Sistema, 1989), p. 599, who argues that "...the necessity for the regional parties to distinguish themselves from the statewide parties with respect to the politics of autonomy and the national question obliged the former to radicalize and exaggerate their claims as a means to guarantee their political space." Translation by the author. Ives Mény, "The Political Dynamics of Regionalism: Italy, France, Spain," Regionalism in European Politics, ed. Roger Morgan (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1986), pp. 22-23, similarly points to the consequences of setting up a regionally based political system in Spain, which includes heightened or newly created claims for self-government and the formation of regionalist parties.
20. This point has been made by Andrés de Blas Guerrero, "El problema nacional-regional español en la transición," La transicíon democrática española, eds. José Felix Tezanos, Ramön Cotarelo, and Andrés de Blas (Madrid: Sistema, 1989), p. 599, who argues that "...the necessity for the regional parties to distinguish themselves from the statewide parties with respect to the politics of autonomy and the national question obliged the former to radicalize and exaggerate their claims as a means to guarantee their political space." Translation by the author. Ives Mény, "The Political Dynamics of Regionalism: Italy, France, Spain," Regionalism in European Politics, ed. Roger Morgan (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1986), pp. 22-23, similarly points to the consequences of setting up a regionally based political system in Spain, which includes heightened or newly created claims for self-government and the formation of regionalist parties.
21. Linz, "Democracy, Multinationalism and Federalism," p. 23.
22. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Political Identities and Electoral Consequences: Spain, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia," Daedalus 121 (1992): 124-125, acknowledge the effects institutions can have on the creation of identities when they argue that in cases where national elections precede regional elections, national parties will form and voters will develop more national identities. While this may be true, I argue that over time, even voters with a national consciousness can develop regional identities once regional institutions exist that they can identify with.
23. Heywood, The Government, p. 33.
24. See, for example, Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967); Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).
25. See, for example, Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967); Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).
26. To simplify the argument, the author does not include strategic voters in this analysis. The assumption of sincere voters appears reasonable because Spain has a proportional representation (PR) system in regional and general elections to the lower house of parliament as well as in European elections, which enhances voters' chances of seeing their vote choice represented in the legislature and minamizes the need for strategic voting. The Spanish system of proportional representation, even though highly disproportionate in comparison to other PR system (due to, among other things, district magnitude), allows regional parties to gain parliamentary seats. See Nohlen and Hildenbrand, "Regionalismus," p. 24. For a discussion of the Spanish electoral systems, see Jose R. Montero, Francisco J. Llera, and Mariano Torcal, "Sistemas electorales en España: una recapitulación," Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas 58 (1992): 7-56.
27. To simplify the argument, the author does not include strategic voters in this analysis. The assumption of sincere voters appears reasonable because Spain has a proportional representation (PR) system in regional and general elections to the lower house of parliament as well as in European elections, which enhances voters' chances of seeing their vote choice represented in the legislature and minamizes the need for strategic voting. The Spanish system of proportional representation, even though highly disproportionate in comparison to other PR system (due to, among other things, district magnitude), allows regional parties to gain parliamentary seats. See Nohlen and Hildenbrand, "Regionalismus," p. 24. For a discussion of the Spanish electoral systems, see Jose R. Montero, Francisco J. Llera, and Mariano Torcal, "Sistemas electorales en España: una recapitulación," Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas 58 (1992): 7-56.
28. See Manuel García Ferrando, Eduardo López-Aranguren, and Miguel Beltrán, La concienca nacional y regional en la España de las autonomías, (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1994), p. 3.
29. Gary Marks et al., "Competencies, Cracks, and Conflicts: Regional Mobilization in the European Union," Comparative Political Studies 29 (1996): 164-192.
30. On the Spanish party system, see for example, Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad, Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System, (Berkely, CA: University of California Press, 1988); Pilar del Castillo, ed., Compartamiento político y electoral (Madrid: Centro de Investigationes Sociológicas, 1995).
31. On the Spanish party system, see for example, Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad, Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System, (Berkely, CA: University of California Press, 1988); Pilar del Castillo, ed., Compartamiento político y electoral (Madrid: Centro de Investigationes Sociológicas, 1995).
32. For example, the 1995 vote to the regional assemblies significantly changed the government composition of the regions and preceded a similar change on the national level in the 1996 election. The PP gained a majority in ten regional legislatures, compared with four in 1991, while the PSOE lost the majority in seven of the nine regional parliaments it had controlled previously. Amodia, "A Regional Battle," 228.
33. Botella, "The Spanish 'New Regions,'" 264.
34. The exception here is Navarra, a non-historic region, where regional parties captured 57 percent of the vote in the 1991 regional election.
35. Following the 1989 elections, the PSOE returned to office with exactly half of the 350 seats in parliament. However, in practice, the Socialists had a working majority because the four deputies from the Basque party HB boycotted parliament.
36. The relatively poor performance of regional parties in 1982 can possibly be explained with the failed coup attempt in 1981, which signaled the precariousness of democratic stability to the voters and may have led to an increased support of centrist, national parties to show support for the larger democratic system.
37. See Pilar del Castillo, "Spain: A Dress Rehearsal for the National Elections," Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of the Union, eds. Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 258-259.
38. Spain joined the European Community in 1986. The representation of the Spanish parties in the European Parliament was provisional and based on the seat distribution in the lower house of the Spanish parliament until elections were held in 1987. Thereafter, elections to the European Parliament were held together with all the other member countries in 1987, and Spain then adopted the regular five-year term between elections.
39. Other research has uncovered similar patterns. See, for example, Andrea Morató-Lara and Fernanda Somuano, "Regionalist Voting in Spain and in Italy: Manifestations of Nationalism or Affluence?" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 1997); Michael Keating, Nations Against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia, and Scotland (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 134.
40. Other research has uncovered similar patterns. See, for example, Andrea Morató-Lara and Fernanda Somuano, "Regionalist Voting in Spain and in Italy: Manifestations of Nationalism or Affluence?" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 1997); Michael Keating, Nations Against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia, and Scotland (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 134.
41. Thomas D. Lancaster and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "Regional Vote Support: The Spanish Case," International Studies Quarterly 33 (March 1989): 29-43.
42. For the calculation and interpretation of N, see Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, chapter 8. The author calculates N for the effective number of parties represented in regional parliaments, based on their number of seats, instead of vote shares. I chose parliamentary seats as the basis for mv calculation because the primary focus of this article lies with patterns of representation rather than merely electoral support. For other studies using N in a similar way, see for example, Carol Mershon, The Costs of Coalition (University of Virginia, unpublished book manuscript, 1998); José Ramón Montero, "Las elecciones legislativas," Transición política y consolidación democrática, ed. Ramón Cortarelo (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociolÿgicas, 1992), pp. 243-299.
43. For the calculation and interpretation of N, see Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, chapter 8. The author calculates N for the effective number of parties represented in regional parliaments, based on their number of seats, instead of vote shares. I chose parliamentary seats as the basis for mv calculation because the primary focus of this article lies with patterns of representation rather than merely electoral support. For other studies using N in a similar way, see for example, Carol Mershon, The Costs of Coalition (University of Virginia, unpublished book manuscript, 1998); José Ramón Montero, "Las elecciones legislativas," Transición política y consolidación democrática, ed. Ramón Cortarelo (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociolÿgicas, 1992), pp. 243-299.
44. For the calculation and interpretation of N, see Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, chapter 8. The author calculates N for the effective number of parties represented in regional parliaments, based on their number of seats, instead of vote shares. I chose parliamentary seats as the basis for mv calculation because the primary focus of this article lies with patterns of representation rather than merely electoral support. For other studies using N in a similar way, see for example, Carol Mershon, The Costs of Coalition (University of Virginia, unpublished book manuscript, 1998); José Ramón Montero, "Las elecciones legislativas," Transición política y consolidación democrática, ed. Ramón Cortarelo (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociolÿgicas, 1992), pp. 243-299.
45. Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, pp. 92-98.
46. Other cleavages that have had some influence on party choice include religion, urbanism, or age, but none of these cleavages has been the main issue around which parties have been founded or campaigned in post-Franco Spain. Post-material issues, especially environmental issues, have been taken up by Green parties, but these have received only marginal electoral support. See, for example, Lancaster and Lewis-Beck, "Regional Vote Support", or Gunther, Sani, and Shabad, Spain After Franco.
47. Other cleavages that have had some influence on party choice include religion, urbanism, or age, but none of these cleavages has been the main issue around which parties have been founded or campaigned in post-Franco Spain. Post-material issues, especially environmental issues, have been taken up by Green parties, but these have received only marginal electoral support. See, for example, Lancaster and Lewis-Beck, "Regional Vote Support", or Gunther, Sani, and Shabad, Spain After Franco.
48. Luis Moreno, La federalización de España: Poder político y territorio (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1997), chapter 4.
49. See Brzinski, Lancaster, and Tuschhoff, Federalism and Compounded Representation."
50. For my definition of government, I borrow from Mershon, The Costs of Coalition, p. 32, and count a new government "with each change of party composition, parliamentary election, change of prime minister, and accepted resignation of the cabinet."
51. In addition, all major national political parties have adopted a federal principle as the organizing device for their internal structure.
52. See also Francesc Pallarès, "Estado autonómico y sistema de partidos: una aproximación electoral," Revista de Estudios Políticos 71 (1991): 301 for national elections (1997-1989) and regional elections (1982-1989).
53. See Amodia, "A Regional Battle," 225.
54. Christopher J. Anderson and Daniel S. Ward, "Barometer Elections in Comparative Perspective," Electoral Studies 15, no. 4 (1996): 447-460.
55. José Ramón Montero, Francesc Pallarès, and Pablo Oñate, "El subsistema de partidos," Elecciones autonómicas en Aragón, eds. Ricardo Chueca and José Ramón Montero (Madrid: Tecnos, 1995), pp. 193-238; Pallarès, "Estado autonómico," 21; Pallarès, "Las elecciones autonómicas."
56. José Ramón Montero, Francesc Pallarès, and Pablo Oñate, "El subsistema de partidos," Elecciones autonómicas en Aragón, eds. Ricardo Chueca and José Ramón Montero (Madrid: Tecnos, 1995), pp. 193-238; Pallarès, "Estado autonómico," 21; Pallarès, "Las elecciones autonómicas."
57. José Ramón Montero, Francesc Pallarès, and Pablo Oñate, "El subsistema de partidos," Elecciones autonómicas en Aragón, eds. Ricardo Chueca and José Ramón Montero (Madrid: Tecnos, 1995), pp. 193-238; Pallarès, "Estado autonómico," 21; Pallarès, "Las elecciones autonómicas."
58. According to Montero, Pallarès, and Oñate, "El subsistema de partidos," p. 225, this stable pattern of vote alternation on both the aggregate and individual level is different from the "generic concept of volatility." The dual vote is most pronounced in Catalonia and Aragon.
59. Pallarès, "Las elecciones autonómicas."
60. For survey data, see Moreno, "Ethnoterritorial Concurrence"; Luis Moreno, La federalización de España, Chapter 6; García Ferrando, López-Aranguren, and Beltrán, La concienca national, p. 16.
61. For survey data, see Moreno, "Ethnoterritorial Concurrence"; Luis Moreno, La federalización de España, Chapter 6; García Ferrando, López-Aranguren, and Beltrán, La concienca national, p. 16.
62. For survey data, see Moreno, "Ethnoterritorial Concurrence"; Luis Moreno, La federalización de España, Chapter 6; García Ferrando, López-Aranguren, and Beltrán, La concienca national, p. 16.
63. See Morató-Lara and Somuano, "Regionalist Voting"; Lancaster and Lewis-Beck, "Regional Vote Support."
64. See Morató-Lara and Somuano, "Regionalist Voting"; Lancaster and Lewis-Beck, "Regional Vote Support."
65. Thanks to Beth Wilner, who raised this point (personal communication).
66. The exception is the conservative Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), which forms an electoral coalition with its "sister party," the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Since unification, the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) can also be considered a regional party targeting the voters in the five new Länder that previously constituted East Germany.