Ike's hair-trigger: U.S. nuclear predelegation, 1953-60

Security Studies

Volumn 7, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 121-164

  Roman, Peter J ^a  

^a DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0039485279     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419808429360     Document Type: Review

References (175)

1. JCS to CINCAL [commander-in-chief, Alaskan Command], et al., JCS Message 915009, 14 December 1956, CCS 471.6, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group (RG) 218, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
2. The order was sent to SAC for information purposes only. See Headquarters USAF to CINCSAC, Message HQA042, 14 December 1956, B-58619 file, Top Secret series, General Curtis LeMay papers, Library of Congress (LOC), Washington, D.C.
3. See David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security 7 (1983): 48-49; Paul Braken, "Delegation of Nuclear Command Authority," in Managing Nuclear Operations, ed. Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles Zraket (Washington, D.C: Brookings, 1987), 352-72; Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Central of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 47-54.
4. See David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security 7 (1983): 48-49; Paul Braken, "Delegation of Nuclear Command Authority," in Managing Nuclear Operations, ed. Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles Zraket (Washington, D.C: Brookings, 1987), 352-72; Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Central of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 47-54.
5. See David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security 7 (1983): 48-49; Paul Braken, "Delegation of Nuclear Command Authority," in Managing Nuclear Operations, ed. Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles Zraket (Washington, D.C: Brookings, 1987), 352-72; Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Central of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 47-54.
6. This is recognized as the problem of "positive" versus "negative" control or "always/never." Command and control systems need to be able "always" to respond to an authorized order to act while "never" responding to an unauthorized one or accidentally. In reality, the tension between always and never forces civilian and military leaders to try to strike some balance between the two values. John D. Steinbruner, "Choices and Trade-offs," in Carter, Steinbruner, and Zraket, Managing Nuclear Operations, 535-54; Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, 12-28; Jordan Seng, "Less is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear Weapons States," Security Studies 6, no. 4 (summer 1997): 55-57.
7. This is recognized as the problem of "positive" versus "negative" control or "always/never." Command and control systems need to be able "always" to respond to an authorized order to act while "never" responding to an unauthorized one or accidentally. In reality, the tension between always and never forces civilian and military leaders to try to strike some balance between the two values. John D. Steinbruner, "Choices and Trade-offs," in Carter, Steinbruner, and Zraket, Managing Nuclear Operations, 535-54; Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, 12-28; Jordan Seng, "Less is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear Weapons States," Security Studies 6, no. 4 (summer 1997): 55-57.
8. This is recognized as the problem of "positive" versus "negative" control or "always/never." Command and control systems need to be able "always" to respond to an authorized order to act while "never" responding to an unauthorized one or accidentally. In reality, the tension between always and never forces civilian and military leaders to try to strike some balance between the two values. John D. Steinbruner, "Choices and Trade-offs," in Carter, Steinbruner, and Zraket, Managing Nuclear Operations, 535-54; Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, 12-28; Jordan Seng, "Less is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear Weapons States," Security Studies 6, no. 4 (summer 1997): 55-57.
9. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking, 1951), 458.
10. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, 47-54 and Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Acaidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993), 46-52.
11. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, 47-54 and Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Acaidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993), 46-52.
12. A major point of disagreement in the debate over the dangers of nuclear proliferation is whether the American experience will apply to new nuclear weapons states. Among the views on this are: Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organisations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995); Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no 4 (summer 1995): 695-753; Feaver, "Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management," Security Studies 4, no 4 (summer 1995): 754-72 ; David J. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security 21, no 3 (winter 1996/97): 87-119; Feaver, Sagan, and Karl, "Correspondence: Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security 22, no 2 (fall 1997): 185-207.
13. A major point of disagreement in the debate over the dangers of nuclear proliferation is whether the American experience will apply to new nuclear weapons states. Among the views on this are: Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organisations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995); Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no 4 (summer 1995): 695-753; Feaver, "Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management," Security Studies 4, no 4 (summer 1995): 754-72 ; David J. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security 21, no 3 (winter 1996/97): 87-119; Feaver, Sagan, and Karl, "Correspondence: Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security 22, no 2 (fall 1997): 185-207.
14. A major point of disagreement in the debate over the dangers of nuclear proliferation is whether the American experience will apply to new nuclear weapons states. Among the views on this are: Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organisations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995); Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no 4 (summer 1995): 695-753; Feaver, "Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management," Security Studies 4, no 4 (summer 1995): 754-72 ; David J. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security 21, no 3 (winter 1996/97): 87-119; Feaver, Sagan, and Karl, "Correspondence: Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security 22, no 2 (fall 1997): 185-207.
15. A major point of disagreement in the debate over the dangers of nuclear proliferation is whether the American experience will apply to new nuclear weapons states. Among the views on this are: Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organisations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995); Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no 4 (summer 1995): 695-753; Feaver, "Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management," Security Studies 4, no 4 (summer 1995): 754-72 ; David J. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security 21, no 3 (winter 1996/97): 87-119; Feaver, Sagan, and Karl, "Correspondence: Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security 22, no 2 (fall 1997): 185-207.
16. A major point of disagreement in the debate over the dangers of nuclear proliferation is whether the American experience will apply to new nuclear weapons states. Among the views on this are: Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organisations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995); Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no 4 (summer 1995): 695-753; Feaver, "Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management," Security Studies 4, no 4 (summer 1995): 754-72 ; David J. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security 21, no 3 (winter 1996/97): 87-119; Feaver, Sagan, and Karl, "Correspondence: Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security 22, no 2 (fall 1997): 185-207.
17. A major point of disagreement in the debate over the dangers of nuclear proliferation is whether the American experience will apply to new nuclear weapons states. Among the views on this are: Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organisations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995); Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no 4 (summer 1995): 695-753; Feaver, "Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management," Security Studies 4, no 4 (summer 1995): 754-72 ; David J. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security 21, no 3 (winter 1996/97): 87-119; Feaver, Sagan, and Karl, "Correspondence: Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security 22, no 2 (fall 1997): 185-207.
18. National Security Council, "Basic National Security Policy," NSC-162/2, 30 October 1953, in Foreign Relations of the United Slates (FRUS), 1952-1954, vol. 2, National Security Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1984), 593.
19. Samuel F. Wells Jr., "The Origins of Massive Retaliation," Political Science Quarterly 96 (1981): 34.
20. "Memorandum of Discussion at the 165th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, October 7, 1953," in FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 2, 532.
21. Ibid., 533. A week later the JCS chairman, Admiral Radford, asked Eisenhower at an NSC meeting if "the Joint Chiefs could plan on the use of atomic weapons in Korea in case of a resumption of hostilities...NSC 162 did not give a dear answer to this question." Both Eisenhower and Dulles believed nuclear weapons could be employed in Korea if war broke out again, but each raised the need to coordinate such actions with allies. Still, the JCS chairman seemed unsatisfied and told the NSC that "unless we could use these weapons in a blanket way, no possibility existed of significantly changing the present composition of our armed forces" (" Memorandum of Discussion at the 166th Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, October 13, 1953," in FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 2, 546-47).
22. Ibid., 533. A week later the JCS chairman, Admiral Radford, asked Eisenhower at an NSC meeting if "the Joint Chiefs could plan on the use of atomic weapons in Korea in case of a resumption of hostilities...NSC 162 did not give a dear answer to this question." Both Eisenhower and Dulles believed nuclear weapons could be employed in Korea if war broke out again, but each raised the need to coordinate such actions with allies. Still, the JCS chairman seemed unsatisfied and told the NSC that "unless we could use these weapons in a blanket way, no possibility existed of significantly changing the present composition of our armed forces" (" Memorandum of Discussion at the 166th Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, October 13, 1953," in FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 2, 546-47).
23. Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith to Eisenhower, memorandum, 3 December 1953, in FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 2, 608. Smith had served as Elsenhower's chief of staff during the Second World War.
24. Under Secretary of State Smith to Eisenhower, memorandum, 22 December 1953, Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog (DDQC), 1982, document number 1668 (subsequent references.from this collection will take the form of year/document number).
25. In approving the memo, Eisenhower deleted the words "undoubtedly" and "virtually" from the second sentence in the above quote, so that it now read: "In certain cases the use of nuclear weapons by the United States would be automatic." This policy was reaffirmed in early 1955.
26. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, chap. 7.
27. A 1953 NSC study reported that anti-aircraft guns and interceptors could destroy only 7 percent of the Soviet bombers. It estimated that 27 percent of Soviet bombers could be shot down in 1955. As a result, it believed that a Soviet attack could destroy 24 percent of U.S. nuclear forces at that time and 30 pecent of nuclear forces in 1955. NSC, "Summary Evaluation of the Net Capability of the USSR to Inflict Direct Injury on the United States Up to July 1,1955," 18 May 1953, NSC 140/1, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 2, 337-38.
28. Kenneth Shaffel, The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense, 1945-1960 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1991), chaps. 5-7; David Goldfischer, The Best Defense: Policy Alternatives for O.S. Nuclear Security from the 1950s to the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), chap. 4.
29. Kenneth Shaffel, The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense, 1945-1960 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1991), chaps. 5-7; David Goldfischer, The Best Defense: Policy Alternatives for O.S. Nuclear Security from the 1950s to the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), chap. 4.
30. In September 1953 a NSC report on continental defense argued that "all possible efforts should be made to expedite the equipping of adequate forces with aircraft and missiles which will achieve a high 'kill ratio' before attacking forces reach our borders. These forces must not only be kept modern, but force levels may have to be increased consistent with any significant increase in Soviet capabilities" (NSC, "Continental Defense," 25 September 1953, NSC 159/4, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 2, 485).
31. Shaffel, The Emerging Shield, 233-34; and Chuck Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (New York: Orion, 1988), 176.
32. Shaffel, The Emerging Shield, 233-34; and Chuck Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (New York: Orion, 1988), 176.
33. Shaffel, The Emerging Shield, 234; and Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 176.
34. Shaffel, The Emerging Shield, 234; and Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 176.
35. Lee DuBridge to Arthur Flemming, letter, 24 May 1954, DDC 1989/1730.
36. Memorandum, "Discussion at the 205th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 1, 1954," DDC 1986/2221. Also see "Conclusions and Recommendations," 30 March 1954, DDC 1990/2362. The AEC head, Admiral Robert Strauss, pointed to this weapon program when he argued to the NSC against any proposal for a nuclear test moratorium beyond the end of 1955: "We required a small megaton weapon for defense against hostile aircraft. Work on such a weapon was still in a primitive stage and would not be ready for a test until 1956. But, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testing such a weapon and adding it to our present family of weapons was almost indispensable" (Memorandum, "Discussion at the 203rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, June 23, 1954," DDC1986/2815).
37. Memorandum, "Discussion at the 205th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 1, 1954," DDC 1986/2221. Also see "Conclusions and Recommendations," 30 March 1954, DDC 1990/2362. The AEC head, Admiral Robert Strauss, pointed to this weapon program when he argued to the NSC against any proposal for a nuclear test moratorium beyond the end of 1955: "We required a small megaton weapon for defense against hostile aircraft. Work on such a weapon was still in a primitive stage and would not be ready for a test until 1956. But, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testing such a weapon and adding it to our present family of weapons was almost indispensable" (Memorandum, "Discussion at the 203rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, June 23, 1954," DDC1986/2815).
38. Memorandum, "Discussion at the 205th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 1, 1954," DDC 1986/2221. Also see "Conclusions and Recommendations," 30 March 1954, DDC 1990/2362. The AEC head, Admiral Robert Strauss, pointed to this weapon program when he argued to the NSC against any proposal for a nuclear test moratorium beyond the end of 1955: "We required a small megaton weapon for defense against hostile aircraft. Work on such a weapon was still in a primitive stage and would not be ready for a test until 1956. But, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testing such a weapon and adding it to our present family of weapons was almost indispensable" (Memorandum, "Discussion at the 203rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, June 23, 1954," DDC1986/2815).
39. Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, "Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack," 14 February 1955, DDC, 1986/documents 2238, 2239 (this document will henceforth be referred to as the "Killian Report"). The responses to the report by the departments and agencies is available in NSC, "Comments on the Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee," 8 June 1955, NSC 5522, NSC 5522 folder, NSC Policy Papers series, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 1952-61, White House Office, Eisenhower Library. I would like to thank Cargill Hall for providing me with this document.
40. Killian Report, 108.
41. According to the panel, these weapons would not pose any danger to the American public as long as they were not detonated at low altitudes. "If all the air defense weapons were actually fired, the total kilotonnage would be approximately that of a single strategic weapon. Thus, the radioactivity which would be added to the atmosphere by the use of the warheads is of no consequence at all" (Killian Report, 105, 107).
42. Killian Report, 108.
43. The only dispute over these recommendations arose over whether the State Department or Defense Department would conduct the negotiations with Canada. See NSC 5522, S-11.
44. The Soviets flew the same ten Bison bombers so that it would seem that there were twenty aircraft. The CIA concluded that as many as forty had been built in the previous year. This was reinforced by the debut of three Bear bombers at a July 1955 air show. See "Editorial Note," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. 19 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 78; Donald P. Steury, Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviel Strategic Forces, 1950-1983 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1996), 5-6.
45. The Soviets flew the same ten Bison bombers so that it would seem that there were twenty aircraft. The CIA concluded that as many as forty had been built in the previous year. This was reinforced by the debut of three Bear bombers at a July 1955 air show. See "Editorial Note," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. 19 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 78; Donald P. Steury, Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviel Strategic Forces, 1950-1983 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1996), 5-6.
46. "Memorandum of Discussion at the 250th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, D.C., 26 May 1955," FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 19, 82-83.
47. John Prados, The Soviet Estimate (New York: Dial, 1982), 42-43.
48. National Intelligence Estimate, "Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and the Free World," 14 June 1955, NIE 100-5-55, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 19, 85-86.
49. General Nathan Twining to Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 15 June 1955, "Subject: UNCAP REPEAT UNCAP COMMAND POST EXERCISE MESSAGE-Directive to the Atomic Energy Commission for Making Available to the Department of Defense, for Pickup upon Demand, Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Components of Atomic Weapons," CCS 381, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives. Other JCS messages for Operation Alert are contained in this file.
50. Lewis Strauss and Reuben Robertson to Eisenhower, letter, 23 March 1956, DDQC, 1983/141.
51. Joint Strategic Plans Committee to Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum, 13 November 1956, "Implementation of Decisions Made By the Joint Chiefs of Staff at National Emergency After Duty Hours Telephonic Conference," JCS 1851/110, CCS 381, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives.
52. Joint Strategic Plans Committee to Joint Chiefs of Staff, report, 16 October 1956, "AEC-DOD Agreement," JCS 2019/198, CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives.
53. In the spring of 1956, the CIA projected Soviet bomber strength at 1,145 aircraft: 760 Bulls, 310 Badgers, 40 Bison, and 35 Bear. The Bull was similar to the B-29, while the Badger was similar to the BAT. This intelligence estimate discussed in depth the problems the Soviets would have launching an attack due to aircraft range, air-to-air refueling, and base location. National Intelligence Estimate, "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US and Key Overseas Installations and Forces Through Mid-1959," 6 March 1956, NIE 11-56, in Steury, Intentions and Capabilitits, 9-37.
54. "Memorandum of Discussion at the 277th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 27, 1956," and NSC, "Basic National Security Policy," 15 March 1956, NSC 5602/1. Both documents located in FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 19, 201-18,246.
55. "Memorandum of Discussion at the 277th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 27, 1956," and NSC, "Basic National Security Policy," 15 March 1956, NSC 5602/1. Both documents located in FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 19, 201-18,246.
56. Special Assistant to Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy, memorandum for file, 2 April 1956, "Subject: Policy on Use of Atomic Weapons"; and Defense Secretary Wilson to Secretary John Foster Dulles, letter, 5 April 1956. Both documents available in Department of State Decimal files, 1955-1959, 711, Record Group 59, National Archives. These documents are also part of a collection of documents made available by the National Security Archive.
57. A 1962 document defined "Warning Red" as "attack by hostile aircraft/missiles upon the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, or Greenland is imminent or taking place." "Warning Yellow" existed when "Attack by hostile aircraft/missiles is probable" (quoted in Sagan, The Limits of Safety, 64-65).
58. Strauss and Robertson to Eisenhower, letter, 23 March 1956.
59. Eisenhower to Strauss, letter, 4 April 1956, DDQC, 1982/662.
60. The seven CINCs were the commanders of the Alaska, Atlantic, European, Far East, Pacific, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, and Strategic Air Commands. In 1957 the JCS revised this order by "directing" the CINCs to declare a Defense Emergency if such circumstances existed. This took away any chance that a CINC would interpret the order as giving him any discretion in the matter. "Atomic Energy Commission-Department of Defense Memorandum of Understanding for the Transfer of Atomic Weapons," 4 May 1956, DDC, 1992/71.
61. Brig. General Wentworth to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, et al., memorandum, 14 December 1956, "Subject: Procedures for the Emergency Transfer of Atomic Weapons," CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives . For more on the code word and notification system, see Colonel Joseph Russell, memorandum for record, 4 September 1956, "Subject: Air Force Notification Procedures for Transfer of Atomic Weapons," DDC, 1992/72.
62. Brig. General Wentworth to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, et al., memorandum, 14 December 1956, "Subject: Procedures for the Emergency Transfer of Atomic Weapons," CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives . For more on the code word and notification system, see Colonel Joseph Russell, memorandum for record, 4 September 1956, "Subject: Air Force Notification Procedures for Transfer of Atomic Weapons," DDC, 1992/72.
63. Joint Strategic Plans Committee to Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum, 14 December 1956, "Authorization for Use of Atomic Weapons in Air Defense," JCS 2019/208, CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives.
64. "Chronological Status of Rules of Engagement for Interception and Engagement of Hostile Aircraft," attachment to Donald Quarles to the Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 6 November 1956, "Subject: Rules of Engagement (Air Defense)," 1956 Top Secret Material folder, Nathan Twining papers, LOC. See also Scott Sagan, "Rules of Engagement," in Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management, ed. Alexander George (Boulder: Westview, 1991), 443-70.
65. "Chronological Status of Rules of Engagement for Interception and Engagement of Hostile Aircraft," attachment to Donald Quarles to the Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 6 November 1956, "Subject: Rules of Engagement (Air Defense)," 1956 Top Secret Material folder, Nathan Twining papers, LOC. See also Scott Sagan, "Rules of Engagement," in Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management, ed. Alexander George (Boulder: Westview, 1991), 443-70.
66. The rules defined a "hostile aircraft" as any aircraft which: (1) Commits a hostile act. (2) Within the sovereign boundaries, of the United States bears the military insignia of the USSR, unless it has proper clearance or is obviously in distress. (3) Is declared "hostile" when the aircraft is considered manifestly hostile in intent. Aircraft may be considered "manifestly hostile in intent" when: (a) The pattern or actions of incoming unidentified aircraft indicate beyond a reasonable doubt that a hostile raid is in progress. (b) Aircraft not properly cleared or not obviously in distress are observed in a Coastal ADIZ and it is ascertained beyond a reasonable doubt that they have hostile intentions against the United States.... (c) Current evaluated intelligence is available which indicates that aircraft are airborne and en route toward the United States with obvious intention of at-tacking targets within the United States. The CADIZs stretched out several hundred miles from the coast of the United States over international waters. Draft, "Intercept and Engagement Instructions," 26 October 1954 revision, enclosure to Air Force Chief of Staff to Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum, 25 August 1954, "Proposed Intercept and Engagement Instructions," JCS 2084/42, CCS 373.24, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives.
67. The rules defined a "hostile aircraft" as any aircraft which: (1) Commits a hostile act. (2) Within the sovereign boundaries, of the United States bears the military insignia of the USSR, unless it has proper clearance or is obviously in distress. (3) Is declared "hostile" when the aircraft is considered manifestly hostile in intent. Aircraft may be considered "manifestly hostile in intent" when: (a) The pattern or actions of incoming unidentified aircraft indicate beyond a reasonable doubt that a hostile raid is in progress. (b) Aircraft not properly cleared or not obviously in distress are observed in a Coastal ADIZ and it is ascertained beyond a reasonable doubt that they have hostile intentions against the United States.... (c) Current evaluated intelligence is available which indicates that aircraft are airborne and en route toward the United States with obvious intention of at-tacking targets within the United States. The CADIZs stretched out several hundred miles from the coast of the United States over international waters. Draft, "Intercept and Engagement Instructions," 26 October 1954 revision, enclosure to Air Force Chief of Staff to Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum, 25 August 1954, "Proposed Intercept and Engagement Instructions," JCS 2084/42, CCS 373.24, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives.
68. G. W. Anderson to Admiral Radford, memorandum, 27 June 1955, "Subject: Intercept and Engagement Instructions," CJCS 373.24, Chairman's records, RG 218, National Archives.
69. Joint Strategic Plans Committee to Joint Chiefs of Staff, report, 25 January 1955, "Procedures in the Event of Attack," JCS 2084/45, CCS 373.24,JCS records, RG 218, National Archives . Draft, "Informal Views Reflecting Joint Staff Thinking on U.S. Action in the Event of Unprovoked Communist Attack Against U.S. Personnel, Aircraft or Vessels," enclosure to Lt. General Mathewson to Bg. General Bonesteel, memorandum, 21 February 1955, "Subject: U.S. Action in the Event of Unprovoked Communist Attack Against U.S. Personnel, Aircraft or Vessels," CCS 373,24, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives.
70. Joint Strategic Plans Committee to Joint Chiefs of Staff, report, 25 January 1955, "Procedures in the Event of Attack," JCS 2084/45, CCS 373.24,JCS records, RG 218, National Archives . Draft, "Informal Views Reflecting Joint Staff Thinking on U.S. Action in the Event of Unprovoked Communist Attack Against U.S. Personnel, Aircraft or Vessels," enclosure to Lt. General Mathewson to Bg. General Bonesteel, memorandum, 21 February 1955, "Subject: U.S. Action in the Event of Unprovoked Communist Attack Against U.S. Personnel, Aircraft or Vessels," CCS 373,24, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives.
71. Joint Strategic Plans Committee to Joint Chiefs of Staff, report, 25 January 1955, "Procedures in the Event of Attack," JCS 2084/45, CCS 373.24,JCS records, RG 218, National Archives . Draft, "Informal Views Reflecting Joint Staff Thinking on U.S. Action in the Event of Unprovoked Communist Attack Against U.S. Personnel, Aircraft or Vessels," enclosure to Lt. General Mathewson to Bg. General Bonesteel, memorandum, 21 February 1955, "Subject: U.S. Action in the Event of Unprovoked Communist Attack Against U.S. Personnel, Aircraft or Vessels," CCS 373,24, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives.
72. Memorandum, "Subject: Discussion at the 283rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 3, 1956," 4 May 1956, DDC, 1987/1614. General Twining to the Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 1 May 1956, "Subject: U.S. Action in the Event of Unprovoked Communist Attack Against U.S. Aircraft (NSC 5604)," CCS 373.24, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives. NSC 5604 remains classified. Circumstantial evidence, however, indicates that it was very similar to the Joint Staff paper.
73. Memorandum, "Subject: Discussion at the 283rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 3, 1956," 4 May 1956, DDC, 1987/1614. General Twining to the Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 1 May 1956, "Subject: U.S. Action in the Event of Unprovoked Communist Attack Against U.S. Aircraft (NSC 5604)," CCS 373.24, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives. NSC 5604 remains classified. Circumstantial evidence, however, indicates that it was very similar to the Joint Staff paper.
74. "Chronology of Status of Rules of Engagement for Interception and Engagement of Hostile Aircraft."
75. Radford to Wilson, memorandum, 2 October 1956, "Subject: Policy Regarding the Use of Atomic Weapons," enclosure to Joint Secretaries to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 October 1956, "Policy Regarding the Use of Atomic Weapons," JCS 2019/196, CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives . The weapon system had its only test in July 1957. Shaffel, The Emerging Shield, 234-35. Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 177.
76. Radford to Wilson, memorandum, 2 October 1956, "Subject: Policy Regarding the Use of Atomic Weapons," enclosure to Joint Secretaries to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 October 1956, "Policy Regarding the Use of Atomic Weapons," JCS 2019/196, CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives . The weapon system had its only test in July 1957. Shaffel, The Emerging Shield, 234-35. Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 177.
77. Radford to Wilson, memorandum, 2 October 1956, "Subject: Policy Regarding the Use of Atomic Weapons," enclosure to Joint Secretaries to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 October 1956, "Policy Regarding the Use of Atomic Weapons," JCS 2019/196, CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives . The weapon system had its only test in July 1957. Shaffel, The Emerging Shield, 234-35. Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 177.
78. Radford to Wilson, memorandum, 2 October 1956, "Subject: Policy Regarding the Use of Atomic Weapons," enclosure to Joint Secretaries to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 October 1956, "Policy Regarding the Use of Atomic Weapons," JCS 2019/196, CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives . The weapon system had its only test in July 1957. Shaffel, The Emerging Shield, 234-35. Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 177.
79. Radford added that "This action will not remove the need for approval of rules to apply to areas beyond the sovereign boundaries, which include the sea approaches to the United States, and to the land areas of Canada" (Radford to Wilson, memorandum, 2 October 1956).
80. The CADIZs extended several hundred miles from United States borders over international waters. Because the CADIZs extended beyond the three-mile territorial limit, ROE for these areas required State Department concurrence. For a description of the CADIZs, see Shaffel, The Emerging Shield, 134.
81. Among the objectives Loper listed were: Avoid where possible the use of limiting expressions, that is, three-mile limit, that would restrict freedom of action in the areas of air defense concern to the United States such as the Coastal ADIZs. Be consistent and meaningful for all areas where the United States exercises sovereignty including such areas as the Panama Canal. (Loper to Radford, memorandum, 29 October 1956, "Subject: The Use of Atomic Weapons," CJCS 381, Chairman's files, RG 218, National Archives).
82. Radford to Wilson, memorandum, 1 November 1956, "Subject: The Use of Atomic Weapons," and Chairman's Staff Group to Radford, 2 November 1956, "Subject: The Use of Atomic Weapons," both located in CJCS 381, Chairman's files, RG 218, National Archives.
83. Radford to Wilson, memorandum, 1 November 1956, "Subject: The Use of Atomic Weapons," and Chairman's Staff Group to Radford, 2 November 1956, "Subject: The Use of Atomic Weapons," both located in CJCS 381, Chairman's files, RG 218, National Archives.
84. JCS to CINCAL, et al., 14 December 1956, JCS Message 915009. Joint Strategic Plans Committee to Joint Chiefs of Staff, report, 14 December 1956, "Authorization for Use of Atomic Weapons in Air Defense," JCS 2019/208, CCS 471.6, JCS records, National Archives.
85. JCS to CINCAL, et al., 14 December 1956, JCS Message 915009. Joint Strategic Plans Committee to Joint Chiefs of Staff, report, 14 December 1956, "Authorization for Use of Atomic Weapons in Air Defense," JCS 2019/208, CCS 471.6, JCS records, National Archives.
86. One DOD goal for the ROE was that it "Serve as a model for other areas of air defense concern to the United States such as Canada, Greenland, etc." (Loper to Radford, memorandum, 29 October 1956). In August 1957 the military requested that the State Department open negotiations with Greenland so that nuclear weapons could be brought to the base at Thule. It is likely this was done with the Genie rocket in mind. "Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting Held in Room 2E924, The Pentagon Building, on Friday, 9 August 1957 at 11:30 A.M," State-JCS meetings file, vol. 6, Lot 61 D 417, State Department records, RG 59, National Archives. Also sec: General Twining to Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 10 June 1960, "Subject: Ak Defense of Thule, Greenland," Chairman's memo file, Chairman's files, RG 218, National Archives; Colonel John Morrow to General Samford, memorandum, n.d., "Subject: Analysis of Soviet Air Activity in the Alaskan Area, 1 January 1953-22 June 1955," CJCS 373.24 file, Chairman's files, RG 218, National Archives.
87. One DOD goal for the ROE was that it "Serve as a model for other areas of air defense concern to the United States such as Canada, Greenland, etc." (Loper to Radford, memorandum, 29 October 1956). In August 1957 the military requested that the State Department open negotiations with Greenland so that nuclear weapons could be brought to the base at Thule. It is likely this was done with the Genie rocket in mind. "Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting Held in Room 2E924, The Pentagon Building, on Friday, 9 August 1957 at 11:30 A.M," State-JCS meetings file, vol. 6, Lot 61 D 417, State Department records, RG 59, National Archives. Also sec: General Twining to Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 10 June 1960, "Subject: Ak Defense of Thule, Greenland," Chairman's memo file, Chairman's files, RG 218, National Archives; Colonel John Morrow to General Samford, memorandum, n.d., "Subject: Analysis of Soviet Air Activity in the Alaskan Area, 1 January 1953-22 June 1955," CJCS 373.24 file, Chairman's files, RG 218, National Archives.
88. One DOD goal for the ROE was that it "Serve as a model for other areas of air defense concern to the United States such as Canada, Greenland, etc." (Loper to Radford, memorandum, 29 October 1956). In August 1957 the military requested that the State Department open negotiations with Greenland so that nuclear weapons could be brought to the base at Thule. It is likely this was done with the Genie rocket in mind. "Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting Held in Room 2E924, The Pentagon Building, on Friday, 9 August 1957 at 11:30 A.M," State-JCS meetings file, vol. 6, Lot 61 D 417, State Department records, RG 59, National Archives. Also sec: General Twining to Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 10 June 1960, "Subject: Ak Defense of Thule, Greenland," Chairman's memo file, Chairman's files, RG 218, National Archives; Colonel John Morrow to General Samford, memorandum, n.d., "Subject: Analysis of Soviet Air Activity in the Alaskan Area, 1 January 1953-22 June 1955," CJCS 373.24 file, Chairman's files, RG 218, National Archives.
89. Shaffel, The Emerging Shield, 250-52.
90. Memorandum, "President's Visit to Canada," 8 July 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 7, pt. 1, Western European Integration and Security; Canada (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 692-95.
91. Memorandum, "President's Visit to Canada," 8 July 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 7, pt. 1, Western European Integration and Security; Canada (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 692-95.
92. A 1958 NSC report stated: "The United States should be prepared to make nuclear components readily available for Canadian-manned and operated defense weapons and weapons systems, under U.S. custody as required under existing U.S. law, as soon as Canadian forces are capable of employing nuclear weapons in the defense of the North American continent....It is in the U.S. security interest to transfer to Canada at an appropriate time the custody of nuclear components for continental defense. To this end, necessary steps should be taken as soon as practicable to insure that the United States will be prepared to make such a transfer, with the understanding that employment by Canada of U.S.-provided nuclear components will be for mutually agreed continental defense purposes under agreed procedures consistent with U.S. Presidential directives for the expenditure of nuclear weapons by U.S. forces" ("Canadian Access to Nuclear Weapons in Peacetime," annex to NSC, "Certain Aspects of U.S. Relations with Canada," 30 December 1958, NSC 5822/1, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 7. pt. 1, 740-43).
93. General Thomas White, CSAF to Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations, memorandum, 21 September 1957; Major General Smart to General Tunner, memorandum, 24 September 1957; both located in Chief of Staff memos folder, White papers, LOC.
94. General Thomas Power, CINCSAC to General Thomas White, CSAF, letter, 21 May 1958; General Curtis LeMay, VCSAF to General Thomas Power, CINSAC, letter, 13 June 1958; both documents located in Command-SAC folder, White papers, LOC.
95. According to Scott Sagan, this type of accident could have occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Sagan, The Limits of Safety, 100-101.
96. Senior commanders might seek clarification of standing orders during a crisis, and thus lessen the potential dangers. This happened during the 1958 Berlin crisis when the CINC of the European Command requested that the JCS clarify his "hot pursuit" authority. JCS to Donald Quarles, memorandum, 12 September 1958, "Subject: USCINCEUR Air Contingency Plan Berlin," FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 7, Berlin Crisis, 1958-1959 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 40-42.
97. An unknown number of these overflights were only shallow penetrations of communist airspace. See R. Cargill Hall, "The Truth About Overflights," MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Mililary History 9 (1997): 24-39.
98. In a top secret address to the Air War College in April 1957, the Air Force commander in the Pacific, General Laurence Kuter displayed a map that showed the routes for about 12 PARPRO flights, which was "a typical month's operation." "Air Power in Limited War," 8 April 1957, Kuter papers, Air Force Academy Library (AFAL). JCS Chairman, General Twining, told State Department officials in fall 1958 that "We are now flying many more [PARPRO] missions than in the past" ("Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting Held in Room 2C923, The Pentagon Building, on Friday, 21 November 1958 at 11:30 A.M.," State-JCS meetings folder, vol. 6, lot 61 D 417, Department of State records, RG 59, National Archives). Also see Hall, "The Truth About Overflights."
99. In a top secret address to the Air War College in April 1957, the Air Force commander in the Pacific, General Laurence Kuter displayed a map that showed the routes for about 12 PARPRO flights, which was "a typical month's operation." "Air Power in Limited War," 8 April 1957, Kuter papers, Air Force Academy Library (AFAL). JCS Chairman, General Twining, told State Department officials in fall 1958 that "We are now flying many more [PARPRO] missions than in the past" ("Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting Held in Room 2C923, The Pentagon Building, on Friday, 21 November 1958 at 11:30 A.M.," State-JCS meetings folder, vol. 6, lot 61 D 417, Department of State records, RG 59, National Archives). Also see Hall, "The Truth About Overflights."
100. For example, the JCS sometimes suspended flights when tensions were high. Kuter to Twining, cable, 26 August 1956, Redline Messages 1956 folder, Twining papers, LOC.
101. General Twining told State Department officials in November 1958 that "We have lost at least 12 [PARPRO] aircraft, probably more, since the war. The loss of two of them could be considered our fault'." There is no elaboration of this intriguing information. "Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting Held in Room 2C923, The Pentagon Building, on Friday, November 21, 1958 at 11:30 A.M." One of these aircraft was shot down by the Chinese in August of 1956. Admiral Burke to General Twining, memorandum, 29 August 1956, "Subject: Location and Salvage of P4M," CJCS 373.24, Chairman's files, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives. A thirteenth aircraft, a C-130, was shot down near Armenia in early 1959. "Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting Held in Room 2C923, The Pentagon Building, on Wednesday, January 14, 1959, at 11:00 A.M.," State-JCS meetings folder, vol. 7, lot 61 D 417, State Department records, RG 59, National Archives. According to Cargill Hall, the services lost "some 170" members in PARPRO missions from 1946 to 1991. Hall, "The Truth About Overflights," 39.
102. General Twining told State Department officials in November 1958 that "We have lost at least 12 [PARPRO] aircraft, probably more, since the war. The loss of two of them could be considered our fault'." There is no elaboration of this intriguing information. "Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting Held in Room 2C923, The Pentagon Building, on Friday, November 21, 1958 at 11:30 A.M." One of these aircraft was shot down by the Chinese in August of 1956. Admiral Burke to General Twining, memorandum, 29 August 1956, "Subject: Location and Salvage of P4M," CJCS 373.24, Chairman's files, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives. A thirteenth aircraft, a C-130, was shot down near Armenia in early 1959. "Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting Held in Room 2C923, The Pentagon Building, on Wednesday, January 14, 1959, at 11:00 A.M.," State-JCS meetings folder, vol. 7, lot 61 D 417, State Department records, RG 59, National Archives. According to Cargill Hall, the services lost "some 170" members in PARPRO missions from 1946 to 1991. Hall, "The Truth About Overflights," 39.
103. General Twining told State Department officials in November 1958 that "We have lost at least 12 [PARPRO] aircraft, probably more, since the war. The loss of two of them could be considered our fault'." There is no elaboration of this intriguing information. "Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting Held in Room 2C923, The Pentagon Building, on Friday, November 21, 1958 at 11:30 A.M." One of these aircraft was shot down by the Chinese in August of 1956. Admiral Burke to General Twining, memorandum, 29 August 1956, "Subject: Location and Salvage of P4M," CJCS 373.24, Chairman's files, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives. A thirteenth aircraft, a C-130, was shot down near Armenia in early 1959. "Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting Held in Room 2C923, The Pentagon Building, on Wednesday, January 14, 1959, at 11:00 A.M.," State-JCS meetings folder, vol. 7, lot 61 D 417, State Department records, RG 59, National Archives. According to Cargill Hall, the services lost "some 170" members in PARPRO missions from 1946 to 1991. Hall, "The Truth About Overflights," 39.
104. General Twining told State Department officials in November 1958 that "We have lost at least 12 [PARPRO] aircraft, probably more, since the war. The loss of two of them could be considered our fault'." There is no elaboration of this intriguing information. "Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting Held in Room 2C923, The Pentagon Building, on Friday, November 21, 1958 at 11:30 A.M." One of these aircraft was shot down by the Chinese in August of 1956. Admiral Burke to General Twining, memorandum, 29 August 1956, "Subject: Location and Salvage of P4M," CJCS 373.24, Chairman's files, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives. A thirteenth aircraft, a C-130, was shot down near Armenia in early 1959. "Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting Held in Room 2C923, The Pentagon Building, on Wednesday, January 14, 1959, at 11:00 A.M.," State-JCS meetings folder, vol. 7, lot 61 D 417, State Department records, RG 59, National Archives. According to Cargill Hall, the services lost "some 170" members in PARPRO missions from 1946 to 1991. Hall, "The Truth About Overflights," 39.
105. General LeMay told State Department officials that "it was not necessary to warn the Soviets of our intention to return fire; they were fully aware that we intended to do so" ("Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting Held in Room 2C923, The Pentagon Building, on Friday, November 21,1958 at 11:30 A.M.").
106. LeMay did not give any further information on this incident. Ibid.
107. A number of routines developed around the PARPRO missions which may have reduced some of the potential dangers. These flights usually took place at regular intervals. Although the Soviets shot down some PARPRO flights, a much, much larger number were ignored. Further, there is, as of yet, no record of the Soviets pursuing PARPRO aircraft into U.S. airspace. Even if they had, there remains the question of whether an American commander would actually exercise his authority to use Genie rockets against Soviet fighters.
108. This is derived from "Draft: Authorization for the Expenditure of Atomic Weapons," appendix A to Admiral Radford to the Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 14 November 1956, "Subject: Authorization for the Expenditure of Atomic Weapons," CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives.
109. Appendix A to Radford to Defense Secretary, memorandum, 14 November 1956.
110. "A military commander may not know whether or not a major air or submarine assault in progress is being made with atomic weapons until too late for effective defense. The integration of nuclear weapons into the defensive weapons systems is rapidly reaching a point where great dependence is being placed upon them, particularly against air or submarine attack....The commanders of major deployed U.S. military forces normally should be prepared to defend their forces against major air or submarine assault with the weapons systems most suitable to the circumstances" (Radford to Defense Secretary, memorandum, 14 November 1956).
111. "Draft Implementing Instructions," Appendix B to Radford to Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 14 November 1956.
112. See "Authorization for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," Policy Planning Staff Records, 1957-1961, Lot 67D548, Record Group 59, National Archives.
113. Gerard Smith to Under Secretary of State, memorandum, 20 April 1957, "Subject: Report on Secretary Dulles' Meeting with Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford on Advance Presidential Authorization for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons - April 19,1957," Department of State Decimal Files, 1955-1959, 711.5611/4-2357, RG 59, National Archives.
114. European experts in the State Department believed that the draft order needed addi-tional revision. "The NATO nations would therefore consider this proposed action as being delegation to a relatively low level of military responsibility. In addition, it is believed that the proposed U.S. procedure might not long remain secret. This would create major public political issues in the NATO capitals which could seriously affect the alliance." Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to Secretary Dulles, memorandum, 22 April 1957, "Subject: Advanced Presidential authority for the expenditure of nuclear weapons," Department of State Decimal Files, 1955-1959, 711.5611/4-2259, RG 59, National Archives.
115. The remainder of this section remains classified in this document. A document from 1959, however, contains the exact same language and continues: "Retaliation for such attack, therefore, will be on order of the President, except in circumstances where immediate communications have become impossible between the President and responsible officials of the Department of Defense. In such circumstances [sanitized]." James Lay to Secretary of State, memorandum, 1 May 1957, "Subject Policy Regarding Use of Atomic Weapons," Department of State Decimal Files, 1955-1959, 711.5611/5/1957, RG 59, National Archives; and JCS to Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, memorandum, "Instructions for Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in Emergency Conditions," Atomic Weapons, Corr. and Background for Presidential Approval folder, Subject subseries, NSC series, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, DDEL.
116. The remainder of this section remains classified in this document. A document from 1959, however, contains the exact same language and continues: "Retaliation for such attack, therefore, will be on order of the President, except in circumstances where immediate communications have become impossible between the President and responsible officials of the Department of Defense. In such circumstances [sanitized]." James Lay to Secretary of State, memorandum, 1 May 1957, "Subject Policy Regarding Use of Atomic Weapons," Department of State Decimal Files, 1955-1959, 711.5611/5/1957, RG 59, National Archives; and JCS to Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, memorandum, "Instructions for Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in Emergency Conditions," Atomic Weapons, Corr. and Background for Presidential Approval folder, Subject subseries, NSC series, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, DDEL.
117. Robert Bowie and Gerard Smith to Secretary of State, memorandum, 15 May 1957, "Subject: Policy Regarding Use of Atomic Weapons," Department of State Decimal Files, 1955-1959, 711.5611/5-1557, RG 59, National Archives.
118. James Lay to Secretary of State, memorandum, 16 May 1957, "Subject: Policy Regarding Use of Atomic Weapons," Meetings, Records, Memoranda on Use of Nuclear Weapons Folder, Intelligence File, National Security File, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.
119. Vice-Admiral B. L Austin to JCS Chairman, memorandum, 27 March 1958, "Subject: Status of the 'Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons Under Special Circumstances,'" CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives.
120. "Comments on Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," annex to Col. Lyle to Director of Plans, letter, 10 August 1957, "Subject: Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," appendix to Air Force Chief of Staff to Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum, 13 August 1957, "Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons ," enclosure to Secretaries to Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum, 15 August 1957, "Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," JCS 2019/238. The head of the Caribbean Command wrote that "any detailed implementing instructions beyond those indicated...might hamper and delay a [commander's] decision and thereby lessen the effectiveness of the [authority] delegated" (CINC, Caribbean Command to Army Chief of Staff, message, 2 August 1957). Both documents located in CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives.
121. "Comments on Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," annex to Col. Lyle to Director of Plans, letter, 10 August 1957, "Subject: Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," appendix to Air Force Chief of Staff to Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum, 13 August 1957, "Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons ," enclosure to Secretaries to Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum, 15 August 1957, "Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," JCS 2019/238. The head of the Caribbean Command wrote that "any detailed implementing instructions beyond those indicated...might hamper and delay a [commander's] decision and thereby lessen the effectiveness of the [authority] delegated" (CINC, Caribbean Command to Army Chief of Staff, message, 2 August 1957). Both documents located in CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives.
122. "Comments on Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," annex to Col. Lyle to Director of Plans, letter, 10 August 1957, "Subject: Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," appendix to Air Force Chief of Staff to Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum, 13 August 1957, "Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons ," enclosure to Secretaries to Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum, 15 August 1957, "Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," JCS 2019/238. The head of the Caribbean Command wrote that "any detailed implementing instructions beyond those indicated...might hamper and delay a [commander's] decision and thereby lessen the effectiveness of the [authority] delegated" (CINC, Caribbean Command to Army Chief of Staff, message, 2 August 1957). Both documents located in CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives.
123. "Comments on Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," annex to Col. Lyle to Director of Plans, letter, 10 August 1957. CINC, Pacific Command to Chief of Naval Operations, message, 8 August 1957; CINC, European Command to Department of the Army, message, 19 August 1957; Admiral Jerauld Wright to CNO, memorandum, 5 August 1957, "Subject: Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," appendix to CNO to JCS, memorandum, 6 September 1957, "Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," enclosure to Secretaries to JCS, note, 10 September 1957, JCS 2019/245. AU documents located in CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives.
124. "Comments on Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," annex to Col. Lyle to Director of Plans, letter, 10 August 1957. CINC, Pacific Command to Chief of Naval Operations, message, 8 August 1957; CINC, European Command to Department of the Army, message, 19 August 1957; Admiral Jerauld Wright to CNO, memorandum, 5 August 1957, "Subject: Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," appendix to CNO to JCS, memorandum, 6 September 1957, "Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," enclosure to Secretaries to JCS, note, 10 September 1957, JCS 2019/245. AU documents located in CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives.
125. "Comments on Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," annex to Col. Lyle to Director of Plans, letter, 10 August 1957. CINC, Pacific Command to Chief of Naval Operations, message, 8 August 1957; CINC, European Command to Department of the Army, message, 19 August 1957; Admiral Jerauld Wright to CNO, memorandum, 5 August 1957, "Subject: Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," appendix to CNO to JCS, memorandum, 6 September 1957, "Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," enclosure to Secretaries to JCS, note, 10 September 1957, JCS 2019/245. AU documents located in CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives.
126. The problems of extended deterrence in Asia prompted a particularly strident cable from CINCPAC to CNO Arleigh Burke. He argued that the military needed "to hammer away on the vital need to stop pussy footing about use of atomic weapons. We have the weapons and everybody knows we have them yet there is not concret (sic) policy assurance that we will use them short of general war with Russia initiating their use....In personal conversations with 2 presidents, Diem and Chaing, they have insisted that we must use our atomic weapons capability, but they have both expressed disturbing doubts about our willingness to do so." CINCPAC to CNO, message, 29 August 1957, CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives.
127. See Peter J. Roman, "Curtis LeMay and the Origins of NATO Atomic Targeting." Journal of Strategic Studies 16 (March 1993): 48-52.
128. "Comments on Implementing Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons," annex to Col. Lyle to Director of Plans, letter, 10 August 1957.
129. Fred Kaplan reported in 1983 that, when Robert Sprague visited SAC in September 1957 as part of the Gaither Committee study, LeMay said that: '"If I see that the Russians are amassing their planes for an attack...I'm going to knock the shit out of them before they take off the ground'.... "But General LeMay', Sprague said, 'that's not national policy'. I don't care', LeMay replied. 'It's my policy. That's what I'm going to do'." According to Jerome Wiesner, a Gaither staff member present at the conversation, LeMay said: "But it's my job to make it possible for the president to change his policy." Since LeMay was no longer SAC commander, it is unclear whether he was actually present in Omaha or just if Kaplan got the day wrong. Despite this inconsistency, it is clear that LeMay could neither resist the urge to tweak the civilian experts nor inform the group of the ongoing delibera-tions over predelegation - his attempt to change Eisenhower's policy. Additionally, LeMay probably realized that if the Gaither Committee discovered problems in the ability of SAC to retaliate, its report would recommend additional money for SAC - which is exactly what happened. Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 134; and the Public Broadcasting System series War and Peace in the Nuclear Age broadcast in 1989. For an interesting perspective on LeMay and the responsibilities of the SAC commander, see Russell E. Dougherty, "The Psychological Climate of Nuclear Command," in Carter, Steinbruncr, and Zraket, Managing Nuclear Operations, 407-8.
130. Fred Kaplan reported in 1983 that, when Robert Sprague visited SAC in September 1957 as part of the Gaither Committee study, LeMay said that: '"If I see that the Russians are amassing their planes for an attack...I'm going to knock the shit out of them before they take off the ground'.... "But General LeMay', Sprague said, 'that's not national policy'. I don't care', LeMay replied. 'It's my policy. That's what I'm going to do'." According to Jerome Wiesner, a Gaither staff member present at the conversation, LeMay said: "But it's my job to make it possible for the president to change his policy." Since LeMay was no longer SAC commander, it is unclear whether he was actually present in Omaha or just if Kaplan got the day wrong. Despite this inconsistency, it is clear that LeMay could neither resist the urge to tweak the civilian experts nor inform the group of the ongoing delibera-tions over predelegation - his attempt to change Eisenhower's policy. Additionally, LeMay probably realized that if the Gaither Committee discovered problems in the ability of SAC to retaliate, its report would recommend additional money for SAC - which is exactly what happened. Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 134; and the Public Broadcasting System series War and Peace in the Nuclear Age broadcast in 1989. For an interesting perspective on LeMay and the responsibilities of the SAC commander, see Russell E. Dougherty, "The Psychological Climate of Nuclear Command," in Carter, Steinbruncr, and Zraket, Managing Nuclear Operations, 407-8.
131. General Thomas White, CSAF to General Thomas Power, CINCSAC, letter, 22 November 1957,1957 Top Secret General folder, White papers, LOC.
132. General Thomas Power, CINCSAC to General Thomas White, CSAF, letter, 21 October 1957,1957 Top Secret-General folder, White papers, LOC.
133. White wrote to Power "We look upon this paper as a first cut at the problem. We still consider that the President's instructions would permit specific delegation to your Air Force commanders" (White to Power, letter, 22 November 1957).
134. This is clear in the Navy's proposal for changes in one paragraph. "The delegation of authority to release retaliatory nuclear forces to a level below that of Secretary of Defense/JCS...is a short-term emergency measure which recognizes the possibility that the seat of government may be wiped out by surprise nuclear attack. Bearing in mind the catastrophic results of a massive nuclear exchange, however, the JCS believe it mandatory to insure that such delegated authority is not assumed through accident or misinformation. Therefore, they recommend that delegation of authority for retaliatory action to a level below that of Secretary of Defense, or the next official in the chain of responsibility acting in his name, be regarded as an interim authorization, effective until more positive steps to assure continuity of high-level control over retaliatory forces can be instituted. In the meantime, the problem of insuring such continuity will be prosecuted actively; the JCS will make further recommendation in the premise" (R. E. Libby to Director, Joint Staff, memorandum, 8 November 1957, "Subject: JSPC 903/883-Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons Under Special Circumstances," CCS 471.6, JCS records, RG 218, National Archives).
135. Vice-Admiral Austin to JCS Chairman, memorandum, 27 March 1958. The delay may have been caused by the advent of the Positive Control or "Fail-Safe" program which Eisenhower approved during this same time period.
136. The revised instructions grew in specificity and included hypothetical cases to guide commanders. James Lay to Gordon Gray, memorandum, 3 September 1958, "Subject: Analysis of Draft 'Implementing Instructions' submitted to the President for approval by letter from the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated August 23, 1958," AEC-Policy on Use folder, Briefing Notes subseries, NSC series, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, DDEL.
137. John S. D. Eisenhower, "Memorandum of conference with the President on December 19, 1958-2:30 pm," 31 December 1958, Staff Notes, December 1958 folder, DDE Diaries, Ann C. Whitman File, DDEL.
138. John S. D. Eisenhower, "Memorandum of conference with the President on December 19,1958-2:30 pm."
139. "Notes Regarding Draft Instructions For [Sanitized]," 20 December 1958; John S. D. Eisenhower, memorandum for record, 31 December 1958; both documents located at DDC, 1991/2473. Both of these documents, especially the first, are heavily sanitized.
140. Peter J. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 79-87.
141. "Memorandum of Discussion at the 412th Meeting of the National Security Council," 9 July 1959, Department of State, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 3, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996), 243 (emphasis added).
142. The following narrative is drawn from "Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower," 2 July 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 3, 228-35.
143. Ibid., 228-35.
144. It also included the language from the previous year which stated that "Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President" ("Memorandum of Discussion at the 412th Meeting of the National Security Council," FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 3, 243).
145. General Nathan Twining to Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 29 September 1959, "Subject: Revised AEC-DOD Memorandum of Understanding for the Transfer of Atomic Weapons," Memos 10-30 September 1959 (Nos. 381-404) folder, Twining papers, LOC.
146. For more on emergency communications, see General Twining to the Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 17 October 1958, "Subject: Periodic Exercise of the Emergency Plans of the Department of Defense," JCS memos folder, Twining papers, LOC.
147. JCS to Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, memorandum, "Subject: Instructions for Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in Emergency Conditions"; JCS to Commander in Chief, Atlantic, memorandum, "Subject: Instructions for Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in [sanitized]"; JCS to Commander in Chief, Europe, memorandum, "Subject: [sanitized]." All documents located in Atomic Weapons, Corr. and Background for Presidential Approval (5) folder, Subject Subseries, NSC series, OSANSA records, DDEL.
148. JCS to Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, memorandum, "Subject: Instructions for Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in Emergency Conditions"; JCS to Commander in Chief, Atlantic, memorandum, "Subject: Instructions for Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in [sanitized]"; JCS to Commander in Chief, Europe, memorandum, "Subject: [sanitized]." All documents located in Atomic Weapons, Corr. and Background for Presidential Approval (5) folder, Subject Subseries, NSC series, OSANSA records, DDEL.
149. JCS to Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, memorandum, "Subject: Instructions for Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in Emergency Conditions"; JCS to Commander in Chief, Atlantic, memorandum, "Subject: Instructions for Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in [sanitized]"; JCS to Commander in Chief, Europe, memorandum, "Subject: [sanitized]." All documents located in Atomic Weapons, Corr. and Background for Presidential Approval (5) folder, Subject Subseries, NSC series, OSANSA records, DDEL.
150. Upon taking office in 1961, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy recommended that President Kennedy review Eisenhower's policies which "have created a situation today in which a subordinate commander faced with a substantial Russian military action could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his own initiative if he could not reach you (by failure of communication at either end of the line)." In 1964, however, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara informed President Johnson that "the instructions currently in use were approved by President Eisenhower on December 3, 1959, and were continued in effect by President Kennedy" (David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," 48-49; "Editorial Note," FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 3, 353; McGeorge Bundy to the President, memorandum, 30 January 1961, "Subject Policies previously approved in NSC which need review," DDQC, 1981/610A; Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to President Johnson, 14 March 1964, DDC, 1996/1914.)
151. Upon taking office in 1961, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy recommended that President Kennedy review Eisenhower's policies which "have created a situation today in which a subordinate commander faced with a substantial Russian military action could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his own initiative if he could not reach you (by failure of communication at either end of the line)." In 1964, however, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara informed President Johnson that "the instructions currently in use were approved by President Eisenhower on December 3, 1959, and were continued in effect by President Kennedy" (David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," 48-49; "Editorial Note," FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 3, 353; McGeorge Bundy to the President, memorandum, 30 January 1961, "Subject Policies previously approved in NSC which need review," DDQC, 1981/610A; Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to President Johnson, 14 March 1964, DDC, 1996/1914.)
152. Upon taking office in 1961, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy recommended that President Kennedy review Eisenhower's policies which "have created a situation today in which a subordinate commander faced with a substantial Russian military action could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his own initiative if he could not reach you (by failure of communication at either end of the line)." In 1964, however, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara informed President Johnson that "the instructions currently in use were approved by President Eisenhower on December 3, 1959, and were continued in effect by President Kennedy" (David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," 48-49; "Editorial Note," FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 3, 353; McGeorge Bundy to the President, memorandum, 30 January 1961, "Subject Policies previously approved in NSC which need review," DDQC, 1981/610A; Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to President Johnson, 14 March 1964, DDC, 1996/1914.)
153. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 63-87; and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), chap. 8.
154. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 63-87; and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), chap. 8.
155. Memorandum, "Discussion at the 394th NSC Meeting, Thursday, January 22, 1959," 22 January 1959, DDC, 1990/1010.
156. This belief also reinforced the deterrence side of the New Look. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 86, 111; and Gaddis, We Now Know, 233-34.
157. This belief also reinforced the deterrence side of the New Look. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 86, 111; and Gaddis, We Now Know, 233-34.
158. Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety; Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War; Ashton B. Carter, "Sources of Error and Uncertainty," in Managing Nuclear Operations, 611-40.
159. Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety; Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War; Ashton B. Carter, "Sources of Error and Uncertainty," in Managing Nuclear Operations, 611-40.
160. Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety; Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War; Ashton B. Carter, "Sources of Error and Uncertainty," in Managing Nuclear Operations, 611-40.
161. For a thorough discussion of the processes that could lead to dangerous accidents, see Sagan, The Limits of Safety, esp. chaps. 2-4.
162. Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 452, 564-76. Rhodes even claims (p. 592) that "The story of SAC efforts to force a nuclear confrontation from 1950 onward is probably even more frightening than I have been able to document." Rhodes' case against LeMay is also available as Rhodes, "The General and World War III," New Yorker 71, 19 June 1995, 47-59 . Supporting Rhodes is Paul Lashmar, "Killer on the Edge," New Statesman and Society, 15 September 1995, 20-22. A thorough refutation of Rhodes and Lashmar is Mark J. Conversino, "Back to the Stone Age: The Attack on Curtis E. LeMay," Strategic Review (spring 1997): 60-68.
163. Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 452, 564-76. Rhodes even claims (p. 592) that "The story of SAC efforts to force a nuclear confrontation from 1950 onward is probably even more frightening than I have been able to document." Rhodes' case against LeMay is also available as Rhodes, "The General and World War III," New Yorker 71, 19 June 1995, 47-59 . Supporting Rhodes is Paul Lashmar, "Killer on the Edge," New Statesman and Society, 15 September 1995, 20-22. A thorough refutation of Rhodes and Lashmar is Mark J. Conversino, "Back to the Stone Age: The Attack on Curtis E. LeMay," Strategic Review (spring 1997): 60-68.
164. Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 452, 564-76. Rhodes even claims (p. 592) that "The story of SAC efforts to force a nuclear confrontation from 1950 onward is probably even more frightening than I have been able to document." Rhodes' case against LeMay is also available as Rhodes, "The General and World War III," New Yorker 71, 19 June 1995, 47-59 . Supporting Rhodes is Paul Lashmar, "Killer on the Edge," New Statesman and Society, 15 September 1995, 20-22. A thorough refutation of Rhodes and Lashmar is Mark J. Conversino, "Back to the Stone Age: The Attack on Curtis E. LeMay," Strategic Review (spring 1997): 60-68.
165. Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 452, 564-76. Rhodes even claims (p. 592) that "The story of SAC efforts to force a nuclear confrontation from 1950 onward is probably even more frightening than I have been able to document." Rhodes' case against LeMay is also available as Rhodes, "The General and World War III," New Yorker 71, 19 June 1995, 47-59 . Supporting Rhodes is Paul Lashmar, "Killer on the Edge," New Statesman and Society, 15 September 1995, 20-22. A thorough refutation of Rhodes and Lashmar is Mark J. Conversino, "Back to the Stone Age: The Attack on Curtis E. LeMay," Strategic Review (spring 1997): 60-68.
166. This view is consistent with Peter Feaver's depiction of Eisenhower's approach to civilian control. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, chap. 7.
167. Sagan, The Limits of Safety, Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers"; Feaver, Sagan, and Karl, "Correspondence: Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers."
168. Sagan, The Limits of Safety, Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers"; Feaver, Sagan, and Karl, "Correspondence: Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers."
169. Sagan, The Limits of Safety, Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers"; Feaver, Sagan, and Karl, "Correspondence: Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers."
170. Sagan, The Limits of Safety, Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers"; Feaver, Sagan, and Karl, "Correspondence: Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers."
171. According to Bruce Blair, the Soviet Union never predelegated its nuclear weapons. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, 71.
172. Inadequate civilian control in some states could result in a situation where civilian predelegation is actually a nonissue. Military leaders might have de facto predelegation because they are not responsive to civilian control over operations. In general, see Seng, "Less is More"; and Feaver, "Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation."
173. Inadequate civilian control in some states could result in a situation where civilian predelegation is actually a nonissue. Military leaders might have de facto predelegation because they are not responsive to civilian control over operations. In general, see Seng, "Less is More"; and Feaver, "Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation."
174. Seng, "Less is More," 79-81; and Feaver, "Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation," 110-12.
175. Seng, "Less is More," 79-81; and Feaver, "Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation," 110-12.