Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 1984, Pages 229-281

  Handel, Michael I ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039941947     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: 1743937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402398408437190     Document Type: Article

References (109)

1. On the inverse correlation between strength and the incentive to resort to surprise, stratagem and deception, see Michael I. Handel, ‘Intelligence and Deception’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 5 (March 1982), 122–54, 145.
2. This is perhaps the reason that in early Soviet military doctrine, surprise was seen as a ‘transitory’ but not a decisive factor. Primarily identified with Stalin’s contribution to military science, these early views were still paid lip service after the German attack on the Soviet Union and even as late as the early 1950s and the nuclear age. The appearance of nuclear weapons rendered earlier Marxist–Leninist observations on the transitory (temporary) and permanent elements of war obsolete. Despite theoretical lip service to the secondary importance of strategic surprise, in practice the Soviet military doctrine assigns it a great deal of importance in conventional as much as in nuclear war. See Raymond L. Garthoff, The Soviet Image of Future War (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1959), Ch.3: ‘The Role of Surprise and Blitzkrieg’. By the 1970s, Colonel Savkin, a leading Soviet strategist, went one step further and referred to the principle of surprise as ‘… a most important principle of military art since olden times’. Col. V. Ye.Savkin, ‘Surprise’, Military Review (April 1974), 84–91; Col. Dr. L. Kuleszynski, ‘Some Problems of Surprise in Warfare’, and Maj. Mgr. Z. Poleski, ‘Psychological Aspects of Surprise’, both in Joseph D. Douglass and Amoretta M. Hoeber (eds), Selected Readings From Military Thought 1963–1973 (Washington DC: GPO, 1983), Vol.5, Part II, US Air Force; and John M. Caravelli, ‘The Role of Surprise and Preemption in Soviet Military Strategy’, International Security Review 6 (Summer 1981), 209–36. See also Amnon Sella, ‘Barbarossa: Surprise Attack and Communication’, The Journal of Contemporary History 13 (July 1978), 555–83; John Francis O’Neil, ‘German Counter-C3 and its Effects on Soviet Command Communications During Operation Barbarossa’ (MA dissertation, Naval Post-graduate School, Monterey, CA, 1980); John Erickson, ‘The Soviet Response to Surprise Attack: Three Directives, 22 June 1941’, Soviet Studies 23 (April 1972), 519–59; Reuben Ainsytein, ‘Stalin and June 22, 1941’, International Affairs 42 (October 1966), 662–73; Vladimir Petrov, ‘June 22, 1941’ Soviet Historians and the German Invasion (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1968).
3. All three quotations are from: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp.198–9.
4. Ibid., p.545.
5. For the impact of modern technology on warfare see: Michael Howard, War in European History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), in particular Chs. 5–7; J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Hutchinson, 1926), pp.278–9; J.F.C. Fuller, Armaments and History (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1945); J.F.C. Fuller, ‘The Mechanization of War’, in What Would Be the Character of a New War, The Interparliamentary Union, Geneva (New York: Harrison Smith and Robert Haas, 1933), pp.49–75; J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789–1961: A Study of the Impact of the French, Industrial and Russian Revolutions on War and Its Conduct (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972); Tom Wintringham, Weapons and Tactics (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973); Edwin A. Pratt, The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest 1833–1914 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1916); Brian Ranft (ed.) Technological Change and British Naval Policy 1860–1839 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977).
6. This apt phrase was suggested by Thomas C. Schelling in The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp.207–30, and in Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p.221. These two books have been neglected by the students of strategic surprise.
7. Clausewitz, p.79. On strategic surprise in the nuclear age, see, for example, Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982), pp.228–54; see also Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp.5–74.
8. Michael I. Handel, ‘The Study of Intelligence’, Orbis 26 (Winter 1978), 817–21.
9. These terms were first applied to the study of strategic surprise and intelligence analysis by Roberta Wohlstetter in Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp.336–8. On the inevitability of surprise, see Michael I. Handel, ‘The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise’, International Studies Quarterly 21 (September 1977), 461–501. An expanded version is Michael I. Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War (Jerusalem: The Leonard Davis Institute, 1976); and Richard K. Betts, ‘Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable’, World Politics 31 (October 1978), 61–89. Other interesting theoretical works on strategic surprise include (in addition to Roberta Wohlstetter’s Warning and Decision and Richard Bett’s Surprise Attack): Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan (eds.), Strategic Military Surprise (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983), pp. 147–71; Barton Whaley, Stratagem, Deception and Surprise in War (Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for International Studies, 1969, mimeo) (by now dated, this was unfortunately never published as a book); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp.567–87; Ephraim Kam, Failure to Anticipate War: The Why of Surprise Attack (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1983). Robert Jervis, ‘Hypothesis on Misperception’, World Politics 20 (April 1968) 454–79, is a pioneering study on the perceptual-psychological dimension of intelligence and decision-making in foreign affairs; earlier studies are Klaus Knorr, ‘Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles’, World Politics 16 (April 1964), 455–67; Benno Wasserman, ‘The Failure of Intelligence Prediction’, Political Studies 8 (June 1960), 156–69; Abraham Ben–Zvi, ‘Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks’, World Politics 28 (April 1976), 381–95; Janice Gross Stein, “Intelligence” and “Stupidity” Reconsidered: Estimation and Decision in Israel, 1973’, Journal of Strategic Studies 3 (September 1980), 147–78; Avi Shlaim, ‘Failures in National Security Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War’, World Politics 28 (April 1976), 348–80.
10. On deception, see for example: Barton Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1973); Whaley, Stratagem; Barton Whaley, ‘Covert Rearmament in Germany 1919–1939: Deception and Misperception’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 5 (March 1982), 3–39; Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig (eds.), Strategic Military Deception (New York: Pergamon, 1982). Among the more interesting Second World War memoirs dealing with deception are: Ewen Montague, Beyond Top Secret Ultra (London: Corgi, 1979); R.V. Jones, Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence in World War II 1939–1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978); R.V. Jones, ‘Intelligence and Deception’, in Robert Pfaltzgraff (ed.), Intelligence Policy and National Security (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp.3–23; David Mure, Practice to Deceive (London: William Kimber, 1977); David Mure, Master of Deception: Tangled Webs in London and the Middle East (London: William Kimber, 1980); Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); J.C. Masterman, The Double Cross System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972); Richard J. Heuer, Jr., ‘Strategic Deception: A Psychological Perspective’, International Studies Quarterly 25 (June 1981), 294–327; Thoughts on the Cost-Effectiveness of Deception and Related Tactics in the Air War 1939–1945 (Deception Research Program, Mathtech Inc., Princeton, NJ, and ORD/CIA Analytic, March 1979); Covert Rearmament in Germany 1919–1939: Deception and Misperception (Deception Research Program, Mathtech, Inc., Princeton, NJ, and ORD/CIA Analytic, March 1979).
11. See also Michael I. Handel, ‘Intelligence and Deception’, pp. 122–54.
12. For background and numerous alerts proceeding the German attack in the west in May 1940, see Telford Taylor, The March of Conquest (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1958); Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (London: Methuen, 1958); Hans Adolf Jacobsen, Fall Gelb: Der Kampf uber Den Deutschen Operationplan in Westoffensive 1940 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1957); Major L.F. Ellis, The War in France and Flanders 1939–1940 (London: HMSO, 1953); Basil Collier, Hidden Weapons: Allied Secret or Undercover Services in World War 11 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1982), pp.78–96; Betts, Surprise Attack, pp.28–34; André Beaufre, 1940: The Fall of France (London: Cassell, 1965); William L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969).
13. Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise, p. 15.
14. Handel, ‘Intelligence and Deception’, p. 154n.
15. See Michael I. Handel, ‘Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab-Israeli Wars’, in Knorr and Morgan (eds.), pp.111–46.
16. Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise, pp.18–28.
17. For the difficulties involved in estimating Hitler’s intentions and in predicting his style of operation, see Michael I. Handel, The Diplomacy of Surprise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1981), Ch.2, pp.31–96. Underestimating the capabilities of an adversary may lead to erroneous conclusions concerning his short-term intentions. Given the fact that capabilities are normally easier to assess than intentions, a competent intelligence organization is less likely to commit this type of error. Japanese intelligence in 1945 vastly underrated Soviet capabilities in Manchuria and therefore miscalculated Soviet intentions to launch a large-scale offensive in August 1945. For an interesting and detailed analysis, see Edward J. Drea, ‘Missing Intentions: Japanese Intelligence and the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria, 1945’, Military Affairs (April 1984), 66–73.
18. Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise, p.62.
19. Clausewitz, p. 190.
20. Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise, pp.15–16.
21. See Kam, p. 182. For the assessment of risks primarily on the tactical level, see Elias Carter Townsend, Risks: The Key to Combat Intelligence (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1955).
22. Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise, pp.46ff.
23. Barry Leach, German Strategy Against Russia 1939–1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp.91–4 and Appendix 4, p.270; Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941–1945 (London: Praeger Publishers, 1971); German Military Intelligence (Fredrick, MD: University Publications of America, 1984).
24. Waldemar Erfurth, Surprise (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1943), pp.6–7.
25. Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise, p. 16.
26. The term is Schelling’s. See The Strategy of Conflict, pp.244–5.
27. For literature on this case, see note 12 above.
28. Both quotations are from: W.D. Howells, ‘Intelligence in Crises’, in Gregory R. Copley (ed.), Defense ’83 (Washington DC: D and F Conferences, Inc., 1983), pp.351, 350.
29. Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise, pp.52–4; Betts, Surprise Attack, pp. 122–3.
30. Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise, p.54.
31. Ibid.
32. Howells, pp.359–61; Betts, Surprise Attack, pp.190–2; Kam, pp.127–39.
33. For an interesting case, see Jones, Most Secret War, pp.233–5.
34. Howells, ‘Intelligence in Crises’, p.361.
35. Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).
36. Betts, ‘Analysis, War and Decision’, pp.73–5; Kam, pp.461–2.
37. Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), pp.123–4.
38. Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, Vols. 2,3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952); Ludwig Reiners, The Lamps Went Out in Europe (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 134–9; Lawrence Lafore, The Long Fuse (Philadelphia: Lippin-cott, 1965), pp.269–75; L.F.C. Turner, The Origins of the First World War (New York: W.W.Norton, 1970), p.91–112; Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan (London: Oswald Wolf, 1958).
39. Paraphrased from an article by Charles Perrow, ‘Normal Accident at Three Mile Island’, Transaction (Social Sciences and Modern Society) 18 (July/August 1981), 17–26, 21.
40. See Jervis, ‘Hypothesis on Misperception’; Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations; and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Joseph de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, OH: Charles Merrill Pub., 1968); Jack S. Levy, ‘Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems’, World Politics 36 (October 1983), 76–100; Arthur S. Stein, ‘When Misperception Matters’, World Politics 34 (July 1982), 502–26; Herbert Goldhamer, Reality and Belief in Military Affairs (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, Feb. 1979 R–2448–NA); Misperception Literature Survey (Mathtech Inc., Princeton, NJ and ORD/CIA Analytic, March 1979).
41. Handel, The Diplomacy of Surprise, pp.97–176, 241–354.
42. For a detailed discussion, see Jervis, ‘Hypothesis on Misperception’.
43. Booth. He refers to this phenomenon as theHe refers to this phenomenon as the ‘Hamlet syndrome’.
44. On problems of ethnocentrism, national character, and the difficulties of understanding other cultures, see the following sample: Washington Platt, National Character in Action: Intelligence Factors in Foreign Relations (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1961); Booth; A.J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, Vol. l: Strategic Illusions 1936–1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). The classic study of national character is still Salvador de Madariaga, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927). On the importance of familiarity with languages, see for example: Lev Navrozov, ‘What the CIA Knows About Russia’, Commentary 66 (September 1971), 51–9.
45. Zvi Lanir, Fundamental Surprise: The National Intelligence Crisis (In Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: HaKibbutz HaMeuchad, 1983).
46. Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise, pp.40–42.
47. Lanir. By basic or fundamental surprise, Lanir means the lack of ‘correct’ understanding by a given society of its own problems, situation, capabilities, direction of development, the gap between its goals and means, the absence of understanding how its neighbors perceive it and the like. This new concept does not add any constructive dimension to the study of intelligence for reasons mentioned in the preceeding text, and may be methodologically more confusing than helpful.
48. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York: Vintage Books, 1964).
49. Ibid., p.49.
50. For an excellent discussion of this point, see Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), Ch.10, pp.183–209.
51. Donald McLachlan, Room 39: A Study in Naval Intelligence (New York: Atheneum, 1968), p.365.
52. See Thomas L. Hughes, The Fate of Facts in the World of Men: Foreign Policy and Intelligence Making (New York: Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association, December 1976, no.233), p. 15. This is one of the best essays on the use and misuse of intelligence by political leaders, and on the problems of cooperation between the intelligence community and political decision-makers.
53. Despite its importance, little has been wittten on politics and intelligence, or the politics of intelligence. Most of the existing observations are scattered throughout memoirs, histories of specific intelligence operations, and the like. An excellent chapter on this subject can be found in McLachlan, Ch.15, pp.338–66, as well as in the rest of the book. Some material concerning the bureaucratic politics of intelligence can be found in Mark M. Lowenthal, U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy, The Washington Papers, 105, Vol. 12 (1984). An interesting case study in the politics of intelligence concerns the process used to estimate the North Vietnamese-Vietcong order of battle. See Sam Adams, ‘Vietnam Cover-Up: Playing War with Numbers’, Harpers Magazine (May 1975), pp.41–4, 62–73; also Patrick J. McGarvey, CIA: The Myth and the Madness (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1974), Ch.7, ‘Intelligence to Please’, pp.148–60. A brief discussion can also be found in Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises, Ch. 10, ‘Careerism, Intelligence and Misperception’, pp.183–208. Similar to those of Howells, are the observations of Yehoshafat Harkabi in ‘The Intelligence Policymaker Tangle’, Jerusalem Quarterly 30 (Winter 1984), 125–31. For a different angle on intelligence and policymaking, focusing on the influence of intelligence estimates on US–USSR relations, see Raymond L. Garthoff, Intelligence Assessment and Policymaking: A Decision Point in the Kennedy Administration (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1984).
54. Handel, The Diplomacy of Surprise, pp. 1–31, 241–53; or Michaeli. Handel, ‘Surprise and Change in International Politics’, International Security 4 (Spring 1980), 57–85. On the failure of Japanese intelligence, see Ashman, Intelligence and Foreign Policy: A Functional Analysis (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah, 1973), pp.99–119. See also Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (eds.), The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the 20th Century (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1985).
55. Ashman, p.53.
56. Ibid., p.61. On Hitler as a decision-maker, see Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964); Percy Ernst Schramm, Hitler: The Man and the Military Leader (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971); Franz Haider, Hitler as a Warlord (London: Putnam, 1950); Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler’s Strategie: Politik und Kriegsfubrung 1940–1941 (Munich: Bernard Greife, 1982). On Ribbentrop’s attitude, see D.C. Watt’s introduction in David Irving, Breach of Security (London: William Kimber, 1968) in particular pp.39–40. Also David Irving, The War Path (New York: Viking Press, 1978), pp.243–4.
57. McLachlan, Room 39, p.135.
58. Handel, The Diplomacy of Surprise, pp.241–355.
59. Howells, p.352 (my emphasis).
60. A well-known example is Walter Langer’s psychoanalytical study of Hitler for the OSS during the Second World War. Walter Langer, The Mind of Adolf Hitler (New York: Basic Books, 1972); also James David Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977).
61. Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘Hitler’s Image of the United States’, American Historical Review 69 (July 1964), 1004–21.
62. See John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s Warwith Germany Vol.1 (New York: Harper & Row, 1975); John Erickson, The Soviet High Command (London: Macmillan, 1962). See also Seweryn Bialer (ed.), Stalin and His Generals (New York: Pegasus, 1969).
63. Ronald Lewin, Churchill as a Warlord (New York: Stein & Day, 1982). For a different viewpoint, see A. J.P. T aylor et al., Churchill Revisited: A Critical Assessment (New York: Dial Press, 1969). More sympathetic is Martin Gilbert’s Winston S. Churchill, Vol.5, The Prophet of Truth (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977) and Vol.6, Finest Hour 1939–1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983). R.W. Thompson, Generalissimo Churchill (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973).
64. Gaddis Smith, ‘How the British Held the Fort’, The New York Times Book Review (25 December 1983), pp. 1–2. This is a review of Martin Gilbert’s Winston S. Churchill, Vol.6, Finest Hour.
65. Lewin, p.75.
66. See McLachlan, Room 39, Ch.6, pp.124–43, and Ch.15, pp.338–67, Many leaders cannot resist the temptation to become their own intelligence officers. This practice is dangerous for the following reasons: (a) Leaders have only a limited amount of time to devote to the in-depth analysis of almost any subject, (b) Most often they are not experts or have only limited knowledge of the problems they intend to analyze, (c) Above all, they will be unable to be objective on exactly those subjects that interest them the most, (d) They tend to focus on pressing issues but ignore other important issues. This danger is best demonstrated by the statement attributed to Kissinger, ‘I don’t know what kind of intelligence I want, what I know is when I get it.’
67. Major Sir Desmond Morton, quoted in R.W. Thompson, Churchill and Morton (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1976), p.45.
68. Lewin, p.21.
69. Ibid., pp.30–31.
70. Ibid., p.20.
71. Howells, p.364. On supplying US Presidents with the ‘right information’ or the information they like to hear, see, among others: Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), in particular Chs. 10–12; David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York, Random House); and Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Wasington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974).
72. McLachlan, Room 39, p.366.
73. See Nigel West, MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909–1945 (London: Weidefeld & Nicolson, 1983), pp. 137–9.
74. Alouph Hareven, ‘Disturbed Hierarchy: Israeli Intelligence in 1954 and in 1973’, The Jerusalem Quarterly 9 (Fall 1978), 3–19; and Janice Gross Stein, ‘The 1973 Intelligence Failure: A Reconsideration’, The Jerusalem Quarterly 24 (Summer 1982), pp.41–54.
75. Perrow, p.21.
76. Howells, p.362.
77. A recently published article by a former senior Israeli intelligence officer (apparently the former head of collection of Israeli military intelligence) tries to demonstrate that the ‘purely rational’ decision-making process in intelligence analysis as well as in intelligence relations with policymakers can exist. The author recommends that the collected facts be allowed to speak for themselves. In light of his experience, this is a startlingly naive recommendation (yet a persistent one) because (a) the intelligence process cannot be totally isolated from the effect of politics; and (b) facts don’t and cannot speak for themselves. See Brigadier General (ret.) Yoel Ben–Porat, ‘The role of the Political Level in Estimates’, Haaretz (in Hebrew) (20 March 1984), p.3; see also Yoel Ben-Porat, ‘Estimates – Why They Collapse’, in Ma’arachot, (in Hebrew) (October 1983), pp.29–39.
78. Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise, p. 17.
79. On the military personality and intelligence see: Aluf Hareven, ‘Disturbed Hierarchy: Israeli Intelligence and 1954 and 1973’, Jerusalem Quarterly 9 (Fall 1978), 5–19. For the reasons outlined in the preceeding text – and primarily, for the low interest in, and regard for, intelligence work by military people (according to McLachlan), McLachlan suggests that this work is better performed by civilians. See McLachlan, Room 39, Ch.15: In his conclusion he recommends that ‘ … intelligence for the fighting services should be directed as far as possible by civilians’, pp.365, 342–5. He makes a powerful case, but seems to carry ft a bit too far. See also Handel, ‘Intelligence and Deception’, p. 140.
80. Quoted from Wesley K. Wark, ‘Baltic Submarine Bogeys: British Naval Intelligence and Nazi Germany 1933–1939’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 6 (March 1983), 60–81, 78.
81. Quoted from Collier, pp.64–5, 70.For the problems of, and measures taken to improve, the coordination of British intelligence operations during the Second World War, see:McLachlan, Room 39, p.298, Ch.11, ‘Three Heads are Better … ’. Includes an excellent discussion of British intelligence coordination at the highest level during the Second World War. See also McLachlan, ‘Naval Intelligence in World War II’, p.222. See also F.H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol.1 (London: HMSO, 1979), Ch.9: ‘Reorganizations and Reassessment During the Winter of 1940–1941’, pp.267–314, in particular pp.291–314; and Vol.2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Ch. 15, ‘Development and Organization of Intelligence’, pp.3–41.
82. Hughes, pp.49–50.
83. R.V. Jones, Most Secret War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), p.157.
84. McLachlan, Room 39, Ch.11, ‘Three Heads are Better … ’, p.298.
85. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little Brown, 1971); Morton Halpern, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1974); and Patrick McGarvey, ‘CIA: Intelligence to Please’, in Morton Halpern and Arnold Kanter (eds.), Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), pp.318–28.
86. Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).
87. Michael I. Handel, ‘Avoiding Political and Technological Surprise in the 1980s’, in Roy Godson (ed.), Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Analysis and Estimates (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980), pp.85–112, 105.
88. On the problems of parochialism, over–secrecy, compartmentalization, coordination, and the ‘indivisible nature’ of intelligence work, see also McLachlan, Room 39, pp.360, 362–3; also Lowenthal.
89. McLachlan, Room 39, p.366.
90. See Lowenthal.
91. Alexander L. George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), in particular, pp. 145–169; and Alexander L. George, ‘The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy’, American Political Science Review (September 1972), 751–95.
92. Betts, ‘Analysis, War and Decision’, pp.77–8.
93. George, Presidential Decision Making.
94. Ibid., pp. 195–6, 207.
95. Ibid., p.203.
96. Ibid., p.204.
97. Ibid. Betts, ‘Analysis, War and Decision’, p.77.
98. Betts, ‘Analysis, War and Decision’, p.76.
99. Ibid.
100. George, Presidential Decision Making, p.204.
101. Janis, pp.210–11.
102. Ibid., pp.207–24.
103. See George, Presidential Decision Making, pp. 169–74; Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp.415–18; Betts, ‘Analysis, War and Decision’, pp.80–81; Janis, pp.215–16.
104. Betts, ‘Analysis, War and Decision’, p.80.
105. In the acquisition of information, a balance must also be struck between technological and human intelligence. The trend during the last two decades has been to invest more heavily in the technical collection of information and relatively to weaken the human effort. This is not an unexpected development in view of the fantastic progress in technology in recent years, yet it will inevitably result in a search for ‘the coin not where it fell but under the lamp’. The emphasis on technical collection through such methods as satellite reconnaissance and electronic monitoring will naturally focus on the military and not the political-diplomatic dimension, and on military capabilities rather than on intentions. Nevertheless, there is no substitute for the human collection effort when it comes to the political dimension. Normally, only the agent on the spot may be able to give timely warning of a plan for a coup d’etat in Saudi Arabia. No satellite could report a last-minute decision by Galtieri and the Argentinian military junta to launch an attack on the Falkland Islands half a year ahead of earlier plans, nor could it warn against a car bomb or terrorist attack by a radical Iranian group in Lebanon. See also Patrick J. McGarvey, CIA: The Myth and the Madness (Baltimore: Penguin 1972), Ch.5, ‘Technology: The Tail Wagging the Dog?’, pp.93–116.
106. See Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise; Betts, Surprise Attack, pp.285–312.
107. On protecting air fields against surprise attacks, see P. Korobkov, ‘Dispersed Basing of Aviation Under Conditions of Waging a Modern War’, in Douglass and Hoeber (eds.), pp.216–25.
108. One weapons system that was considered to have great potential to halt a surprise attack (with the central front in Europe being the particular consideration) was the neutron bomb – a low–yield intense radiation nuclear bomb which presumably could be used instantaneously with less fear of the conflict deteriorating into nuclear escalation. See Col. Daniel Gans, ‘Neutron Weapons: Solution to a Surprise Attack?’, Military Review (January 1982), 19–37 (Part I) and (February 1982), 55–72 (Part II).
109. This discussion is primarily based on Perrow; all quotations are from this excellent article. See also Daniel F. Ford, Three Mile Island: Thirty Minutes to Meltdown (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), and Barry A. Turner, ‘The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters’, Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (Sep. 1976), 378–96.