Political participation and Eudaimonia in Aristotle's politics

History of Political Thought

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 21-34

  Duvall, Tim ^a   Dotson, Paul ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^b NONE

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EID: 0032363338     PISSN: 0143781X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (81)

1. T. Irwin, 'The Good of Political Activity', with commentary by Gisela Striker, in XI Symposium Aristotelicum: Studien zur Politik des Aristoteles, ed. G. Patzig (Gottingen, 1989), pp. 73-100.
2. See Richard Mulgan, 'Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation', Political Theory; 18 (1990), pp. 195-215; Richard Mulgan, 'Aristotle and the Political Role of Women', History of Political Thought, XV (1994), pp. 183-6. Mulgan argues that political participation is not vital for the good (or eudaimon) man. This is, in many respects, similar to the argument we will make in this essay. But our argument significantly expands upon Mulgan's in the sense that it (1) provides an understanding of what eudaimonia is, (2) explains more completely how eudaimonia is possible in the less than ideal polis through looking at Aristotle's classification of constitutions, (3) explains how the good man and the good citizen are related, and (4) deals more fully with the importance of the polis for the eudaimon man.
3. See Richard Mulgan, 'Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation', Political Theory; 18 (1990), pp. 195-215; Richard Mulgan, 'Aristotle and the Political Role of Women', History of Political Thought, XV (1994), pp. 183-6. Mulgan argues that political participation is not vital for the good (or eudaimon) man. This is, in many respects, similar to the argument we will make in this essay. But our argument significantly expands upon Mulgan's in the sense that it (1) provides an understanding of what eudaimonia is, (2) explains more completely how eudaimonia is possible in the less than ideal polis through looking at Aristotle's classification of constitutions, (3) explains how the good man and the good citizen are related, and (4) deals more fully with the importance of the polis for the eudaimon man.
4. D Keyt, 'Three Basic Theorems in Aristotle's Polities', in A Companion to Aristotle's Politics, ed. David Keyt and Fred D. Miller (Oxford, 1991), pp. 118-41, pp.118, 140.
5. Aristotle, Politics, 1.2.1252b27-1253a1.
6. Keyt, 'Three Basic Theorems', p. 124.
7. See W. Kullman, 'Man as a Political Animal in Aristotle', in A Companion to Aristotle's Politics, ed. Keyt and Miller, pp. 94-117. Kullman makes the argument that Aristotle does not equate the good citizen with the good man.
8. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V.2.1 130b25-29. See Aristotle, Politics, III.4.1276b31-33; III.4.1276b41-1277a2; IV.7.1293b5-7.
9. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V.2.1 130b25-29. See Aristotle, Politics, III.4.1276b31-33; III.4.1276b41-1277a2; IV.7.1293b5-7.
10. See Mulgan, 'Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation'.
11. Ibid., p. 196.
12. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1.7.1097b5-22; X.6.1175a30-34; X.7.1177al 1-13.
13. Mulgan, 'Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation', p. 210. See Aristotle, Politics, III.4.1236b33-34; III.4.1276al-1277a2; III.4.1277a20-24; III.4.1278b2-5.
14. Mulgan, 'Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation', p. 210. See Aristotle, Politics, III.4.1236b33-34; III.4.1276al-1277a2; III.4.1277a20-24; III.4.1278b2-5.
15. Politics, III.8.1287a37-1288b4.
16. Ibid., p. 204. Here we agree, in all poleis other than aristocracy. In aristocracy, the good man qua citizen will share in the offices of the polis.
17. Aristotle, Politics, I.2.1253a10.
18. Ibid., 1253a10-14.
19. Ibid., 1253a14-17.
20. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.7. 1097b5-22; X.6.117a30-34; X.7.1177a11-13.
21. Ibid., I.7. 1097b20-25.
22. Ibid., 1098a15-18.
23. J.M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge and London, 1975). Cooper has the same concerns regarding the trnslation of eudaimonia as happiness. He arrives at the translation of 'human flourishing' (see ibid., pp. 89-90, n. 1). This captures Aristotle's sense of eudaimonia rather well, but it is rather opague. We want to provide an understanding of eudaimonia that is more readily accessible.
24. J.M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge and London, 1975). Cooper has the same concerns regarding the trnslation of eudaimonia as happiness. He arrives at the translation of 'human flourishing' (see ibid., pp. 89-90, n. 1). This captures Aristotle's sense of eudaimonia rather well, but it is rather opague. We want to provide an understanding of eudaimonia that is more readily accessible.
25. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.9.1109a20-1109b7; X.7.1177b18-1 178a8; Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, I.3.1215a15-20.
26. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.9.1109a20-1109b7; X.7.1177b18-1 178a8; Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, I.3.1215a15-20.
27. Virtue (or excellence) is both moral and intellectual for Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, 1.13.1103a4-10; II.1.1103a14-18). It is intuitively obvious that virtue involves morality. It is not so obvious, however, that virtue involves an intellectual (or rational) aspect. Aristotle argues that we become habituated to acting in a virtuous way. It is not enough, however, to act virtuously out of habit. In order to be virtuous, one must understand that one is acting in a virtuous way and be able to explain and justify that action. This is not possible without reason and thus virtue involves an intellectual aspect. This issue certainly is more complex, but further explication falls outside the scope of this essay.
28. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.6.1106b36-1107a2; II.9.1109a20-24.
29. Ibid., II.6.1107a1-7.
30. Ibid., II.6.1107a1-2.
31. Ibid., II.9.1109b2-4.
32. Ibid.,VIII.1.1155a10-15;VIII.3.1156b5-10;IX.9.1170a6-12.
33. Aristotle is, of course, very clear that when he says 'man' he means only men, not humans more generally. While it is clear to most of us today that both men and women can be moral beings, to Aristotle it was not so clear. Thus, we have chosen to leave Aristotle's gendered concept alone. We hope, though, that the reader will keep the above proviso in mind.
34. Cooper holds a different view. We assume (in alliance with J.D. Monan, Moral Knowledge and Its Methodology in Aristotle (Oxford, 1968)), that Aristotle's discussion of the contemplative life in Book 10 of Nicomachean Ethics is misplaced. Cooper argues that Aristotle includes two types of good life in the Nicomachean Ethics. There is the mixed or moral life of the Eudemian Ethics and Nicomachean Ethics 1-9, and there is the intellectualist or contemplative life of Book 10. The contemplative life is, according to Cooper, the true or best good life while the mixed life is only good in a secondary sense. Cooper bases this claim in the psychology expressed in On the Soul, particularly that aspect dealing with the active intellect (III.5). He claims that Aristotle's discussion of the active intellect encourages the idea that human beings are essentially godlike and that Aristotle simply works out the consequences of this view in his theory of flourishing. There are at least three problems with this reading. First, Cooper is proposing two ends for human life and this is certainly problematic for a teleological ethical theory. Second, the contemplative life would have to be a superhuman life, a life that Aristotle explicitly rules out as an impossibility since humans are naturally social. Finally, Cooper's discussion of the active intellect is far too simplistic. The passage he points to as encouraging the idea that humans are godlike is perhaps one of the most difficult passages in Aristotle's work (On the Soul, III.5). Cooper's conclusion that Aristotle's notion of the active intellect renders humans godlike turns out to be merely an assertion because it lacks the detailed discussion necessary to make sense of the passage (if, indeed, it can be made sense of). See Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle, pp. 144-80.
35. Cooper holds a different view. We assume (in alliance with J.D. Monan, Moral Knowledge and Its Methodology in Aristotle (Oxford, 1968)), that Aristotle's discussion of the contemplative life in Book 10 of Nicomachean Ethics is misplaced. Cooper argues that Aristotle includes two types of good life in the Nicomachean Ethics. There is the mixed or moral life of the Eudemian Ethics and Nicomachean Ethics 1-9, and there is the intellectualist or contemplative life of Book 10. The contemplative life is, according to Cooper, the true or best good life while the mixed life is only good in a secondary sense. Cooper bases this claim in the psychology expressed in On the Soul, particularly that aspect dealing with the active intellect (III.5). He claims that Aristotle's discussion of the active intellect encourages the idea that human beings are essentially godlike and that Aristotle simply works out the consequences of this view in his theory of flourishing. There are at least three problems with this reading. First, Cooper is proposing two ends for human life and this is certainly problematic for a teleological ethical theory. Second, the contemplative life would have to be a superhuman life, a life that Aristotle explicitly rules out as an impossibility since humans are naturally social. Finally, Cooper's discussion of the active intellect is far too simplistic. The passage he points to as encouraging the idea that humans are godlike is perhaps one of the most difficult passages in Aristotle's work (On the Soul, III.5). Cooper's conclusion that Aristotle's notion of the active intellect renders humans godlike turns out to be merely an assertion because it lacks the detailed discussion necessary to make sense of the passage (if, indeed, it can be made sense of). See Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle, pp. 144-80.
36. The notion of the rational element as director of the soul's activities is manifest at Nicomachean Ethics, III. 13.1119b10-17. On our understanding of eudaimonia, it is reached when the rational element has successfully directed the soul's activities to the various means between the extremes.
37. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.7.1097b20-21.
38. Aristotle, Politics, I.5.1254b2-32.
39. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.5.1095b13-1096a10. Proper moral habituation should steer us away from these 'faulty' conceptions of eudaimonia. But, how can one possibly be certain that they will undergo 'proper' habituation, especially in a less than eudaimon polis? See our discussion of this in Section III.
40. We would like to thank Nick Smith for offering this 'translation' which we have appropriated here. The blame for any misappropriation of this conception of eudaimonia falls squarely on our shoulders.
41. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IX.10.1170b18-19.
42. Aristotle, On the Soul, III.5.430a20-25.
43. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X.7.1177b20-1178a9.
44. Aristotle, On the Soul, II.1.412a14-28; III.5.430a20-25. The passive intellect is that part of the intellect which stores information, while the active intellect is the part which actively manipulates and uses information in rational contemplation (ibid., II.1.412al4-28; III.5.430a20-25). There is so much more to this problem that it merits an exploration of its own. However for the purposes of this argument the above description must suffice.
45. Aristotle, On the Soul, II.1.412a14-28; III.5.430a20-25. The passive intellect is that part of the intellect which stores information, while the active intellect is the part which actively manipulates and uses information in rational contemplation (ibid., II.1.412al4-28; III.5.430a20-25). There is so much more to this problem that it merits an exploration of its own. However for the purposes of this argument the above description must suffice.
46. Or, as he puts it in Eudemian Ethics, VIII.3.1249b9-11: 'But since a human being, also, is by nature composed of a thing that governs and a thing that is governed, each too should live by reference to its own governing principle.' Aristotle specifically argues that these elements ( 1 ) ruler/thing that governs and (2) ruled/thing that is governed are only in proper order in the eudaimon man - who, though he can arise in most any polis is the only man qualified to be a citizen of an aristocracy. His ability properly to order himself is his qualification for office, where he can model the order of the polis after himself (Aristotle, Politics, III.5.1278a17-19; III.8.1288a37-1288a4).
47. Or, as he puts it in Eudemian Ethics, VIII.3.1249b9-11: 'But since a human being, also, is by nature composed of a thing that governs and a thing that is governed, each too should live by reference to its own governing principle.' Aristotle specifically argues that these elements ( 1 ) ruler/thing that governs and (2) ruled/thing that is governed are only in proper order in the eudaimon man - who, though he can arise in most any polis is the only man qualified to be a citizen of an aristocracy. His ability properly to order himself is his qualification for office, where he can model the order of the polis after himself (Aristotle, Politics, III.5.1278a17-19; III.8.1288a37-1288a4).
48. Aristotle, Politics, VII.1-3.
49. See also N.D. Smith and F.D. Miller Jr., Thought Probes: Philosophy Through Science Fiction Literature (New Jersey, 1989), pp.287-8: 'A second snare [in Aristotle's labelling man zoon politikon] involves the word "political", which comes from the ancient Greek word polis or city-state. The Greeks used this word not merely for the government but also for the whole complex of social relationships within the city-state. So the words "political animal" can mean "an animal with a government" or they can mean "an animal living in a social system"'. In his introduction to Homer' s Iliad (New York, 1990), Bernard Knox characterizes the city-state as such: 'The city, the polis as the Greeks called it, was for them the matrix of civilization, the only form of ordered social life they could understand; it is the exclusive form assumed by ancient Greek culture from its beginning to its end. The city was small enough so that the citizens knew one another, participated in a communal life, shared the common joy of festivals . . . The destruction of a city is a calamity all the more deeply felt because of the close cohesion of its inhabitants' (Iliad, ed. Knox, p. 30). This surely provides a plausible backdrop for the characterization of man as a creature of the polis, a social animal who may become a political animal, as we understand the word political.
50. See also N.D. Smith and F.D. Miller Jr., Thought Probes: Philosophy Through Science Fiction Literature (New Jersey, 1989), pp.287-8: 'A second snare [in Aristotle's labelling man zoon politikon] involves the word "political", which comes from the ancient Greek word polis or city-state. The Greeks used this word not merely for the government but also for the whole complex of social relationships within the city-state. So the words "political animal" can mean "an animal with a government" or they can mean "an animal living in a social system"'. In his introduction to Homer' s Iliad (New York, 1990), Bernard Knox characterizes the city-state as such: 'The city, the polis as the Greeks called it, was for them the matrix of civilization, the only form of ordered social life they could understand; it is the exclusive form assumed by ancient Greek culture from its beginning to its end. The city was small enough so that the citizens knew one another, participated in a communal life, shared the common joy of festivals . . . The destruction of a city is a calamity all the more deeply felt because of the close cohesion of its inhabitants' (Iliad, ed. Knox, p. 30). This surely provides a plausible backdrop for the characterization of man as a creature of the polis, a social animal who may become a political animal, as we understand the word political.
51. See also N.D. Smith and F.D. Miller Jr., Thought Probes: Philosophy Through Science Fiction Literature (New Jersey, 1989), pp.287-8: 'A second snare [in Aristotle's labelling man zoon politikon] involves the word "political", which comes from the ancient Greek word polis or city-state. The Greeks used this word not merely for the government but also for the whole complex of social relationships within the city-state. So the words "political animal" can mean "an animal with a government" or they can mean "an animal living in a social system"'. In his introduction to Homer' s Iliad (New York, 1990), Bernard Knox characterizes the city-state as such: 'The city, the polis as the Greeks called it, was for them the matrix of civilization, the only form of ordered social life they could understand; it is the exclusive form assumed by ancient Greek culture from its beginning to its end. The city was small enough so that the citizens knew one another, participated in a communal life, shared the common joy of festivals . . . The destruction of a city is a calamity all the more deeply felt because of the close cohesion of its inhabitants' (Iliad, ed. Knox, p. 30). This surely provides a plausible backdrop for the characterization of man as a creature of the polis, a social animal who may become a political animal, as we understand the word political.
52. Kullman, 'Man as a Political Animal in Aristotle', p. 115.
53. Aristotle, Politics, VII.2.1324a5-12.
54. Once again, the translation here as 'happy' must be considered suspect.
55. For example at Politics, VI.4 Aristotle makes the argument that the 'best democracy' is a middle one. A middle democracy (polity) is more durable than an extreme democracy (although it is not completely virtuous) because both the poor and the 'notables' share the ruling responsibilities. Aristotle makes similar claims in the case of the best aristocracy. In this way, middle constitutions can be seen to function as eudaimon poleis. See footnote 54, below, for a more complete explanation of this point.
56. Aristotle, Politics, IV.7.1293b12-14; III.5.1278a17-19; IV.7.1293b2-4. In fact, the citizens of aristocracy are limited to those men who are eudaimon. When discussing who is 'properly called' a citizen in each constitution, Aristotle limits aristocratic citizenship to those who are citizens 'in the highest sense' (who share in holding office) and these are only good men (Aristotle, Politics, III.5.1278a36-37; III.5.1278a17-20). See also Aristotle, Politics, IV.7.1293b2-4, '. . . for that only can be rightly called aristocracy which is a government formed of the best men absolutely . . .'.
57. Aristotle, Politics, IV.7.1293b12-14; III.5.1278a17-19; IV.7.1293b2-4. In fact, the citizens of aristocracy are limited to those men who are eudaimon. When discussing who is 'properly called' a citizen in each constitution, Aristotle limits aristocratic citizenship to those who are citizens 'in the highest sense' (who share in holding office) and these are only good men (Aristotle, Politics, III.5.1278a36-37; III.5.1278a17-20). See also Aristotle, Politics, IV.7.1293b2-4, '. . . for that only can be rightly called aristocracy which is a government formed of the best men absolutely . . .'.
58. Aristotle, Politics, IV.7.1293b12-14; III.5.1278a17-19; IV.7.1293b2-4. In fact, the citizens of aristocracy are limited to those men who are eudaimon. When discussing who is 'properly called' a citizen in each constitution, Aristotle limits aristocratic citizenship to those who are citizens 'in the highest sense' (who share in holding office) and these are only good men (Aristotle, Politics, III.5.1278a36-37; III.5.1278a17-20). See also Aristotle, Politics, IV.7.1293b2-4, '. . . for that only can be rightly called aristocracy which is a government formed of the best men absolutely . . .'.
59. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VIII.1.1155a10-15; VIII.1156b5-10; IX.9.1170a6-12.
60. J.M. Cooper, 'Political Animals and Civic Friendship', with commentary by Julia Annas, in XI Symposium Aristotelicum, ed. Patzig, pp. 220-47, p. 247.
61. Aristotle, Politics, IV.2.1289a26-28.
62. Ibid., 1289a38-42.
63. At ibid., IV.8.1294a9-29 Aristotle argues that the most genuine aristocracy, after 'pure aristocracy', involves a triple mixture of freedom, wealth and virtue. Assuming, as we do, that this genuine aristocracy represents the ideal constitution for Aristotle, the least ideal constitution (namely the tyrannical one) would allow for the least freedom, wealth and virtue. Intuitively, this seems to make sense.
64. Ibid., 1294a9 ff.
65. This issue is a great deal more complex than we are making it appear to be. For a fuller discussion see J. Creed, 'Aristotle's Middle Constitution', Polis, 8 (1989) pp. 2-27; W. Bluhm, 'The Place of "Polity" in Aristotle's Theory of the Ideal State', Journal of Politics, 124 (1962), pp. 743-53. Creed claims that Aristotle describes an aristocracy in Books 7 and 8 of the Politics, an aristocracy that is apparently un-mixed (Creed, 'Aristotle' Middle Constitution', p. 6). He admits that Aristotle does introduce a 'second-class aristocracy' that is a mixture of democracy and oligarchy which consists of wealth, freedom and virtue. However, while he is never explicit about this, it seems that Creed believes that Aristotle did not describe this aristocracy in Books 7 and 8, he described pure or primary aristocracy. Creed admits that Aristotle sought an excelent constitution that is also attainable by most cities, and as such requires a 'substantial group of middle men' (ibid., p. 5). The excellent and attainable constitution, then must be a middle constitution. Pure or primary aristocracy is not a middle constitution and is therefore not attainable and excellent. Therefore, if Creed is correct to say tha Aristotle describes pure aristocracy in Books 7 and 8, then Aristotle is describing a utopia. But Aristotle uses Book 2 to dispense with those who propose utopias, so to propose a utopia in Books 7 and 8 would be contradictory for Aristotle. Creed agrees that Aristotle is interested in providing a practical, yet excellent, constitution, and pure aristocracy is not attainable. Thus, Creed's argument, it seems, is also contradictory. Aristotle must be describing something different in Books 7 and 8. Bluhm argues that Aristotle's, 'perfect aristocracy' is not what it appears to be. That is, it is not some higher form of oligarchy. Rather, according to Bluhm, perfect aristocracy 'represents the highest form of middle- class polity in which the mixture of rich and poor has been truly completed'. This is the constitution Aristotle describes in Books 7 and 8. In this assessment Aristotle would recognize two ideal constitutions. One would be absolute monarchy or aristocracy which Aristotle would never expect to occur because it would preclude the citizenship of the many. The other would be Bluhm's 'middle-class polity in which all would participate'. Thus, perhaps Aristotle describes polity in Books 7 and 8 as the most excellent and attainable constitution. But this is clearly wrong. We know that Aristotle considered the excellent constitution to be one whose aim is eudaimonia, (Politics, 7.1331b39-1332ab and the attainable constitution to be one that is mixed. Polity is certainly a mixed constitution, but it cannot aim at eudaimonia because it consists of only freedom and wealth, not virtue. Pure aristocracy does aim at eudaimonia, but it is not attainable because it is not mixed Only Creed's 'second-class aristocracy' is attainable (it is mixed and consists of wealth, freedom and virtue) and excellent (it has virtue). On this view, this 'second-class' form of aristocracy, and not pure aristocracy, is the ideal constitution of Books 7 and 8 for it is both excellent and humanly possible. Also see J.M. Blythe, Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages (Princeton, 1992), pp. 23-4.
66. This issue is a great deal more complex than we are making it appear to be. For a fuller discussion see J. Creed, 'Aristotle's Middle Constitution', Polis, 8 (1989) pp. 2- 27; W. Bluhm, 'The Place of "Polity" in Aristotle's Theory of the Ideal State', Journal of Politics, 124 (1962), pp. 743-53. Creed claims that Aristotle describes an aristocracy in Books 7 and 8 of the Politics, an aristocracy that is apparently un-mixed (Creed, 'Aristotle' Middle Constitution', p. 6). He admits that Aristotle does introduce a 'second-class aristocracy' that is a mixture of democracy and oligarchy which consists of wealth, freedom and virtue. However, while he is never explicit about this, it seems that Creed believes that Aristotle did not describe this aristocracy in Books 7 and 8, he described pure or primary aristocracy. Creed admits that Aristotle sought an excelent constitution that is also attainable by most cities, and as such requires a 'substantial group of middle men' (ibid., p. 5). The excellent and attainable constitution, then must be a middle constitution. Pure or primary aristocracy is not a middle constitution and is therefore not attainable and excellent. Therefore, if Creed is correct to say tha Aristotle describes pure aristocracy in Books 7 and 8, then Aristotle is describing a utopia. But Aristotle uses Book 2 to dispense with those who propose utopias, so to propose a utopia in Books 7 and 8 would be contradictory for Aristotle. Creed agrees that Aristotle is interested in providing a practical, yet excellent, constitution, and pure aristocracy is not attainable. Thus, Creed's argument, it seems, is also contradictory. Aristotle must be describing something different in Books 7 and 8. Bluhm argues that Aristotle's, 'perfect aristocracy' is not what it appears to be. That is, it is not some higher form of oligarchy. Rather, according to Bluhm, perfect aristocracy 'represents the highest form of middle- class polity in which the mixture of rich and poor has been truly completed'. This is the constitution Aristotle describes in Books 7 and 8. In this assessment Aristotle would recognize two ideal constitutions. One would be absolute monarchy or aristocracy which Aristotle would never expect to occur because it would preclude the citizenship of the many. The other would be Bluhm's 'middle-class polity in which all would participate'. Thus, perhaps Aristotle describes polity in Books 7 and 8 as the most excellent and attainable constitution. But this is clearly wrong. We know that Aristotle considered the excellent constitution to be one whose aim is eudaimonia, (Politics, 7.1331b39-1332ab and the attainable constitution to be one that is mixed. Polity is certainly a mixed constitution, but it cannot aim at eudaimonia because it consists of only freedom and wealth, not virtue. Pure aristocracy does aim at eudaimonia, but it is not attainable because it is not mixed Only Creed's 'second-class aristocracy' is attainable (it is mixed and consists of wealth, freedom and virtue) and excellent (it has virtue). On this view, this 'second-class' form of aristocracy, and not pure aristocracy, is the ideal constitution of Books 7 and 8 for it is both excellent and humanly possible. Also see J.M. Blythe, Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages (Princeton, 1992), pp. 23-4.
67. This issue is a great deal more complex than we are making it appear to be. For a fuller discussion see J. Creed, 'Aristotle's Middle Constitution', Polis, 8 (1989) pp. 2- 27; W. Bluhm, 'The Place of "Polity" in Aristotle's Theory of the Ideal State', Journal of Politics, 124 (1962), pp. 743-53. Creed claims that Aristotle describes an aristocracy in Books 7 and 8 of the Politics, an aristocracy that is apparently un-mixed (Creed, 'Aristotle' Middle Constitution', p. 6). He admits that Aristotle does introduce a 'second-class aristocracy' that is a mixture of democracy and oligarchy which consists of wealth, freedom and virtue. However, while he is never explicit about this, it seems that Creed believes that Aristotle did not describe this aristocracy in Books 7 and 8, he described pure or primary aristocracy. Creed admits that Aristotle sought an excelent constitution that is also attainable by most cities, and as such requires a 'substantial group of middle men' (ibid., p. 5). The excellent and attainable constitution, then must be a middle constitution. Pure or primary aristocracy is not a middle constitution and is therefore not attainable and excellent. Therefore, if Creed is correct to say tha Aristotle describes pure aristocracy in Books 7 and 8, then Aristotle is describing a utopia. But Aristotle uses Book 2 to dispense with those who propose utopias, so to propose a utopia in Books 7 and 8 would be contradictory for Aristotle. Creed agrees that Aristotle is interested in providing a practical, yet excellent, constitution, and pure aristocracy is not attainable. Thus, Creed's argument, it seems, is also contradictory. Aristotle must be describing something different in Books 7 and 8. Bluhm argues that Aristotle's, 'perfect aristocracy' is not what it appears to be. That is, it is not some higher form of oligarchy. Rather, according to Bluhm, perfect aristocracy 'represents the highest form of middle- class polity in which the mixture of rich and poor has been truly completed'. This is the constitution Aristotle describes in Books 7 and 8. In this assessment Aristotle would recognize two ideal constitutions. One would be absolute monarchy or aristocracy which Aristotle would never expect to occur because it would preclude the citizenship of the many. The other would be Bluhm's 'middle-class polity in which all would participate'. Thus, perhaps Aristotle describes polity in Books 7 and 8 as the most excellent and attainable constitution. But this is clearly wrong. We know that Aristotle considered the excellent constitution to be one whose aim is eudaimonia, (Politics, 7.1331b39-1332ab and the attainable constitution to be one that is mixed. Polity is certainly a mixed constitution, but it cannot aim at eudaimonia because it consists of only freedom and wealth, not virtue. Pure aristocracy does aim at eudaimonia, but it is not attainable because it is not mixed Only Creed's 'second-class aristocracy' is attainable (it is mixed and consists of wealth, freedom and virtue) and excellent (it has virtue). On this view, this 'second-class' form of aristocracy, and not pure aristocracy, is the ideal constitution of Books 7 and 8 for it is both excellent and humanly possible. Also see J.M. Blythe, Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages (Princeton, 1992), pp. 23-4.
68. This issue is a great deal more complex than we are making it appear to be. For a fuller discussion see J. Creed, 'Aristotle's Middle Constitution', Polis, 8 (1989) pp. 2- 27; W. Bluhm, 'The Place of "Polity" in Aristotle's Theory of the Ideal State', Journal of Politics, 124 (1962), pp. 743-53. Creed claims that Aristotle describes an aristocracy in Books 7 and 8 of the Politics, an aristocracy that is apparently un-mixed (Creed, 'Aristotle' Middle Constitution', p. 6). He admits that Aristotle does introduce a 'second-class aristocracy' that is a mixture of democracy and oligarchy which consists of wealth, freedom and virtue. However, while he is never explicit about this, it seems that Creed believes that Aristotle did not describe this aristocracy in Books 7 and 8, he described pure or primary aristocracy. Creed admits that Aristotle sought an excelent constitution that is also attainable by most cities, and as such requires a 'substantial group of middle men' (ibid., p. 5). The excellent and attainable constitution, then must be a middle constitution. Pure or primary aristocracy is not a middle constitution and is therefore not attainable and excellent. Therefore, if Creed is correct to say tha Aristotle describes pure aristocracy in Books 7 and 8, then Aristotle is describing a utopia. But Aristotle uses Book 2 to dispense with those who propose utopias, so to propose a utopia in Books 7 and 8 would be contradictory for Aristotle. Creed agrees that Aristotle is interested in providing a practical, yet excellent, constitution, and pure aristocracy is not attainable. Thus, Creed's argument, it seems, is also contradictory. Aristotle must be describing something different in Books 7 and 8. Bluhm argues that Aristotle's, 'perfect aristocracy' is not what it appears to be. That is, it is not some higher form of oligarchy. Rather, according to Bluhm, perfect aristocracy 'represents the highest form of middle-class polity in which the mixture of rich and poor has been truly completed'. This is the constitution Aristotle describes in Books 7 and 8. In this assessment Aristotle would recognize two ideal constitutions. One would be absolute monarchy or aristocracy which Aristotle would never expect to occur because it would preclude the citizenship of the many. The other would be Bluhm's 'middle-class polity in which all would participate'. Thus, perhaps Aristotle describes polity in Books 7 and 8 as the most excellent and attainable constitution. But this is clearly wrong. We know that Aristotle considered the excellent constitution to be one whose aim is eudaimonia, (Politics, 7.1331b39-1332ab and the attainable constitution to be one that is mixed. Polity is certainly a mixed constitution, but it cannot aim at eudaimonia because it consists of only freedom and wealth, not virtue. Pure aristocracy does aim at eudaimonia, but it is not attainable because it is not mixed Only Creed's 'second-class aristocracy' is attainable (it is mixed and consists of wealth, freedom and virtue) and excellent (it has virtue). On this view, this 'second-class' form of aristocracy, and not pure aristocracy, is the ideal constitution of Books 7 and 8 for it is both excellent and humanly possible. Also see J.M. Blythe, Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages (Princeton, 1992), pp. 23-4.
69. This issue is a great deal more complex than we are making it appear to be. For a fuller discussion see J. Creed, 'Aristotle's Middle Constitution', Polis, 8 (1989) pp. 2- 27; W. Bluhm, 'The Place of "Polity" in Aristotle's Theory of the Ideal State', Journal of Politics, 124 (1962), pp. 743-53. Creed claims that Aristotle describes an aristocracy in Books 7 and 8 of the Politics, an aristocracy that is apparently un-mixed (Creed, 'Aristotle' Middle Constitution', p. 6). He admits that Aristotle does introduce a 'second-class aristocracy' that is a mixture of democracy and oligarchy which consists of wealth, freedom and virtue. However, while he is never explicit about this, it seems that Creed believes that Aristotle did not describe this aristocracy in Books 7 and 8, he described pure or primary aristocracy. Creed admits that Aristotle sought an excelent constitution that is also attainable by most cities, and as such requires a 'substantial group of middle men' (ibid., p. 5). The excellent and attainable constitution, then must be a middle constitution. Pure or primary aristocracy is not a middle constitution and is therefore not attainable and excellent. Therefore, if Creed is correct to say tha Aristotle describes pure aristocracy in Books 7 and 8, then Aristotle is describing a utopia. But Aristotle uses Book 2 to dispense with those who propose utopias, so to propose a utopia in Books 7 and 8 would be contradictory for Aristotle. Creed agrees that Aristotle is interested in providing a practical, yet excellent, constitution, and pure aristocracy is not attainable. Thus, Creed's argument, it seems, is also contradictory. Aristotle must be describing something different in Books 7 and 8. Bluhm argues that Aristotle's, 'perfect aristocracy' is not what it appears to be. That is, it is not some higher form of oligarchy. Rather, according to Bluhm, perfect aristocracy 'represents the highest form of middle- class polity in which the mixture of rich and poor has been truly completed'. This is the constitution Aristotle describes in Books 7 and 8. In this assessment Aristotle would recognize two ideal constitutions. One would be absolute monarchy or aristocracy which Aristotle would never expect to occur because it would preclude the citizenship of the many. The other would be Bluhm's 'middle-class polity in which all would participate'. Thus, perhaps Aristotle describes polity in Books 7 and 8 as the most excellent and attainable constitution. But this is clearly wrong. We know that Aristotle considered the excellent constitution to be one whose aim is eudaimonia, (Politics, 7.1331b39-1332ab and the attainable constitution to be one that is mixed. Polity is certainly a mixed constitution, but it cannot aim at eudaimonia because it consists of only freedom and wealth, not virtue. Pure aristocracy does aim at eudaimonia, but it is not attainable because it is not mixed Only Creed's 'second-class aristocracy' is attainable (it is mixed and consists of wealth, freedom and virtue) and excellent (it has virtue). On this view, this 'second-class' form of aristocracy, and not pure aristocracy, is the ideal constitution of Books 7 and 8 for it is both excellent and humanly possible. Also see J.M. Blythe, Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages (Princeton, 1992), pp. 23-4.
70. This issue is a great deal more complex than we are making it appear to be. For a fuller discussion see J. Creed, 'Aristotle's Middle Constitution', Polis, 8 (1989) pp. 2- 27; W. Bluhm, 'The Place of "Polity" in Aristotle's Theory of the Ideal State', Journal of Politics, 124 (1962), pp. 743-53. Creed claims that Aristotle describes an aristocracy in Books 7 and 8 of the Politics, an aristocracy that is apparently un-mixed (Creed, 'Aristotle' Middle Constitution', p. 6). He admits that Aristotle does introduce a 'second-class aristocracy' that is a mixture of democracy and oligarchy which consists of wealth, freedom and virtue. However, while he is never explicit about this, it seems that Creed believes that Aristotle did not describe this aristocracy in Books 7 and 8, he described pure or primary aristocracy. Creed admits that Aristotle sought an excelent constitution that is also attainable by most cities, and as such requires a 'substantial group of middle men' (ibid., p. 5). The excellent and attainable constitution, then must be a middle constitution. Pure or primary aristocracy is not a middle constitution and is therefore not attainable and excellent. Therefore, if Creed is correct to say tha Aristotle describes pure aristocracy in Books 7 and 8, then Aristotle is describing a utopia. But Aristotle uses Book 2 to dispense with those who propose utopias, so to propose a utopia in Books 7 and 8 would be contradictory for Aristotle. Creed agrees that Aristotle is interested in providing a practical, yet excellent, constitution, and pure aristocracy is not attainable. Thus, Creed's argument, it seems, is also contradictory. Aristotle must be describing something different in Books 7 and 8. Bluhm argues that Aristotle's, 'perfect aristocracy' is not what it appears to be. That is, it is not some higher form of oligarchy. Rather, according to Bluhm, perfect aristocracy 'represents the highest form of middle- class polity in which the mixture of rich and poor has been truly completed'. This is the constitution Aristotle describes in Books 7 and 8. In this assessment Aristotle would recognize two ideal constitutions. One would be absolute monarchy or aristocracy which Aristotle would never expect to occur because it would preclude the citizenship of the many. The other would be Bluhm's 'middle-class polity in which all would participate'. Thus, perhaps Aristotle describes polity in Books 7 and 8 as the most excellent and attainable constitution. But this is clearly wrong. We know that Aristotle considered the excellent constitution to be one whose aim is eudaimonia, (Politics, 7.1331b39-1332ab and the attainable constitution to be one that is mixed. Polity is certainly a mixed constitution, but it cannot aim at eudaimonia because it consists of only freedom and wealth, not virtue. Pure aristocracy does aim at eudaimonia, but it is not attainable because it is not mixed Only Creed's 'second-class aristocracy' is attainable (it is mixed and consists of wealth, freedom and virtue) and excellent (it has virtue). On this view, this 'second-class' form of aristocracy, and not pure aristocracy, is the ideal constitution of Books 7 and 8 for it is both excellent and humanly possible. Also see J.M. Blythe, Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages (Princeton, 1992), pp. 23-4.
71. Aristotle, Politics, I.2.1252b27-30.
72. Ibid., VII.1.1323a38 ff.
73. Ibid., III.9.1280a30 ff.
74. Ibid., III.9.1280b29-1281a1.
75. M. Nussbaum, 'Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution', in XI Symposium Aristotelicum, ed. Patzig, pp. 145-206, p. 147.
76. J. Annas, 'Aristotelian Political Theory in the Hellenistic Period', in Justice and Generosity Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy; Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Helle nisticum, ed. A. Laks and M. Schofield (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 74-94.
77. Aristotle, Politics, III.9.1280b29-1281a1.
78. In all other cases men cannot be 'good' citizens and be 'good' men. At Politics, III.4.1276b34 Aristotle claims that 'it is possible to be a sound citizen without having that virtue which makes a sound man'. A man can be a good man without also being a good citizen. At Politics, III.4.1276b29-30 Aristotle argues that 'the virtue of the citizen must be in relation to the constitution'. Therefore, what it is to be a good citizen changes depending on the constitution. The good citizen upholds the constitution in order that it remain stable (ibid., 1276n27-28). Thus, since the good citizen in a less than virtuous constitution (from Aristotle's perspective) must act in a less than virtuous way (from the good man's perspective) in order to be a good citizen, he cannot also be a good man because the virtue of the good man (eudaimonia) never changes (ibid., 1276b32-33).
79. In all other cases men cannot be 'good' citizens and be 'good' men. At Politics, III.4.1276b34 Aristotle claims that 'it is possible to be a sound citizen without having that virtue which makes a sound man'. A man can be a good man without also being a good citizen. At Politics, III.4.1276b29-30 Aristotle argues that 'the virtue of the citizen must be in relation to the constitution'. Therefore, what it is to be a good citizen changes depending on the constitution. The good citizen upholds the constitution in order that it remain stable (ibid., 1276n27-28). Thus, since the good citizen in a less than virtuous constitution (from Aristotle's perspective) must act in a less than virtuous way (from the good man's perspective) in order to be a good citizen, he cannot also be a good man because the virtue of the good man (eudaimonia) never changes (ibid., 1276b32-33).
80. In all other cases men cannot be 'good' citizens and be 'good' men. At Politics, III.4.1276b34 Aristotle claims that 'it is possible to be a sound citizen without having that virtue which makes a sound man'. A man can be a good man without also being a good citizen. At Politics, III.4.1276b29-30 Aristotle argues that 'the virtue of the citizen must be in relation to the constitution'. Therefore, what it is to be a good citizen changes depending on the constitution. The good citizen upholds the constitution in order that it remain stable (ibid., 1276n27-28). Thus, since the good citizen in a less than virtuous constitution (from Aristotle's perspective) must act in a less than virtuous way (from the good man's perspective) in order to be a good citizen, he cannot also be a good man because the virtue of the good man (eudaimonia) never changes (ibid., 1276b32-33).
81. In all other cases men cannot be 'good' citizens and be 'good' men. At Politics, III.4.1276b34 Aristotle claims that 'it is possible to be a sound citizen without having that virtue which makes a sound man'. A man can be a good man without also being a good citizen. At Politics, III.4.1276b29-30 Aristotle argues that 'the virtue of the citizen must be in relation to the constitution'. Therefore, what it is to be a good citizen changes depending on the constitution. The good citizen upholds the constitution in order that it remain stable (ibid., 1276n27-28). Thus, since the good citizen in a less than virtuous constitution (from Aristotle's perspective) must act in a less than virtuous way (from the good man's perspective) in order to be a good citizen, he cannot also be a good man because the virtue of the good man (eudaimonia) never changes (ibid., 1276b32-33).