Was Aristotle an "Aristotelian social democrat"?

Ethics

Volumn 111, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 79-101

  Mulgan, Richard ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039626318     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233420     Document Type: Article

References (122)

1. The main sources for a discussion of social democracy are Martha Nussbaum, "Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, suppl. vol. (1988), pp. 145-84, and "Aristotelian Social Democracy," in Liberalism and the Good, ed. R. Bruce Douglass et al. (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 203-52. Nussbaum also canvasses Aristotle's support for liberal democracy in "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), and Love's Knowledge: Essays in Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
2. The main sources for a discussion of social democracy are Martha Nussbaum, "Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, suppl. vol. (1988), pp. 145-84, and "Aristotelian Social Democracy," in Liberalism and the Good, ed. R. Bruce Douglass et al. (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 203-52. Nussbaum also canvasses Aristotle's support for liberal democracy in "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), and Love's Knowledge: Essays in Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
3. The main sources for a discussion of social democracy are Martha Nussbaum, "Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, suppl. vol. (1988), pp. 145-84, and "Aristotelian Social Democracy," in Liberalism and the Good, ed. R. Bruce Douglass et al. (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 203-52. Nussbaum also canvasses Aristotle's support for liberal democracy in "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), and Love's Knowledge: Essays in Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
4. The main sources for a discussion of social democracy are Martha Nussbaum, "Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, suppl. vol. (1988), pp. 145-84, and "Aristotelian Social Democracy," in Liberalism and the Good, ed. R. Bruce Douglass et al. (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 203-52. Nussbaum also canvasses Aristotle's support for liberal democracy in "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), and Love's Knowledge: Essays in Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
5. The main sources for a discussion of social democracy are Martha Nussbaum, "Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, suppl. vol. (1988), pp. 145-84, and "Aristotelian Social Democracy," in Liberalism and the Good, ed. R. Bruce Douglass et al. (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 203-52. Nussbaum also canvasses Aristotle's support for liberal democracy in "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), and Love's Knowledge: Essays in Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
6. For example, Bernard Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Jeremy Waldron, "The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle's Politics," Political Theory 23 (1995): 563-84; Susan Bickford, The Dissonance of Democracy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Arlene Saxonhouse, Athenian Democracy: Modern Mythmakers and Ancient Theories (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996); John Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
7. For example, Bernard Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Jeremy Waldron, "The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle's Politics," Political Theory 23 (1995): 563-84; Susan Bickford, The Dissonance of Democracy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Arlene Saxonhouse, Athenian Democracy: Modern Mythmakers and Ancient Theories (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996); John Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
8. For example, Bernard Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Jeremy Waldron, "The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle's Politics," Political Theory 23 (1995): 563-84; Susan Bickford, The Dissonance of Democracy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Arlene Saxonhouse, Athenian Democracy: Modern Mythmakers and Ancient Theories (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996); John Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
9. For example, Bernard Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Jeremy Waldron, "The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle's Politics," Political Theory 23 (1995): 563-84; Susan Bickford, The Dissonance of Democracy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Arlene Saxonhouse, Athenian Democracy: Modern Mythmakers and Ancient Theories (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996); John Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
10. For example, Bernard Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Jeremy Waldron, "The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle's Politics," Political Theory 23 (1995): 563-84; Susan Bickford, The Dissonance of Democracy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Arlene Saxonhouse, Athenian Democracy: Modern Mythmakers and Ancient Theories (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996); John Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
11. Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 118-20.
12. Alan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987); I. F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates (Boston: Little Brown, 1988).
13. Alan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987); I. F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates (Boston: Little Brown, 1988).
14. For slaves, the main discussion is 1.4-7, 13 (all Aristotle references are to the Politics unless otherwise indicated). See also 3.6.1278b32-37, Ethica Nicomachea (hereafter EN), 8.11.1161a32-b8; Richard Mulgan, Aristotle's Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 40-44; Nicholas Smith, "Aristotle's Theory of Natural Slavery," Phoenix 37 (1983): 109-22. For women, see Aristode, 1.12-13, 2.5; see also Mulgan, Aristotle's Political Theory, pp. 44-47.
15. For slaves, the main discussion is 1.4-7, 13 (all Aristotle references are to the Politics unless otherwise indicated). See also 3.6.1278b32-37, Ethica Nicomachea (hereafter EN), 8.11.1161a32-b8; Richard Mulgan, Aristotle's Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 40-44; Nicholas Smith, "Aristotle's Theory of Natural Slavery," Phoenix 37 (1983): 109-22. For women, see Aristode, 1.12-13, 2.5; see also Mulgan, Aristotle's Political Theory, pp. 44-47.
16. For slaves, the main discussion is 1.4-7, 13 (all Aristotle references are to the Politics unless otherwise indicated). See also 3.6.1278b32-37, Ethica Nicomachea (hereafter EN), 8.11.1161a32-b8; Richard Mulgan, Aristotle's Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 40-44; Nicholas Smith, "Aristotle's Theory of Natural Slavery," Phoenix 37 (1983): 109-22. For women, see Aristode, 1.12-13, 2.5; see also Mulgan, Aristotle's Political Theory, pp. 44-47.
17. For slaves, the main discussion is 1.4-7, 13 (all Aristotle references are to the Politics unless otherwise indicated). See also 3.6.1278b32-37, Ethica Nicomachea (hereafter EN), 8.11.1161a32-b8; Richard Mulgan, Aristotle's Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 40-44; Nicholas Smith, "Aristotle's Theory of Natural Slavery," Phoenix 37 (1983): 109-22. For women, see Aristode, 1.12-13, 2.5; see also Mulgan, Aristotle's Political Theory, pp. 44-47.
18. For example, Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), in the case of women. Followers of the cryptographic method of Leo Strauss have interpreted Aristotle's logically flawed accounts of slavery and of the subjection of women as deliberately intended to raise doubts about the justification of these institutions: e.g., Wayne Ambler, "Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery," Political Theory 15 (1987): 390-410; on slavery, Arlene Saxonhouse, "Family, Polity and Unity: Aristotle on Socrates' Community of Wives," Polity 15 (1982): 202-19; and Harold Levy, "Does Aristotle Exclude Women from Politics?" Review of Politics 52 (1990): 397-416, on women. This approach is implausible; see Richard Mulgan, "Aristotle and the Political Role of Women," History of Political Thought 15 (1994) : 179-202, "The Straussian Influence in the Interpretation of Aristotle's Politics," in History of Philosophy Yearbook, ed. Paul Thom and Udo Thiel (Canberra: Australasian Society for the History of Philosophy, 1994), pp. 219-35.
19. For example, Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), in the case of women. Followers of the cryptographic method of Leo Strauss have interpreted Aristotle's logically flawed accounts of slavery and of the subjection of women as deliberately intended to raise doubts about the justification of these institutions: e.g., Wayne Ambler, "Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery," Political Theory 15 (1987): 390-410; on slavery, Arlene Saxonhouse, "Family, Polity and Unity: Aristotle on Socrates' Community of Wives," Polity 15 (1982): 202-19; and Harold Levy, "Does Aristotle Exclude Women from Politics?" Review of Politics 52 (1990): 397-416, on women. This approach is implausible; see Richard Mulgan, "Aristotle and the Political Role of Women," History of Political Thought 15 (1994) : 179-202, "The Straussian Influence in the Interpretation of Aristotle's Politics," in History of Philosophy Yearbook, ed. Paul Thom and Udo Thiel (Canberra: Australasian Society for the History of Philosophy, 1994), pp. 219-35.
20. For example, Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), in the case of women. Followers of the cryptographic method of Leo Strauss have interpreted Aristotle's logically flawed accounts of slavery and of the subjection of women as deliberately intended to raise doubts about the justification of these institutions: e.g., Wayne Ambler, "Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery," Political Theory 15 (1987): 390-410; on slavery, Arlene Saxonhouse, "Family, Polity and Unity: Aristotle on Socrates' Community of Wives," Polity 15 (1982): 202-19; and Harold Levy, "Does Aristotle Exclude Women from Politics?" Review of Politics 52 (1990): 397-416, on women. This approach is implausible; see Richard Mulgan, "Aristotle and the Political Role of Women," History of Political Thought 15 (1994) : 179-202, "The Straussian Influence in the Interpretation of Aristotle's Politics," in History of Philosophy Yearbook, ed. Paul Thom and Udo Thiel (Canberra: Australasian Society for the History of Philosophy, 1994), pp. 219-35.
21. For example, Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), in the case of women. Followers of the cryptographic method of Leo Strauss have interpreted Aristotle's logically flawed accounts of slavery and of the subjection of women as deliberately intended to raise doubts about the justification of these institutions: e.g., Wayne Ambler, "Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery," Political Theory 15 (1987): 390-410; on slavery, Arlene Saxonhouse, "Family, Polity and Unity: Aristotle on Socrates' Community of Wives," Polity 15 (1982): 202-19; and Harold Levy, "Does Aristotle Exclude Women from Politics?" Review of Politics 52 (1990): 397-416, on women. This approach is implausible; see Richard Mulgan, "Aristotle and the Political Role of Women," History of Political Thought 15 (1994) : 179-202, "The Straussian Influence in the Interpretation of Aristotle's Politics," in History of Philosophy Yearbook, ed. Paul Thom and Udo Thiel (Canberra: Australasian Society for the History of Philosophy, 1994), pp. 219-35.
22. For example, Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), in the case of women. Followers of the cryptographic method of Leo Strauss have interpreted Aristotle's logically flawed accounts of slavery and of the subjection of women as deliberately intended to raise doubts about the justification of these institutions: e.g., Wayne Ambler, "Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery," Political Theory 15 (1987): 390-410; on slavery, Arlene Saxonhouse, "Family, Polity and Unity: Aristotle on Socrates' Community of Wives," Polity 15 (1982): 202-19; and Harold Levy, "Does Aristotle Exclude Women from Politics?" Review of Politics 52 (1990): 397-416, on women. This approach is implausible; see Richard Mulgan, "Aristotle and the Political Role of Women," History of Political Thought 15 (1994) : 179-202, "The Straussian Influence in the Interpretation of Aristotle's Politics," in History of Philosophy Yearbook, ed. Paul Thom and Udo Thiel (Canberra: Australasian Society for the History of Philosophy, 1994), pp. 219-35.
23. For example, Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), in the case of women. Followers of the cryptographic method of Leo Strauss have interpreted Aristotle's logically flawed accounts of slavery and of the subjection of women as deliberately intended to raise doubts about the justification of these institutions: e.g., Wayne Ambler, "Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery," Political Theory 15 (1987): 390-410; on slavery, Arlene Saxonhouse, "Family, Polity and Unity: Aristotle on Socrates' Community of Wives," Polity 15 (1982): 202-19; and Harold Levy, "Does Aristotle Exclude Women from Politics?" Review of Politics 52 (1990): 397-416, on women. This approach is implausible; see Richard Mulgan, "Aristotle and the Political Role of Women," History of Political Thought 15 (1994) : 179-202, "The Straussian Influence in the Interpretation of Aristotle's Politics," in History of Philosophy Yearbook, ed. Paul Thom and Udo Thiel (Canberra: Australasian Society for the History of Philosophy, 1994), pp. 219-35.
24. For example, Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), in the case of women. Followers of the cryptographic method of Leo Strauss have interpreted Aristotle's logically flawed accounts of slavery and of the subjection of women as deliberately intended to raise doubts about the justification of these institutions: e.g., Wayne Ambler, "Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery," Political Theory 15 (1987): 390-410; on slavery, Arlene Saxonhouse, "Family, Polity and Unity: Aristotle on Socrates' Community of Wives," Polity 15 (1982): 202-19; and Harold Levy, "Does Aristotle Exclude Women from Politics?" Review of Politics 52 (1990): 397-416, on women. This approach is implausible; see Richard Mulgan, "Aristotle and the Political Role of Women," History of Political Thought 15 (1994) : 179-202, "The Straussian Influence in the Interpretation of Aristotle's Politics," in History of Philosophy Yearbook, ed. Paul Thom and Udo Thiel (Canberra: Australasian Society for the History of Philosophy, 1994), pp. 219-35.
25. Aristotle, 2.2-5.
26. Ibid., 3.12, 4.11.1296a13-18.
27. For example, Josiah Ober, Political Dissent in Classical Athens (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), chap. 6.
28. For example, Thucydides, 8.97; Isocrates, Areopagiticus.
29. Aristotle, 3.13.1284a3-14, 7.14.1332b22-27.
30. Ibid., 4.11, 3.17.1288a12-15.
31. Ibid., 2.9.12, 5.1.1301b29, 6.2.1317b4; EN 5.3.1131a27-29.
32. Ibid., 2.9.12, 5.1.1301b29, 6.2.1317b4; EN 5.3.1131a27-29.
33. See Aristotle (?), Constitution of Athens 33
34. Aristotle, 3.12, 4.11.1296a13-18, 5.10.1310a25-36.
35. For example, Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, p. 353, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," p. 239; Aristotle, 6.4.1318b6-1319a18.
36. For example, Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, p. 353, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," p. 239; Aristotle, 6.4.1318b6-1319a18.
37. Ober, p. 306.
38. For example, Aristotle, 1.2.1252b28-30, 3.6.1278b20-30, 7.14.1333a11-16.
39. Aristotle, EN 1.8.1099a31-b8, 10.8.1178b33-35.
40. Aristotle, 2.9.1271a29-37, 2.10.1272a12-27.
41. Aristotle, EN 2.1.1103a32-b6, 10.9.1179b20-21, 7.13.1332a39-40.
42. Ibid., EN 2.6.1106b3; Aristotle, 7.16.1335b12.
43. For example, Aristotle, 7.7, cf. 7.10.1330a25-30.
44. For example, Nussbaum, "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity," pp. 420-21, Fragility of Goodness, pp. 347-49, "Nature, Function, and Capability," pp. 156-57, 171-72, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," p. 248, n. 80.
45. For example, Nussbaum, "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity," pp. 420-21, Fragility of Goodness, pp. 347-49, "Nature, Function, and Capability," pp. 156-57, 171-72, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," p. 248, n. 80.
46. For example, Nussbaum, "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity," pp. 420-21, Fragility of Goodness, pp. 347-49, "Nature, Function, and Capability," pp. 156-57, 171-72, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," p. 248, n. 80.
47. For example, Nussbaum, "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity," pp. 420-21, Fragility of Goodness, pp. 347-49, "Nature, Function, and Capability," pp. 156-57, 171-72, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," p. 248, n. 80.
48. Aristotle, 3.5.1278a20-21, 7.9.1329a39-41.
49. Ibid., 7.9.1329a1-2.
50. Ibid., 3.4.1277a37-b7, 3.5.1278a17-21.
51. Ibid., 7.9.1328b41-1329a2; see Fred D. Miller, Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotle's Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 161, 244.
52. Ibid., 7.9.1328b41-1329a2; see Fred D. Miller, Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotle's Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 161, 244.
53. Some commentators, e.g., W. L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1887-1902), 1.117, have inferred, on the analogy of his theory of natural slavery, that Aristotle believed in the existence of a naturally inferior laboring class of Greeks. However, there is no clear evidence for such an interpretation. Among Greek males, there are only natural slaves and natural free men, all of whom are potentially virtuous (Aristotle, 1.13.1260b1-3).
54. For example, Aristotle, 1.13.1260a10-12; see also n. 6 above.
55. Aristotle, 7.9.1328b36-1329a2.
56. Merchants are too concerned with acquisition and bodily desires (ibid., 1.9.1257b23-1258a14). See Ober, pp. 340-41 and n. 87.
57. Aristotle, 7.9.1329a24-26, 7.10.1330a25-33.
58. Aristotle does not explicitly say that no free Greeks are noncitizens. However, his preference for slaves and foreigners in the menial roles, as well as his theory of distributive justice, suggest that no free Greeks were excluded. See David Keyt, "Aristotle's Theory of Distributive Justice," in A Companion to Aristotle's Politics, ed. David Keyt and Fred D. Miller (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 238-78; Ober, pp. 340-41 and n. 87.
59. Nussbaum, "Nature, Function, and Capability," pp. 146-48, 156-57, interprets Aristotle's remark (7.2.1324a23-25) that the best constitution allows "anyone whatsoever" to live well as implying that the ideal state should provide a good life for everyone who is capable of it. However, the extension of "anyone whatsoever" may be confined to a preselected citizen body and need not carry any implication about how widely that citizen body is selected in the first place. See David Charles, "Perfectionism in Aristotle's Political Theory: Reply to Martha Nussbaum," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, suppl. vol. (1988), pp. 185-206, 194-97; Miller, p. 214 and n. 65.
60. Nussbaum, "Nature, Function, and Capability," pp. 146-48, 156-57, interprets Aristotle's remark (7.2.1324a23-25) that the best constitution allows "anyone whatsoever" to live well as implying that the ideal state should provide a good life for everyone who is capable of it. However, the extension of "anyone whatsoever" may be confined to a preselected citizen body and need not carry any implication about how widely that citizen body is selected in the first place. See David Charles, "Perfectionism in Aristotle's Political Theory: Reply to Martha Nussbaum," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, suppl. vol. (1988), pp. 185-206, 194-97; Miller, p. 214 and n. 65.
61. Aristotle, 7.4.
62. Democracies may include laborers who ideally should be excluded (ibid., 3.5.1278a15-20). Farmers, who are excluded from the ideal state, form the citizen body of the best (least bad) form of democracy (4.6.1292b25-29). Oligarchies, too, with their emphasis on wealth, may include as citizens rich merchants whose concern for trade and profit making would make them unsuitable citizens for the ideal state. See n. 32 above.
63. Nussbaum, "Nature, Function, and Capability," p. 172, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," p. 248, n. 80.
64. Nussbaum, "Nature, Function, and Capability," p. 172, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," p. 248, n. 80.
65. Nussbaum, "Nature, Function, and Capability," p. 171.
66. Nussbaum, "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity," p. 420.
67. Nussbaum, "Nature, Function, and Capability," p. 172.
68. See n. 12 above.
69. Seen. 13 above.
70. Aristotle, 2.9.1270a30-b7.
71. For example, ibid., 5.8.1309a15-31.
72. Ibid., 5.9.1309b16-18.
73. Ibid., 4.11.1296a13-18, 5.1.1302a8-13.
74. Ibid., 7.10.1330a29. See Charles, p. 191.
75. Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, esp. chaps. 1, 11; Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
76. Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, esp. chaps. 1, 11; Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
77. Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, chap. 1; Williams, p. 122.
78. See nn. 5, 6 above.
79. Aristotle, 3.9.1280a9-11, 5.1.1301a25-28, 5.2.1302a24-31.
80. Ibid., 3.12.1283a15-20. Wealth (oligarchy) and freedom (democracy) are necessary for the state's existence, but virtue is necessary for living well.
81. Ibid., 3.12.1282b35-37.
82. Nussbaum, "Nature, Function, and Capability," pp. 166-68.
83. Charles, p. 195.
84. Note 22; Nussbaum, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," p. 111.
85. Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 79-86.
86. Nussbaum, "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity," p. 417.
87. Ibid.
88. Nussbaum, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," p. 214.
89. Ibid., p. 239.
90. Ibid., quoting Jonathan Barnes, "Aristotle and Political Liberty," in Aristoteles' "Politik": Akten des XI Symposium Aristotelicum, ed. Gunther Patzig (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990), pp. 249-63.
91. Barnes.
92. See Miller, pp. 248-49.
93. Aristotle, EN 10.9.1180a1-4.
94. Barnes, p. 259; Mulgan, Aristotle's Political Theory, pp. 34, 79-80.
95. For example, Aristotle, EN 10.9.1180b3-13.
96. Ibid., EN 10.9.1180b1; Aristotle, 6.5.1319b40. That the word normally used for law (nomos) could also refer to social norms or conventions shows the difficulty in Greek of clearly distinguishing between law and morality or of seeking to limit the law's concern with morality.
97. Richard Sorabji, "Comments on Barnes," in Patzig, ed., pp. 264-76. Sorabji, though less inclined than Barnes to find a totalitarian impulse in Aristotle (referring particularly to Aristotle's vindication of the family), nonetheless rejects the view of Donald Allan that Aristotle held a minimalist view of the role of the state. See Allan's "Individual and State in the Ethics and Politics," in La Politique d'Aristote, ed. Rudolf Stark et al. (Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1964).
98. Richard Sorabji, "Comments on Barnes," in Patzig, ed., pp. 264-76. Sorabji, though less inclined than Barnes to find a totalitarian impulse in Aristotle (referring particularly to Aristotle's vindication of the family), nonetheless rejects the view of Donald Allan that Aristotle held a minimalist view of the role of the state. See Allan's "Individual and State in the Ethics and Politics," in La Politique d'Aristote, ed. Rudolf Stark et al. (Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1964).
99. Aristotle, 2.9.1271a41-b10, 7.14.1333b10-1334a11, 8.4.1338b10-16; and EN 10.9.1180a25-29.
100. Aristotle, Metaphysics, A.2.982b25, Rhetoric, 1.9.1367a33.
101. Aristotle, Metaphysics, A.2.982b25, Rhetoric, 1.9.1367a33.
102. Nussbaum, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," p. 239.
103. Aristotle, EN 2.5.1105a30-34.
104. See, e.g., John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), chap. 1; W. F. R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), chap. 11; Terence Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), chap. 7.
105. See, e.g., John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), chap. 1; W. F. R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), chap. 11; Terence Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), chap. 7.
106. See, e.g., John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), chap. 1; W. F. R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), chap. 11; Terence Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), chap. 7.
107. Aristotle, EN 6.5; David Wiggins, "Deliberation and Practical Wisdom," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 221-40; Sherman, pp. 79-94; Irwin, p. 336.
108. Aristotle, EN 6.5; David Wiggins, "Deliberation and Practical Wisdom," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 221-40; Sherman, pp. 79-94; Irwin, p. 336.
109. Such a pluralist view of Aristotle, advanced, e.g., by Yack and Waldron, is rebutted in Richard Mulgan, "Aristotle, Ethical Diversity and Political Argument," Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1999): 191-207.
110. Aristotle, 7.4.1325b38-40.
111. See p. 91 above.
112. Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, p. 349, argues that the key virtues of justice and equity are largely political in scope and that a life of full virtue requires citizenship and (at least the right of) political participation. It can be argued, however, that the virtues of the ethical treatises, though compatible with citizenship, do not require it; see Richard Mulgan, "Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation," Political Theory 18 (1990): 195-215. See also Miller, pp. 237-39; Tim Duvall and Paul Dotson, "Political Participation and Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Politics," History of Political Thought 19 (1998); 21-34. Of the external goods, it is the loss of family and friends rather than of power and citizenship which particularly damage happiness (Aristotle, EN 1.8.1099b5-6, 1.9.1100a7-8). Thus, Aristotle's own life as a metic (foreign noncitizen) was not as deficient as Nussbaum suggests (Fragility of Goodness, p. 497, n. 8; see also her "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity," p. 419, and "Aristotelian Social Democracy," pp. 232-33).
113. Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, p. 349, argues that the key virtues of justice and equity are largely political in scope and that a life of full virtue requires citizenship and (at least the right of) political participation. It can be argued, however, that the virtues of the ethical treatises, though compatible with citizenship, do not require it; see Richard Mulgan, "Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation," Political Theory 18 (1990): 195-215. See also Miller, pp. 237-39; Tim Duvall and Paul Dotson, "Political Participation and Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Politics," History of Political Thought 19 (1998); 21-34. Of the external goods, it is the loss of family and friends rather than of power and citizenship which particularly damage happiness (Aristotle, EN 1.8.1099b5-6, 1.9.1100a7-8). Thus, Aristotle's own life as a metic (foreign noncitizen) was not as deficient as Nussbaum suggests (Fragility of Goodness, p. 497, n. 8; see also her "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity," p. 419, and "Aristotelian Social Democracy," pp. 232-33).
114. Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, p. 349, argues that the key virtues of justice and equity are largely political in scope and that a life of full virtue requires citizenship and (at least the right of) political participation. It can be argued, however, that the virtues of the ethical treatises, though compatible with citizenship, do not require it; see Richard Mulgan, "Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation," Political Theory 18 (1990): 195-215. See also Miller, pp. 237-39; Tim Duvall and Paul Dotson, "Political Participation and Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Politics," History of Political Thought 19 (1998); 21-34. Of the external goods, it is the loss of family and friends rather than of power and citizenship which particularly damage happiness (Aristotle, EN 1.8.1099b5-6, 1.9.1100a7-8). Thus, Aristotle's own life as a metic (foreign noncitizen) was not as deficient as Nussbaum suggests (Fragility of Goodness, p. 497, n. 8; see also her "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity," p. 419, and "Aristotelian Social Democracy," pp. 232-33).
115. Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, p. 349, argues that the key virtues of justice and equity are largely political in scope and that a life of full virtue requires citizenship and (at least the right of) political participation. It can be argued, however, that the virtues of the ethical treatises, though compatible with citizenship, do not require it; see Richard Mulgan, "Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation," Political Theory 18 (1990): 195-215. See also Miller, pp. 237-39; Tim Duvall and Paul Dotson, "Political Participation and Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Politics," History of Political Thought 19 (1998); 21-34. Of the external goods, it is the loss of family and friends rather than of power and citizenship which particularly damage happiness (Aristotle, EN 1.8.1099b5-6, 1.9.1100a7-8). Thus, Aristotle's own life as a metic (foreign noncitizen) was not as deficient as Nussbaum suggests (Fragility of Goodness, p. 497, n. 8; see also her "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity," p. 419, and "Aristotelian Social Democracy," pp. 232-33).
116. Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, p. 349, argues that the key virtues of justice and equity are largely political in scope and that a life of full virtue requires citizenship and (at least the right of) political participation. It can be argued, however, that the virtues of the ethical treatises, though compatible with citizenship, do not require it; see Richard Mulgan, "Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation," Political Theory 18 (1990): 195-215. See also Miller, pp. 237-39; Tim Duvall and Paul Dotson, "Political Participation and Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Politics," History of Political Thought 19 (1998); 21-34. Of the external goods, it is the loss of family and friends rather than of power and citizenship which particularly damage happiness (Aristotle, EN 1.8.1099b5-6, 1.9.1100a7-8). Thus, Aristotle's own life as a metic (foreign noncitizen) was not as deficient as Nussbaum suggests (Fragility of Goodness, p. 497, n. 8; see also her "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity," p. 419, and "Aristotelian Social Democracy," pp. 232-33).
117. Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, p. 349, argues that the key virtues of justice and equity are largely political in scope and that a life of full virtue requires citizenship and (at least the right of) political participation. It can be argued, however, that the virtues of the ethical treatises, though compatible with citizenship, do not require it; see Richard Mulgan, "Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation," Political Theory 18 (1990): 195-215. See also Miller, pp. 237-39; Tim Duvall and Paul Dotson, "Political Participation and Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Politics," History of Political Thought 19 (1998); 21-34. Of the external goods, it is the loss of family and friends rather than of power and citizenship which particularly damage happiness (Aristotle, EN 1.8.1099b5-6, 1.9.1100a7-8). Thus, Aristotle's own life as a metic (foreign noncitizen) was not as deficient as Nussbaum suggests (Fragility of Goodness, p. 497, n. 8; see also her "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity," p. 419, and "Aristotelian Social Democracy," pp. 232-33).
118. Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, p. 349, argues that the key virtues of justice and equity are largely political in scope and that a life of full virtue requires citizenship and (at least the right of) political participation. It can be argued, however, that the virtues of the ethical treatises, though compatible with citizenship, do not require it; see Richard Mulgan, "Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation," Political Theory 18 (1990): 195-215. See also Miller, pp. 237-39; Tim Duvall and Paul Dotson, "Political Participation and Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Politics," History of Political Thought 19 (1998); 21-34. Of the external goods, it is the loss of family and friends rather than of power and citizenship which particularly damage happiness (Aristotle, EN 1.8.1099b5-6, 1.9.1100a7-8). Thus, Aristotle's own life as a metic (foreign noncitizen) was not as deficient as Nussbaum suggests (Fragility of Goodness, p. 497, n. 8; see also her "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity," p. 419, and "Aristotelian Social Democracy," pp. 232-33).
119. Aristotle, 1.2.1253a2-7. Aristotle uses the gender neutral anthropos, not the male aner, for "man," which suggests that he is talking about living in a polis, not about the rights of citizenship. Aristotle uses the "political animal" argument to indicate human sociability contrasted with living alone, not political participation contrasted with exclusion from political activity (3.6.128b20; EN 9.8.1169b18). Nussbaum's own analysis of this argument stresses sociability and friendship rather than specifically political activity; see her "Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundation of Ethics," in World, Mind and Ethics, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 102-10.
120. Aristotle, 1.2.1253a2-7. Aristotle uses the gender neutral anthropos, not the male aner, for "man," which suggests that he is talking about living in a polis, not about the rights of citizenship. Aristotle uses the "political animal" argument to indicate human sociability contrasted with living alone, not political participation contrasted with exclusion from political activity (3.6.128b20; EN 9.8.1169b18). Nussbaum's own analysis of this argument stresses sociability and friendship rather than specifically political activity; see her "Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundation of Ethics," in World, Mind and Ethics, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 102-10.
121. Aristotle, 4.1.1288b28-30, 5-6.
122. Nussbaum, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," pp. 208-13. Nussbaum considers Aristotle's account superior because it treats material goods as clearly instrumental and allows for individual variation according to need.