Russian Archival Revelations and Our Understanding of the Cold War

Diplomatic History

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 217-228

  Haslam, Jonathan ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0041166643     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0145-2096.00065     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Contemporary Documentation: director, Dr. Kiril Andersen; ul. Pushkinskaia 15, 103009, Moscow, Russian Federation.
2. Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation: director, Dr. Tomilina; ul. Il'inka 12, 103132, Moscow, Russian Federation.
3. Formerly Alexei Filatov, who moved on to manage the campaign for Yeltsin's reelection.
4. Vladimir K. Bukovsky, Jugement à Moscou: un dissident dans les archives du Kremlin [Judgment at Moscow: A dissident in the Kremlin archives] (Paris, 1995).
5. Giuliano Procacci, ed., Grant Adibeko et al., coeds., The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences, 1947/1948/1949 (Milan, 1994).
6. The first results of these arrangements: J. Costello and O. Tsarev, Deadly Illusions: The KGB Orlov Dossier Reveals Stalin's Master Spy (New York, 1993).
7. S. Stephashin et al., eds., Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine: Sbornik dokumentov [State security organs of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War: A collection of documents], vol. 1, noiabr' 1938-dekabr' 1940 [November 1938-December 1940] and vol. 2, I ianvaria 21-iiunia 1941 [1 January - 21 June 1941] (Moscow, 1995).
8. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions. This was written largely from KGB files.
9. Pavel and Anatoli S. Sudoplatov, with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schechter, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness: A Soviet Spymaster (Boston, 1994); Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends (London, 1994).
10. Pavel and Anatoli S. Sudoplatov, with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schechter, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness: A Soviet Spymaster (Boston, 1994); Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends (London, 1994).
11. For the controversy: Cold War International History Project [CWIHP] Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994) and 5 (Spring 1995).
12. For the controversy: Cold War International History Project [CWIHP] Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994) and 5 (Spring 1995).
13. Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva: Vospominaniia diplomata, Sovetnika A.A. Gromyko, pomoshchnika L.I. Brezhneva, IU.V. Andropova, K.U. Chernenko, i M.S. Gorbacheva [From Kollontai to Gorbachev: Memoirs of a diplomat, adviser to A. A. Gromyko, aide to L. I. Brezhnev, IU. V. Andropov, K. U. Chernenko, and M. S. Gorbachev] (Moscow, 1994), 43-44.
14. For a summary of the evidence see Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933-41: Moscow, Tokyo, and the Prelude to the Pacific War (Pittsburgh, 1992), 16-17.
15. Author interviews with Vladimir Yerofeev, 25 June-2 July 1995, Cambridge, England.
16. Anatoly F. Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986) (New York, 1995), 27.
17. G. Adibekov, Kominform i poslevoennaia Evropa [The Cominform and postwar Europe] (Moscow, 1994), 19.
18. Jonathan Haslam, "Le valutazioni di Stalin sulla probabilità della guerra (1945-1953)" [Stalin's assessment of the probability of war (1945-1953)], in L'età dello stalinismo [The Stalinist era], ed. A. Natoli and S. Pons (Rome, 1991), 279-97.
19. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven, 1995).
20. CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 5.
21. Ibid., 13.
22. Vincent Auriol, Journal du Septennat, 1947-1954 [Presidential diaries, 1947-1954], vol. 2, 1948 (Paris, 1974), 189.
23. Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (Cambridge, MA, 1963).
24. Although Bruce Cumings claims the question as to who started the Korean War cannot be answered, the release from Moscow of documents showing that together the North Koreans and the Russians planned and executed the surprise attack shows otherwise, and in some detail. And Cumings's injudicious assumption that Yakov Malik was telling the truth at the subsequent UN debates and his references to U.S. "disinformation" indicate too much credulity vis-à-vis the original Soviet and North Korean versions of events. See Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, 1990), 619, 571. The Soviet documentation appears in part in CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996).
25. Although Bruce Cumings claims the question as to who started the Korean War cannot be answered, the release from Moscow of documents showing that together the North Koreans and the Russians planned and executed the surprise attack shows otherwise, and in some detail. And Cumings's injudicious assumption that Yakov Malik was telling the truth at the subsequent UN debates and his references to U.S. "disinformation" indicate too much credulity vis-à-vis the original Soviet and North Korean versions of events. See Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, 1990), 619, 571. The Soviet documentation appears in part in CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996).
26. Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 513.
27. Ibid., 15.
28. Gerard Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (New York, 1980).
29. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, 1982).
30. Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York, 1975), and Sphinx and Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World (London, 1978).
31. Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York, 1975), and Sphinx and Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World (London, 1978).
32. Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: Soviet-American Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, 1985), and The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, 1994).
33. Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: Soviet-American Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, 1985), and The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, 1994).
34. Andrei Gromyko, Memories (London, 1989).
35. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva, 68.
36. Ibid., 69.
37. Ibid., 249.
38. P. Pikhoia, "Chekhoslovakiia, 1968 god. Vzgliad iz Moskvy: po dokumentam TsK KPSS" [Czechoslovakia, 1968. The view from Moscow: From CPSU Central Committee Documents], Novaia i noveishaia istoriia [Modern and contemporary history] 1995, no. 3, 34-48.
39. For Grechko's struggle with Brezhnev see Dobrynin, In Confidence, 394. For differences with Gromyko see Viktor L. Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin during the Yom Kippur War (University Park, PA, 1995), 143-44.
40. For Grechko's struggle with Brezhnev see Dobrynin, In Confidence, 394. For differences with Gromyko see Viktor L. Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin during the Yom Kippur War (University Park, PA, 1995), 143-44.
41. Dobrynin, In Confidence, 329, 427.
42. Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin.
43. Wojciech Jaruzelski, Les chaînes et le refuge: mémoires [Captivity and safety: Memoirs] (Paris, 1992), 236.
44. Bukovsky, Jugement, 383.
45. Anatolii Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-godov" [The "Brezhnev Doctrine" and the Polish crisis of the early 1980s], Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal [Military history journal] 9 (1972): 55.
46. Ibid., 56-57. This is for some reason a point that is played down in Mark Kramer's account of the crisis in the CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995): 118-25. He thereby inadvertently plays into the hands of Jaruzelski and friends, who are trying to legitimize the damage they did to Poland from 1981, an interpretation Bukovsky is most anxious to scotch.
47. Ibid., 56-57. This is for some reason a point that is played down in Mark Kramer's account of the crisis in the CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995): 118-25. He thereby inadvertently plays into the hands of Jaruzelski and friends, who are trying to legitimize the damage they did to Poland from 1981, an interpretation Bukovsky is most anxious to scotch.
48. Dobrynin, In Confidence, 500.
49. Anatolii Cherniaev, Shest' let s Gorbachevym: Po dnenikovym zapisiam [Six years with Gorbachev: Notes from a diary] (Moscow, 1993).
50. Yegor Ligachev, Zagadka Gorbacheva [The Gorbachev riddle] (Novosibirsk, 1992).
51. Shakhnazarov interview with the author, 6 May 1992.