Localized competition, multimarket operation, and collusive behavior

International Economic Review

Volumn 39, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 371-398

  Verboven, Frank ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040086436     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2527298     Document Type: Article

References (31)

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