Tacit knowledge, trust and the Q of Sapphire

Social Studies of Science

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 71-85

  Collins, H M ^a  

^a CARDIFF UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Experiment; International trust; Measurement of skill; Natural science; Repetition of experiments; Writing conventions

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035626088     PISSN: 03063127     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/030631201031001004     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. The classic text is Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), esp. Part Two, 'The Tacit Dimension', 69-245.
2. H.M. Collins, 'The TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge and Scientific Networks', Science Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 1974), 165-86; Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2nd edn, 1992), Chapter 3, 51-78.
3. H.M. Collins, 'The TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge and Scientific Networks', Science Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 1974), 165-86; Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2nd edn, 1992), Chapter 3, 51-78.
4. Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, 'Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons', American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No. 1 (July 1995), 44-99.
5. Kathleen Jordan and Michael Lynch, 'The Sociology of a Genetic Engineering Technique: Ritual and Rationality in the Performance of the "Plasmid Prep"', in Adele Clarke and Joan Fujimura (eds), The Right Tools for the Job: At Work in Twentieth-Century Life Sciences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 77-114; Alberto Cambrosio and Peter Keating, '"Going Monoclonal": Art, Science, and Magic in the Day-to-Day Use of Hybridoma Technology', Social Problems, Vol. 35, No. 3 (June 1988), 244-60. Oddly, Jordan and Lynch do not use the term 'tacit knowledge' in their discussion of continuing variation of craft practices in biological preparations, nor do they refer to the previously existing and well-known literature on the same topics as explored in the physical sciences. Cambrosio and Keating stress the way that scientists themselves use similar categories to describe the 'artistic' and 'magical' aspects of their work as those developed here. They claim that scientists' own categories are sharper and more useful than those developed by sociologists. Certainly one criterion of success in the description of tacit knowledge is whether the outcome seems plausible to scientists - that is, whether it matches their world as they already understand it. In this paper I try to provide a more systematic exploration of that world than is common in the physical sciences, and then to draw out some implications which certainly vary from scientists' current practice. Should all this be a failure in the eyes of scientists, I believe that it is still a worthwhile exercise, for the object of much sociology of scientific knowledge is to explore the world of scientific knowledge for the sake of non-scientists.
6. Kathleen Jordan and Michael Lynch, 'The Sociology of a Genetic Engineering Technique: Ritual and Rationality in the Performance of the "Plasmid Prep"', in Adele Clarke and Joan Fujimura (eds), The Right Tools for the Job: At Work in Twentieth-Century Life Sciences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 77-114; Alberto Cambrosio and Peter Keating, '"Going Monoclonal": Art, Science, and Magic in the Day-to-Day Use of Hybridoma Technology', Social Problems, Vol. 35, No. 3 (June 1988), 244-60. Oddly, Jordan and Lynch do not use the term 'tacit knowledge' in their discussion of continuing variation of craft practices in biological preparations, nor do they refer to the previously existing and well-known literature on the same topics as explored in the physical sciences. Cambrosio and Keating stress the way that scientists themselves use similar categories to describe the 'artistic' and 'magical' aspects of their work as those developed here. They claim that scientists' own categories are sharper and more useful than those developed by sociologists. Certainly one criterion of success in the description of tacit knowledge is whether the outcome seems plausible to scientists - that is, whether it matches their world as they already understand it. In this paper I try to provide a more systematic exploration of that world than is common in the physical sciences, and then to draw out some implications which certainly vary from scientists' current practice. Should all this be a failure in the eyes of scientists, I believe that it is still a worthwhile exercise, for the object of much sociology of scientific knowledge is to explore the world of scientific knowledge for the sake of non-scientists.
7. Trevor Pinch, H.M. Collins and Larry Carbone, 'Inside Knowledge: Second Order Measures of Skill', Sociological Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 (May 1996), 163-86.
8. For the idea applied to expert systems and machines in general, see H.M. Collins, Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990); Collins and Martin Kusch, The Shape of Actions: What Humans and Machines Can Do (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); and, for example, the articles in Bo Goranzon and Ingela Josefson (eds), Knowledge, Skill and Artificial Intelligence (London: Springer-Verlag, 1988). For a critique of the idea, see Stephen Turner, The Social Theory of Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge and Presuppositions (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994). For a discussion of this critique and an analysis of the way in which the idea of tacit knowledge has been used in sociology of science, see H.M. Collins, 'What is Tacit Knowledge?', in Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr-Cetina and Eike von Savigny (eds), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), 107-19; and for more of this, and a philosophical treatment of the notion of practice, see the other articles in this book.
9. For the idea applied to expert systems and machines in general, see H.M. Collins, Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990); Collins and Martin Kusch, The Shape of Actions: What Humans and Machines Can Do (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); and, for example, the articles in Bo Goranzon and Ingela Josefson (eds), Knowledge, Skill and Artificial Intelligence (London: Springer-Verlag, 1988). For a critique of the idea, see Stephen Turner, The Social Theory of Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge and Presuppositions (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994). For a discussion of this critique and an analysis of the way in which the idea of tacit knowledge has been used in sociology of science, see H.M. Collins, 'What is Tacit Knowledge?', in Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr-Cetina and Eike von Savigny (eds), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), 107-19; and for more of this, and a philosophical treatment of the notion of practice, see the other articles in this book.
10. For the idea applied to expert systems and machines in general, see H.M. Collins, Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990); Collins and Martin Kusch, The Shape of Actions: What Humans and Machines Can Do (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); and, for example, the articles in Bo Goranzon and Ingela Josefson (eds), Knowledge, Skill and Artificial Intelligence (London: Springer-Verlag, 1988). For a critique of the idea, see Stephen Turner, The Social Theory of Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge and Presuppositions (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994). For a discussion of this critique and an analysis of the way in which the idea of tacit knowledge has been used in sociology of science, see H.M. Collins, 'What is Tacit Knowledge?', in Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr-Cetina and Eike von Savigny (eds), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), 107-19; and for more of this, and a philosophical treatment of the notion of practice, see the other articles in this book.
11. For the idea applied to expert systems and machines in general, see H.M. Collins, Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990); Collins and Martin Kusch, The Shape of Actions: What Humans and Machines Can Do (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); and, for example, the articles in Bo Goranzon and Ingela Josefson (eds), Knowledge, Skill and Artificial Intelligence (London: Springer-Verlag, 1988). For a critique of the idea, see Stephen Turner, The Social Theory of Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge and Presuppositions (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994). For a discussion of this critique and an analysis of the way in which the idea of tacit knowledge has been used in sociology of science, see H.M. Collins, 'What is Tacit Knowledge?', in Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr-Cetina and Eike von Savigny (eds), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), 107-19; and for more of this, and a philosophical treatment of the notion of practice, see the other articles in this book.
12. For the idea applied to expert systems and machines in general, see H.M. Collins, Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990); Collins and Martin Kusch, The Shape of Actions: What Humans and Machines Can Do (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); and, for example, the articles in Bo Goranzon and Ingela Josefson (eds), Knowledge, Skill and Artificial Intelligence (London: Springer-Verlag, 1988). For a critique of the idea, see Stephen Turner, The Social Theory of Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge and Presuppositions (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994). For a discussion of this critique and an analysis of the way in which the idea of tacit knowledge has been used in sociology of science, see H.M. Collins, 'What is Tacit Knowledge?', in Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr-Cetina and Eike von Savigny (eds), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), 107-19; and for more of this, and a philosophical treatment of the notion of practice, see the other articles in this book.
13. See www.caltech.ligo.edu for details of the US Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) and links to other international projects, and www.cardiff.ac.uk/ socsi/gravwave for the author's work on the sociology of gravitational wave detection.
14. A relatively 'low' epistemological level for the analysis is selected as it is intended that this paper make contact with the world of scientists as well as the world of epistemologists. Thus, there is no discussion here of the nature of knowledge in the natural sciences. For example, we do not discuss whether, say, the efficacy of the skills involved in the preparation of a ritual sacrifice to appease an angry god is more or less readily verifiable than that of the skills exhibited in the scientific laboratory. Harry Collins and Steven Yearley have argued the need for 'meta-alternation' - that is 'alternation', as discussed by Peter L. Berger in his Invitation to Sociology (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963), esp. 65-66, 77-78 - between epistemological levels: see H.M. Collins and S. Yearley, 'Epistemological Chicken', in Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 301-26. The approach of meta-alternation should be contrasted with the more epistemologically uniform but, as Collins and Yearley argue, less methodologically powerful, approach of Bruno Latour and Michel Callon and their followers: see M. Callon and B. Latour, 'Don't Throw the Baby Out With the Bath School!', in Pickering (ed.), op. cit., 343-68.
15. A relatively 'low' epistemological level for the analysis is selected as it is intended that this paper make contact with the world of scientists as well as the world of epistemologists. Thus, there is no discussion here of the nature of knowledge in the natural sciences. For example, we do not discuss whether, say, the efficacy of the skills involved in the preparation of a ritual sacrifice to appease an angry god is more or less readily verifiable than that of the skills exhibited in the scientific laboratory. Harry Collins and Steven Yearley have argued the need for 'meta-alternation' - that is 'alternation', as discussed by Peter L. Berger in his Invitation to Sociology (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963), esp. 65-66, 77-78 - between epistemological levels: see H.M. Collins and S. Yearley, 'Epistemological Chicken', in Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 301-26. The approach of meta-alternation should be contrasted with the more epistemologically uniform but, as Collins and Yearley argue, less methodologically powerful, approach of Bruno Latour and Michel Callon and their followers: see M. Callon and B. Latour, 'Don't Throw the Baby Out With the Bath School!', in Pickering (ed.), op. cit., 343-68.
16. A relatively 'low' epistemological level for the analysis is selected as it is intended that this paper make contact with the world of scientists as well as the world of epistemologists. Thus, there is no discussion here of the nature of knowledge in the natural sciences. For example, we do not discuss whether, say, the efficacy of the skills involved in the preparation of a ritual sacrifice to appease an angry god is more or less readily verifiable than that of the skills exhibited in the scientific laboratory. Harry Collins and Steven Yearley have argued the need for 'meta-alternation' - that is 'alternation', as discussed by Peter L. Berger in his Invitation to Sociology (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963), esp. 65-66, 77-78 - between epistemological levels: see H.M. Collins and S. Yearley, 'Epistemological Chicken', in Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 301-26. The approach of meta-alternation should be contrasted with the more epistemologically uniform but, as Collins and Yearley argue, less methodologically powerful, approach of Bruno Latour and Michel Callon and their followers: see M. Callon and B. Latour, 'Don't Throw the Baby Out With the Bath School!', in Pickering (ed.), op. cit., 343-68.
17. For a discussion of this problem with reference to the construction of Italian violins, see Colin Gough, 'Science and the Stradivarius', Physics World, Vol. 13, No. 4 (April 2000), 27-33.
18. The classic text here is Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953).
19. See, for example, Collins & Kusch, op. cit. note 6. For a different kind of discussion of Uncognizable Knowledge, see Cambrosio & Keating, op. cit. note 4.
20. See, for example, Collins & Kusch, op. cit. note 6. For a different kind of discussion of Uncognizable Knowledge, see Cambrosio & Keating, op. cit. note 4.
21. For an extended discussion of the transformation of tacit knowledge into 'turnkey' knowledge, see Collins (2001), op. cit. note 6, passim, and Collins & Kusch, op. cit. note 6, Chapter 9.
22. For an extended discussion of the transformation of tacit knowledge into 'turnkey' knowledge, see Collins (2001), op. cit. note 6, passim, and Collins & Kusch, op. cit. note 6, Chapter 9.
23. Collins (1992), op. cit. note 2, 79-106. The 'experimenters' regress' occurs when a series of experimental replications is used to test a disputed claim. The usual criterion of successful execution of an experimental skill - an outcome in the right range - is absent, because the nature of the right outcome is exactly what is under dispute. Therefore experimenters can argue indefinitely over the question of which set of experiments with conflicting outcomes were performed adequately. The answer to this question provides the answer to the question about the correct outcome to such experiments. But the only way to decide which experiments have been performed adequately is to decide what the correct outcome is, and then to see which experiments produce it. Hence the regress.
24. Vladimir Borisovich Braginsky, V.P. Mitrofanov and V.I. Panov (trans. Erast Gliner, ed. and intro. Kip S. Thorne and Cynthia Eller), Systems with Small Dissipation (Chicago, IL: The University Press, 1985).
25. For the sake of completeness, I should add that the Russians more recently discovered that sapphire has some less desirable properties that may make it less suitable as mirror material. Among the community this revelation is known as 'the Braginsky bombshell', but it does not affect the argument presented here.
26. For an extended exploration of this point, see Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994).
27. Braginsky, Mitrofanov & Panov, op. cit. note 14, 25-26.
28. A diagram showing a crystal supported by a very short pendulum is shown on page 27 of Braginsky, Mitrofanov & Panov, op. cit. note 14, but it could easily be read as a schematic representation rather than something to be interpreted literally. An impression of a detail of that diagram is reproduced here (Figure 1).
29. FIGURE 1 Apparently Short Suspension for Cylindrical Resonator Source: adapted from Braginsky, Mitrofanov & Panov, op. cit. note 14, 27.
30. In some respects, the process could be compared with the experience of an anthropologist. Native members cannot describe the 'taken-for-granted' aspects of their world precisely because they are taken-for-granted, but these can become salient when they are viewed through the eyes of someone to whom they are not familiar.
31. Braginsky, Mitrofanov & Panov, op. cit. note 14, 29.
32. Heinz Otto Sibum, 'Reworking the Mechanical Value of Heat: Instruments of Precision and Gestures of Accuracy in Early Victorian England', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 26, No. 1 (March 1995), 73-106.
33. This point is argued by Pinch, Collins & Carbone, op. cit. note 5.
34. Ibid.