Normative reasons and full rationality: Reply to Swanton

Analysis

Volumn 56, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 160-168

  Smith, Michael ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002057567     PISSN: 00032638     EISSN: 14678284     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/analys/56.3.160     Document Type: Note

References (7)

1. Kennett, J. and M. Smith. 1994. Philosophy and commonsense: the case of weakness of will. In Philosophy in Mind, ed. M. Michael and J. O'Leary-Hawthorne, 141-57. Dordrecht: Kluwer Press.
2. Pettit, P. and M. Smith. 1993a. Practical unreason. Mind 102: 53-79.
3. Pettit, P. and M. Smith. 1993b. Brandt on self-control. In Rationality, Rules and Utility: New Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Richard B. Brandt, ed. B. Hooker, 33-50. Boulder: Westview Press.
4. Smith, M. 1994. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
5. Smith, M. 1995a. Internal reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55: 109-31
6. Smith, M. 1995b. Internalism's wheel. Ratio 8: 277-302.
7. Swanton, C. 1996. Is the moral problem solved? Analysis 56: 156-60.