Towards a strategic view on EMU: A critical survey

Journal of Public Policy

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 1-28

  Winkler, Bernhard ^a  

^a EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CURRENCY STABILITY; ECONOMIC INTEGRATION; EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION;

EUROPE, (WEST);

EID: 0030439561     PISSN: 0143814X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0143814X00007844     Document Type: Review

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