Proverbial economies: How an understanding of some linguistic and social features of common sense can throw light on more prestigious bodies of knowledge, science for example

Social Studies of Science

Volumn 31, Issue 5, 2001, Pages 731-769

  Shapin, Steven ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Folklore; Heuristics; Metaphor; Mnemonics; Rhetoric; Socio linguistics

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039894350     PISSN: 03063127     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/030631201031005003     Document Type: Article

References (172)

1. The defining exercise can in principle go the other way round - common people can take a view of, and condemn, learned fools - but the learned have, until recently, controlled the presses.
2. See, among many examples, Galileo Galilei, 'Letter to Madam Christina of Lorraine, Grand Duchess of Tuscany, Concerning the Use of Biblical Quotations in Matters of Science [1615]', in Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, ed. and trans. Stillman Drake (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1957), 196, 200; William Gilbert, De Magnete, trans. P. Fleury Mottelay (New York: Dover, 1958; orig. publ. 1600), 318; John Wilkins, The Mathematical and Philosophical Works of the Right Rev. John Wilkins, 2 Vols in 1 (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1970; facsimile reproduction of 1802 edition; tract orig. publ. 1638), I, 11; Isaac Newton, The Mathematical Papers of Isaac Newton, Vol. VI: 1684-1691, ed. D.T. Whiteside (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 192.
3. See, among many examples, Galileo Galilei, 'Letter to Madam Christina of Lorraine, Grand Duchess of Tuscany, Concerning the Use of Biblical Quotations in Matters of Science [1615]', in Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, ed. and trans. Stillman Drake (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1957), 196, 200; William Gilbert, De Magnete, trans. P. Fleury Mottelay (New York: Dover, 1958; orig. publ. 1600), 318; John Wilkins, The Mathematical and Philosophical Works of the Right Rev. John Wilkins, 2 Vols in 1 (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1970; facsimile reproduction of 1802 edition; tract orig. publ. 1638), I, 11; Isaac Newton, The Mathematical Papers of Isaac Newton, Vol. VI: 1684-1691, ed. D.T. Whiteside (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 192.
4. See, among many examples, Galileo Galilei, 'Letter to Madam Christina of Lorraine, Grand Duchess of Tuscany, Concerning the Use of Biblical Quotations in Matters of Science [1615]', in Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, ed. and trans. Stillman Drake (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1957), 196, 200; William Gilbert, De Magnete, trans. P. Fleury Mottelay (New York: Dover, 1958; orig. publ. 1600), 318; John Wilkins, The Mathematical and Philosophical Works of the Right Rev. John Wilkins, 2 Vols in 1 (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1970; facsimile reproduction of 1802 edition; tract orig. publ. 1638), I, 11; Isaac Newton, The Mathematical Papers of Isaac Newton, Vol. VI: 1684-1691, ed. D.T. Whiteside (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 192.
5. See, among many examples, Galileo Galilei, 'Letter to Madam Christina of Lorraine, Grand Duchess of Tuscany, Concerning the Use of Biblical Quotations in Matters of Science [1615]', in Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, ed. and trans. Stillman Drake (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1957), 196, 200; William Gilbert, De Magnete, trans. P. Fleury Mottelay (New York: Dover, 1958; orig. publ. 1600), 318; John Wilkins, The Mathematical and Philosophical Works of the Right Rev. John Wilkins, 2 Vols in 1 (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1970; facsimile reproduction of 1802 edition; tract orig. publ. 1638), I, 11; Isaac Newton, The Mathematical Papers of Isaac Newton, Vol. VI: 1684-1691, ed. D.T. Whiteside (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 192.
6. Ralph Waldo Emerson, 'Nature', in Emerson, The Complete Essays. . . , ed. Brooks Anderson (New York: The Modern Library, 1940; art. orig. publ. 1836), 1-42, at 18: '[T]he memorable words of history and the proverbs of nations consist usually of a natural fact, selected as a picture or parable of a moral truth'.
7. Thomas Browne, Pseudodoxia Epidemica: Or, Enquiries into Very Many Received Tenets, And Commonly Presumed Truths (London, 1650; orig. publ. 1646), 4-6.
8. Alfred Sidgwick, Fallacies: A View of Logic from the Practical Side (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 1883), 266.
9. See here Barry Barnes and John Law, 'Whatever Should Be Done with Indexical Expressions?', Theory and Society, Vol. 3 (1976), 223-37.
10. This tendency is documented and criticized in Daniel M. Wegner and Robin R. Vallacher, 'Common-Sense Psychology', in Joseph P. Forgas (ed.), Social Cognition: Perspectives on Everyday Understanding (London: Academic Press, 1981), 225-46.
11. For entry into the secondary literature on scholarly attitudes to proverbs as folkish or learned items, see, for example, Natalie Zemon Davis's superb 'Proverbial Wisdom and Popular Errors', in Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975), 227-67; also excellent work by James Obelkevich, 'Proverbs and Social History', in Peter Burke and Roy Porter (eds), The Social History of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 43-72; Mary Thomas Crane, Framing Authority: Sayings, Self, and Society in Sixteenth-Century England (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), esp. 50-51, 206 (n.23); Ann Moss, Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Kevin Sharpe, Reading Revolutions: The Politics of Reading in Early Modern England (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), e.g. 101-5, 193-98, 320-22; and Adam Fox, Oral and Literature Culture in England 1500-1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), Chapter 2. I will be writing in the future about the early history of contrasts between learned expertise and common sense.
12. For entry into the secondary literature on scholarly attitudes to proverbs as folkish or learned items, see, for example, Natalie Zemon Davis's superb 'Proverbial Wisdom and Popular Errors', in Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975), 227-67; also excellent work by James Obelkevich, 'Proverbs and Social History', in Peter Burke and Roy Porter (eds), The Social History of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 43-72; Mary Thomas Crane, Framing Authority: Sayings, Self, and Society in Sixteenth-Century England (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), esp. 50-51, 206 (n.23); Ann Moss, Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Kevin Sharpe, Reading Revolutions: The Politics of Reading in Early Modern England (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), e.g. 101-5, 193-98, 320-22; and Adam Fox, Oral and Literature Culture in England 1500-1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), Chapter 2. I will be writing in the future about the early history of contrasts between learned expertise and common sense.
13. For entry into the secondary literature on scholarly attitudes to proverbs as folkish or learned items, see, for example, Natalie Zemon Davis's superb 'Proverbial Wisdom and Popular Errors', in Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975), 227-67; also excellent work by James Obelkevich, 'Proverbs and Social History', in Peter Burke and Roy Porter (eds), The Social History of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 43-72; Mary Thomas Crane, Framing Authority: Sayings, Self, and Society in Sixteenth-Century England (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), esp. 50-51, 206 (n.23); Ann Moss, Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Kevin Sharpe, Reading Revolutions: The Politics of Reading in Early Modern England (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), e.g. 101-5, 193-98, 320-22; and Adam Fox, Oral and Literature Culture in England 1500-1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), Chapter 2. I will be writing in the future about the early history of contrasts between learned expertise and common sense.
14. For entry into the secondary literature on scholarly attitudes to proverbs as folkish or learned items, see, for example, Natalie Zemon Davis's superb 'Proverbial Wisdom and Popular Errors', in Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975), 227-67; also excellent work by James Obelkevich, 'Proverbs and Social History', in Peter Burke and Roy Porter (eds), The Social History of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 43-72; Mary Thomas Crane, Framing Authority: Sayings, Self, and Society in Sixteenth-Century England (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), esp. 50-51, 206 (n.23); Ann Moss, Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Kevin Sharpe, Reading Revolutions: The Politics of Reading in Early Modern England (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), e.g. 101-5, 193-98, 320-22; and Adam Fox, Oral and Literature Culture in England 1500-1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), Chapter 2. I will be writing in the future about the early history of contrasts between learned expertise and common sense.
15. For entry into the secondary literature on scholarly attitudes to proverbs as folkish or learned items, see, for example, Natalie Zemon Davis's superb 'Proverbial Wisdom and Popular Errors', in Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975), 227-67; also excellent work by James Obelkevich, 'Proverbs and Social History', in Peter Burke and Roy Porter (eds), The Social History of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 43-72; Mary Thomas Crane, Framing Authority: Sayings, Self, and Society in Sixteenth-Century England (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), esp. 50-51, 206 (n.23); Ann Moss, Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Kevin Sharpe, Reading Revolutions: The Politics of Reading in Early Modern England (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), e.g. 101-5, 193-98, 320-22; and Adam Fox, Oral and Literature Culture in England 1500-1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), Chapter 2. I will be writing in the future about the early history of contrasts between learned expertise and common sense.
16. For entry into the secondary literature on scholarly attitudes to proverbs as folkish or learned items, see, for example, Natalie Zemon Davis's superb 'Proverbial Wisdom and Popular Errors', in Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975), 227-67; also excellent work by James Obelkevich, 'Proverbs and Social History', in Peter Burke and Roy Porter (eds), The Social History of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 43-72; Mary Thomas Crane, Framing Authority: Sayings, Self, and Society in Sixteenth-Century England (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), esp. 50-51, 206 (n.23); Ann Moss, Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Kevin Sharpe, Reading Revolutions: The Politics of Reading in Early Modern England (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), e.g. 101-5, 193-98, 320-22; and Adam Fox, Oral and Literature Culture in England 1500-1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), Chapter 2. I will be writing in the future about the early history of contrasts between learned expertise and common sense.
17. It would be very valuable to have a systematic 'history of ideas' survey of the temporally changing, and synchronically varying, references and evaluations of 'common sense': the sensus communis (the sense that mediates the five special senses); the shared sensibilities of Common Sense Philosophy; what everybody ought to know; what everybody knows if they have not received special instruction; the intellectual basis for prudence (or merely for prudence); what the common people only think they know; how everybody ought to think; how the common people think they think; etc. etc.
18. The indispensable source here is Archer Taylor, The Proverb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931). Of course, in lay society proverbs are probably most commonly defined through ostention, by giving examples and trusting the inquirer to see the pertinent family resemblances. For a few other definitional exercises, see George B. Milner, 'What is a Proverb?', New Society, No. 332 (6 February 1969), 199-202; Wolfgang Mieder and Alan Dundes (eds), The Wisdom of Many: Essays on the Proverb (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994), vii-xiii; W. Carew Hazlitt, English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases (London: Reeves & Turner, 1907), vii-xxx; Richard Chenevix Trench, Proverbs and Their Lessons (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1905), 1-25; Nigel Barley, '"The Proverb" and Related Problems of Genre Definition', Proverbium, Vol. 23 (1974), 880-84; Neal R. Norrick, How Proverbs Mean: Semantic Studies in English Proverbs (Berlin: Mouton, 1985), 65-79.
19. The indispensable source here is Archer Taylor, The Proverb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931). Of course, in lay society proverbs are probably most commonly defined through ostention, by giving examples and trusting the inquirer to see the pertinent family resemblances. For a few other definitional exercises, see George B. Milner, 'What is a Proverb?', New Society, No. 332 (6 February 1969), 199-202; Wolfgang Mieder and Alan Dundes (eds), The Wisdom of Many: Essays on the Proverb (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994), vii-xiii; W. Carew Hazlitt, English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases (London: Reeves & Turner, 1907), vii-xxx; Richard Chenevix Trench, Proverbs and Their Lessons (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1905), 1-25; Nigel Barley, '"The Proverb" and Related Problems of Genre Definition', Proverbium, Vol. 23 (1974), 880-84; Neal R. Norrick, How Proverbs Mean: Semantic Studies in English Proverbs (Berlin: Mouton, 1985), 65-79.
20. The indispensable source here is Archer Taylor, The Proverb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931). Of course, in lay society proverbs are probably most commonly defined through ostention, by giving examples and trusting the inquirer to see the pertinent family resemblances. For a few other definitional exercises, see George B. Milner, 'What is a Proverb?', New Society, No. 332 (6 February 1969), 199-202; Wolfgang Mieder and Alan Dundes (eds), The Wisdom of Many: Essays on the Proverb (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994), vii-xiii; W. Carew Hazlitt, English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases (London: Reeves & Turner, 1907), vii-xxx; Richard Chenevix Trench, Proverbs and Their Lessons (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1905), 1-25; Nigel Barley, '"The Proverb" and Related Problems of Genre Definition', Proverbium, Vol. 23 (1974), 880-84; Neal R. Norrick, How Proverbs Mean: Semantic Studies in English Proverbs (Berlin: Mouton, 1985), 65-79.
21. The indispensable source here is Archer Taylor, The Proverb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931). Of course, in lay society proverbs are probably most commonly defined through ostention, by giving examples and trusting the inquirer to see the pertinent family resemblances. For a few other definitional exercises, see George B. Milner, 'What is a Proverb?', New Society, No. 332 (6 February 1969), 199-202; Wolfgang Mieder and Alan Dundes (eds), The Wisdom of Many: Essays on the Proverb (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994), vii-xiii; W. Carew Hazlitt, English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases (London: Reeves & Turner, 1907), vii-xxx; Richard Chenevix Trench, Proverbs and Their Lessons (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1905), 1-25; Nigel Barley, '"The Proverb" and Related Problems of Genre Definition', Proverbium, Vol. 23 (1974), 880-84; Neal R. Norrick, How Proverbs Mean: Semantic Studies in English Proverbs (Berlin: Mouton, 1985), 65-79.
22. The indispensable source here is Archer Taylor, The Proverb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931). Of course, in lay society proverbs are probably most commonly defined through ostention, by giving examples and trusting the inquirer to see the pertinent family resemblances. For a few other definitional exercises, see George B. Milner, 'What is a Proverb?', New Society, No. 332 (6 February 1969), 199-202; Wolfgang Mieder and Alan Dundes (eds), The Wisdom of Many: Essays on the Proverb (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994), vii-xiii; W. Carew Hazlitt, English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases (London: Reeves & Turner, 1907), vii-xxx; Richard Chenevix Trench, Proverbs and Their Lessons (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1905), 1-25; Nigel Barley, '"The Proverb" and Related Problems of Genre Definition', Proverbium, Vol. 23 (1974), 880-84; Neal R. Norrick, How Proverbs Mean: Semantic Studies in English Proverbs (Berlin: Mouton, 1985), 65-79.
23. The indispensable source here is Archer Taylor, The Proverb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931). Of course, in lay society proverbs are probably most commonly defined through ostention, by giving examples and trusting the inquirer to see the pertinent family resemblances. For a few other definitional exercises, see George B. Milner, 'What is a Proverb?', New Society, No. 332 (6 February 1969), 199-202; Wolfgang Mieder and Alan Dundes (eds), The Wisdom of Many: Essays on the Proverb (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994), vii-xiii; W. Carew Hazlitt, English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases (London: Reeves & Turner, 1907), vii-xxx; Richard Chenevix Trench, Proverbs and Their Lessons (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1905), 1-25; Nigel Barley, '"The Proverb" and Related Problems of Genre Definition', Proverbium, Vol. 23 (1974), 880-84; Neal R. Norrick, How Proverbs Mean: Semantic Studies in English Proverbs (Berlin: Mouton, 1985), 65-79.
24. The indispensable source here is Archer Taylor, The Proverb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931). Of course, in lay society proverbs are probably most commonly defined through ostention, by giving examples and trusting the inquirer to see the pertinent family resemblances. For a few other definitional exercises, see George B. Milner, 'What is a Proverb?', New Society, No. 332 (6 February 1969), 199-202; Wolfgang Mieder and Alan Dundes (eds), The Wisdom of Many: Essays on the Proverb (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994), vii-xiii; W. Carew Hazlitt, English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases (London: Reeves & Turner, 1907), vii-xxx; Richard Chenevix Trench, Proverbs and Their Lessons (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1905), 1-25; Nigel Barley, '"The Proverb" and Related Problems of Genre Definition', Proverbium, Vol. 23 (1974), 880-84; Neal R. Norrick, How Proverbs Mean: Semantic Studies in English Proverbs (Berlin: Mouton, 1985), 65-79.
25. Taylor, op. cit. note 10, 3.
26. Thomas Fuller, The Worthies of England, ed. John Freeman (London: Allen & Unwin, 1952; orig. publ. 1662), 5.
27. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1413a 15. All quotations from Aristotle in this paper are from The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 Vols, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). See also Jan Fredrick Kindstrand, 'The Greek Concept of Proverbs', Eranos, Vol. 76 (1978), 71-85, at 78-80. For metaphor in the definition of proverbs, see, for example, Peter Seitel, 'Proverbs: A Social Use of Metaphor', Genre, Vol. 2 (1969), 143-61.
28. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1413a 15. All quotations from Aristotle in this paper are from The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 Vols, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). See also Jan Fredrick Kindstrand, 'The Greek Concept of Proverbs', Eranos, Vol. 76 (1978), 71-85, at 78-80. For metaphor in the definition of proverbs, see, for example, Peter Seitel, 'Proverbs: A Social Use of Metaphor', Genre, Vol. 2 (1969), 143-61.
29. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1413a 15. All quotations from Aristotle in this paper are from The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 Vols, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). See also Jan Fredrick Kindstrand, 'The Greek Concept of Proverbs', Eranos, Vol. 76 (1978), 71-85, at 78-80. For metaphor in the definition of proverbs, see, for example, Peter Seitel, 'Proverbs: A Social Use of Metaphor', Genre, Vol. 2 (1969), 143-61.
30. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1413a 15. All quotations from Aristotle in this paper are from The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 Vols, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). See also Jan Fredrick Kindstrand, 'The Greek Concept of Proverbs', Eranos, Vol. 76 (1978), 71-85, at 78-80. For metaphor in the definition of proverbs, see, for example, Peter Seitel, 'Proverbs: A Social Use of Metaphor', Genre, Vol. 2 (1969), 143-61.
31. Beatrice Silverman-Weinrich, 'Towards a Structural Analysis of Yiddish Proverbs', in Mieder & Dundes (eds), op. cit. note 10, 65-85, at 78, 80. Silverman-Weinrich acknowledges that no single semantic, phonic or rhetorical marker is found in all proverbs, but she insists that most proverbs - properly so-called - have at least one such marker.
32. It is fair to say that the extent of our culture's present-day experience with the ways of farmyard animals has greatly diminished, and hence that this metaphorical base is being hollowed out. One has only to turn the pages of a dictionary of proverbs to see how many now need explication just because we no longer have the stock of familiar experience, or of common usage, to make sense of them. And, on these grounds alone, it is very likely that many proverbs current several generations ago have now passed out of use, and that many others will soon do so. But it is hard to understand how it can be seriously maintained that late modernity does not use and make proverbs, and the concluding section of this paper will retrieve a sample arising from present-day technical subcultures. For a claim that 'The proverb is a language form which has largely passed from usage in contemporary American culture', see William Albig, 'Proverbs and Social Control', Sociology and Social Research, Vol. 15 (1931), 527-35. Albig reckoned that proverb-use was an inverse index of the extent of social differentiation, conflict and change - so to speak, a marker of modernity.
33. For proverbs and orality, see Walter J. Ong, SJ, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology: Studies in the Interaction of Expression and Culture (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), esp. 29-31, 78-81, 286-87; Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London: Routledge, 1988), 16ff., 34-35; also Obelkevich, op. cit. note 8; Fox, op. cit. note 8.
34. For proverbs and orality, see Walter J. Ong, SJ, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology: Studies in the Interaction of Expression and Culture (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), esp. 29-31, 78-81, 286-87; Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London: Routledge, 1988), 16ff., 34-35; also Obelkevich, op. cit. note 8; Fox, op. cit. note 8.
35. For proverbs and orality, see Walter J. Ong, SJ, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology: Studies in the Interaction of Expression and Culture (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), esp. 29-31, 78-81, 286-87; Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London: Routledge, 1988), 16ff., 34-35; also Obelkevich, op. cit. note 8; Fox, op. cit. note 8.
36. For proverbs and orality, see Walter J. Ong, SJ, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology: Studies in the Interaction of Expression and Culture (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), esp. 29-31, 78-81, 286-87; Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London: Routledge, 1988), 16ff., 34-35; also Obelkevich, op. cit. note 8; Fox, op. cit. note 8.
37. Barbara Herrnstein Smith, On the Margins of Discourse: The Relation of Literature to Language (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 69; Obelkevich (op. cit. note 8, 62) describes a shift in polite fashion during the 19th century from the anonymous proverb to the specifically authored quotation and aphorism: 'To cite a quotation', Obelkevich says, 'is to identify with the genius of the author and to lift oneself above the common herd'.
38. Barbara Herrnstein Smith, On the Margins of Discourse: The Relation of Literature to Language (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 69; Obelkevich (op. cit. note 8, 62) describes a shift in polite fashion during the 19th century from the anonymous proverb to the specifically authored quotation and aphorism: 'To cite a quotation', Obelkevich says, 'is to identify with the genius of the author and to lift oneself above the common herd'.
39. Obelkevich, op. cit. note 8, 65.
40. Early anthropology is a rich source for characterizations of proverbs as expressions of the 'primitive mentality' and its faulty modes of reasoning; see, for example, Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture, 2 Vols (London: John Murray, 1920; orig. publ. 1870), I, 83-90 (for proverbs as 'mines of historical knowledge' and as 'survivals' of past culture, and the view that the age of proverb-making was definitively past); for more recent anthropological evaluations, see Christopher R. Hallpike, The Foundations of Primitive Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 110-12, and Jack R. Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 125-26.
41. Early anthropology is a rich source for characterizations of proverbs as expressions of the 'primitive mentality' and its faulty modes of reasoning; see, for example, Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture, 2 Vols (London: John Murray, 1920; orig. publ. 1870), I, 83-90 (for proverbs as 'mines of historical knowledge' and as 'survivals' of past culture, and the view that the age of proverb-making was definitively past); for more recent anthropological evaluations, see Christopher R. Hallpike, The Foundations of Primitive Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 110-12, and Jack R. Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 125-26.
42. Early anthropology is a rich source for characterizations of proverbs as expressions of the 'primitive mentality' and its faulty modes of reasoning; see, for example, Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture, 2 Vols (London: John Murray, 1920; orig. publ. 1870), I, 83-90 (for proverbs as 'mines of historical knowledge' and as 'survivals' of past culture, and the view that the age of proverb-making was definitively past); for more recent anthropological evaluations, see Christopher R. Hallpike, The Foundations of Primitive Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 110-12, and Jack R. Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 125-26.
43. The list originated with the 17th-century English churchman and antiquary Thomas Fuller (op. cit. note 12, 5).
44. Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), though proverbial utterances do not usually lead to the bewilderment and annoyance Goffman ascribed to the frame-breaking passages he noted.
45. Thomas A. Sebeok, 'The Structure and Content of Cheremis Charms', in Dell Hymes (ed.), Language in Culture and Society: A Reader in Linguistics and Anthropology (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 356-71. (I owe this reference to Jay Jasanoff.) Some of proverbs' authority may possibly flow from these linguistic signs linking them to other forms of utterance - religious, legal and magical - known to be authoritative. Treating aphorisms rather than proverbs, Murray Davis has usefully drawn attention to the capacity of short-generic formulae to interest: Murray S. Davis, 'Aphorisms and Clichés: The Generation and Dissipation of Conceptual Charisma', Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 25 (1999), 245-69.
46. Thomas A. Sebeok, 'The Structure and Content of Cheremis Charms', in Dell Hymes (ed.), Language in Culture and Society: A Reader in Linguistics and Anthropology (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 356-71. (I owe this reference to Jay Jasanoff.) Some of proverbs' authority may possibly flow from these linguistic signs linking them to other forms of utterance - religious, legal and magical - known to be authoritative. Treating aphorisms rather than proverbs, Murray Davis has usefully drawn attention to the capacity of short-generic formulae to interest: Murray S. Davis, 'Aphorisms and Clichés: The Generation and Dissipation of Conceptual Charisma', Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 25 (1999), 245-69.
47. Iona Opie and Peter Opie, The Lore and Language of Schoolchildren (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959).
48. Harvey Sacks, 'On Proverbs', in Sacks, Lectures on Conversation, ed. Gail Jefferson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), Vol. I, 104-12, at 109, 111. This is a combination of several lectures given in 1964/65. Note, however, that proverbs can be purposefully adapted to achieve twists on the original message and, when this is understood to be done, the effect can be totally different from that of a mistake. Take the present-day statistician's proverb, 'The n justifies the mean'; the economist's expansion, 'There ain't no such thing as a free lunch, but there is a cheap one'; the professor's, 'You can lead a boy to college but you can't make him think'; Corporal Klinger's, 'The nose is the window of the soul'; and Mae West's, 'A hard man is good to find'. In each case, the authority of the modified form piggy-backs on that of the undeformed original.
49. Latour himself, however, is notably unimpressed with the proverb, using it as an example of a 'soft fact', something which may indeed spread stably in its expression over time and space, but whose reference is easily adapted and transformed by its users: Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 207-09.
50. For example, Heda Jason, 'Proverbs in Society: The Problem of Meaning and Function', Proverbium, Vol. 17 (1971), 617-23, at 618.
51. George Herzog, Jabo Proverbs from Liberia: Maxims in the Life of a Native Tribe (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), 2; Ruth Finnegan, Oral Literature in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 419.
52. George Herzog, Jabo Proverbs from Liberia: Maxims in the Life of a Native Tribe (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), 2; Ruth Finnegan, Oral Literature in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 419.
53. Kenneth Burke, 'Literature as Equipment for Living', in Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (Berkeley: University of California Press, 3rd edn, 1973; orig. publ. 1941), 293-304, at 296-97; see also Paul D. Goodwin and Joseph W. Wenzel, 'Proverbs and Practical Reasoning: A Study in Socio-Logic', Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 65 (1979), 289-302, at 290.
54. Kenneth Burke, 'Literature as Equipment for Living', in Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (Berkeley: University of California Press, 3rd edn, 1973; orig. publ. 1941), 293-304, at 296-97; see also Paul D. Goodwin and Joseph W. Wenzel, 'Proverbs and Practical Reasoning: A Study in Socio-Logic', Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 65 (1979), 289-302, at 290.
55. Sacks, op. cit. note 24, 107.
56. I shall, however, note below that translation from one experiential domain to another is not a necessary feature of proverb use and meaning, even where proverbs are metaphorical. See also Seitel, op. cit. note 13, 145.
57. For example, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1112a 17-1113a 14: 'Deliberation is concerned with things that happen in a certain way for the most part, but in which the event is obscure, and with things in which it is indeterminate. We call in others to aid us in deliberation on important questions, distrusting ourselves as not being equal to deciding'.
58. Stephen Toulmin, Return to Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
59. Herzog's study of a West African proverbial economy (op. cit. note 27, 2) makes a large claim for the place of proverbs in everyday generalization: '[I]n the realm of conversation and verbal expression proverbs furnish almost exclusively the means by which generalizations are made explicit'. It would be interesting to have an ethnographic study of how generalization actually happens in ordinary modern Western social life and in its technical sub-cultures.
60. This claim opposes an evidently common view that translation must be involved: see, for example, Geoffrey M. White, 'Proverbs and Cultural Models: An American Psychology of Problem Solving', in Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn (eds), Cultural Models in Language and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 151-72, at 152-55.
61. We now say 'The exception proves the rule' mainly to express a view that rules just do have exceptions, while the historical sense was that apparent counter-instances tested a rule which, if legitimate, should have no exceptions. That sense of 'proving' survives among bread-makers: proving the dough, letting it rise once to test whether the yeast is active. See Taylor, op. cit. note 10, 78; Linda Flavell and Roger Flavell, Dictionary of Proverbs and Their Origins (London: Kyle Cathie Ltd, 1993), 91.
62. We now say 'The exception proves the rule' mainly to express a view that rules just do have exceptions, while the historical sense was that apparent counter-instances tested a rule which, if legitimate, should have no exceptions. That sense of 'proving' survives among bread-makers: proving the dough, letting it rise once to test whether the yeast is active. See Taylor, op. cit. note 10, 78; Linda Flavell and Roger Flavell, Dictionary of Proverbs and Their Origins (London: Kyle Cathie Ltd, 1993), 91.
63. Susan Kemper, 'Comprehension and the Interpretation of Proverbs', Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, Vol. 10 (1981), 179-98.
64. That's an interesting proverb because there is radical contemporary divergence about what it means when applied to human conduct. Some reckon that it is an injunction to keep active, commending the virtues of busy-ness (keep on the move and you won't get mentally fusty). Others use the proverb to convey quite opposite sentiments (if you don't stay in one situation long enough, you won't acquire those desirable softening and stabilizing qualities signified by the moss coating stones in a quiet stream). And there are still other interpretations and uses: see Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 'Toward a Theory of Proverb Meaning', Proverbium, Vol. 22 (1973), 821-27.
65. Failure to 'get the point' of metaphorical proverbs, or a tendency to take them literally, is treated as a pathological sign. In a vast literature on this subject, see, for example, Donald R. Gorham, 'A Proverbs Test for Differentiating Schizophrenics from Normals', Journal of Consulting Psychology, Vol. 20 (1956), 435-40, and Wolfgang Mieder, 'The Use of Proverbs in Psychological Testing', Journal of the Folklore Institute, Vol. 15 (1978), 45-55.
66. Failure to 'get the point' of metaphorical proverbs, or a tendency to take them literally, is treated as a pathological sign. In a vast literature on this subject, see, for example, Donald R. Gorham, 'A Proverbs Test for Differentiating Schizophrenics from Normals', Journal of Consulting Psychology, Vol. 20 (1956), 435-40, and Wolfgang Mieder, 'The Use of Proverbs in Psychological Testing', Journal of the Folklore Institute, Vol. 15 (1978), 45-55.
67. Clifford Geertz characterizes common sense as representing 'the simple nature of the case': 'An air of "of-courseness", a sense of "it figures" is cast over things', or at least of certain things; 'They are depicted as inherent in the situation, intrinsic aspects of reality, the way things go': C. Geertz, 'Common Sense as a Cultural System', in Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 73-93, at 85;
68. also Geertz, Islam Observed (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 90-94.
69. I owe this point to Geoffrey Bowker.
70. Two British epidemiologists have recently subjected to sceptical statistical inquiry the health, economic and cognitive benefits proverbially associated with being 'early to bed and early to rise': 'Our results suggest that. . . the time of going to and getting up matters little'. The Christmas issue of the medical journal in which the paper was published is, however, well known for its attempts at medical levity: Catharine Gale and Christopher Martyn, 'Larks and Owls and Health, Wealth, and Wisdom', British Medical Journal, Vol. 137 (19-26 December 1998), 1675-77, at 1677; cf. Wolfgang Mieder, 'Early to Bed and Early to Rise: From Proverb to Benjamin Franklin and Back', in Mieder, Proverbs are Never Out of Season: Popular Wisdom in the Modern Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 98-134.
71. Two British epidemiologists have recently subjected to sceptical statistical inquiry the health, economic and cognitive benefits proverbially associated with being 'early to bed and early to rise': 'Our results suggest that. . . the time of going to and getting up matters little'. The Christmas issue of the medical journal in which the paper was published is, however, well known for its attempts at medical levity: Catharine Gale and Christopher Martyn, 'Larks and Owls and Health, Wealth, and Wisdom', British Medical Journal, Vol. 137 (19-26 December 1998), 1675-77, at 1677; cf. Wolfgang Mieder, 'Early to Bed and Early to Rise: From Proverb to Benjamin Franklin and Back', in Mieder, Proverbs are Never Out of Season: Popular Wisdom in the Modern Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 98-134.
72. Sacks, op. cit. note 24, 105, 109. Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca argue a somewhat weaker case with respect to 'maxims': 'a maxim can always be rejected,. . . the agreement it calls forth is never compulsory, but so great is its force, so great is the presumption of agreement attaching to it, that one must have weighty reasons for rejecting it': C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 165.
73. Sacks, op. cit. note 24, 105, 109. Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca argue a somewhat weaker case with respect to 'maxims': 'a maxim can always be rejected,. . . the agreement it calls forth is never compulsory, but so great is its force, so great is the presumption of agreement attaching to it, that one must have weighty reasons for rejecting it': C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 165.
74. Latour, op. cit. note 25, 206-07. Latour imagines the proverbial utterance accompanying and justifying the doling out of a maternal apple. In my experience, however, mothers tend to say this proverb as part of a general injunction to sensible eating, or, sometimes specifically, to consuming fresh fruit and vegetables - in which case, the son would in fact be hard put to cite expert studies contradicting the mother's counsel. In section 6 of this paper I will warn against, so to speak, comparing proverbial apples with scientific oranges: it will be useful to consider how real, as opposed to ideal, scientific practice itself may incorporate features of a proverbial economy.
75. Sacks, op. cit. note 24, 105, 109; Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1395a 12-13; see also Quintilian, The Institutio Oratorio, trans. Harold E. Butler, 4 Vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), II, 295 (Book V, Chapter 11, 41-42): 'Generally received sayings. . . would not have acquired immortality had they not carried conviction of their truth to all mankind'.
76. Sacks, op. cit. note 24, 105, 109; Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1395a 12-13; see also Quintilian, The Institutio Oratorio, trans. Harold E. Butler, 4 Vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), II, 295 (Book V, Chapter 11, 41-42): 'Generally received sayings. . . would not have acquired immortality had they not carried conviction of their truth to all mankind'.
77. Sacks, op. cit. note 24, 105, 109; Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1395a 12-13; see also Quintilian, The Institutio Oratorio, trans. Harold E. Butler, 4 Vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), II, 295 (Book V, Chapter 11, 41-42): 'Generally received sayings. . . would not have acquired immortality had they not carried conviction of their truth to all mankind'.
78. Take, for instance, this concluding sentence of a measuredly sceptical survey of management consultancy: 'As the Chinese proverb has it, in a good wind even turkeys can fly; but management consultancies may be headed for the doldrums': The Economist (22 March 1997), 20. (It may be part of the intended pawky humour that there were no turkeys in China until modern times.)
79. Sacks, op. cit. note 24, 105.
80. I owe this point to Michael Lynch.
81. Burke, op. cit. note 28, 301-02; see also Taylor, op. cit. note 10, 82; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, op. cit. note 42, 166. Sounding here more like a cognitive scientist than a literary critic, Herrnstein Smith argues (op. cit. note 17, 70) that selective mechanisms underwrite the broad range of situations to which a proverb can be 'appropriately affirmed': 'By a sort of natural selection, those proverbs that survive are literally the fittest; that is, they fit the widest variety of circumstances or adapt most readily to emergent environments'.
82. Burke, op. cit. note 28, 301-02; see also Taylor, op. cit. note 10, 82; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, op. cit. note 42, 166. Sounding here more like a cognitive scientist than a literary critic, Herrnstein Smith argues (op. cit. note 17, 70) that selective mechanisms underwrite the broad range of situations to which a proverb can be 'appropriately affirmed': 'By a sort of natural selection, those proverbs that survive are literally the fittest; that is, they fit the widest variety of circumstances or adapt most readily to emergent environments'.
83. Burke, op. cit. note 28, 301-02; see also Taylor, op. cit. note 10, 82; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, op. cit. note 42, 166. Sounding here more like a cognitive scientist than a literary critic, Herrnstein Smith argues (op. cit. note 17, 70) that selective mechanisms underwrite the broad range of situations to which a proverb can be 'appropriately affirmed': 'By a sort of natural selection, those proverbs that survive are literally the fittest; that is, they fit the widest variety of circumstances or adapt most readily to emergent environments'.
84. Burke, op. cit. note 28, 301-02; see also Taylor, op. cit. note 10, 82; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, op. cit. note 42, 166. Sounding here more like a cognitive scientist than a literary critic, Herrnstein Smith argues (op. cit. note 17, 70) that selective mechanisms underwrite the broad range of situations to which a proverb can be 'appropriately affirmed': 'By a sort of natural selection, those proverbs that survive are literally the fittest; that is, they fit the widest variety of circumstances or adapt most readily to emergent environments'.
85. For example, E.E. Evans-Pritchard, 'Meaning in Zande Proverbs', Man, Vol. 62 (1962), 4-7.
86. Sacks, op. cit. note 24, 110; also Herrnstein Smith, op. cit. note 17, 72.
87. Sacks, op. cit. note 24, 110; also Herrnstein Smith, op. cit. note 17, 72.
88. Gilat Hasan-Rokem, 'The Pragmatics of Proverbs: How the Proverb Gets Its Meaning', in Loraine K. Obler and Lise Menn (eds), Exceptional Language and Linguistics (New York: Academic Press, 1982), 169-73.
89. See, for example, Dell H. Hymes, 'The Ethnography of Speaking', in Thomas Gladwin and William C. Sturtevant (eds), Anthropology and Human Behavior (Washington, DC: Anthropological Society of Washington, 1962), 13-53 (for programmatic statements); E. Ojo Arewa and Alan Dundes, 'Proverbs and the Ethnography of Speaking Folklore', in John J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes (eds), The Ethnography of Communication, Special Issue, American Anthropologist, Vol. 66, No. 6, Part 2 (December 1964), 70-85; and Seitel, op. cit. note 13.
90. See, for example, Dell H. Hymes, 'The Ethnography of Speaking', in Thomas Gladwin and William C. Sturtevant (eds), Anthropology and Human Behavior (Washington, DC: Anthropological Society of Washington, 1962), 13-53 (for programmatic statements); E. Ojo Arewa and Alan Dundes, 'Proverbs and the Ethnography of Speaking Folklore', in John J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes (eds), The Ethnography of Communication, Special Issue, American Anthropologist, Vol. 66, No. 6, Part 2 (December 1964), 70-85; and Seitel, op. cit. note 13.
91. See, for example, Dell H. Hymes, 'The Ethnography of Speaking', in Thomas Gladwin and William C. Sturtevant (eds), Anthropology and Human Behavior (Washington, DC: Anthropological Society of Washington, 1962), 13-53 (for programmatic statements); E. Ojo Arewa and Alan Dundes, 'Proverbs and the Ethnography of Speaking Folklore', in John J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes (eds), The Ethnography of Communication, Special Issue, American Anthropologist, Vol. 66, No. 6, Part 2 (December 1964), 70-85; and Seitel, op. cit. note 13.
92. Raymond Firth, 'Proverbs in Native Life, with Special Reference to Those of the Maori', Folk-lore, Vol. 37 (1926), 134-53, 245-70, at 134.
93. Indeed, sometimes proverbs are intentionally used as code - so that the translation from their metaphorical base is not transparent to certain auditors, or so that other aspects of their linguistic specialness restrict access to their meaning. So a mother may say to her husband - devant les enfants - 'Little pitchers have big ears', confident (at least for a while) that the children will not understand that parental discretion is being counselled in a sensitive matter.
94. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1295a 3-6. For proverb-speaking in relation to age-and-experience,
95. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1295a 3-6. For proverb-speaking in relation to age-and-experience, see Goodwin & Wenzel, op. cit. note 28, 291-92; Finnegan, op. cit. note 27, 417; William P. Murphy, 'Oral Literature', Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 7 (1978), 113-36, at 128-29.
96. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1295a 3-6. For proverb-speaking in relation to age-and-experience, see Goodwin & Wenzel, op. cit. note 28, 291-92; Finnegan, op. cit. note 27, 417; William P. Murphy, 'Oral Literature', Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 7 (1978), 113-36, at 128-29.
97. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1295a 3-6. For proverb-speaking in relation to age-and-experience, see Goodwin & Wenzel, op. cit. note 28, 291-92; Finnegan, op. cit. note 27, 417; William P. Murphy, 'Oral Literature', Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 7 (1978), 113-36, at 128-29.
98. Herzog, op. cit. note 27, 2. See, in this connection, the nauseatingly packaged, but famously popular, collections of proverbs and aphorisms currently marketed in America as the Chicken Soup for the Soul series.
99. Jesus Ben-Sira, Ecclesiasticus or The Wisdom of Jesus Son of Sirach, ed. John G. Snaith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974; orig. comp. ca. 190 BC), 103.
100. Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, The Adventures of Don Quixote, trans. J.M. Cohen (Harmondsworth, Middx, UK: Penguin, 1950; orig. publ. 1604-14), 742; also 510, 591, 655, 688, 695, 741-44. Nevertheless, Sancho knows enough to upbraid those whose proverb-citing is even more undisciplined than his own (ibid., 500). See also Fox, op. cit. note 8, 165-67.
101. Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, The Adventures of Don Quixote, trans. J.M. Cohen (Harmondsworth, Middx, UK: Penguin, 1950; orig. publ. 1604-14), 742; also 510, 591, 655, 688, 695, 741-44. Nevertheless, Sancho knows enough to upbraid those whose proverb-citing is even more undisciplined than his own (ibid., 500). See also Fox, op. cit. note 8, 165-67.
102. Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, The Adventures of Don Quixote, trans. J.M. Cohen (Harmondsworth, Middx, UK: Penguin, 1950; orig. publ. 1604-14), 742; also 510, 591, 655, 688, 695, 741-44. Nevertheless, Sancho knows enough to upbraid those whose proverb-citing is even more undisciplined than his own (ibid., 500). See also Fox, op. cit. note 8, 165-67.
103. Seitel, op. cit. note 13, 147-48, 155-58.
104. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1358a 12-13.
105. Murray Davis's very funny essay on how sociological theories become 'interesting' stresses the necessity that they visibly set themselves against what is supposedly taken-for-granted, and, in passing, he identifies the taken-for-granted with the proverbial: '[A] new theory will be noticed only when it denies an old truth (proverb, platitude, maxim, adage, saying, common-place, etc.)': Murray S. Davis, 'That's Interesting: Towards a Phenomenology of Sociology and a Sociology of Phenomenology', Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 1 (1971), 309-44. Here I mean to show that proverbs can be 'interesting' in just the same way that their theoretical negation is 'interesting'.
106. For celery, see Christopher R. Henke, 'Making a Place for Science: The Field Trial', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 30, No. 4 (August 2000), 483-511, at 501.
107. Tim B. Rogers, 'Proverbs as Psychological Theories. . . Or Is It the Other Way Around?', Canadian Psychology, Vol. 31 (1990), 195-207.
108. This is precisely the intention of E.D. Hirsch, Jr's repellent A First Dictionary of Cultural Literacy: What Our Children Need to Know (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), the very first section of which (1-5) is a compilation of proverbs, accompanied by short interpretative homilies.
109. Compare, however, 'A black hen may lay a white egg'; 'A wise man commonly has foolish children'; and 'From the thornbush comes the rose'. The corpus of proverbial wisdom does indeed recognize 'regression to the mean'.
110. For surprising scientific confirmation of Murphy's Law, see Robert A.J. Matthews, 'The Science of Murphy's Law', Scientific American, Vol. 276, No. 4 (April 1997), 88-91. Note also the recently overheard 'The tendency of an event to occur varies inversely with one's preparation for it'. For oral citation of Sod's Law in the scientific training of PhD students, see Sara Delamont and Paul Atkinson, 'Doctoring Uncertainty: Mastering Craft Knowledge', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 31, No. 1 (February 2001), 87-107, at 97, 99.
111. For surprising scientific confirmation of Murphy's Law, see Robert A.J. Matthews, 'The Science of Murphy's Law', Scientific American, Vol. 276, No. 4 (April 1997), 88-91. Note also the recently overheard 'The tendency of an event to occur varies inversely with one's preparation for it'. For oral citation of Sod's Law in the scientific training of PhD students, see Sara Delamont and Paul Atkinson, 'Doctoring Uncertainty: Mastering Craft Knowledge', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 31, No. 1 (February 2001), 87-107, at 97, 99.
112. See, for example, Goodwin & Wenzel, op. cit. note 28, 301, and, for the civic setting of proverbial probabilism, see Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), Chapter 3.
113. See, for example, Goodwin & Wenzel, op. cit. note 28, 301, and, for the civic setting of proverbial probabilism, see Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), Chapter 3.
114. Ecclesiastes 3:1.
115. See Steven Shapin, 'Rarely Pure and Never Simple: Talking about Truth', Configurations, Vol. 7 (1999), 1-14, esp. 14.
116. Taylor, op. cit. note 10, 20-21, 168-69. On proverbs as a 'subversive kind of wisdom' among the common people, see Obelkevich, op. cit. note 8, 49.
117. Taylor, op. cit. note 10, 20-21, 168-69. On proverbs as a 'subversive kind of wisdom' among the common people, see Obelkevich, op. cit. note 8, 49.
118. Geertz, 'Common Sense', op. cit. note 39, 89. Geertz rightly picked out (91) the 'anti-expert, if not anti-intellectual' tone of many proverbial expressions.
119. Taylor, op. cit. note 10, 4, 9. For example, 'If Candlemas day [2 February] be sunny and bright, winter will have another flight; if Candlemas day be cloudy with rain, winter is gone and won't come again'. This can hardly have any predictive value in a range of settings where such sayings continue to circulate, including Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania (where the official American groundhog lives), and would only seem to have any chance of being correct in Mediterranean conditions. On the other hand, lots of proverbs about diet and regimen smack of dernier cri medical thinking: see Steven Shapin, 'How to Eat Like a Gentleman: Dietetics and Ethics in Early Modern England', in Charles E. Rosenberg (ed.), Every Man His Own Physician (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, in the press). The notion of 'phatic communion' - linguistic acts whose purpose is just the establishment and maintenance of social bonds - belongs to Bronislaw Malinowski: see his 'The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages', in C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards (eds), The Meaning of Meaning (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 8th edn, 1956), 296-336, esp. 315-16.
120. Taylor, op. cit. note 10, 4, 9. For example, 'If Candlemas day [2 February] be sunny and bright, winter will have another flight; if Candlemas day be cloudy with rain, winter is gone and won't come again'. This can hardly have any predictive value in a range of settings where such sayings continue to circulate, including Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania (where the official American groundhog lives), and would only seem to have any chance of being correct in
121. Taylor, op. cit. note 10, 4, 9. For example, 'If Candlemas day [2 February] be sunny and bright, winter will have another flight; if Candlemas day be cloudy with rain, winter is gone and won't come again'. This can hardly have any predictive value in a range of settings where such sayings continue to circulate, including Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania (where the official American groundhog lives), and would only seem to have any chance of being correct in Mediterranean conditions. On the other hand, lots of proverbs about diet and regimen smack of dernier cri medical thinking: see Steven Shapin, 'How to Eat Like a Gentleman: Dietetics and Ethics in Early Modern England', in Charles E. Rosenberg (ed.), Every Man His Own Physician (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, in the press). The notion of 'phatic communion' - linguistic acts whose purpose is just the establishment and maintenance of social bonds - belongs to Bronislaw Malinowski: see his 'The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages', in C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards (eds), The Meaning of Meaning (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 8th edn, 1956), 296-336, esp. 315-16.
122. For example, John Heywood, A Dialogue of Proverbs (London, 1546); Nicholas Breton, A Crossing of Proverbs (London, 1616), and Michael Drayton's sonnet 'To Proverbe [ca. 1602]', in Minor Poems of Michael Drayton, ed. Cyril Brett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), 45. For general introduction to the topic of crossed proverbs, see Archer Taylor, 'Proverb', in Maria Leach (ed.), Dictionary of Folklore, Mythology and Legend, 2 Vols (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1949-50), II, 902-06, at 903.
123. For example, John Heywood, A Dialogue of Proverbs (London, 1546); Nicholas Breton, A Crossing of Proverbs (London, 1616), and Michael Drayton's sonnet 'To Proverbe [ca. 1602]', in Minor Poems of Michael Drayton, ed. Cyril Brett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), 45. For general introduction to the topic of crossed proverbs, see Archer Taylor, 'Proverb', in Maria Leach (ed.), Dictionary of Folklore, Mythology and Legend, 2 Vols (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1949-50), II, 902-06, at 903.
124. For example, John Heywood, A Dialogue of Proverbs (London, 1546); Nicholas Breton, A Crossing of Proverbs (London, 1616), and Michael Drayton's sonnet 'To Proverbe [ca. 1602]', in Minor Poems of Michael Drayton, ed. Cyril Brett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), 45. For general introduction to the topic of crossed proverbs, see Archer Taylor, 'Proverb', in Maria Leach (ed.), Dictionary of Folklore, Mythology and Legend, 2 Vols (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1949-50), II, 902-06, at 903.
125. For example, John Heywood, A Dialogue of Proverbs (London, 1546); Nicholas Breton, A Crossing of Proverbs (London, 1616), and Michael Drayton's sonnet 'To Proverbe [ca. 1602]', in Minor Poems of Michael Drayton, ed. Cyril Brett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), 45. For general introduction to the topic of crossed proverbs, see Archer Taylor, 'Proverb', in Maria Leach (ed.), Dictionary of Folklore, Mythology and Legend, 2 Vols (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1949-50), II, 902-06, at 903.
126. Wegner & Vallacher, op. cit. note 7, 231; cf. Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), esp. 10-13. See in this connection Merton's famous discussions of 'norms and counter-norms' - some of which take proverbial forms - in Robert K. Merton and Elinor Barber, 'Sociological Ambivalence', in Edward A. Tiryakian (ed.), Sociological Theory, Values, and Sociocultural Change (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1963), 91-120; also Robert S. Lynd, Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1940), Chapter 3.
127. Wegner & Vallacher, op. cit. note 7, 231; cf. Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), esp. 10-13. See in this connection Merton's famous discussions of 'norms and counter-norms' - some of which take proverbial forms - in Robert K. Merton and Elinor Barber, 'Sociological Ambivalence', in Edward A. Tiryakian (ed.), Sociological Theory, Values, and Sociocultural Change (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1963), 91-120; also Robert S. Lynd, Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1940), Chapter 3.
128. Wegner & Vallacher, op. cit. note 7, 231; cf. Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), esp. 10-13. See in this connection Merton's famous discussions of 'norms and counter-norms' - some of which take proverbial forms - in Robert K. Merton and Elinor Barber, 'Sociological Ambivalence', in Edward A. Tiryakian (ed.), Sociological Theory, Values, and Sociocultural Change (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1963), 91-120; also Robert S. Lynd, Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1940), Chapter 3.
129. Wegner & Vallacher, op. cit. note 7, 231; cf. Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), esp. 10-13. See in this connection Merton's famous discussions of 'norms and counter-norms' - some of which take proverbial forms - in Robert K. Merton and Elinor Barber, 'Sociological Ambivalence', in Edward A. Tiryakian (ed.), Sociological Theory, Values, and Sociocultural Change (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1963), 91-120; also Robert S. Lynd, Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1940), Chapter 3.
130. Goody, op. cit. note 19, 125-26; on this point, see also Sacks, op. cit. note 24, 105. In this connection, Goody is preferred to Geertz, who invokes contradictory proverbs to illustrate what he calls the 'immethodicalness' of common sense. When Geertz says of proverbs ('Common Sense', op. cit. note 39, 90) that 'it is not their interconsistency that recommends them but indeed virtually the opposite', he is implicitly retaining the conception of proverbs as an inspectable set of propositions - whether consistent or inconsistent - that Goody rightly challenges.
131. Goody, op. cit. note 19, 125-26; on this point, see also Sacks, op. cit. note 24, 105. In this connection, Goody is preferred to Geertz, who invokes contradictory proverbs to illustrate what he calls the 'immethodicalness' of common sense. When Geertz says of proverbs ('Common Sense', op. cit. note 39, 90) that 'it is not their interconsistency that recommends them but indeed virtually the opposite', he is implicitly retaining the conception of proverbs as an inspectable set of propositions - whether consistent or inconsistent - that Goody rightly challenges.
132. Goody, op. cit. note 19, 125-26; on this point, see also Sacks, op. cit. note 24, 105. In this connection, Goody is preferred to Geertz, who invokes contradictory proverbs to illustrate what he calls the 'immethodicalness' of common sense. When Geertz says of proverbs ('Common Sense', op. cit. note 39, 90) that 'it is not their interconsistency that recommends them but indeed virtually the opposite', he is implicitly retaining the conception of proverbs as an inspectable set of propositions - whether consistent or inconsistent - that Goody rightly challenges.
133. See, for example, H.M. Collins, 'The TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge and Scientific Networks', Science Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 1974), 165-86; Collins, 'Tacit Knowledge, Trust and the Q of Sapphire', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 31, No. 1 (February 2001), 71-85.
134. See, for example, H.M. Collins, 'The TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge and Scientific Networks', Science Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 1974), 165-86; Collins, 'Tacit Knowledge, Trust and the Q of Sapphire', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 31, No. 1 (February 2001), 71-85.
135. It would be pedantic to provide references for all of these, and I assume readers will have their own samples readily at hand. Almost needless to say, what's wanted in this connection is a much more systematic study of proverbial genres in expert practices. This part of the paper is intended to stimulate interest in the subject, and it is offered as the result of merely casual - though long-standing - inquiry on my part. A crude compilation of some social scientific and natural scientific proverbs is Alexander F. Chamberlain, 'Proverbs in the Making: Some Scientific Commonplaces', Journal of American Folk-lore, Vol. 17 (1904), 161-70, 268-78. For important brief remarks on the 'maxims' of science, see Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 30-31, 50, 54, 88, 90, 125 (citing Polya), 153-58, 162, 170, 311-12. For the biochemist's advice, see Delamont & Atkinson, op. cit. note 66, 95; for the machinists' maxim, see David F. Noble, 'Social Choice in Machine Design: The Case of Automatically Controlled Machine Tools', in Andrew Zimbalist (ed.), Case Studies on the Labor Process (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), 18-50, at 44; for rules of thumb in technicians' practice, circulating as 'as stories or snippets of advice', see Stephen R. Barley and Beth A. Bechky, 'In the Backrooms of Science: The Work of Technicians in Science Labs', Work and Occupations, Vol. 21 (1994), 85-126, at 109-10.
136. It would be pedantic to provide references for all of these, and I assume readers will have their own samples readily at hand. Almost needless to say, what's wanted in this connection is a much more systematic study of proverbial genres in expert practices. This part of the paper is intended to stimulate interest in the subject, and it is offered as the result of merely casual - though long-standing - inquiry on my part. A crude compilation of some social scientific and natural scientific proverbs is Alexander F. Chamberlain, 'Proverbs in the Making: Some Scientific Commonplaces', Journal of American Folk-lore, Vol. 17 (1904), 161-70, 268-78. For important brief remarks on the 'maxims' of science, see Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 30-31, 50, 54, 88, 90, 125 (citing Polya), 153-58, 162, 170, 311-12. For the biochemist's advice, see Delamont & Atkinson, op. cit. note 66, 95; for the machinists' maxim, see David F. Noble, 'Social Choice in Machine Design: The Case of Automatically Controlled Machine Tools', in Andrew Zimbalist (ed.), Case Studies on the Labor Process (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), 18-50, at 44; for rules of thumb in technicians' practice, circulating as 'as stories or snippets of advice', see Stephen R. Barley and Beth A. Bechky, 'In the Backrooms of Science: The Work of Technicians in Science Labs', Work and Occupations, Vol. 21 (1994), 85-126, at 109-10.
137. It would be pedantic to provide references for all of these, and I assume readers will have their own samples readily at hand. Almost needless to say, what's wanted in this connection is a much more systematic study of proverbial genres in expert practices. This part of the paper is intended to stimulate interest in the subject, and it is offered as the result of merely casual - though long-standing - inquiry on my part. A crude compilation of some social scientific and natural scientific proverbs is Alexander F. Chamberlain, 'Proverbs in the Making: Some Scientific Commonplaces', Journal of American Folk-lore, Vol. 17 (1904), 161-70, 268-78. For important brief remarks on the 'maxims' of science, see Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 30-31, 50, 54, 88, 90, 125 (citing Polya), 153-58, 162, 170, 311-12. For the biochemist's advice, see Delamont & Atkinson, op. cit. note 66, 95; for the machinists' maxim, see David F. Noble, 'Social Choice in Machine Design: The Case of Automatically Controlled Machine Tools', in Andrew Zimbalist (ed.), Case Studies on the Labor Process (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), 18-50, at 44; for rules of thumb in technicians' practice, circulating as 'as stories or snippets of advice', see Stephen R. Barley and Beth A. Bechky, 'In the Backrooms of Science: The Work of Technicians in Science Labs', Work and Occupations, Vol. 21 (1994), 85-126, at 109-10.
138. It would be pedantic to provide references for all of these, and I assume readers will have their own samples readily at hand. Almost needless to say, what's wanted in this connection is a much more systematic study of proverbial genres in expert practices. This part of the paper is intended to stimulate interest in the subject, and it is offered as the result of merely casual - though long-standing - inquiry on my part. A crude compilation of some social scientific and natural scientific proverbs is Alexander F. Chamberlain, 'Proverbs in the Making: Some Scientific Commonplaces', Journal of American Folk-lore, Vol. 17 (1904), 161-70, 268-78. For important brief remarks on the 'maxims' of science, see Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 30-31, 50, 54, 88, 90, 125 (citing Polya), 153-58, 162, 170, 311-12. For the biochemist's advice, see Delamont & Atkinson, op. cit. note 66, 95; for the machinists' maxim, see David F. Noble, 'Social Choice in Machine Design: The Case of Automatically Controlled Machine Tools', in Andrew Zimbalist (ed.), Case Studies on the Labor Process (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), 18-50, at 44; for rules of thumb in technicians' practice, circulating as 'as stories or snippets of advice', see Stephen R. Barley and Beth A. Bechky, 'In the Backrooms of Science: The Work of Technicians in Science Labs', Work and Occupations, Vol. 21 (1994), 85-126, at 109-10.
139. It would be pedantic to provide references for all of these, and I assume readers will have their own samples readily at hand. Almost needless to say, what's wanted in this connection is a much more systematic study of proverbial genres in expert practices. This part of the paper is intended to stimulate interest in the subject, and it is offered as the result of merely casual - though long-standing - inquiry on my part. A crude compilation of some social scientific and natural scientific proverbs is Alexander F. Chamberlain, 'Proverbs in the Making: Some Scientific Commonplaces', Journal of American Folk-lore, Vol. 17 (1904), 161-70, 268-78. For important brief remarks on the 'maxims' of science, see Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 30-31, 50, 54, 88, 90, 125 (citing Polya), 153-58, 162, 170, 311-12. For the biochemist's advice, see Delamont & Atkinson, op. cit. note 66, 95; for the machinists' maxim, see David F. Noble, 'Social Choice in Machine Design: The Case of Automatically Controlled Machine Tools', in Andrew Zimbalist (ed.), Case Studies on the Labor Process (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), 18-50, at 44; for rules of thumb in technicians' practice, circulating as 'as stories or snippets of advice', see Stephen R. Barley and Beth A. Bechky, 'In the Backrooms of Science: The Work of Technicians in Science Labs', Work and Occupations, Vol. 21 (1994), 85-126, at 109-10.
140. Sir William Osler, Aphorisms: From His Bedside Teachings and Writings, ed. William Bennett Bean (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1961), 103, 105, 137, 141.
141. William S. Reveno, 711 Medical Maxims: Diagnostic and Therapeutic Aids for the Physician, 3 Vols (Westport, CT: Technomic Publishing Co., 1951-76); also Fielding H. Garrison, 'Medical Proverbs, Aphorisms, and Epigrams', Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, Vol. 4 (1928), 979-1005.
142. William S. Reveno, 711 Medical Maxims: Diagnostic and Therapeutic Aids for the Physician, 3 Vols (Westport, CT: Technomic Publishing Co., 1951-76); also Fielding H. Garrison, 'Medical Proverbs, Aphorisms, and Epigrams', Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, Vol. 4 (1928), 979-1005.
143. Harold Bursztajn and Robert M. Hamm, 'Medical Maxims: Two Views of Science', Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine, Vol. 52 (1979), 483-86, at 485; see also Harold Bursztajn et al., Medical Choices, Medical Chances: How Patients, Families, and Physicians Can Cope with Uncertainty (New York: Delacorte Press, 1981), esp. 69-70, 204; Paul Atkinson, Medical Talk and Medical Work: The Liturgy of the Clinic (London: Sage, 1995), 140-47; Arthur S. Elstein, with Linda Allal et al., Medical Problem Solving: An Analysis of Clinical Reasoning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), esp. Chapter 10.
144. Harold Bursztajn and Robert M. Hamm, 'Medical Maxims: Two Views of Science', Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine, Vol. 52 (1979), 483-86, at 485; see also Harold Bursztajn et al., Medical Choices, Medical Chances: How Patients, Families, and Physicians Can Cope with Uncertainty (New York: Delacorte Press, 1981), esp. 69-70, 204; Paul Atkinson, Medical Talk and Medical Work: The Liturgy of the Clinic (London: Sage, 1995), 140-47; Arthur S. Elstein, with Linda Allal et al., Medical Problem Solving: An Analysis of Clinical Reasoning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), esp. Chapter 10.
145. Harold Bursztajn and Robert M. Hamm, 'Medical Maxims: Two Views of Science', Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine, Vol. 52 (1979), 483-86, at 485; see also Harold Bursztajn et al., Medical Choices, Medical Chances: How Patients, Families, and Physicians Can Cope with Uncertainty (New York: Delacorte Press, 1981), esp. 69-70, 204; Paul Atkinson, Medical Talk and Medical Work: The Liturgy of the Clinic (London: Sage, 1995), 140-47; Arthur S. Elstein, with Linda Allal et al., Medical Problem Solving: An Analysis of Clinical Reasoning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), esp. Chapter 10.
146. Harold Bursztajn and Robert M. Hamm, 'Medical Maxims: Two Views of Science', Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine, Vol. 52 (1979), 483-86, at 485; see also Harold Bursztajn et al., Medical Choices, Medical Chances: How Patients, Families, and Physicians Can Cope with Uncertainty (New York: Delacorte Press, 1981), esp. 69-70, 204; Paul Atkinson, Medical Talk and Medical Work: The Liturgy of the Clinic (London: Sage, 1995), 140-47; Arthur S. Elstein, with Linda Allal et al., Medical Problem Solving: An Analysis of Clinical Reasoning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), esp. Chapter 10.
147. Henry F. Ledgard, Programming Proverbs (Rochelle Park, NJ: Hayden Book Co., 1975), 3. Jerry Ravetz, who elsewhere strongly defended a view of science as 'craftwork', nevertheless regarded the use of 'aphorisms' as a sign of scientific 'immaturity', to be eventually replaced by more certain 'universal laws': Jerome R. Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996; orig. publ. 1971), 375-76.
148. Henry F. Ledgard, Programming Proverbs (Rochelle Park, NJ: Hayden Book Co., 1975), 3. Jerry Ravetz, who elsewhere strongly defended a view of science as 'craftwork', nevertheless regarded the use of 'aphorisms' as a sign of scientific 'immaturity', to be eventually replaced by more certain 'universal laws': Jerome R. Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996; orig. publ. 1971), 375-76.
149. G[eorge] Polya, How to Solve It: A New Aspect of Mathematical Method (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2nd edn, 1973; orig. publ. 1945), 3, 221-25; for the invocation of folkish proverbs in surgical problem-solving, see Trevor J. Pinch, H.M. Collins and Larry Carbone, 'Inside Knowledge: Second Order Measures of Skill', The Sociological Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 (May 1996), 163-86, at 163; and, in the training of biochemists, Sara Delamont, Paul Atkinson and Odette Parry, The Doctoral Experience: Success and Failure in Graduate School (London: Falmer Press, 2000), 60.
150. G[eorge] Polya, How to Solve It: A New Aspect of Mathematical Method (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2nd edn, 1973; orig. publ. 1945), 3, 221-25; for the invocation of folkish proverbs in surgical problem-solving, see Trevor J. Pinch, H.M. Collins and Larry Carbone, 'Inside Knowledge: Second Order Measures of Skill', The Sociological Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 (May 1996), 163-86, at 163; and, in the training of biochemists, Sara Delamont, Paul Atkinson and Odette Parry, The Doctoral Experience: Success and Failure in Graduate School (London: Falmer Press, 2000), 60.
151. G[eorge] Polya, How to Solve It: A New Aspect of Mathematical Method (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2nd edn, 1973; orig. publ. 1945), 3, 221-25; for the invocation of folkish proverbs in surgical problem-solving, see Trevor J. Pinch, H.M. Collins and Larry Carbone, 'Inside Knowledge: Second Order Measures of Skill', The Sociological Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 (May 1996), 163-86, at 163; and, in the training of biochemists, Sara Delamont, Paul Atkinson and Odette Parry, The Doctoral Experience: Success and Failure in Graduate School (London: Falmer Press, 2000), 60.
152. Notably, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 'Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases', Science, Vol. 185 (27 September 1974), 1124-31, quoting 1124, 1131.
153. To be fair, Tversky and Kahneman themselves stipulated (ibid., 1130) that 'The reliance on heuristics and the prevalence of biases are not restricted to laymen. Experienced researchers are also prone to the same biases - when they think intuitively'.
154. Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd and the ABC Research Group, Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
155. Ibid., 7-10 (for the model of 'unbounded rationality'); 9 (for philosophers' practical rationality); 25-26 (for remarks on the history of heuristics); 363 (for proverbs; my emphasis). See also Gerd Gigerenzer, Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 15-25 (for criticisms of cognitive psychological tendencies to conceive of everyday heuristics as biases); 290-91 (for the Gambler's Fallacy); Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, 163-72 (for sympathetic views of 'Philosophical Heuristics'); William C. Wimsatt, 'Heuristics and the Study of Human Behavior', in Donald W. Fiske and Richard A. Shweder (eds), Metatheory in Social Science: Pluralisms and Subjectivities (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 292-314; Michael E. Gorman, Simulating Science: Heuristics, Mental Models, and Technoscientific Thinking (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), esp. 193, 210-13; and Herbert Simon and Allen Newell, Human Problem Solving (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972). The specific objection to Tversky and Kahneman on the Gambler's Fallacy is my own, not Gigerenzer's, though I take it to be broadly compatible with his point of view.
156. Ibid., 7-10 (for the model of 'unbounded rationality'); 9 (for philosophers' practical rationality); 25-26 (for remarks on the history of heuristics); 363 (for proverbs; my emphasis). See also Gerd Gigerenzer, Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 15-25 (for criticisms of cognitive psychological tendencies to conceive of everyday heuristics as biases); 290-91 (for the Gambler's Fallacy); Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, 163-72 (for sympathetic views of 'Philosophical Heuristics'); William C. Wimsatt, 'Heuristics and the Study of Human Behavior', in Donald W. Fiske and Richard A. Shweder (eds), Metatheory in Social Science: Pluralisms and Subjectivities (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 292-314; Michael E. Gorman, Simulating Science: Heuristics, Mental Models, and Technoscientific Thinking (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), esp. 193, 210-13; and Herbert Simon and Allen Newell, Human Problem Solving (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972). The specific objection to Tversky and Kahneman on the Gambler's Fallacy is my own, not Gigerenzer's, though I take it to be broadly compatible with his point of view.
157. Ibid., 7-10 (for the model of 'unbounded rationality'); 9 (for philosophers' practical rationality); 25-26 (for remarks on the history of heuristics); 363 (for proverbs; my emphasis). See also Gerd Gigerenzer, Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 15-25 (for criticisms of cognitive psychological tendencies to conceive of everyday heuristics as biases); 290-91 (for the Gambler's Fallacy); Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, 163-72 (for sympathetic views of 'Philosophical Heuristics'); William C. Wimsatt, 'Heuristics and the Study of Human Behavior', in Donald W. Fiske and Richard A. Shweder (eds), Metatheory in Social Science: Pluralisms and Subjectivities (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 292-314; Michael E. Gorman, Simulating Science: Heuristics, Mental Models, and Technoscientific Thinking (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), esp. 193, 210-13; and Herbert Simon and Allen Newell, Human Problem Solving (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972). The specific objection to Tversky and Kahneman on the Gambler's Fallacy is my own, not Gigerenzer's, though I take it to be broadly compatible with his point of view.
158. Ibid., 7-10 (for the model of 'unbounded rationality'); 9 (for philosophers' practical rationality); 25-26 (for remarks on the history of heuristics); 363 (for proverbs; my emphasis). See also Gerd Gigerenzer, Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 15-25 (for criticisms of cognitive psychological tendencies to conceive of everyday heuristics as biases); 290-91 (for the Gambler's Fallacy); Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, 163-72 (for sympathetic views of 'Philosophical Heuristics'); William C. Wimsatt, 'Heuristics and the Study of Human Behavior', in Donald W. Fiske and Richard A. Shweder (eds), Metatheory in Social Science: Pluralisms and Subjectivities (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 292-314; Michael E. Gorman, Simulating Science: Heuristics, Mental Models, and Technoscientific Thinking (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), esp. 193, 210-13; and Herbert Simon and Allen Newell, Human Problem Solving (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972). The specific objection to Tversky and Kahneman on the Gambler's Fallacy is my own, not Gigerenzer's, though I take it to be broadly compatible with his point of view.
159. Ibid., 7-10 (for the model of 'unbounded rationality'); 9 (for philosophers' practical rationality); 25-26 (for remarks on the history of heuristics); 363 (for proverbs; my emphasis). See also Gerd Gigerenzer, Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 15-25 (for criticisms of cognitive psychological tendencies to conceive of everyday heuristics as biases); 290-91 (for the Gambler's Fallacy); Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, 163-72 (for sympathetic views of 'Philosophical Heuristics'); William C. Wimsatt, 'Heuristics and the Study of Human Behavior', in Donald W. Fiske and Richard A. Shweder (eds), Metatheory in Social Science: Pluralisms and Subjectivities (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 292-314; Michael E. Gorman, Simulating Science: Heuristics, Mental Models, and Technoscientific Thinking (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), esp. 193, 210-13; and Herbert Simon and Allen Newell, Human Problem Solving (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972). The specific objection to Tversky and Kahneman on the Gambler's Fallacy is my own, not Gigerenzer's, though I take it to be broadly compatible with his point of view.
160. Ibid., 7-10 (for the model of 'unbounded rationality'); 9 (for philosophers' practical rationality); 25-26 (for remarks on the history of heuristics); 363 (for proverbs; my emphasis). See also Gerd Gigerenzer, Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 15-25 (for criticisms of cognitive psychological tendencies to conceive of everyday heuristics as biases); 290-91 (for the Gambler's Fallacy); Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, 163-72 (for sympathetic views of 'Philosophical Heuristics'); William C. Wimsatt, 'Heuristics and the Study of Human Behavior', in Donald W. Fiske and Richard A. Shweder (eds), Metatheory in Social Science: Pluralisms and Subjectivities (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 292-314; Michael E. Gorman, Simulating Science: Heuristics, Mental Models, and Technoscientific Thinking (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), esp. 193, 210-13; and Herbert Simon and Allen Newell, Human Problem Solving (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972). The specific objection to Tversky and Kahneman on the Gambler's Fallacy is my own, not Gigerenzer's, though I take it to be broadly compatible with his point of view.
161. Geertz, 'Common Sense', op. cit. note 39, 89-91.
162. Galileo Galilei, Dialogue Concerning Two Chief World Systems, trans. Stillman Drake (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2nd edn, 1967; orig. publ. 1632), 203.
163. Following Alfred Schutz, Harold Garfinkel set up a contrast between 'the rational properties of scientific and common sense activities', identifying the special 'maxims of conduct' that distinguish the two modes. Yet he later felt obliged to warn against the domains such a distinction legitimately marks out: 'To avoid misunderstanding I want to stress that the concern here is with the attitude of scientific theorizing. The attitude that informs the activities of actual scientific inquiry is another matter entirely': H. Garfinkel, 'The Rational Properties of Scientific and Common Sense Activities', in Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967), Chapter 8, at 269-70, 272 (note).
164. Thomas Henry Huxley, 'On the Educational Value of the Natural History Sciences', in Huxley, Collected Essays, Vol. III. Science and Education: Essays (New York: D. Appleton, 1900; orig. publ. 1854), 38-65, at 45 (Huxley's emphasis). For experimentally based claims that scientists are not notably better at formal logic than other sorts of people, see Michael J. Mahoney, 'Psychology of the Scientist: An Evaluative Review', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 9, No. 3 (August 1979), 349-75; and Michael J. Mahoney and B.G. DeMonbreun, 'Psychology of the Scientist: An Analysis of Problem-Solving Bias', Cognitive Therapy and Research, Vol. 1 (1977), 229-38.
165. Thomas Henry Huxley, 'On the Educational Value of the Natural History Sciences', in Huxley, Collected Essays, Vol. III. Science and Education: Essays (New York: D. Appleton, 1900; orig. publ. 1854), 38-65, at 45 (Huxley's emphasis). For experimentally based claims that scientists are not notably better at formal logic than other sorts of people, see Michael J. Mahoney, 'Psychology of the Scientist: An Evaluative Review', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 9, No. 3 (August 1979), 349-75; and Michael J. Mahoney and B.G. DeMonbreun, 'Psychology of the Scientist: An Analysis of Problem-Solving Bias', Cognitive Therapy and Research, Vol. 1 (1977), 229-38.
166. Thomas Henry Huxley, 'On the Educational Value of the Natural History Sciences', in Huxley, Collected Essays, Vol. III. Science and Education: Essays (New York: D. Appleton, 1900; orig. publ. 1854), 38-65, at 45 (Huxley's emphasis). For experimentally based claims that scientists are not notably better at formal logic than other sorts of people, see Michael J. Mahoney, 'Psychology of the Scientist: An Evaluative Review', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 9, No. 3 (August 1979), 349-75; and Michael J. Mahoney and B.G. DeMonbreun, 'Psychology of the Scientist: An Analysis of Problem-Solving Bias', Cognitive Therapy and Research, Vol. 1 (1977), 229-38.
167. Albert Einstein, Ideas and Opinions (New York: Crown Publishers, 1954), 319.
168. Max Planck, Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers, trans. Frank Gaynor (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), 88.
169. J. Robert Oppenheimer, 'The Scientific Foundations for World Order', in Ernest Llewellyn Woodward et al., Foundations for World Order (Denver, CO: University of Denver Press, 1949), 35-51, at 51; James B. Conant, Science and Common Sense (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1951), 32; C.H. Waddington, The Scientific Attitude (West Drayton, Middx, UK: Penguin, rev. edn, 1948), 117. For a famously splenetic attempt at putting Huxley, Einstein, Planck, Oppenheimer, Conant, Waddington (and the sociologists of science) in their place, see Lewis Wolpert, The Unnatural Nature of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), e.g. 11: 'I would almost contend that if something fits in with common sense it almost certainly isn't science'.
170. J. Robert Oppenheimer, 'The Scientific Foundations for World Order', in Ernest Llewellyn Woodward et al., Foundations for World Order (Denver, CO: University of Denver Press, 1949), 35-51, at 51; James B. Conant, Science and Common Sense (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1951), 32; C.H. Waddington, The Scientific Attitude (West Drayton, Middx, UK: Penguin, rev. edn, 1948), 117. For a famously splenetic attempt at putting Huxley, Einstein, Planck, Oppenheimer, Conant, Waddington (and the sociologists of science) in their place, see Lewis Wolpert, The Unnatural Nature of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), e.g. 11: 'I would almost contend that if something fits in with common sense it almost certainly isn't science'.
171. J. Robert Oppenheimer, 'The Scientific Foundations for World Order', in Ernest Llewellyn Woodward et al., Foundations for World Order (Denver, CO: University of Denver Press, 1949), 35-51, at 51; James B. Conant, Science and Common Sense (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1951), 32; C.H. Waddington, The Scientific Attitude (West Drayton, Middx, UK: Penguin, rev. edn, 1948), 117. For a famously splenetic attempt at putting Huxley, Einstein, Planck, Oppenheimer, Conant, Waddington (and the sociologists of science) in their place, see Lewis Wolpert, The Unnatural Nature of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), e.g. 11: 'I would almost contend that if something fits in with common sense it almost certainly isn't science'.
172. J. Robert Oppenheimer, 'The Scientific Foundations for World Order', in Ernest Llewellyn Woodward et al., Foundations for World Order (Denver, CO: University of Denver Press, 1949), 35-51, at 51; James B. Conant, Science and Common Sense (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1951), 32; C.H. Waddington, The Scientific Attitude (West Drayton, Middx, UK: Penguin, rev. edn, 1948), 117. For a famously splenetic attempt at putting Huxley, Einstein, Planck, Oppenheimer, Conant, Waddington (and the sociologists of science) in their place, see Lewis Wolpert, The Unnatural Nature of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), e.g. 11: 'I would almost contend that if something fits in with common sense it almost certainly isn't science'.