The fall of Litvinov: Harbinger of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 33-56

  Resis, Albert ^a  

^a NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0039550174     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09668130098253     Document Type: Review

References (148)

1. For example, Gerhard Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Nazi Germany. Starting World War II, 1937-1939 (Chicago and London, 1980), pp. 570-573;
2. Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came. The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939 (New York, 1989), pp. 232-235;
3. Robert Tucker, Stalin in Power. The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941 (New York and London, 1990), pp. 593-595;
4. Jonathan Haslam, 'Litvinov, Stalin, and the Road Not Taken' ; Gabriel Gorodetsky (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991. A Retrospective (London, 1994), p. 58;
5. or 'The dismissal of Litvinov marked the end of an epoch. It registered the abandonment by the Kremlin of all faith in a security pact with the Western Powers and in the possibility of organising an Eastern Front against Germany' (Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (New York, 1961), p. 328).
6. Geoffrey Roberts, 'The Fall of Litvinov: A Revisionist View', Journal of Contemporary History, 27, 1992, p. 645
7. 'Litvinov was the victim of an internal political purge whose objective was to extend the power and control of Stalin's inner circle in the field of foreign policy'; Teddy J. Uldricks, 'Soviet Security Policy in the 1930s', in Gorodetsky (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991, p. 73
8. 'Throughout the decade, suspicion of all imperialist powers and a desperate search for security remained constant. Stalin may be faulted for a great many mistakes in attempting to carry out the Collective Security line, but the line itself seems indisputably genuine'. In an agnostic view, Fleischhauer presents six hypotheses that had yet to be tested against Soviet diplomatic papers: the removal of Litvinov was a signal designed to warn the Western powers that the policy of collective security was in danger, it released from his post a man whose foreign policy conceptualisation had not proved true and in any case a man who, unlike Molotov, did not belong to Stalin's inner circle; in Molotov Stalin appointed a foreign commissar who pursued no ideas of his own but was a competent executant of Stalin' s will; the change at the top of Narkomindel gave the Soviet Government full freedom of action at a time of acute international crisis; with Litvinov and his appointees the pro-Western faction of Narkomindel was removed, if only temporarily (Litvinov was not subjected to the Purge but could in honour await a return to favour); the elimination of the Jew Litvinov cleared the way for further rapprochement of the USSR with Germany (Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Der Pakt, Hitler, Stalin, und die Initiative der deutschen Diplomatie 1938-1939 (Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, 1990), pp. 164-165).
9. Geoffrey Roberts, 'The Fall of Litvinov: A Revisionist View', Journal of Contemporary History, 27, 1992, p. 645: 'Litvinov was the victim of an internal political purge whose objective was to extend the power and control of Stalin's inner circle in the field of foreign policy'; Teddy J. Uldricks, 'Soviet Security Policy in the 1930s', in Gorodetsky (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991, p. 73: 'Throughout the decade, suspicion of all imperialist powers and a desperate search for security remained constant. Stalin may be faulted for a great many mistakes in attempting to carry out the Collective Security line, but the line itself seems indisputably genuine'. In an agnostic view, Fleischhauer presents six hypotheses that had yet to be tested against Soviet diplomatic papers: the removal of Litvinov was a signal designed to warn the Western powers that the policy of collective security was in danger, it released from his post a man whose foreign policy conceptualisation had not proved true and in any case a man who, unlike Molotov, did not belong to Stalin's inner circle; in Molotov Stalin appointed a foreign commissar who pursued no ideas of his own but was a competent executant of Stalin' s will; the change at the top of Narkomindel gave the Soviet Government full freedom of action at a time of acute international crisis; with Litvinov and his appointees the pro-Western faction of Narkomindel was removed, if only temporarily (Litvinov was not subjected to the Purge but could in honour await a return to favour); the elimination of the Jew Litvinov cleared the way for further rapprochement of the USSR with Germany (Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Der Pakt, Hitler, Stalin, und die Initiative der deutschen Diplomatie 1938-1939 (Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, 1990), pp. 164-165).
10. Geoffrey Roberts, 'The Fall of Litvinov: A Revisionist View', Journal of Contemporary History, 27, 1992, p. 645: 'Litvinov was the victim of an internal political purge whose objective was to extend the power and control of Stalin's inner circle in the field of foreign policy'; Teddy J. Uldricks, 'Soviet Security Policy in the 1930s', in Gorodetsky (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991, p. 73: 'Throughout the decade, suspicion of all imperialist powers and a desperate search for security remained constant. Stalin may be faulted for a great many mistakes in attempting to carry out the Collective Security line, but the line itself seems indisputably genuine'. In an agnostic view, Fleischhauer presents six hypotheses that had yet to be tested against Soviet diplomatic papers: the removal of Litvinov was a signal designed to warn the Western powers that the policy of collective security was in danger, it released from his post a man whose foreign policy conceptualisation had not proved true and in any case a man who, unlike Molotov, did not belong to Stalin's inner circle; in Molotov Stalin appointed a foreign commissar who pursued no ideas of his own but was a competent executant of Stalin' s will; the change at the top of Narkomindel gave the Soviet Government full freedom of action at a time of acute international crisis; with Litvinov and his appointees the pro-Western faction of Narkomindel was removed, if only temporarily (Litvinov was not subjected to the Purge but could in honour await a return to favour); the elimination of the Jew Litvinov cleared the way for further rapprochement of the USSR with Germany (Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Der Pakt, Hitler, Stalin, und die Initiative der deutschen Diplomatie 1938-1939 (Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, 1990), pp. 164-165).
11. Geoffrey Roberts, 'The Fall of Litvinov: A Revisionist View', Journal of Contemporary History, 27, 1992, p. 645: 'Litvinov was the victim of an internal political purge whose objective was to extend the power and control of Stalin's inner circle in the field of foreign policy'; Teddy J. Uldricks, 'Soviet Security Policy in the 1930s', in Gorodetsky (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991, p. 73: 'Throughout the decade, suspicion of all imperialist powers and a desperate search for security remained constant. Stalin may be faulted for a great many mistakes in attempting to carry out the Collective Security line, but the line itself seems indisputably genuine'. In an agnostic view, Fleischhauer presents six hypotheses that had yet to be tested against Soviet diplomatic papers: the removal of Litvinov was a signal designed to warn the Western powers that the policy of collective security was in danger, it released from his post a man whose foreign policy conceptualisation had not proved true and in any case a man who, unlike Molotov, did not belong to Stalin's inner circle; in Molotov Stalin appointed a foreign commissar who pursued no ideas of his own but was a competent executant of Stalin' s will; the change at the top of Narkomindel gave the Soviet Government full freedom of action at a time of acute international crisis; with Litvinov and his appointees the pro-Western faction of Narkomindel was removed, if only temporarily (Litvinov was not subjected to the Purge but could in honour await a return to favour); the elimination of the Jew Litvinov cleared the way for further rapprochement of the USSR with Germany (Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Der Pakt, Hitler, Stalin, und die Initiative der deutschen Diplomatie 1938-1939 (Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, 1990), pp. 164-165).
12. Geoffrey Roberts, 'The Fall of Litvinov: A Revisionist View', Journal of Contemporary History, 27, 1992, p. 645: 'Litvinov was the victim of an internal political purge whose objective was to extend the power and control of Stalin's inner circle in the field of foreign policy'; Teddy J. Uldricks, 'Soviet Security Policy in the 1930s', in Gorodetsky (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991, p. 73: 'Throughout the decade, suspicion of all imperialist powers and a desperate search for security remained constant. Stalin may be faulted for a great many mistakes in attempting to carry out the Collective Security line, but the line itself seems indisputably genuine'. In an agnostic view, Fleischhauer presents six hypotheses that had yet to be tested against Soviet diplomatic papers: the removal of Litvinov was a signal designed to warn the Western powers that the policy of collective security was in danger, it released from his post a man whose foreign policy conceptualisation had not proved true and in any case a man who, unlike Molotov, did not belong to Stalin's inner circle; in Molotov Stalin appointed a foreign commissar who pursued no ideas of his own but was a competent executant of Stalin' s will; the change at the top of Narkomindel gave the Soviet Government full freedom of action at a time of acute international crisis; with Litvinov and his appointees the pro-Western faction of Narkomindel was removed, if only temporarily (Litvinov was not subjected to the Purge but could in honour await a return to favour); the elimination of the Jew Litvinov cleared the way for further rapprochement of the USSR with Germany (Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Der Pakt, Hitler, Stalin, und die Initiative der deutschen Diplomatie 1938-1939 (Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, 1990), pp. 164-165).
13. Geoffrey Roberts, 'The Fall of Litvinov: A Revisionist View', Journal of Contemporary History, 27, 1992, p. 645: 'Litvinov was the victim of an internal political purge whose objective was to extend the power and control of Stalin's inner circle in the field of foreign policy'; Teddy J. Uldricks, 'Soviet Security Policy in the 1930s', in Gorodetsky (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991, p. 73: 'Throughout the decade, suspicion of all imperialist powers and a desperate search for security remained constant. Stalin may be faulted for a great many mistakes in attempting to carry out the Collective Security line, but the line itself seems indisputably genuine'. In an agnostic view, Fleischhauer presents six hypotheses that had yet to be tested against Soviet diplomatic papers: the removal of Litvinov was a signal designed to warn the Western powers that the policy of collective security was in danger, it released from his post a man whose foreign policy conceptualisation had not proved true and in any case a man who, unlike Molotov, did not belong to Stalin's inner circle; in Molotov Stalin appointed a foreign commissar who pursued no ideas of his own but was a competent executant of Stalin' s will; the change at the top of Narkomindel gave the Soviet Government full freedom of action at a time of acute international crisis; with Litvinov and his appointees the pro-Western faction of Narkomindel was removed, if only temporarily (Litvinov was not subjected to the Purge but could in honour await a return to favour); the elimination of the Jew Litvinov cleared the way for further rapprochement of the USSR with Germany (Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Der Pakt, Hitler, Stalin, und die Initiative der deutschen Diplomatie 1938-1939 (Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, 1990), pp. 164-165).
14. 'Throughout the decade, suspicion of all imperialist powers and a desperate search for security remained constant. Stalin may be faulted for a great many mistakes in attempting to carry out the Collective Security line, but the line itself seems indisputably genuine'. In an agnostic view, Fleischhauer presents six hypotheses that had yet to be tested against Soviet diplomatic papers: the removal of Litvinov was a signal designed to warn the Western powers that the policy of collective security was in danger, it released from his post a man whose foreign policy conceptualisation had not proved true and in any case a man who, unlike Molotov, did not belong to Stalin's inner circle; in Molotov Stalin appointed a foreign commissar who pursued no ideas of his own but was a competent executant of Stalin' s will; the change at the top of Narkomindel gave the Soviet Government full freedom of action at a time of acute international crisis; with Litvinov and his appointees the pro-Western faction of Narkomindel was removed, if only temporarily (Litvinov was not subjected to the Purge but could in honour await a return to favour); the elimination of the Jew Litvinov cleared the way for further rapprochement of the USSR with Germany (Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Der Pakt, Hitler, Stalin, und die Initiative der deutschen Diplomatie 1938-1939 (Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, 1990), pp. 164-165).
15. Dmitrii Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediya, Politicheskii portret I. V. Stalina. V 2-kh knigakh (Moscow, 1989). Kniga II, chast'l, pp. 15-18;
16. Aleksandr Nekrich, Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941.Edited and translated by Gregory L. Freeze (New York, 1996), pp. 109-110;
17. M. M. Narinsky, 'Kak eto bylo', in Yu. N. Afans'ev (ed.), Drugaya voina, 1939-1945 (Moscow 1996), pp. 39-40.
18. See however N. A. Abramov & L. A. Bezymensky, 'Osobaya Missiya Davida Kandelaki', Voprosy istorii, 1991, 4-5, pp. 144-156
19. L.A. Bezymenskly, 'Sovetsko-German-skie Dogovory 1939 g.: Novye Dokumenty i Starye Problemy', Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriya, 1998, 3, pp. 3-26 . They show the cardinal political importance Stalin attached to economic agreements with Germany. He believed that agreement by Berlin to exchange its state-of-the art military equipment to the USSR for Soviet raw materials would give him surety against a German war on the USSR.
20. The Stalin and Molotov papers remain, more or less, under lock and key in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. On this question see Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, 'Chapter 1, Why is Stalin's Archive Still Locked Away?', Archives of Russia. Five Years After 'Purveyors of Sensation ' or 'Shadows of the Past'? (Amsterdam, International Institute of Social History, 1997), pp. 11-18 and passim;
21. Jonathan Haslam, 'Russian Archival Revelations and Our Understanding of the Cold War', Diplomatic History, 21, 2, Spring 1997, pp. 218-219 ;
22. D. G. Nadzhafov, 'Sovetsko-Germanskii Pakt 1939 goda: pereosmyslenie podkhodov k ego otsenke', Voprosy istorii, 1999, 1, pp. 154-167.
23. The public acknowledgement by the Gorbachev leadership in December 1989 that copies of the Secret Additional Protocol to the Non-aggression Treaty were in fact genuine cleared the way for publication of the following diplomatic papers: Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, God krizisa, 1938-1939.
24. Dokumenty i Materialy v dvukh tomakh (henceforth Gk) (Moscow, 1990).
25. After a hiatus of some 15 years, vol. XXII in the Documents of Foreign Policy series was published under theEl'tsin government: Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki 1939 god (DVP), XXII, v 2 kn. (Moscow, 1992). Although it contains important material omitted from the 1990 publication, it too suffers from serious gaps, mainly the absence of Stalin's replies to Litvinov's communications and of internal documents on Narkomindel decision making.
26. Letters, Tippelskirch to Schliep, Moscow, 3 and 10 October 1938, Documents of German Foreign Policy, (DGFP), Series D, IV (Washington DC, 1951), nos 476 and 477.
27. Telegrams, Chargé Kirk to Secretary of State, Moscow, 31 October 1938 and 22 February 1939, Foreign Relations of The United States: The Soviet Union, 1933-1939 (Washington DC, 1952), p. 592 and p. 737.
28. Litvinov to Stalin, 3 January, DVP, XXI, kn. 1, no. 2.
29. Litvinov to Stalin, 23 February ibid., no. 104. Stalin's written replies to Litvinov's letters, if any (Stalin was loath to leave a paper trail), are not included in this collection. The commission recommended by Litvinov to supervise continuation of the purge and to screen replacements was formed after his dismissal. Its members included Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Dekanazov - and, for several days, Litvinov. Elected a member of the Party Central Committee at the XVII Congress in February 1934, he remained a member until he was dropped in February 1941 (Vladimir Sokolov, 'People's Commissar Maxim Litvinov', International Affairs (Moscow), May 1991, p. 104).
30. For further information on the purge of Narkomindel see Teddy J. Uldricks, 'The Impact of the Great Purges on the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs', Slavic Review, 36, 1977, pp. 200-201.
31. Z. Sheinis, Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov. Revolyutsioner. Diplomat. Chelovek (Moscow, 1989), pp. 360-361.
32. Stalin to Polpredy, 3 May, DVP, XXII, kn. 1, no. 269. In an implausible account, Arthur Upham Pope, who maintained a close friendship with Ambassador Litvinov during the war years, reported that Litvinov himself had recognised that he had to go, because appeasement had left the USSR no alternative but collaboration with Hitler. It was Litvinov himself who had offered his resignation and he had also 'suggested his friend, Prime Minister Molotov, as his successor' (Arthur Upham Pope, Maxim Litvinoff (New York, 1943), pp. 441-442.
33. Quoted in A. Roschin, 'People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs Before World War II', International Affairs (Moscow), May 1988, pp. 113-114.
34. Albert Resis (ed.), Molotov Remembers. Inside Kremlin Politics (Chicago, 1993), p. 192.
35. On the anti-semitic aspect of the Narkomindel purge, see Arkady Vaksberg, Stalin Against the Jews, translated by Antonina W. Bouis (New York, 1994), pp. 82-88.
36. Andrei Gromyko, Memoirs, translated by Harold Shukman (New York, 1989), p. 313.
37. XVIII S'èzd Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi partii (b). Stenograficheskii Otchet (Moscow, 1939), pp. 12-15. Of the more than 1500 delegates with full voting rights, only 21 held membership before 1917, including Stalin, Litvinov and M. I. Kalinin. Their membership purportedly dated from 1898.
38. Vyacheslav Dashichev contends in his analysis of the speech that Stalin had decided from January 1939 to sign with Germany rather than with Britain and France. See his 'Pakt: pagubnost' i neizbezhnost" , Znanie-Sila, 1989, 8, pp. 79-82;
39. 'Stalin in Early 1939', Moscow News, 3-10 September 1989;
40. 'Planungen und Fehlschläge Stalins am Vorabend des Krieges - der XVIII Parteitag der KPD (B) und der sowjetisch-deutsche Nichtangriffspakt', in Klaus Hildebrand et al., (eds), 1939. An der Schwelle zum Weltkrieg (Berlin and New York, 1990), pp. 303-314. Written before declassification of key diplomatic papers (see note 5), Dashichev's analysis rests mainly on assertion and contains no fresh corroborative material.
41. Litvinov to Stalin, 20 March 1939, DVP, XXII, kn. 1, no. 157. Litvinov said nothing about a change in Soviet policy toward Germany. In fact the USSR took up a similar posture toward the Reich. Since Germany bore responsibility for the deterioration of Soviet-German relations, the Reich must take the initiative in patching up that relationship.
42. Maisky to NKID, 18 March, Gk, 1, no. 196; Halifax to Seeds, 17 March, Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), 3d Series, 1938-39. vol. IV (London, 1951), no. 389.
43. Maisky to NKID, 18 March, Gk, 1, no. 196; Halifax to Seeds, 17 March, Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), 3d Series, 1938-39. vol. IV (London, 1951), no. 389.
44. Seeds to Halifax, Moscow, 18 March, ibid., no. 403; Litvinov to Maisky and Surits, 18 March, Gk, I, no. 197.
45. Seeds to Halifax, Moscow, 18 March, ibid., no. 403; Litvinov to Maisky and Surits, 18 March, Gk, I, no. 197.
46. Litvinov to Stalin, 18 March (copy to Molotov), DVP, XXII, 1, no. 150.
47. Litvinov to Maisky (London) and Surits (France), 18 March, Gk, I, no. 198. Regarding Turkey, Litvinov to Surits and Maisky, 19 March, ibid., no. 200; Seeds to Halifax, 19 March, DBFP, IV, no. 421.
48. Litvinov to Maisky (London) and Surits (France), 18 March, Gk, I, no. 198. Regarding Turkey, Litvinov to Surits and Maisky, 19 March, ibid., no. 200; Seeds to Halifax, 19 March, DBFP, IV, no. 421.
49. Litvinov to Maisky (London) and Surits (France), 18 March, Gk, I, no. 198. Regarding Turkey, Litvinov to Surits and Maisky, 19 March, ibid., no. 200; Seeds to Halifax, 19 March, DBFP, IV, no. 421.
50. Maisky to NKID, 19 March, ibid., No. 201; Halifax to Seeds, 19 March, DBFP, 4, no. 433.
51. Maisky to NKID, 19 March, ibid., No. 201; Halifax to Seeds, 19 March, DBFP, 4, no. 433.
52. Halifax to Ambassadors, Paris, Moscow and Warsaw, 20 March, DBFP, IV, no. 446; Record of Litvinov-Seeds Conversation, 21 March, Gk, 1, no. 209.
53. Halifax to Ambassadors, Paris, Moscow and Warsaw, 20 March, DBFP, IV, no. 446; Record of Litvinov-Seeds Conversation, 21 March, Gk, 1, no. 209.
54. Litvinov told the Polpredy for their information that the USSR would not sign the declaration unless Poland signed. He had not informed Seeds of this, because Seeds had not asked what the USSR would do failing Polish adhesion to the declaration (Litvinov to Polpredy in Britain and France, 22 March, DVP, XXII, 1, no. 162). Daladier had assured Surits that the declaration covered not just Romania but any case of aggression (Surits to NKID, 22 March, DVP, XXII, 1, no. 165).
55. Litvinov had cleared the texts of the notes of warnings first with Stalin (Litvinov to Stalin, 27 March, DVP, XXII, I, no. 179). Texts: nos 180 (Estonia) and 181 (Latvia); Latvian and Estonian rejection of the Soviet notes, (7 April), ibid., nos 204 (Latvia) and 205 (Estonia). Stalin saw Litvinov in Stalin's Kremlin office for 30 minutes on the evening of 26 March and five minutes on the afternoon of 27 March. Also present on 26 March were Molotov, Zhdanov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan and Litvinov's Deputy Potemkin (for 15 minutes). Also present on 27 March were Zhdanov, Molotov and Mikoyan ('Posetiteli kremlevskogo kabineta I. V. Stalina. Zhurnaly (tetradi) zapisi lits, prinyatykh pervym gensekom, 1924-1953 gg', Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1995, 5-6, p. 33).
56. Litvinov had cleared the texts of the notes of warnings first with Stalin (Litvinov to Stalin, 27 March, DVP, XXII, I, no. 179). Texts: nos 180 (Estonia) and 181 (Latvia); Latvian and Estonian rejection of the Soviet notes, (7 April), ibid., nos 204 (Latvia) and 205 (Estonia). Stalin saw Litvinov in Stalin's Kremlin office for 30 minutes on the evening of 26 March and five minutes on the afternoon of 27 March. Also present on 26 March were Molotov, Zhdanov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan and Litvinov's Deputy Potemkin (for 15 minutes). Also present on 27 March were Zhdanov, Molotov and Mikoyan ('Posetiteli kremlevskogo kabineta I. V. Stalina. Zhurnaly (tetradi) zapisi lits, prinyatykh pervym gensekom, 1924-1953 gg', Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1995, 5-6, p. 33).
57. Litvinov had cleared the texts of the notes of warnings first with Stalin (Litvinov to Stalin, 27 March, DVP, XXII, I, no. 179). Texts: nos 180 (Estonia) and 181 (Latvia); Latvian and Estonian rejection of the Soviet notes, (7 April), ibid., nos 204 (Latvia) and 205 (Estonia). Stalin saw Litvinov in Stalin's Kremlin office for 30 minutes on the evening of 26 March and five minutes on the afternoon of 27 March. Also present on 26 March were Molotov, Zhdanov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan and Litvinov's Deputy Potemkin (for 15 minutes). Also present on 27 March were Zhdanov, Molotov and Mikoyan ('Posetiteli kremlevskogo kabineta I. V. Stalina. Zhurnaly (tetradi) zapisi lits, prinyatykh pervym gensekom, 1924-1953 gg', Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1995, 5-6, p. 33).
58. Maisky to NKID, 29 March 1939, Gk, I, no. 240; Halifax to Seeds, 28 March, DBFP, IV, no. 565.
59. Maisky to NKID, 29 March 1939, Gk, I, no. 240; Halifax to Seeds, 28 March, DBFP, IV, no. 565.
60. Record, Maisky-Cadogan conversation, 29 March, DVP, XXII, 1, no. 187; Maisky to NKID, 29 March 1939, Gk, I, no. 240.
61. Halifax to Seeds, 31 March, DBFP, IV, no. 589; text of Chamberlain statement, no. 582.
62. Maisky to NKID, 31 March, Gk, 1, no. 246. Halifax, half-hearted, suggested to Beck that Poland might seek a closer relationship with the USSR, even if it were only Russian agreement to supply Poland in the event of war. Beck contended that any extension of Polish relations with the USSR would provoke a German attack, not deter it (Record, Halifax-Beck conversation, 4 April, London, DBFP, V, no. 1, pp. 6-7.
63. Record, Litvinov-Seeds conversation, 1 April, Gk, 1, no. 248; Seeds to Halifax, 1 April, DBFP, IV, no. 597.
64. Record, Litvinov-Seeds conversation, 1 April, Gk, 1, no. 248; Seeds to Halifax, 1 April, DBFP, IV, no. 597.
65. Litvinov to Maisky, 4 April, Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of World War II. Documents and Records (SPE), Two Parts (Moscow, 1973), 1, no. 210.
66. Ibid.
67. 'Record of Conversation', Chamberlain-Beck, 5 April, DBFP, V, no. 10, 'Communiqué', pp. 35-36; Halifax: Maisky's 'ingenuity in the formulation and examination of hypothetical problems is unrivaled' (Halifax to Seeds, 6 April, DBFP, V, no. 19).
68. 'Record of Conversation', Chamberlain-Beck, 5 April, DBFP, V, no. 10, 'Communiqué', pp. 35-36; Halifax: Maisky's 'ingenuity in the formulation and examination of hypothetical problems is unrivaled' (Halifax to Seeds, 6 April, DBFP, V, no. 19).
69. Maisky to NKID, 6 April, Gk, 1, no. 255; Halifax to Seeds, 6 April, DBFP, V, no. 19.
70. Maisky to Litvinov, 9 April, SPE, 1, no. 218.
71. Maisky to NKID, 9 April, Gk, 1, no. 257.
72. Surits to NKID, 7 April, SPE, 1, no. 215; Surits to NKID, 4 April, ibid., no. 212; Bonnet to Payart, 5 April, Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1932-1939. 2e Série, (1936-1939) (DDF), vol. XV, no. 263.
73. Surits to NKID, 7 April, SPE, 1, no. 215; Surits to NKID, 4 April, ibid., no. 212; Bonnet to Payart, 5 April, Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1932-1939. 2e Série, (1936-1939) (DDF), vol. XV, no. 263.
74. Litvinov to Stalin, 9 April, (copy to Molotov), DVP, XXII, 1, no. 206; Litvinov to Surits, 10 April, ibid., no. 208. Potemkin informed Payart of the same (Payart to Bonnet, 11 April, DDF, XV, no. 343).
75. Litvinov to Stalin, 9 April, (copy to Molotov), DVP, XXII, 1, no. 206; Litvinov to Surits, 10 April, ibid., no. 208. Potemkin informed Payart of the same (Payart to Bonnet, 11 April, DDF, XV, no. 343).
76. Litvinov to Stalin, 9 April, (copy to Molotov), DVP, XXII, 1, no. 206; Litvinov to Surits, 10 April, ibid., no. 208. Potemkin informed Payart of the same (Payart to Bonnet, 11 April, DDF, XV, no. 343).
77. Bonnet to Payart, 10 April, DDF, XV, no. 318; Surits to NKID, 10 April, Gk, I, no. 260.
78. Bonnet to Payart, 10 April, DDF, XV, no. 323.
79. Surits to NKID, 10 April, Gk, 1, no. 260; Bonnet's account of this conversation says nothing about a willingness on his part to sign a tripartite declaration with Britain and the USSR but without Poland (Bonnet to Payart, 10 April, DDF, XV, no. 318). Litvinov to Surits, 11 April, Gk, I, no. 262.
80. Surits to NKID, 10 April, Gk, 1, no. 260; Bonnet's account of this conversation says nothing about a willingness on his part to sign a tripartite declaration with Britain and the USSR but without Poland (Bonnet to Payart, 10 April, DDF, XV, no. 318). Litvinov to Surits, 11 April, Gk, I, no. 262.
81. Surits to NKID, 10 April, Gk, 1, no. 260; Bonnet's account of this conversation says nothing about a willingness on his part to sign a tripartite declaration with Britain and the USSR but without Poland (Bonnet to Payart, 10 April, DDF, XV, no. 318). Litvinov to Surits, 11 April, Gk, I, no. 262.
82. Daladier to General Palasse (Moscow), Paris, 11 April, DDF, XV, no. 344; Payart to Bonnet, Moscow, 14 April, ibid., no. 386; Gamelin to Daladier, Paris, 15 April, ibid., no. 416.
83. Daladier to General Palasse (Moscow), Paris, 11 April, DDF, XV, no. 344; Payart to Bonnet, Moscow, 14 April, ibid., no. 386; Gamelin to Daladier, Paris, 15 April, ibid., no. 416.
84. Daladier to General Palasse (Moscow), Paris, 11 April, DDF, XV, no. 344; Payart to Bonnet, Moscow, 14 April, ibid., no. 386; Gamelin to Daladier, Paris, 15 April, ibid., no. 416.
85. On French rejection of Soviet proposals that the French and Soviet military hold staff talks in conjunction with their Mutual Assistance Treaty see Michael Carley, 'End of the "Low, Dishonest Decade". Failure of the Anglo -Franco-Soviet Alliance', Europe-Asia Studies, 45, 2, 1993, pp. 306-309 and passim.
86. Daladier to Bonnet, Paris, 22 April, DDF, XV, no. 476.
87. Litvinov to Surits, 11 April, Gk, 1, no. 262.
88. Halifax to Cabinet Foreign Policy Committee: 'if we had to make a choice between Poland and Soviet Russia, it seemed clear that Poland would give the greater value' (Public Record Office, Cab 27/624, F.P. (36) 38th meeting 27 March, quoted in Robert Manne, 'The British Decision for Alliance with Russia, May 1939', Journal of Contemporary History, 8, 1974, p. 12);
89. Chamberlain to the full Cabinet: 'it was of the utmost importance to obtain the support of Poland and it was impossible to secure this if Russia was brought into the declaration' (Cab 23/98, CM 15/39, 29 March a.m., quoted in Christopher Hill, Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy: the British Experience, October 1938-June 1941 (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 43-44). Chamberlain and Halifax did not concede the necessity of alliance with the USSR until late in May.
90. Litvinov to Surits, 11 April, and copy to Maisky, Gk, 1, no. 262; Litvinov to Maisky, 11 April, ibid., no. 263. But the British guarantee to Poland also strengthened the Soviet hand vis-à-vis Germany and Britain. If this did not occur to Litvinov, it must certainly have crossed Stalin's mind.
91. Litvinov to Surits, 11 April, and copy to Maisky, Gk, 1, no. 262; Litvinov to Maisky, 11 April, ibid., no. 263. But the British guarantee to Poland also strengthened the Soviet hand vis-à-vis Germany and Britain. If this did not occur to Litvinov, it must certainly have crossed Stalin's mind.
92. Litvinov to Maisky, 11 April, DVP, XXII, 1, no. 210.
93. Maisky to NKID, 11 April, Gk, 1, no. 264. Halifax's account states that Maisky had asked whether Poland had floated the idea of taking possession of Latvian ports in exchange for Danzig and the Corridor. Halifax replied that Beck had made no such suggestion as he did not contemplate abandoning the Corridor (Halifax to Seeds, 11 April, DBFP, V, no. 42).
94. Ibid.
95. Text, 13 April, DBFP, V, p. 197.
96. Litvinov to Stalin, 13 April, DVP, XX, 1, no. 216 and Litvinov to Maisky, 13 April, ibid., no. 217.
97. Halifax to Seeds, 14 April, DBFP, V, no. 176. Halifax again stressed that his proposals were in complete harmony with Stalin's statements of 10 March on Soviet aid to countries resisting aggression (Maisky to Litvinov, 14 April, DVP, XXII, no. 221).
98. Halifax to Seeds, 14 April, DBFP, V, no. 170; 'Memorandum, Litvinov-Seeds conversation', 15 April, SPE, I, no. 233.
99. Seeds to Halifax, 15 April, DBFP, V, no. 182; Memorandum, Litvinov-Seeds conversation, 15 April, SPE, I, no. 233.
100. Surits to NKID, 14 April, Gk, I, no. 269. Bonnet pointed out to Emile Naggiar, French Ambassador to the USSR, who was still in Paris, that although this proposed arrangement lacked reciprocity with the guaranteed states, it was akin to the guarantee that France had extended to Belgium and Switzerland (Bonnet to Naggiar, Paris, 14 April, DDF, XV, no. 387).
101. Halifax to Phipps, 14 April, DBFP, V, no. 172; Phipps to Halifax, 15 April, ibid., no. 183, also no. 186.
102. Halifax to Phipps, 14 April, DBFP, V, no. 172; Phipps to Halifax, 15 April, ibid., no. 183, also no. 186.
103. Surits to Litvinov, 15 April, Gk, I, no. 272; Bonnet to Payart, 16 April, DDF, XV, no. 417.
104. Surits to Litvinov, 15 April, Gk, I, no. 272; Bonnet to Payart, 16 April, DDF, XV, no. 417.
105. Three days later Moscow accepted the French proposal 'in principle'. See the draft triple alliance, dated 17 April, Moscow proposed to Britain and France (Text, DVP, XXII, 1, no. 229 and SPE, I, no. 239). See pp. 46-47.
106. Litvinov to Stalin, 15 April, DVP, XXII, 1, no. 223; copy to Molotov.
107. Ibid.
108. Evidently Litvinov still envisaged the possibility of separate bilateral mutual defence pacts with Britain and France respectively.
109. In conclusion, Litvinov vigorously urged that Maisky be kept in London in view of the pressing, complex negotiations that lay ahead (Litvinov to Stalin, 15 April, DVP, XXII, 1, no. 224), but Litvinov was compelled to summon Maisky to Moscow to participate in consultations on the prospects for the tripartite pact of mutual assistance that Litvinov proposed on 17 April. Maisky left London on 19 April and returned nine days later (Ivan Maisky, Who Helped Hitler?, translated from the Russian by Andrew Rothstein (London, 1964), p. 119). Litvinov told Seeds that he was summoning Maisky to Moscow in order to ask him why he had not pressed Halifax to specify the form of assistance Britain would render Romania and the nature of the assistance that Britain expected the USSR and other interested parties to render Romania (Seeds to Halifax, 17 April, DBFP, V, no. 196)
110. In conclusion, Litvinov vigorously urged that Maisky be kept in London in view of the pressing, complex negotiations that lay ahead (Litvinov to Stalin, 15 April, DVP, XXII, 1, no. 224), but Litvinov was compelled to summon Maisky to Moscow to participate in consultations on the prospects for the tripartite pact of mutual assistance that Litvinov proposed on 17 April. Maisky left London on 19 April and returned nine days later (Ivan Maisky, Who Helped Hitler?, translated from the Russian by Andrew Rothstein (London, 1964), p. 119). Litvinov told Seeds that he was summoning Maisky to Moscow in order to ask him why he had not pressed Halifax to specify the form of assistance Britain would render Romania and the nature of the assistance that Britain expected the USSR and other interested parties to render Romania (Seeds to Halifax, 17 April, DBFP, V, no. 196)
111. The Politburo, on 14 April 1937, at Stalin's initiative, had adopted a decision to form under its aegis a standing committee intended 'to prepare for the Politburo, and in the case of special urgency, to take decisions on, questions of a secret character, including questions of foreign policy'. The committee members were Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, L. Kaganovich and Ezhov (O. V. Khlevnyuk, Politbyuro. Mekhanizm Politicheskoi Vlasti v 1930-e gody (Moscow, 1996), pp. 237-238; Molotov Remembers, p. 283). Ezhov was purged in December 1938, reducing the five-member committee to a chetverka. In 1939, however, Mikoyan, Commissar for Foreign Trade, frequently participated in sessions of this Politburo core. Other members elected in March 1939 to the Politburo were Kalinin, Andreev, Zhdanov and Khrushchev, and candidate members Beria and Shvernik.
112. The Politburo, on 14 April 1937, at Stalin's initiative, had adopted a decision to form under its aegis a standing committee intended 'to prepare for the Politburo, and in the case of special urgency, to take decisions on, questions of a secret character, including questions of foreign policy'. The committee members were Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, L. Kaganovich and Ezhov (O. V. Khlevnyuk, Politbyuro. Mekhanizm Politicheskoi Vlasti v 1930-e gody (Moscow, 1996), pp. 237-238; Molotov Remembers, p. 283). Ezhov was purged in December 1938, reducing the five-member committee to a chetverka. In 1939, however, Mikoyan, Commissar for Foreign Trade, frequently participated in sessions of this Politburo core. Other members elected in March 1939 to the Politburo were Kalinin, Andreev, Zhdanov and Khrushchev, and candidate members Beria and Shvernik.
113. Stalin and Molotov saw Litvinov and his deputy Potemkin in Stalin's Kremlin office on the nights of 16 and 17 April, each night for more than one hour. Also present were Mikoyan and Kaganovich ('Posetiteli', p. 35).
114. Litvinov to Stalin, 17 April, DVP, XXII, 1, no. 228; text of the proposal, dated 17 April, ibid., no. 229 and SPE, 1, no. 239.
115. Litvinov to Stalin, 17 April, DVP, XXII, 1, no. 228; text of the proposal, dated 17 April, ibid., no. 229 and SPE, 1, no. 239.
116. Turkey was a special case because it did not border the USSR in Europe and it involved the Straits question. Litvinov either had a blind spot where Turkey was concerned or early on it was reserved for Molotov to handle. Litvinov had neglected to include it in his initial 18 March list of states that would confer. Molotov was negotiating directly with the President of Turkey as early as 15 April (Molotov to Chargé d' Affaires O. I. Nikitnikova, DVP, XXII, kn. 1, no. 225; Record of a Conversation, Nikitnikova with President Ismet Inönü and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sükrü Saracoglu, 16 April, ibid., no. 227). In the counterproposal of 17 April, Molotov had substituted his formulation respecting Turkey for Litvinov's softer one, which was intended to avoid the appearance of an ultimatum (ibid., fn., p. 283).
117. Turkey was a special case because it did not border the USSR in Europe and it involved the Straits question. Litvinov either had a blind spot where Turkey was concerned or early on it was reserved for Molotov to handle. Litvinov had neglected to include it in his initial 18 March list of states that would confer. Molotov was negotiating directly with the President of Turkey as early as 15 April (Molotov to Chargé d' Affaires O. I. Nikitnikova, DVP, XXII, kn. 1, no. 225; Record of a Conversation, Nikitnikova with President Ismet Inönü and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sükrü Saracoglu, 16 April, ibid., no. 227). In the counterproposal of 17 April, Molotov had substituted his formulation respecting Turkey for Litvinov's softer one, which was intended to avoid the appearance of an ultimatum (ibid., fn., p. 283).
118. Soviet war plans, approved by Stalin in 1938 and carried over into 1939, assumed that the USSR had to be prepared for war on two fronts: in the West against Nazi Germany, Italy and Poland, and the states gravitating to this core - Romania, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - and in the East against Japan. The most immediate and greatest danger lay in the West. The moment a critical situation developed, Lithuania would be occupied by Germany and Poland. The armies of the three Baltic countries and Finland might be utilised by Germany for a concentrated strike on Leningrad to cut it off from the rest of the country (M. V. Zakharov, General'nyi Shtab v predvoennye gody (Moscow, 1989), pp. 126-128). Zakharov omitted any reference to the position Britain and France might take. Also see Cynthia Roberts, 'Planning for War. The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941 ', Europe-Asia Studies, 47, 8, 1995, pp. 1293-1295 and 1314-1315.
119. Soviet war plans, approved by Stalin in 1938 and carried over into 1939, assumed that the USSR had to be prepared for war on two fronts: in the West against Nazi Germany, Italy and Poland, and the states gravitating to this core - Romania, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - and in the East against Japan. The most immediate and greatest danger lay in the West. The moment a critical situation developed, Lithuania would be occupied by Germany and Poland. The armies of the three Baltic countries and Finland might be utilised by Germany for a concentrated strike on Leningrad to cut it off from the rest of the country (M. V. Zakharov, General'nyi Shtab v predvoennye gody (Moscow, 1989), pp. 126-128). Zakharov omitted any reference to the position Britain and France might take. Also see Cynthia Roberts, 'Planning for War. The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941 ', Europe-Asia Studies, 47, 8, 1995, pp. 1293-1295 and 1314-1315.
120. 'Posetiteli', pp. 35-36.
121. Maisky's spare account remains the major source on these consultations, but he offered few details. Ivan Maisky, Vospominaniya Sovetskogo Posla, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1964), 2, pp. 466-467; also his Who Helped Hitler? pp. 120-121.
122. Maisky's spare account remains the major source on these consultations, but he offered few details. Ivan Maisky, Vospominaniya Sovetskogo Posla, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1964), 2, pp. 466-467; also his Who Helped Hitler? pp. 120-121.
123. Surits to Litvinov, 18 April, SPE, I, no. 240; Surits to Litvinov, 25 April, ibid., nos 252-253; Surits to Litvinov, 29 April, ibid., I, no. 261 and Draft Agreement… 29 April, ibid., no. 262; Surits to Litvinov, 29 April, ibid., 263.
124. Surits to Litvinov, 18 April, SPE, I, no. 240; Surits to Litvinov, 25 April, ibid., nos 252-253; Surits to Litvinov, 29 April, ibid., I, no. 261 and Draft Agreement… 29 April, ibid., no. 262; Surits to Litvinov, 29 April, ibid., 263.
125. Surits to Litvinov, 18 April, SPE, I, no. 240; Surits to Litvinov, 25 April, ibid., nos 252-253; Surits to Litvinov, 29 April, ibid., I, no. 261 and Draft Agreement… 29 April, ibid., no. 262; Surits to Litvinov, 29 April, ibid., 263.
126. Surits to Litvinov, 18 April, SPE, I, no. 240; Surits to Litvinov, 25 April, ibid., nos 252-253; Surits to Litvinov, 29 April, ibid., I, no. 261 and Draft Agreement… 29 April, ibid., no. 262; Surits to Litvinov, 29 April, ibid., 263.
127. Merekalov to Litvinov, 12 January, Gk, I, no. 110; Merekalov Diary, entry, 1 March, DVP, XXII, I, no. 116.
128. Merekalov to Litvinov, 12 January, Gk, I, no. 110; Merekalov Diary, entry, 1 March, DVP, XXII, I, no. 116.
129. Merekalov reported Weizsäcker as having said: 'Germany has fundamental political differences with the USSR. Nevertheless, Germany wants to develop economic relations with [the USSR]' (Merekalov to Litvinov, 18 April, Gk, I, no. 279). Weizsäcker reported Merekalov as having stated that ideological differences should not affect Soviet-German relations. As far as Russia was concerned, 'there was no reason why she should not live on a normal footing with us [Germany], and out of normal relations could grow increasingly improved relations' (Memorandum by State Secretary Weizsäcker, 17 April, DGFP, VI, no. 215).
130. 'Directive by the Führer', Berlin, 11 April 1939, ibid., no. 185, pp. 224-225, fn. 3. Russian Federation intelligence historians claim that Soviet foreign intelligence had learned of Hitler's directive and speedily reported it to the Soviet leadership. In negotiating with the British and French military delegations in 1939, the Soviet side knew that 'Plan Weiss' had already been signed and the fate of Poland sealed (O. I. Nazhestkin, 'Groznye Vesti iz Varshavy', in E. M. Primakov (ed.), Ocherki istorii Rossiiskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, six vols, vol. 3, 1933-1941 (Moscow, 1997), p. 290).
131. 'Directive by the Führer', Berlin, 11 April 1939, ibid., no. 185, pp. 224-225, fn. 3. Russian Federation intelligence historians claim that Soviet foreign intelligence had learned of Hitler's directive and speedily reported it to the Soviet leadership. In negotiating with the British and French military delegations in 1939, the Soviet side knew that 'Plan Weiss' had already been signed and the fate of Poland sealed (O. I. Nazhestkin, 'Groznye Vesti iz Varshavy', in E. M. Primakov (ed.), Ocherki istorii Rossiiskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, six vols, vol. 3, 1933-1941 (Moscow, 1997), p. 290).
132. Lev Bezymensky, 'Dvenadtsat' Minut iz zhizni Posla Merekalova', Novoe vremya, 1996, 7, p. 45. Bezymensky based this account on the notes left by Merekalov, who died in 1983, and the recollections of the ambassador's son, who died in 1992. This hazy account must be checked against the reports Merekalov had filed from Berlin. Despite the promising signs emanating from Berlin, Moscow did not return Merekalov to Berlin, although Berlin had asked Moscow when he might be expected back (Memorandum, Weizsäcker, 25 May, DGFP, VI, no. 437). Merekalov retained the title of Ambassador to Germany until 2 September. His absence left it to the far more capable Acting Chargé d'Affaires Georgii Astakhov in Berlin to test and foster Germany's readiness to improve relations with the USSR.
133. According to Maisky, on 27 April (sic) he and Litvinov were summoned by Stalin and Molotov to explain why Maisky en route to Moscow had without specific authorisation paid a routine courtesy call on Finnish Foreign Minister Eljas Erkkö in Helsinki, news of which had leaked to the press. At this Kremlin hearing Molotov turned violent, accusing Litvinov of every kind of mortal sin. Stalin, barely containing his rancour, castigated Litvinov for supposedly letting his associates get out of hand (Sheinis, pp. 362-363).
134. Maisky to Litvinov, 29 April, Gk, 1, no. 303; Halifax to Seeds, 29 April, DBFP, V, no. 316.
135. 'Communication du Départment à l'Ambassade d'U.R.S.S. à Paris, April 29, 1939', DDF, XV no. 523; English translation, SPE, vol. 1, no. 262.
136. 'Communication du Départment à l'Ambassade d'U.R.S.S. à Paris, April 29, 1939', DDF, XV no. 523; English translation, SPE, vol. 1, no. 262.
137. Surits to Litvinov, 29 April, SPE, I, no. 263.
138. Seeds to Halifax, 3 May, DBFP, V, no. 344.
139. Litvinov to Stalin, 3 May, DVP, 1, no. 267.
140. R. A. C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, pp. 224-226. The central issue, Chamberlain observed (19 April), was how the Soviet counteroffer might be most diplomatically rejected (Robert Manne, 'The British Decision', Journal of Contemporary History, 8, 1974, p. 19).
141. R. A. C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, pp. 224-226. The central issue, Chamberlain observed (19 April), was how the Soviet counteroffer might be most diplomatically rejected (Robert Manne, 'The British Decision', Journal of Contemporary History, 8, 1974, p. 19).
142. 'Posetiteli', p. 36.
143. Vladimir Sokolov, 'People's Commissar Maxim Litvinov', International Affairs (Moscow), May 1991, p. 103.
144. Seeds to Halifax, 4 May, DBFP, V, no. 353.
145. A propos, Litvinov in a small gathering of close party comrades once reportedly said about Stalin: 'He will twist Eastern rulers, all those Shahs, and other despots around his little finger. But the Western world, Western politics are beyond his ken. He can't cope with such polities' (Sheinis, p. 370).
146. Hitler, in a major foreign policy speech to the Reichstag on 28 April, assailed the democracies and Poland but studiously refrained from his stock anti-Soviet invective (Norman H. Baynes (ed.), The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, 2 vols (New York, 1942), vol. 2, pp. 1605-1663). He did however make a few digs at Soviet Russia in passing (ibid., pp. 1612 and 1636).
147. Hitler, in a major foreign policy speech to the Reichstag on 28 April, assailed the democracies and Poland but studiously refrained from his stock anti-Soviet invective (Norman H. Baynes (ed.), The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, 2 vols (New York, 1942), vol. 2, pp. 1605-1663). He did however make a few digs at Soviet Russia in passing (ibid., pp. 1612 and 1636).
148. Hours before the Pact was signed, Hitler said that in his step-by-step rapprochement with Russia, 'Litvinov's replacement was decisive' ('Unsigned Memorandum, August 22, 1939. Speech by the Führer to the Commanders-in-Chief on August 22', DCFP, VII, no. 192, p. 204).