Strategic interaction among the states: An in-depth look at the welfare "Race to the bottom"

Social Work Research

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 199-216

  Albert, Vicky ^a   Catlin, Sandra N ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

Author keywords

"Race to the bottom"; Block grants; Strategic interactions; Welfare benefit levels; Welfare migration

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040076534     PISSN: 10705309     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/swr/26.4.199     Document Type: Article

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