Review article: Communities of enlightenment

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 531-558

  Goodin, Robert E ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0040118494     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123498000234     Document Type: Article

References (157)

1. Giovanni Pico, Conte della Mirandola, 'Oration on the Dignity of Man' (trans. Elizabeth Livermoore Forbes), The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller and John Herman Randall Jr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948; originally published 1486), pp. 223-54 at para. 3, pp. 224-5. The text follows Martin Hollis's revised translation of the passage in 'Economic Man and Original Sin', Political Studies, 29 (1981), 167-80. In a hauntingly unconscious echo of this passage, Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 177, describes the model his communitarianism opposes in almost identical terms: 'Freed from the dictates of nature and the sanction of social roles, the deontological subject is installed as sovereign, cast as the author of the only moral meanings there are. As inhabitants of a world without telos, we are free to construct principles of justice unconstrained by an order of value antecedently given ... And as independent selves, we are free to choose our purposes and ends unconstrained by such an order, or by custom or tradition or inherited status. So long as they are not unjust, our conceptions of the good carry weight, whatever they are, simply in virtue of our having chosen them. We are "self-originating sources of valid claims" .'
2. Giovanni Pico, Conte della Mirandola, 'Oration on the Dignity of Man' (trans. Elizabeth Livermoore Forbes), The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller and John Herman Randall Jr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948; originally published 1486), pp. 223-54 at para. 3, pp. 224-5. The text follows Martin Hollis's revised translation of the passage in 'Economic Man and Original Sin', Political Studies, 29 (1981), 167-80. In a hauntingly unconscious echo of this passage, Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 177, describes the model his communitarianism opposes in almost identical terms: 'Freed from the dictates of nature and the sanction of social roles, the deontological subject is installed as sovereign, cast as the author of the only moral meanings there are. As inhabitants of a world without telos, we are free to construct principles of justice unconstrained by an order of value antecedently given ... And as independent selves, we are free to choose our purposes and ends unconstrained by such an order, or by custom or tradition or inherited status. So long as they are not unjust, our conceptions of the good carry weight, whatever they are, simply in virtue of our having chosen them. We are "self-originating sources of valid claims" .'
3. Giovanni Pico, Conte della Mirandola, 'Oration on the Dignity of Man' (trans. Elizabeth Livermoore Forbes), The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller and John Herman Randall Jr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948; originally published 1486), pp. 223-54 at para. 3, pp. 224-5. The text follows Martin Hollis's revised translation of the passage in 'Economic Man and Original Sin', Political Studies, 29 (1981), 167-80. In a hauntingly unconscious echo of this passage, Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 177, describes the model his communitarianism opposes in almost identical terms: 'Freed from the dictates of nature and the sanction of social roles, the deontological subject is installed as sovereign, cast as the author of the only moral meanings there are. As inhabitants of a world without telos, we are free to construct principles of justice unconstrained by an order of value antecedently given ... And as independent selves, we are free to choose our purposes and ends unconstrained by such an order, or by custom or tradition or inherited status. So long as they are not unjust, our conceptions of the good carry weight, whatever they are, simply in virtue of our having chosen them. We are "self-originating sources of valid claims" .'
4. Immanuel Kant, 'What Is Enlightenment?' The Philosophy of Kant, trans. & ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Random House, 1949; originally published 1784), pp. 132-9, esp. sec. 2; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), and 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', Journal of Philosophy, 77 (1980), 151-72; Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (London: Verso/New Left Books, 1979).
5. Immanuel Kant, 'What Is Enlightenment?' The Philosophy of Kant, trans. & ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Random House, 1949; originally published 1784), pp. 132-9, esp. sec. 2; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), and 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', Journal of Philosophy, 77 (1980), 151-72; Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (London: Verso/New Left Books, 1979).
6. Immanuel Kant, 'What Is Enlightenment?' The Philosophy of Kant, trans. & ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Random House, 1949; originally published 1784), pp. 132-9, esp. sec. 2; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), and 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', Journal of Philosophy, 77 (1980), 151-72; Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (London: Verso/New Left Books, 1979).
7. Immanuel Kant, 'What Is Enlightenment?' The Philosophy of Kant, trans. & ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Random House, 1949; originally published 1784), pp. 132-9, esp. sec. 2; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), and 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', Journal of Philosophy, 77 (1980), 151-72; Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (London: Verso/New Left Books, 1979).
8. Culminating, latterly, in Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), and Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
9. Culminating, latterly, in Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), and Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
10. Robert A. Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition (New York: Basic Books, 1966), chap. 3; Martin Hollis, Models of Man: Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
11. Robert A. Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition (New York: Basic Books, 1966), chap. 3; Martin Hollis, Models of Man: Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
12. Teresa Brennan and Carole Pateman, ' "Mere Auxiliaries to the Commonwealth": Women and the Origins of Liberalism', Political Studies, 27 (1979), 183-200; Carole Pateman, ' "The Disorder of Women": Women, Love and the Sense of Justice', Ethics, 91 (1980), 20-34; and The Sexual Contract (Oxford: Polity, 1988); Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
13. Teresa Brennan and Carole Pateman, ' "Mere Auxiliaries to the Commonwealth": Women and the Origins of Liberalism', Political Studies, 27 (1979), 183-200; Carole Pateman, ' "The Disorder of Women": Women, Love and the Sense of Justice', Ethics, 91 (1980), 20-34; and The Sexual Contract (Oxford: Polity, 1988); Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
14. Teresa Brennan and Carole Pateman, ' "Mere Auxiliaries to the Commonwealth": Women and the Origins of Liberalism', Political Studies, 27 (1979), 183-200; Carole Pateman, ' "The Disorder of Women": Women, Love and the Sense of Justice', Ethics, 91 (1980), 20-34; and The Sexual Contract (Oxford: Polity, 1988); Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
15. Teresa Brennan and Carole Pateman, ' "Mere Auxiliaries to the Commonwealth": Women and the Origins of Liberalism', Political Studies, 27 (1979), 183-200; Carole Pateman, ' "The Disorder of Women": Women, Love and the Sense of Justice', Ethics, 91 (1980), 20-34; and The Sexual Contract (Oxford: Polity, 1988); Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
16. Ironically, although its opposition to universalizing meta-narratives puts postmodernism in opposition to Enlightenment philosophy as a whole, its specifically poststructuralist propositions can equally well be pressed into the service of Enlightenment models denying that the sovereign artificer's actions and volitions are structurally determined. See Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Oxford: Polity, 1992); Linda Nicholson, ed., Feminism/Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1990); Michèle Barrett and Anne Phillips, ed.. Destabilizing Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates (Oxford: Polity, 1992); Gisela Bock and Susan James, eds., Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity (London: Routledge, 1992); Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell and Nancy Fraser, Feminist Contentions (New York: Routledge, 1995).
17. Ironically, although its opposition to universalizing meta-narratives puts postmodernism in opposition to Enlightenment philosophy as a whole, its specifically poststructuralist propositions can equally well be pressed into the service of Enlightenment models denying that the sovereign artificer's actions and volitions are structurally determined. See Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Oxford: Polity, 1992); Linda Nicholson, ed., Feminism/Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1990); Michèle Barrett and Anne Phillips, ed.. Destabilizing Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates (Oxford: Polity, 1992); Gisela Bock and Susan James, eds., Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity (London: Routledge, 1992); Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell and Nancy Fraser, Feminist Contentions (New York: Routledge, 1995).
18. Ironically, although its opposition to universalizing meta-narratives puts postmodernism in opposition to Enlightenment philosophy as a whole, its specifically poststructuralist propositions can equally well be pressed into the service of Enlightenment models denying that the sovereign artificer's actions and volitions are structurally determined. See Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Oxford: Polity, 1992); Linda Nicholson, ed., Feminism/Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1990); Michèle Barrett and Anne Phillips, ed.. Destabilizing Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates (Oxford: Polity, 1992); Gisela Bock and Susan James, eds., Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity (London: Routledge, 1992); Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell and Nancy Fraser, Feminist Contentions (New York: Routledge, 1995).
19. Ironically, although its opposition to universalizing meta-narratives puts postmodernism in opposition to Enlightenment philosophy as a whole, its specifically poststructuralist propositions can equally well be pressed into the service of Enlightenment models denying that the sovereign artificer's actions and volitions are structurally determined. See Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Oxford: Polity, 1992); Linda Nicholson, ed., Feminism/Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1990); Michèle Barrett and Anne Phillips, ed.. Destabilizing Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates (Oxford: Polity, 1992); Gisela Bock and Susan James, eds., Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity (London: Routledge, 1992); Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell and Nancy Fraser, Feminist Contentions (New York: Routledge, 1995).
20. Ironically, although its opposition to universalizing meta-narratives puts postmodernism in opposition to Enlightenment philosophy as a whole, its specifically poststructuralist propositions can equally well be pressed into the service of Enlightenment models denying that the sovereign artificer's actions and volitions are structurally determined. See Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Oxford: Polity, 1992); Linda Nicholson, ed., Feminism/Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1990); Michèle Barrett and Anne Phillips, ed.. Destabilizing Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates (Oxford: Polity, 1992); Gisela Bock and Susan James, eds., Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity (London: Routledge, 1992); Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell and Nancy Fraser, Feminist Contentions (New York: Routledge, 1995).
21. Ironically, although its opposition to universalizing meta-narratives puts postmodernism in opposition to Enlightenment philosophy as a whole, its specifically poststructuralist propositions can equally well be pressed into the service of Enlightenment models denying that the sovereign artificer's actions and volitions are structurally determined. See Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Oxford: Polity, 1992); Linda Nicholson, ed., Feminism/Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1990); Michèle Barrett and Anne Phillips, ed.. Destabilizing Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates (Oxford: Polity, 1992); Gisela Bock and Susan James, eds., Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity (London: Routledge, 1992); Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell and Nancy Fraser, Feminist Contentions (New York: Routledge, 1995).
22. I use the term advisedly, on the advice of the feminist critique just canvassed: the Enlightenment conception was indeed a conception of man, and man alone.
23. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and 'The Procedural Republic & the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, 12 (1984), 81-96; Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality ? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Taylor, Sources of the Self. Michael Walzer, sometimes included among communitarians, constitutes a more ambiguous case, as is evident from his Thick and Thin (Notre Dame, Ind.; University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). The general outline of the communitarian argument will be taken as read. It has been reviewed effectively in many other places already, e.g.: Amy Gutmann, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 308-22; Will Kymlicka, 'Communitarianism', Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 199-237; Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); and Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey, The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal-Communitarian Debate (Brighton: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993). See also two important compilations collecting key contributions to this debate: Michael J. Sandel, ed., Liberalism & Its Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); and Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds., Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
24. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and 'The Procedural Republic & the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, 12 (1984), 81-96; Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality ? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Taylor, Sources of the Self. Michael Walzer, sometimes included among communitarians, constitutes a more ambiguous case, as is evident from his Thick and Thin (Notre Dame, Ind.; University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). The general outline of the communitarian argument will be taken as read. It has been reviewed effectively in many other places already, e.g.: Amy Gutmann, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 308-22; Will Kymlicka, 'Communitarianism', Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 199-237; Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); and Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey, The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal-Communitarian Debate (Brighton: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993). See also two important compilations collecting key contributions to this debate: Michael J. Sandel, ed., Liberalism & Its Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); and Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds., Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
25. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and 'The Procedural Republic & the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, 12 (1984), 81-96; Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality ? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Taylor, Sources of the Self. Michael Walzer, sometimes included among communitarians, constitutes a more ambiguous case, as is evident from his Thick and Thin (Notre Dame, Ind.; University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). The general outline of the communitarian argument will be taken as read. It has been reviewed effectively in many other places already, e.g.: Amy Gutmann, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 308-22; Will Kymlicka, 'Communitarianism', Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 199-237; Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); and Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey, The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal-Communitarian Debate (Brighton: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993). See also two important compilations collecting key contributions to this debate: Michael J. Sandel, ed., Liberalism & Its Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); and Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds., Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
26. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and 'The Procedural Republic & the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, 12 (1984), 81-96; Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality ? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Taylor, Sources of the Self. Michael Walzer, sometimes included among communitarians, constitutes a more ambiguous case, as is evident from his Thick and Thin (Notre Dame, Ind.; University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). The general outline of the communitarian argument will be taken as read. It has been reviewed effectively in many other places already, e.g.: Amy Gutmann, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 308-22; Will Kymlicka, 'Communitarianism', Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 199-237; Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); and Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey, The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal-Communitarian Debate (Brighton: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993). See also two important compilations collecting key contributions to this debate: Michael J. Sandel, ed., Liberalism & Its Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); and Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds., Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
27. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and 'The Procedural Republic & the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, 12 (1984), 81-96; Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality ? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Taylor, Sources of the Self. Michael Walzer, sometimes included among communitarians, constitutes a more ambiguous case, as is evident from his Thick and Thin (Notre Dame, Ind.; University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). The general outline of the communitarian argument will be taken as read. It has been reviewed effectively in many other places already, e.g.: Amy Gutmann, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 308-22; Will Kymlicka, 'Communitarianism', Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 199-237; Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); and Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey, The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal-Communitarian Debate (Brighton: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993). See also two important compilations collecting key contributions to this debate: Michael J. Sandel, ed., Liberalism & Its Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); and Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds., Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
28. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and 'The Procedural Republic & the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, 12 (1984), 81-96; Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality ? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Taylor, Sources of the Self. Michael Walzer, sometimes included among communitarians, constitutes a more ambiguous case, as is evident from his Thick and Thin (Notre Dame, Ind.; University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). The general outline of the communitarian argument will be taken as read. It has been reviewed effectively in many other places already, e.g.: Amy Gutmann, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 308-22; Will Kymlicka, 'Communitarianism', Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 199-237; Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); and Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey, The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal-Communitarian Debate (Brighton: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993). See also two important compilations collecting key contributions to this debate: Michael J. Sandel, ed., Liberalism & Its Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); and Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds., Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
29. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and 'The Procedural Republic & the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, 12 (1984), 81-96; Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality ? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Taylor, Sources of the Self. Michael Walzer, sometimes included among communitarians, constitutes a more ambiguous case, as is evident from his Thick and Thin (Notre Dame, Ind.; University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). The general outline of the communitarian argument will be taken as read. It has been reviewed effectively in many other places already, e.g.: Amy Gutmann, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 308-22; Will Kymlicka, 'Communitarianism', Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 199-237; Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); and Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey, The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal-Communitarian Debate (Brighton: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993). See also two important compilations collecting key contributions to this debate: Michael J. Sandel, ed., Liberalism & Its Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); and Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds., Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
30. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and 'The Procedural Republic & the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, 12 (1984), 81-96; Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality ? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Taylor, Sources of the Self. Michael Walzer, sometimes included among communitarians, constitutes a more ambiguous case, as is evident from his Thick and Thin (Notre Dame, Ind.; University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). The general outline of the communitarian argument will be taken as read. It has been reviewed effectively in many other places already, e.g.: Amy Gutmann, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 308-22; Will Kymlicka, 'Communitarianism', Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 199-237; Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); and Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey, The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal-Communitarian Debate (Brighton: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993). See also two important compilations collecting key contributions to this debate: Michael J. Sandel, ed., Liberalism & Its Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); and Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds., Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
31. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and 'The Procedural Republic & the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, 12 (1984), 81-96; Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality ? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Taylor, Sources of the Self. Michael Walzer, sometimes included among communitarians, constitutes a more ambiguous case, as is evident from his Thick and Thin (Notre Dame, Ind.; University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). The general outline of the communitarian argument will be taken as read. It has been reviewed effectively in many other places already, e.g.: Amy Gutmann, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 308-22; Will Kymlicka, 'Communitarianism', Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 199-237; Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); and Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey, The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal-Communitarian Debate (Brighton: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993). See also two important compilations collecting key contributions to this debate: Michael J. Sandel, ed., Liberalism & Its Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); and Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds., Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
32. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and 'The Procedural Republic & the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, 12 (1984), 81-96; Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality ? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Taylor, Sources of the Self. Michael Walzer, sometimes included among communitarians, constitutes a more ambiguous case, as is evident from his Thick and Thin (Notre Dame, Ind.; University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). The general outline of the communitarian argument will be taken as read. It has been reviewed effectively in many other places already, e.g.: Amy Gutmann, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 308-22; Will Kymlicka, 'Communitarianism', Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 199-237; Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); and Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey, The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal-Communitarian Debate (Brighton: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993). See also two important compilations collecting key contributions to this debate: Michael J. Sandel, ed., Liberalism & Its Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); and Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds., Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
33. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and 'The Procedural Republic & the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, 12 (1984), 81-96; Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality ? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Taylor, Sources of the Self. Michael Walzer, sometimes included among communitarians, constitutes a more ambiguous case, as is evident from his Thick and Thin (Notre Dame, Ind.; University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). The general outline of the communitarian argument will be taken as read. It has been reviewed effectively in many other places already, e.g.: Amy Gutmann, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 308-22; Will Kymlicka, 'Communitarianism', Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 199-237; Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); and Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey, The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal-Communitarian Debate (Brighton: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993). See also two important compilations collecting key contributions to this debate: Michael J. Sandel, ed., Liberalism & Its Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); and Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds., Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
34. Rawls, Theory of Justice, and Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
35. Thomas Nagel, The Possiblity of Altruism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), and The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
36. Thomas Nagel, The Possiblity of Altruism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), and The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
37. Critics of the Enlightenment project are sometimes in sympathy with these concerns and are at pains to show that, even once their criticisms are taken on board, there still remain ways of getting some substantial critical distance from received wisdom and popular prejudice. See, e.g., Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott, eds., Feminists Theorize the Political (New York: Routledge, 1992).
38. Communitarian critics might baulk, saying that the very act of distinguishing different kinds of community in itself does violence to the basic organicist spirit of the communitarian project. In real life, after all, these distinct communities exist alongside one another and are inextricably intertwined with one another in the fabric of social life as a whole. True though that may be of our lived experience of them, however, we can discuss these communities separately even if we can never actually experience them separately. That is all I am counting on, for purposes of this article. Communitarians might continue to baulk, now at the 'abstraction' that this involves; for a defence of that, see my 'Political Ideals and Political Practice', British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 37-56.
39. Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryan S. Turner, Sovereign Individuals of Capitalism (London-Allen & Unwin, 1986); C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Robert E. Goodin, 'Possessive Individualism Again', Political Studies, 24 (1976), 488-501.
40. Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryan S. Turner, Sovereign Individuals of Capitalism (London-Allen & Unwin, 1986); C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Robert E. Goodin, 'Possessive Individualism Again', Political Studies, 24 (1976), 488-501.
41. Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryan S. Turner, Sovereign Individuals of Capitalism (London-Allen & Unwin, 1986); C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Robert E. Goodin, 'Possessive Individualism Again', Political Studies, 24 (1976), 488-501.
42. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Andrew Crooke, 1651); John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960; originally published 1690).
43. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Andrew Crooke, 1651); John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960; originally published 1690).
44. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner and W. B. Todd (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976; originally published 1776); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: John Noon, 1739), and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (London: Cadell, 1777).
45. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner and W. B. Todd (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976; originally published 1776); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: John Noon, 1739), and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (London: Cadell, 1777).
46. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner and W. B. Todd (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976; originally published 1776); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: John Noon, 1739), and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (London: Cadell, 1777).
47. In a way even more minimal than many other of Michael Walzer's 'thin, minimal moralities', not all of which are of a strictly instrumental sort; Thick and Thin, chap. 1.
48. Jon Elster, 'A Note on Hysteresis in the Social Sciences', Synthese, 33 (1976), 371-91. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Jerzy Hausner, Bob Jessop and Klaus Nielsen, ed., Strategic Choice and Path-Dependency in Post-Socialism (Aldershot: Elgar, 1995).
49. Jon Elster, 'A Note on Hysteresis in the Social Sciences', Synthese, 33 (1976), 371-91. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Jerzy Hausner, Bob Jessop and Klaus Nielsen, ed., Strategic Choice and Path-Dependency in Post-Socialism (Aldershot: Elgar, 1995).
50. Jon Elster, 'A Note on Hysteresis in the Social Sciences', Synthese, 33 (1976), 371-91. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Jerzy Hausner, Bob Jessop and Klaus Nielsen, ed., Strategic Choice and Path-Dependency in Post-Socialism (Aldershot: Elgar, 1995).
51. Robert E. Goodin, The Politics of Rational Man (London: Wiley, 1976); David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson, 'Reputation and Imperfect Information', Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (1982), 253-79; David M. Kreps, 'Corporate Culture and Economic Theory', in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143; Diego Gambetta, 'Godfather's Gossip', Archives Européenes de Sociologie, 35 (1994), 199-223, and 'Inscrutable Markets', Rationality & Society, 6 (1994), 353-68.
52. Robert E. Goodin, The Politics of Rational Man (London: Wiley, 1976); David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson, 'Reputation and Imperfect Information', Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (1982), 253-79; David M. Kreps, 'Corporate Culture and Economic Theory', in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143; Diego Gambetta, 'Godfather's Gossip', Archives Européenes de Sociologie, 35 (1994), 199-223, and 'Inscrutable Markets', Rationality & Society, 6 (1994), 353-68.
53. Robert E. Goodin, The Politics of Rational Man (London: Wiley, 1976); David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson, 'Reputation and Imperfect Information', Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (1982), 253-79; David M. Kreps, 'Corporate Culture and Economic Theory', in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143; Diego Gambetta, 'Godfather's Gossip', Archives Européenes de Sociologie, 35 (1994), 199-223, and 'Inscrutable Markets', Rationality & Society, 6 (1994), 353-68.
54. Robert E. Goodin, The Politics of Rational Man (London: Wiley, 1976); David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson, 'Reputation and Imperfect Information', Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (1982), 253-79; David M. Kreps, 'Corporate Culture and Economic Theory', in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143; Diego Gambetta, 'Godfather's Gossip', Archives Européenes de Sociologie, 35 (1994), 199-223, and 'Inscrutable Markets', Rationality & Society, 6 (1994), 353-68.
55. Robert E. Goodin, The Politics of Rational Man (London: Wiley, 1976); David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson, 'Reputation and Imperfect Information', Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (1982), 253-79; David M. Kreps, 'Corporate Culture and Economic Theory', in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143; Diego Gambetta, 'Godfather's Gossip', Archives Européenes de Sociologie, 35 (1994), 199-223, and 'Inscrutable Markets', Rationality & Society, 6 (1994), 353-68.
56. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), and 'An Evolutionary Approach to Norms', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 1095-112.
57. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), and 'An Evolutionary Approach to Norms', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 1095-112.
58. Wayne Baker, 'The Social Structure of a National Securities Market', American Journal of Sociology, 89 (1984), 775-811; Huseyin Leblebici and Gerald R. Salanick, 'Stability in Interorganizational Exchanges: Rulemaking Processes of the Chicago Board of Trade', Administrative Sciences Quarterly, 27 (1982), 227-42.
59. Wayne Baker, 'The Social Structure of a National Securities Market', American Journal of Sociology, 89 (1984), 775-811; Huseyin Leblebici and Gerald R. Salanick, 'Stability in Interorganizational Exchanges: Rulemaking Processes of the Chicago Board of Trade', Administrative Sciences Quarterly, 27 (1982), 227-42.
60. Stewart Macaulay, 'Non-Contractual Relations in Business', American Sociological Review, 28 (1963), 55-67, at p. 61. See, more generally, Mark Granovetter, 'Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness', American Journal of Sociology, 91 (1985), 481-510.
61. Stewart Macaulay, 'Non-Contractual Relations in Business', American Sociological Review, 28 (1963), 55-67, at p. 61. See, more generally, Mark Granovetter, 'Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness', American Journal of Sociology, 91 (1985), 481-510.
62. It is not that calculative egoism masquerades as high-minded moralism, or that people's 'real' motives are much more base than they allow. Where prudence and principle point so consistently in the same direction, the issue of differentiating the motives simply does not arise - certainly not in any practically meaningful way for agents themselves, and given that fact it cannot coherently arise for outside commentators on their actions either. See Robert E. Goodin, 'Do Motives Matter?' Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 19 (1989), 405-20; and, similarly, Alisdair MacIntyre, 'Egoism and Altruism', in Paul Edwards, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967), vol. 2, pp. 462-6; and C. Wright Mills, 'Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive', American Sociological Review, 5 (1940), 904-13.
63. It is not that calculative egoism masquerades as high-minded moralism, or that people's 'real' motives are much more base than they allow. Where prudence and principle point so consistently in the same direction, the issue of differentiating the motives simply does not arise - certainly not in any practically meaningful way for agents themselves, and given that fact it cannot coherently arise for outside commentators on their actions either. See Robert E. Goodin, 'Do Motives Matter?' Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 19 (1989), 405-20; and, similarly, Alisdair MacIntyre, 'Egoism and Altruism', in Paul Edwards, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967), vol. 2, pp. 462-6; and C. Wright Mills, 'Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive', American Sociological Review, 5 (1940), 904-13.
64. It is not that calculative egoism masquerades as high-minded moralism, or that people's 'real' motives are much more base than they allow. Where prudence and principle point so consistently in the same direction, the issue of differentiating the motives simply does not arise - certainly not in any practically meaningful way for agents themselves, and given that fact it cannot coherently arise for outside commentators on their actions either. See Robert E. Goodin, 'Do Motives Matter?' Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 19 (1989), 405-20; and, similarly, Alisdair MacIntyre, 'Egoism and Altruism', in Paul Edwards, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967), vol. 2, pp. 462-6; and C. Wright Mills, 'Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive', American Sociological Review, 5 (1940), 904-13.
65. Peter Laslett, 'The Face to Face Society', in P. Laslett, ed., Philosophy, Politics & Society, 1st series (Oxford: Blackwell, 1956), pp. 157-84.
66. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 43; Russell Hardin, 'Exchange Theory on Strategic Bases', Social Science Information, 21 (1982), 251-72, at p. 260.
67. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 43; Russell Hardin, 'Exchange Theory on Strategic Bases', Social Science Information, 21 (1982), 251-72, at p. 260.
68. Robert Paul Wolff, There's Nobody Here but Us Persons', in Carol C. Gould and Marx W. Wartofsky, eds., Women & Philosophy (New York: Putnam, 1980), pp. 128-44; Virginia Held, 'Non-Contractual Society', in M. Hanen and K. Nielsen, eds., Science, Morality and Feminist Theory (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1987), pp. 111-38, and 'Birth and Death', Ethics, 99 (1989), 362-88.
69. Robert Paul Wolff, There's Nobody Here but Us Persons', in Carol C. Gould and Marx W. Wartofsky, eds., Women & Philosophy (New York: Putnam, 1980), pp. 128-44; Virginia Held, 'Non-Contractual Society', in M. Hanen and K. Nielsen, eds., Science, Morality and Feminist Theory (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1987), pp. 111-38, and 'Birth and Death', Ethics, 99 (1989), 362-88.
70. Robert Paul Wolff, There's Nobody Here but Us Persons', in Carol C. Gould and Marx W. Wartofsky, eds., Women & Philosophy (New York: Putnam, 1980), pp. 128-44; Virginia Held, 'Non-Contractual Society', in M. Hanen and K. Nielsen, eds., Science, Morality and Feminist Theory (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1987), pp. 111-38, and 'Birth and Death', Ethics, 99 (1989), 362-88.
71. Onora O'Neill, 'Children's Rights and Children's Lives', Ethics, 98 (1988), 445-63; Robert E. Goodin and Diane Gibson, 'Rights, Young and Old', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 17 (1997), 185-203
72. Onora O'Neill, 'Children's Rights and Children's Lives', Ethics, 98 (1988), 445-63; Robert E. Goodin and Diane Gibson, 'Rights, Young and Old', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 17 (1997), 185-203
73. John Beattie, Other Cultures (New York: Free Press, 1964); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
74. John Beattie, Other Cultures (New York: Free Press, 1964); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
75. The family of course, is a paradigmatically multifaceted community - constituting, in the terms of the discussion that follows, a community of meaning and experience and regard (and sometimes even of subsumption), at the same time as playing these biological and sociological roles in generation and socialization. My discussion of the family under this heading is, therefore, without prejudice to its multifarious other roles under those other headings.
76. Many of the norms into which families socialize people are themselves in some deeper sense profoundly antisocial, however; see Michèle Barrett and Mary McIntosh, The Anti-social Family (London: Verso, 1982).
77. Among the most vociferous advocates of communitarianism on such linguistic grounds is Charles Taylor; see his Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), and Sources of the Self.
78. Among the most vociferous advocates of communitarianism on such linguistic grounds is Charles Taylor; see his Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), and Sources of the Self.
79. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), para. 243.
80. The conventions can be rather loose and open-textured and still perform this function perfectly well. There is no need to take sides in the spat between Derrida and Austin and Searle to feel the larger force of the points being developed here. Cf.: J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); and John R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Searle, 'The Word Turned Upside Down', New York Review of Books, 30 (27 October 1983), 74-9; and Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995).
81. The conventions can be rather loose and open-textured and still perform this function perfectly well. There is no need to take sides in the spat between Derrida and Austin and Searle to feel the larger force of the points being developed here. Cf.: J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); and John R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Searle, 'The Word Turned Upside Down', New York Review of Books, 30 (27 October 1983), 74-9; and Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995).
82. The conventions can be rather loose and open-textured and still perform this function perfectly well. There is no need to take sides in the spat between Derrida and Austin and Searle to feel the larger force of the points being developed here. Cf.: J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); and John R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Searle, 'The Word Turned Upside Down', New York Review of Books, 30 (27 October 1983), 74-9; and Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995).
83. The conventions can be rather loose and open-textured and still perform this function perfectly well. There is no need to take sides in the spat between Derrida and Austin and Searle to feel the larger force of the points being developed here. Cf.: J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); and John R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Searle, 'The Word Turned Upside Down', New York Review of Books, 30 (27 October 1983), 74-9; and Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995).
84. The conventions can be rather loose and open-textured and still perform this function perfectly well. There is no need to take sides in the spat between Derrida and Austin and Searle to feel the larger force of the points being developed here. Cf.: J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); and John R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Searle, 'The Word Turned Upside Down', New York Review of Books, 30 (27 October 1983), 74-9; and Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995).
85. This is a familiar point from socio-linguistics, dating from Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought & Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1956). It is encapsulated philosophically in Wittgenstein's famous phrase, 'the limits of my language mean the limits of my world' (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), para. 5.6, further refined and elaborated in his Philosophical Investigations, paras. 90 ff.) For political applications, see: Hanna F. Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Murray Edelman, Political Language (New York: Academic Press, 1977); and Robert E. Goodin, Manipulatory Politics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), chap. 3.
86. This is a familiar point from socio-linguistics, dating from Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought & Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1956). It is encapsulated philosophically in Wittgenstein's famous phrase, 'the limits of my language mean the limits of my world' (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), para. 5.6, further refined and elaborated in his Philosophical Investigations, paras. 90 ff.) For political applications, see: Hanna F. Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Murray Edelman, Political Language (New York: Academic Press, 1977); and Robert E. Goodin, Manipulatory Politics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), chap. 3.
87. This is a familiar point from socio-linguistics, dating from Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought & Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1956). It is encapsulated philosophically in Wittgenstein's famous phrase, 'the limits of my language mean the limits of my world' (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), para. 5.6, further refined and elaborated in his Philosophical Investigations, paras. 90 ff.) For political applications, see: Hanna F. Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Murray Edelman, Political Language (New York: Academic Press, 1977); and Robert E. Goodin, Manipulatory Politics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), chap. 3.
88. This is a familiar point from socio-linguistics, dating from Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought & Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1956). It is encapsulated philosophically in Wittgenstein's famous phrase, 'the limits of my language mean the limits of my world' (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), para. 5.6, further refined and elaborated in his Philosophical Investigations, paras. 90 ff.) For political applications, see: Hanna F. Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Murray Edelman, Political Language (New York: Academic Press, 1977); and Robert E. Goodin, Manipulatory Politics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), chap. 3.
89. This is a familiar point from socio-linguistics, dating from Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought & Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1956). It is encapsulated philosophically in Wittgenstein's famous phrase, 'the limits of my language mean the limits of my world' (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), para. 5.6, further refined and elaborated in his Philosophical Investigations, paras. 90 ff.) For political applications, see: Hanna F. Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Murray Edelman, Political Language (New York: Academic Press, 1977); and Robert E. Goodin, Manipulatory Politics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), chap. 3.
90. This is a familiar point from socio-linguistics, dating from Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought & Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1956). It is encapsulated philosophically in Wittgenstein's famous phrase, 'the limits of my language mean the limits of my world' (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), para. 5.6, further refined and elaborated in his Philosophical Investigations, paras. 90 ff.) For political applications, see: Hanna F. Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Murray Edelman, Political Language (New York: Academic Press, 1977); and Robert E. Goodin, Manipulatory Politics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), chap. 3.
91. This is a special case of the more general analysis of how we fit analytical frameworks to empirical phenomena found in W. V. O. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', From a Logical Point of View, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 20-46, at pp. 42-6.
92. Quentin Skinner, 'On Performing and Explaining Linguistics Actions', Philosophical Quartely, 21 (1971), 1-21; J. G. A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time (New York: Atheneum, 1971 ), and 'Verbalizing a Political Act: Toward a Politics of Speech', Political Theory, 1 (1973), 27-45.
93. Quentin Skinner, 'On Performing and Explaining Linguistics Actions', Philosophical Quartely, 21 (1971), 1-21; J. G. A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time (New York: Atheneum, 1971 ), and 'Verbalizing a Political Act: Toward a Politics of Speech', Political Theory, 1 (1973), 27-45.
94. Quentin Skinner, 'On Performing and Explaining Linguistics Actions', Philosophical Quartely, 21 (1971), 1-21; J. G. A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time (New York: Atheneum, 1971 ), and 'Verbalizing a Political Act: Toward a Politics of Speech', Political Theory, 1 (1973), 27-45.
95. Geertz, 'Politics of Meaning', in The Interpretation of Cultures, pp. 311-26.
96. Goodin, Manipulatory Politics, chap. 3.
97. Nor is it what sovereign artificers in a community of interests are like, for reasons set out in the introduction above. The qualifications to be introduced here are largely orthogonal to those, however - even though, as I hope to show in Section III, they can be incorporated into the same broader model.
98. Joan W. Scott, 'Experience', Critical Inquiry, 17 (1991), 773-97.
99. Karl Marx, The Civil War in France (1871)', in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 526-76.
100. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
101. It is 'extended' in the spatial sense, reaching beyond one's immediate social surroundings. It is also 'extended' in the linguistic sense, representing an attenuated usage, a non-paradigmatic case of a community of experience.
102. Joan C. Tronto, 'Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care', Signs, 12 (1987), 644-63, and Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (London: Routledge, 1993); Sara Ruddick, 'Maternal Thinking', Feminist Studies, 6 (1980), 342-67, and Maternal Thinking (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989).
103. Joan C. Tronto, 'Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care', Signs, 12 (1987), 644-63, and Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (London: Routledge, 1993); Sara Ruddick, 'Maternal Thinking', Feminist Studies, 6 (1980), 342-67, and Maternal Thinking (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989).
104. Joan C. Tronto, 'Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care', Signs, 12 (1987), 644-63, and Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (London: Routledge, 1993); Sara Ruddick, 'Maternal Thinking', Feminist Studies, 6 (1980), 342-67, and Maternal Thinking (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989).
105. Joan C. Tronto, 'Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care', Signs, 12 (1987), 644-63, and Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (London: Routledge, 1993); Sara Ruddick, 'Maternal Thinking', Feminist Studies, 6 (1980), 342-67, and Maternal Thinking (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989).
106. Carol Thomas, 'Deconstructing the Concept of Care', Sociology, 27 (1993), 649-69.
107. That is at least one way in which 'alienation' of labour was supposed to work according to the early Karl Marx; see his 1844 'Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts', in Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, pp. 52-104.
108. This conjuring up a sense of community out of a group of people with no direct relations with one another is the stuff of Anderson's Imagined Communities, whether those communities be based on nationality or race or class or gender or religion.
109. Robert K. Merton and Alice S. Kitt, 'Contnbutions to the Theory of Referene Group Behavior', in Robert K. Merton and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, eds., Communities in Social Research (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1950), pp 40-105; Ralf Dahrendorf, 'Homo Sociologicus', Essays in Social Theory (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968 [first published 1958]), pp. 19-87.
110. Robert K. Merton and Alice S. Kitt, 'Contnbutions to the Theory of Referene Group Behavior', in Robert K. Merton and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, eds., Communities in Social Research (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1950), pp 40-105; Ralf Dahrendorf, 'Homo Sociologicus', Essays in Social Theory (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968 [first published 1958]), pp. 19-87.
111. Robert E Goodin and John Dryzek, 'Rational Participation: The Politics of Relative Power', British Journal of Political Science, 10 (1980), 273-92; Amartya Sen, 'Poor, Relatively Speaking', Oxford Economic Papers, 35 (1983), 153-69.
112. Robert E Goodin and John Dryzek, 'Rational Participation: The Politics of Relative Power', British Journal of Political Science, 10 (1980), 273-92; Amartya Sen, 'Poor, Relatively Speaking', Oxford Economic Papers, 35 (1983), 153-69.
113. This ,s the basis for the defence of the rights of cultural membership in Will Kymlicka, liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), esp chap 8, and Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), esp. chap. 5. See similarly Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
114. This ,s the basis for the defence of the rights of cultural membership in Will Kymlicka, liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), esp chap 8, and Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), esp. chap. 5. See similarly Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
115. This ,s the basis for the defence of the rights of cultural membership in Will Kymlicka, liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), esp chap 8, and Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), esp. chap. 5. See similarly Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
116. Erving Goffman, Asylums (New York: Doubleday, 1961): Lewis A. Coser, Greedy Institutions: Patterns of Undivided Commitment (New York: Free Press. 1974). See also Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977 [originally published 1975]).
117. Erving Goffman, Asylums (New York: Doubleday, 1961): Lewis A. Coser, Greedy Institutions: Patterns of Undivided Commitment (New York: Free Press. 1974). See also Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977 [originally published 1975]).
118. Erving Goffman, Asylums (New York: Doubleday, 1961): Lewis A. Coser, Greedy Institutions: Patterns of Undivided Commitment (New York: Free Press. 1974). See also Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977 [originally published 1975]).
119. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Commitment and Community: Communes and Utopias in Sociological Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1972).
120. Cf., e.g., Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community (London: HarperCollins, 1993).
121. Walzer, Thick and Thin.
122. Irving L. Janis, Groupthink, 2nd edn (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).
123. Taylor, Sources of the Self, Pt. I.
124. Michèle Barrett, Women 's Oppression Today: Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis (London: Verso, 1980); Heidi Hartmann, The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism', in Lydia Sargent, ed., Women and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism (Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1981), pp. 1-41.
125. Michèle Barrett, Women 's Oppression Today: Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis (London: Verso, 1980); Heidi Hartmann, The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism', in Lydia Sargent, ed., Women and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism (Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1981), pp. 1-41.
126. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949), chap. 2; Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).
127. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949), chap. 2; Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).
128. Whatever truth status moral propositions can themselves aspire to, in any larger sense, what moral code prevails in any particular community is itself purely a matter of fact. It is an undeniably true fact about any particular community that its members expect one another to behave according to certain well-defined rules and that they will be judged, and rewarded or punished, accordingly. Whatever our meta-ethics, we can none the less talk sensibly about normative 'information' of this at least minimal sort being communicated within communities.
129. While no proposition is utterly immune to revision, on Quine's analysis, some are clearly more central in the sense that their revision would have wider ramifications and require more extensive revisions in other propositions if they were themselves to be revised (Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', pp. 43-4).
130. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions (New York: Free Press, 1989), esp. chap. 9, and Democratic Governance (New York: Free Press, 1995), esp. chap. 2.
131. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions (New York: Free Press, 1989), esp. chap. 9, and Democratic Governance (New York: Free Press, 1995), esp. chap. 2.
132. David Hume, 'Of Mirages', Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1777), sec. 10; James G. March, 'Model Bias in Social Action', Review of Educational Research, 42 (1972), 413-29; see also March 'The Technology of Foolishness', in March and Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1976), pp. 69-81; and Donald A. Schön and Martin Rein, Frame Reflection (New York: Basic, 1994).
133. David Hume, 'Of Mirages', Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1777), sec. 10; James G. March, 'Model Bias in Social Action', Review of Educational Research, 42 (1972), 413-29; see also March 'The Technology of Foolishness', in March and Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1976), pp. 69-81; and Donald A. Schön and Martin Rein, Frame Reflection (New York: Basic, 1994).
134. David Hume, 'Of Mirages', Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1777), sec. 10; James G. March, 'Model Bias in Social Action', Review of Educational Research, 42 (1972), 413-29; see also March 'The Technology of Foolishness', in March and Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1976), pp. 69-81; and Donald A. Schön and Martin Rein, Frame Reflection (New York: Basic, 1994).
135. David Hume, 'Of Mirages', Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1777), sec. 10; James G. March, 'Model Bias in Social Action', Review of Educational Research, 42 (1972), 413-29; see also March 'The Technology of Foolishness', in March and Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1976), pp. 69-81; and Donald A. Schön and Martin Rein, Frame Reflection (New York: Basic, 1994).
136. Sandra Harding and Merill B. Hintikka, 'Introduction', in Harding and Hintikka, eds., Discovering Reality (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), pp. ix-xix.
137. Thomas Piketty, 'Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (1995), 551-84.
138. Russell Hardin, 'The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust', Politics & Society, 21 (1993), 505-29, and One for All (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Robert E. Goodin, 'Conventions and Conversions: or, Why is Nationalism Sometimes So Nasty?' in Jeff McMahan and Robert McKim, eds., The Ethics of Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press. 1997).
139. Russell Hardin, 'The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust', Politics & Society, 21 (1993), 505-29, and One for All (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Robert E. Goodin, 'Conventions and Conversions: or, Why is Nationalism Sometimes So Nasty?' in Jeff McMahan and Robert McKim, eds., The Ethics of Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press. 1997).
140. Russell Hardin, 'The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust', Politics & Society, 21 (1993), 505-29, and One for All (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Robert E. Goodin, 'Conventions and Conversions: or, Why is Nationalism Sometimes So Nasty?' in Jeff McMahan and Robert McKim, eds., The Ethics of Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press. 1997).
141. Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).
142. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, pp. 179-81.
143. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 181.
144. Thus, Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 175-81, talks of the 'second birth' which people experience in the political forum, in discovering their true selves through the process of revealing them to one another.
145. Ronald Beiner, Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1983), pp. 138-9.
146. Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), and 'Should Preferences Count?' Land Economics, 70 (1994), 127-44.
147. Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), and 'Should Preferences Count?' Land Economics, 70 (1994), 127-44.
148. Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: Free Press, 1993), and Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Bernard Manin, 'On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation', Political Theory, 15 (1987), 338-68; Joshua Cohen, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', in Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, eds., The Good Polity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 17-34.
149. Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: Free Press, 1993), and Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Bernard Manin, 'On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation', Political Theory, 15 (1987), 338-68; Joshua Cohen, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', in Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, eds., The Good Polity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 17-34.
150. Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: Free Press, 1993), and Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Bernard Manin, 'On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation', Political Theory, 15 (1987), 338-68; Joshua Cohen, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', in Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, eds., The Good Polity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 17-34.
151. Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: Free Press, 1993), and Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Bernard Manin, 'On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation', Political Theory, 15 (1987), 338-68; Joshua Cohen, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', in Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, eds., The Good Polity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 17-34.
152. Frank Michelman, 'Traces of Self-Government', Harvard Law Review, 100 (1986), 4-77; Cass Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', Yale Law Journal, 97 (1988), 1539-90.
153. Frank Michelman, 'Traces of Self-Government', Harvard Law Review, 100 (1986), 4-77; Cass Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival', Yale Law Journal, 97 (1988), 1539-90.
154. Jon Elster, 'The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory', in Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, eds., Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 103-32; Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 171; Robert E. Goodin, Motivating Political Morality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), chap. 7.
155. Jon Elster, 'The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory', in Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, eds., Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 103-32; Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 171; Robert E. Goodin, Motivating Political Morality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), chap. 7.
156. Jon Elster, 'The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory', in Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, eds., Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 103-32; Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 171; Robert E. Goodin, Motivating Political Morality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), chap. 7.
157. Hanna Pitkin, 'Justice: On Relating Private and Public', Political Theory, 9 (1981), 327-52, at p. 347.