Democratization, the Bourgeoisie and Russia

Government and Opposition

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 307-329

  Gill, Graeme ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0039448135     PISSN: 0017257X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.1998.tb00454.x     Document Type: Article

References (74)

1. Barrington Moore Jr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969.
2. For example, Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, pp. 66-8.
3. Although he does not show how this can be measured. See Theda Skocpol, 'A Critical Review of Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy', Politics and Society, 4:1 (1973).
4. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992.
5. Rueschemeyer et al. distinguish between bourgeoisie and middle class, with the latter being seen as a group which, if its interests could be served by such an alliance, was willing to throw in its lot with the working class to press for an extension of democracy. The only consistent democratic force, in their view, was the working class.
6. John D. Stephens, 'Democratic Transition and Breakdown in Western Europe, 1870-1939: A Test of the Moore Thesis', American Journal of Sociology, 94:5 (March 1989), p. 1038.
7. Moore, op. cit., p. 418.
8. For a slightly different categorization, but one which emphasizes the importance of a nomenklatura background, see Bertram Silverman and Murray Yanowitch, New Rich, New Poor, New Russia: Winners and Losers on the Russian Road to Capitalism, Armonk, M. E. Sharpe, 1997, ch. 6.
9. Olga Kryshtanovskaia in Izvestiia, 10 January 1996; and Olga Kryshtanovskaia and Stephen White, 'From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite', Europe-Asia Studies, 48:5 (July 1996).
10. Olga Kryshtanovskaia in Izvestiia, 10 January 1996; and Olga Kryshtanovskaia and Stephen White, 'From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite', Europe-Asia Studies, 48:5 (July 1996).
11. For the argument that the nomenklatura has exchanged not power for ownership but ideology for ownership, which has allowed its power and wealth to be legitimized by the law rather than 'the lie', see Izvestiia, 7 March 1995.
12. Silverman and Yanowitch, pp. 114-15, distinguish between these groups, with the former taking over material production capacity which they controlled while the latter mobilized various resources, including financial, to which their positions gave them access.
13. For a discussion of this, see Stephen Fortescue, 'Privatisation of Russian Industry', Australian Journal of Political Science, 29:1 (March 1994), pp. 141 and 149. Also Simon Clarke, 'Privatization and the Development of Capitalism in Russia', New Left Review, 196: 11-12 (1992), pp. 10-12 and Simon Johnson and Heidi Kroll, 'Managerial Strategies for Spontaneous Privatisation', Soviet Economy, 7:4 (1991). For a similar point regarding Hungary, see Attila Agh, 'From Nomenklatura to Clientura: The Emergence of New Political Elites in East Central Europe', Budapest Papers on Democratic Transition, No. 68, 1993, p. 14.
14. For a discussion of this, see Stephen Fortescue, 'Privatisation of Russian Industry', Australian Journal of Political Science, 29:1 (March 1994), pp. 141 and 149. Also Simon Clarke, 'Privatization and the Development of Capitalism in Russia', New Left Review, 196: 11-12 (1992), pp. 10-12 and Simon Johnson and Heidi Kroll, 'Managerial Strategies for Spontaneous Privatisation', Soviet Economy, 7:4 (1991). For a similar point regarding Hungary, see Attila Agh, 'From Nomenklatura to Clientura: The Emergence of New Political Elites in East Central Europe', Budapest Papers on Democratic Transition, No. 68, 1993, p. 14.
15. For a discussion of this, see Stephen Fortescue, 'Privatisation of Russian Industry', Australian Journal of Political Science, 29:1 (March 1994), pp. 141 and 149. Also Simon Clarke, 'Privatization and the Development of Capitalism in Russia', New Left Review, 196: 11-12 (1992), pp. 10-12 and Simon Johnson and Heidi Kroll, 'Managerial Strategies for Spontaneous Privatisation', Soviet Economy, 7:4 (1991). For a similar point regarding Hungary, see Attila Agh, 'From Nomenklatura to Clientura: The Emergence of New Political Elites in East Central Europe', Budapest Papers on Democratic Transition, No. 68, 1993, p. 14.
16. For a discussion of this, see Stephen Fortescue, 'Privatisation of Russian Industry', Australian Journal of Political Science, 29:1 (March 1994), pp. 141 and 149. Also Simon Clarke, 'Privatization and the Development of Capitalism in Russia', New Left Review, 196: 11-12 (1992), pp. 10-12 and Simon Johnson and Heidi Kroll, 'Managerial Strategies for Spontaneous Privatisation', Soviet Economy, 7:4 (1991). For a similar point regarding Hungary, see Attila Agh, 'From Nomenklatura to Clientura: The Emergence of New Political Elites in East Central Europe', Budapest Papers on Democratic Transition, No. 68, 1993, p. 14.
17. According to one survey, 61 per cent of the 'business elite' had been part of the nomenklatura in Soviet times, Izvestiia, 10 January 1996.
18. For the argument that such insiders were able to gain control of many large enterprises because the old institutions which they had dominated in Soviet times had not been destroyed, thereby leaving them in a strong position to influence the government, see Michael McFaul, 'State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization in Russia', World Politics, 47:2 (January 1995), pp. 238 and 240.
19. Peter Rutland, 'Privaṫisation in Russia: One Step Forward: Two Steps Back?', Europe-Asia Studies, 46:7 (1994), pp. 1112.
20. Izvestiia, 10 January 1996. Also Pekka Sutela, 'Insider Privatisation in Russia: Speculations on Systemic Change', Europe-Asia Studies, 46:3 (1994). This particular privatization option had been placed on the agenda as a result of the pressure from industrial managers. McFaul, op. cit., p. 232. For a discussion of some of the means used to achieve ownership, see Roman Frydman, Kenneth Murphy and Andrzey Rapaczynski, 'Capitalism With a Comrade's Face', Transition, 2:2 (1996), p. 8. For one discussion of how management won control within enterprises, see Simon Clarke and Veronika Kabalina, 'Privatisation and the Struggle for Control of the Enterprise', in David Lane (ed.), Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality, London, Longman, 1995, pp. 142-58.
21. Izvestiia, 10 January 1996. Also Pekka Sutela, 'Insider Privatisation in Russia: Speculations on Systemic Change', Europe-Asia Studies, 46:3 (1994). This particular privatization option had been placed on the agenda as a result of the pressure from industrial managers. McFaul, op. cit., p. 232. For a discussion of some of the means used to achieve ownership, see Roman Frydman, Kenneth Murphy and Andrzey Rapaczynski, 'Capitalism With a Comrade's Face', Transition, 2:2 (1996), p. 8. For one discussion of how management won control within enterprises, see Simon Clarke and Veronika Kabalina, 'Privatisation and the Struggle for Control of the Enterprise', in David Lane (ed.), Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality, London, Longman, 1995, pp. 142-58.
22. Izvestiia, 10 January 1996. Also Pekka Sutela, 'Insider Privatisation in Russia: Speculations on Systemic Change', Europe-Asia Studies, 46:3 (1994). This particular privatization option had been placed on the agenda as a result of the pressure from industrial managers. McFaul, op. cit., p. 232. For a discussion of some of the means used to achieve ownership, see Roman Frydman, Kenneth Murphy and Andrzey Rapaczynski, 'Capitalism With a Comrade's Face', Transition, 2:2 (1996), p. 8. For one discussion of how management won control within enterprises, see Simon Clarke and Veronika Kabalina, 'Privatisation and the Struggle for Control of the Enterprise', in David Lane (ed.), Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality, London, Longman, 1995, pp. 142-58.
23. Izvestiia, 10 January 1996. Also Pekka Sutela, 'Insider Privatisation in Russia: Speculations on Systemic Change', Europe-Asia Studies, 46:3 (1994). This particular privatization option had been placed on the agenda as a result of the pressure from industrial managers. McFaul, op. cit., p. 232. For a discussion of some of the means used to achieve ownership, see Roman Frydman, Kenneth Murphy and Andrzey Rapaczynski, 'Capitalism With a Comrade's Face', Transition, 2:2 (1996), p. 8. For one discussion of how management won control within enterprises, see Simon Clarke and Veronika Kabalina, 'Privatisation and the Struggle for Control of the Enterprise', in David Lane (ed.), Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality, London, Longman, 1995, pp. 142-58.
24. Izvestiia, 10 January 1996. Also Pekka Sutela, 'Insider Privatisation in Russia: Speculations on Systemic Change', Europe-Asia Studies, 46:3 (1994). This particular privatization option had been placed on the agenda as a result of the pressure from industrial managers. McFaul, op. cit., p. 232. For a discussion of some of the means used to achieve ownership, see Roman Frydman, Kenneth Murphy and Andrzey Rapaczynski, 'Capitalism With a Comrade's Face', Transition, 2:2 (1996), p. 8. For one discussion of how management won control within enterprises, see Simon Clarke and Veronika Kabalina, 'Privatisation and the Struggle for Control of the Enterprise', in David Lane (ed.), Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality, London, Longman, 1995, pp. 142-58.
25. Access to state funds was formally guaranteed to privatized enterprises as well as those remaining in state ownership. Yeltsin's decree to this effect is noted in Izvestiia, 30 November 1992.
26. N. Lapina, Rossiiskie ekonomicheskie elity i modeli natsional'nogo razvitiia, Moscow, Inion Ran, 1997, pp. 10-11. Also see the discussion in Joel Hellman, 'Bureaucrats vs Markets? Rethinking the Bureaucratic Response to Market Reform in Centrally Planned Economies', in Susan Gross Solomon (ed.), Beyond Sovietology: Essays in Politics and History, Armonk, M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1993, pp. 70-1.
27. N. Lapina, Rossiiskie ekonomicheskie elity i modeli natsional'nogo razvitiia, Moscow, Inion Ran, 1997, pp. 10-11. Also see the discussion in Joel Hellman, 'Bureaucrats vs Markets? Rethinking the Bureaucratic Response to Market Reform in Centrally Planned Economies', in Susan Gross Solomon (ed.), Beyond Sovietology: Essays in Politics and History, Armonk, M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1993, pp. 70-1.
28. On the coloured markets, see the 'Berkeley-Duke Occasional Papers on the Second Economy in the USSR', beginning in September 1985. (The term refers to that range of unofficial economic activity which grew up outside the processes of the official Soviet economy. The terms 'black' or 'grey' markets were also sometimes used.)
29. Lynn D. Nelson and Irina A. Kuzes, 'Privatisation and the New Business Class', in Lane, op. cit., p. 124.
30. Lapina, op. cit., pp. 11 and 29.
31. Izvestiia, 26 January 1994 and the series in Izvestiia, 18, 19 and 21 October 1994.
32. Izvestiia, 26 January 1994 and the series in Izvestiia, 18, 19 and 21 October 1994.
33. Izvestiia, 11 June 1994.
34. For a discussion of the aluminium industry in this context, including its search for government support through personal contacts, see Lapina, op. cit., pp. 19-20. Lapina also cites estimates of the size of the criminal economy.
35. For one discussion of the general phenomenon, see Stephen Handelman, 'The Russian "Mafiya" ', Foreign Affairs, 73:2 (1994).
36. The development of private security forces has been one response, but this will not be discussed here.
37. For one reference to the cartelization of the economy, see Delovoi Mir, 20 February 1997.
38. On Gazprom, see Peter Rutland, 'Russia's Natural Gas Leviathan', Transition, 2:9 (May 1996), p. 3, and Igor Khripunov and Mary M. Matthews, 'Russia's Oil and Gas Interest Group and Its Foreign Policy Agenda', Problems of Post-Communism, 43:3 (May-June 1996).
39. On Gazprom, see Peter Rutland, 'Russia's Natural Gas Leviathan', Transition, 2:9 (May 1996), p. 3, and Igor Khripunov and Mary M. Matthews, 'Russia's Oil and Gas Interest Group and Its Foreign Policy Agenda', Problems of Post-Communism, 43:3 (May-June 1996).
40. Izvestiia, 6 December 1994.
41. For some examples, see Rutland, Russia's Natural Gas Leviathan, p. 13.
42. Lapina, op. cit., pp. 6 and 8.
43. These are only a few examples. For more details, see Floriana Fossato, 'Russia: Media, Money and Power - An Analysis', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty http://www.rferl.org
44. Izvestiia, 16 November 1993.
45. For a discussion of the FIGs, see Joseph R. Blasi, Maya Kroumova and Douglas Kruse, Kremlin Capitalism: Privatizing the Russian Economy, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 155-7. Also see Lapina, op. cit., p. 31.
46. For a discussion of the FIGs, see Joseph R. Blasi, Maya Kroumova and Douglas Kruse, Kremlin Capitalism: Privatizing the Russian Economy, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 155-7. Also see Lapina, op. cit., p. 31.
47. For an argument that the highly organized and disciplined nature of the gas elite was in part due to its internal recruitment from within Gazprom, see Lapina, op. cit., p. 6.
48. Izvestiia, 26 January 1994.
49. Hellman, 'Bureaucrats vs. Markets?', p. 54.
50. Izvestiia, 10 January 1995.
51. Vladimir Shlapentokh, The Four Faces of Mother Russia', Transition, 4:5 (October 1997), pp. 60-1. For references to the 'bank war', see e.g., Lilia Shevtsova in Izvestiia, 9 October 1997.
52. Vladimir Shlapentokh, The Four Faces of Mother Russia', Transition, 4:5 (October 1997), pp. 60-1. For references to the 'bank war', see e.g., Lilia Shevtsova in Izvestiia, 9 October 1997.
53. Fossato, op. cit.
54. Lapina, op. cit., p. 17.
55. For a brief discussion of this scheme, which was manipulated by the banks to gain control over economic assets at a cheap price, see Blasi et al., op. cit., pp. 74-6. Also Joel Hellman, 'Russia Adjusts to Stability', Transition, 2:10 (1996), pp. 8-9.
56. For a brief discussion of this scheme, which was manipulated by the banks to gain control over economic assets at a cheap price, see Blasi et al., op. cit., pp. 74-6. Also Joel Hellman, 'Russia Adjusts to Stability', Transition, 2:10 (1996), pp. 8-9.
57. Izvestiia, 10 January 1996.
58. On the continued presence of people from Gazprom in leading political circles, see Lapina, op. cit., p. 7; on oil representation, see p. 9.
59. Izvestiia, 6 December 1994 and 10 January 1996.
60. For some details on the support for Yeltsin, see Stephen White, Richard Rose and Ian McAllister, How Russia Votes, Chatham, Chatham House Publishers, 1997, pp. 251-2.
61. While the state owns 51 per cent of ORT, Berezovsky is its main financial backer.
62. See the report by David Hoffman, 'Powerful Few Rule Russian Mass Media', The Washington Post, 31 March 1997. The subsequent appointments to government office of Berezovsky and Potanin were widely seen as pay-offs for this support.
63. This means that there is no guarantee that as the bourgeoisie expands through the entry of new entrepreneurs, the principles established to structure commercial life will change.
64. For some types of arrangement, see Stephen Fortescue, 'Privatisation of Large-Scale Russian Industry', Amin Saikal and William Maley (eds), Russia in Search of its Future, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 93. However there have also been indications that some managers are starting to act in a more market-orientated fashion. Rutland, 'Privatisation in Russia', pp. 1120-1. For another analysis emphasizing the importance of personal relations in the political sphere, see Olga Kryshtanovskaia in Argumenty i fakty, 21 May 1997.
65. For some types of arrangement, see Stephen Fortescue, 'Privatisation of Large-Scale Russian Industry', Amin Saikal and William Maley (eds), Russia in Search of its Future, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 93. However there have also been indications that some managers are starting to act in a more market-orientated fashion. Rutland, 'Privatisation in Russia', pp. 1120-1. For another analysis emphasizing the importance of personal relations in the political sphere, see Olga Kryshtanovskaia in Argumenty i fakty, 21 May 1997.
66. For some types of arrangement, see Stephen Fortescue, 'Privatisation of Large-Scale Russian Industry', Amin Saikal and William Maley (eds), Russia in Search of its Future, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 93. However there have also been indications that some managers are starting to act in a more market-orientated fashion. Rutland, 'Privatisation in Russia', pp. 1120-1. For another analysis emphasizing the importance of personal relations in the political sphere, see Olga Kryshtanovskaia in Argumenty i fakty, 21 May 1997.
67. There have been attempts to develop business lobby groups, and these appear to have had some success. See discussions in Paul Kubicek, 'Variations on a Corporatist Theme: Interest Associations in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 48:1 (1996), Sergei Peregudov and Irina Semenenko, 'Lobbying Business Interests in Russia', Democratization, 3:2 (1996), and Lapina, op. cit., pp. 9 and 13.
68. There have been attempts to develop business lobby groups, and these appear to have had some success. See discussions in Paul Kubicek, 'Variations on a Corporatist Theme: Interest Associations in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 48:1 (1996), Sergei Peregudov and Irina Semenenko, 'Lobbying Business Interests in Russia', Democratization, 3:2 (1996), and Lapina, op. cit., pp. 9 and 13.
69. There have been attempts to develop business lobby groups, and these appear to have had some success. See discussions in Paul Kubicek, 'Variations on a Corporatist Theme: Interest Associations in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 48:1 (1996), Sergei Peregudov and Irina Semenenko, 'Lobbying Business Interests in Russia', Democratization, 3:2 (1996), and Lapina, op. cit., pp. 9 and 13.
70. Rutland, 'Privatisation in Russia', p. 1125.
71. Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 7 April 1995.
72. Lapina argues that the fuel and energy complex prefers to work through the executive to get its way rather than the legislature. In the 1995 Duma elections, the banking sector supported a range of candidates of all persuasions, reflecting an attempt to use the legislature as a means for pressing its concerns. Lapina, op. cit., pp. 7 and 12-13.
73. Izvestiia, 21 September 1995.
74. See the discussion in Vladimir Shlapentokh, 'Early Feudalism - The Best Parallel for Contemporary Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 48:3 (1996), pp. 398-9.