Chirac's 'new Arab policy' and Middle East challenges: The Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq and Iran

Middle East Journal

Volumn 52, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 562-580

  Wood, Pia Christina ^a  

^a OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0039448070     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (92)

1. Le Monde (Paris), 9 April 1996, p. 1. According to Hervé de Charette, then foreign minister, "France is determined to play a role in the Middle East," Le Monde, 19 January 1996, p. 3. Quotation translated by author.
2. Le Monde (Paris), 9 April 1996, p. 1. According to Hervé de Charette, then foreign minister, "France is determined to play a role in the Middle East," Le Monde, 19 January 1996, p. 3. Quotation translated by author.
3. In March 1997, France co-sponsored a UN Security Council resolution with Great Britain, Portugal and Sweden calling Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem "illegal." The United States vetoed the resolution. Le Monde, 9-10 March, 1997, p. 4.
4. On 14 April 1995, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 986, which allowed Iraq to sell $2 billion worth of oil for humanitarian reasons. As conditions deteriorated for the Iraqi people in 1996-97, France and other nations strongly supported increasing the amount of oil Iraq could sell. On 20 February 1998, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1153, which allowed Iraq to increase its sales of oil to $5.256 billion. See Middle East International, 28 April 1995, p. 10; Le Monde (supplement), 28 February 1998, p. VI; and The New York Times, 31 January 1998, p. A4.
5. On 14 April 1995, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 986, which allowed Iraq to sell $2 billion worth of oil for humanitarian reasons. As conditions deteriorated for the Iraqi people in 1996-97, France and other nations strongly supported increasing the amount of oil Iraq could sell. On 20 February 1998, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1153, which allowed Iraq to increase its sales of oil to $5.256 billion. See Middle East International, 28 April 1995, p. 10; Le Monde (supplement), 28 February 1998, p. VI; and The New York Times, 31 January 1998, p. A4.
6. On 14 April 1995, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 986, which allowed Iraq to sell $2 billion worth of oil for humanitarian reasons. As conditions deteriorated for the Iraqi people in 1996-97, France and other nations strongly supported increasing the amount of oil Iraq could sell. On 20 February 1998, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1153, which allowed Iraq to increase its sales of oil to $5.256 billion. See Middle East International, 28 April 1995, p. 10; Le Monde (supplement), 28 February 1998, p. VI; and The New York Times, 31 January 1998, p. A4.
7. According to Chirac, "It is necessary to leave behind the dual containment policy against Iraq and Iran . . ." Le Monde, 24 February 1998, p. 2. Quotation translated by author.
8. The Helms-Burton Act (Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity [Libertad] Act of 1996) provides for sanctions against countries assisting Cuba. For the full text, see "Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996" (PL 101-114, 12 March 1996), United States Statutes at Large 110, pp. 785-824. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act imposed sanctions on foreign businesses investing over a certain amount in the oil and gas production of either Libya or Iran. For the full text, see "Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996" (PL 104-172, 5 August 1996), United States Statutes at Large 110, pp. 1541-51.
9. The Helms-Burton Act (Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity [Libertad] Act of 1996) provides for sanctions against countries assisting Cuba. For the full text, see "Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996" (PL 101-114, 12 March 1996), United States Statutes at Large 110, pp. 785-824. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act imposed sanctions on foreign businesses investing over a certain amount in the oil and gas production of either Libya or Iran. For the full text, see "Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996" (PL 104-172, 5 August 1996), United States Statutes at Large 110, pp. 1541-51.
10. See Le Monde, 1 October 1997, p. 2.
11. Arab News, 29 August 1997, p. 1. In later remarks, Védrine stated, "There is a very relaxed atmosphere now compared with earlier times. When we [France and the United States] agree, it is for the best. When we do not agree, it is not a crisis. Sooner or later we always resolve our problems. We know when things get very difficult, we always find ourselves side by side against a common enemy." Arab News, 9 October 1997, p. 9.
12. Arab News, 29 August 1997, p. 1. In later remarks, Védrine stated, "There is a very relaxed atmosphere now compared with earlier times. When we [France and the United States] agree, it is for the best. When we do not agree, it is not a crisis. Sooner or later we always resolve our problems. We know when things get very difficult, we always find ourselves side by side against a common enemy." Arab News, 9 October 1997, p. 9.
13. Le Monde, 18 April 1996, p. 4.
14. According to Jacques Chirac, "We are going . . . toward a multipolar world. The United States, of course is first . . . Europe, despite its difficulties, is becoming stronger . . . ." Le Monde, 27 February 1998, p. 2. Quotation translated by author.
15. In response to rocket attacks by Hizballah, Israeli prime minister Shimon Peres, facing strong political opposition and an up-coming election, launched a military operation code-named "Grapes of Wrath" into South Lebanon. Israeli forces also bombed non-Hizballah targets, temporarily displaced 400,000 people from South Lebanon, killed Lebanese civilians, and destroyed electrical power stations vital to Lebanon's reconstruction efforts.
16. Le Monde. 5 April 1996, p. 15. In French the phrase is "une véritable politique franco-européenne au Proche-Orient."
17. During a visit to The Hague to meet with Dutch prime minister Wim Kok, Israeli prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu stated that Europe's role in the peace process should be "essentially economic," and criticized what he considered to be Europe's unbalanced pro-Palestinian position. Le Monde, 12 April 1997, p. 5.
18. Syrian military intervention in Lebanon dates to the Lebanese civil war. Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad sent his troops into Lebanon on 31 May 1976. Syrian troops have remained in Lebanon since then and number approximately 30,000. See, for example, Charles Winslow, Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society (New York: Routledge, 1996).
19. Le Monde, 6 April 1996, p. 2.
20. Le Monde, 9 April 1996, p. 3.
21. In 1995, France was the fourth largest exporter to Egypt, with a positive trade balance of four billion French francs. Le Monde, 7-8 April 1996, p. 2.
22. Le Monde, 9 April 1996, p. 1. Quotation translated by author.
23. Le Monde, 19 April 1996, p. 4.
24. Le Monde, 28-29 April 1996, p. 2.
25. Le Monde, 18 April 1996, p. 4. Quotation translated by author.
26. Middle East International, 26 April 1996, p. 8.
27. Ibid.; and Le Monde, 19 April 1996, p. 4.
28. Ibid.; and Le Monde, 19 April 1996, p. 4.
29. The final terms were based on the 1993 "arrangement" brokered by the United States, and included a cease-fire and an agreement that neither Israel nor Hizballah would target civilians nor would the latter give up its weapons nor the right of "legitimate defense" in the security zone. Israel wanted the terms in writing and signed by Syria and Lebanon, but Syria and Lebanon refused to sign any document with Israel. Eventually Lebanon and Israel both signed separate letters addressed to the United States agreeing to the terms. Le Monde, 28-29 April 1996, p. 2.
30. The French proposed the creation of a surveillance group, consisting of representatives from the United States, France, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, to monitor the Israeli-Lebanese agreement. Le Monde, 8 May 1996, p. 13.
31. Le Monde, 2 May 1996, p. 5. Quotation translated by author.
32. According to Israeli foreign minister David Levy, Europe already plays "an important role in the negotiations, in the economics of peace. We reject all interference in the negotiations. A new mediator in the conflict or in the negotiations is inconceivable." Le Monde, 22 October 1996, p. 2. Quotation translated by author.
33. Le Monde, 2-3 March 1997.
34. Ibid. Quotation translated by author.
35. On 22 October 1996, Nicholas Burns, the spokesman for the US State Department at the time, warned against European intervention in the peace negotiations. "The United States is the only indispensable country [that] has been present [in the Middle East peace process] for the last 25-30 years. We do not wish to create a mini-UN at Taba and at Eilat." Le Monde, 24 October 1996, p. 2. Quotation translated by author.
36. Le Monde, 2 July 1997, p. 3.
37. In 1997, the peace negotiations stalled for a number of reasons, including Prime Minister Netanyahu's stated opposition to certain aspects of the 1993 Oslo Accords (Israeli withdrawal from land in the West Bank), his decision to approve a new Israeli settlement in East Jerusalem (Har Homa), clashes between Palestinians and Israelis in Hebron, and terrorist attacks against Israelis. Le Monde, 23-24 March 1997, p. 3.
38. During a visit to Israel in March 1997, de Charette criticized Israeli plans to construct new settlements in East Jerusalem as "contrary to international law" and "an obstacle to the peace process." Le Monde, 6 March 1997, p. 3.
39. Le Monde, 13 September 1997, p. 2. Quotation translated by author.
40. Libération (Paris), 26 November 1997, p. 12.
41. Middle East International, 5 December 1997, p. 10.
42. Middle East International, 29 March 1996, p. 4.
43. Middle East International, 7 March 1997, p. 9.
44. In the wake of a double suicide bombing in Jerusalem on 30 July 1997, the Israeli government withheld the transfer of taxes (from Palestinian workers) and customs duties, estimated at $80 million, that it collects for the Palestinian Authority. The New York Times, 15 September 1997, p A1.
45. Middle East International, 12 April 1996, p. 10.
46. Le Monde, 17 January 1998, p. 3. Quotation translated by author.
47. The resolution states that Iraq must unconditionally destroy all of its chemical and biological weapons, and its ballistic missiles as well as all weapons research, development, and production facilities. For the full text, see "Security Council Action (3 April)," in Yearbook of the United Nations (New York: United Nations, 1992), pp. 172-76.
48. Le Monde, 29-30 December 1997, p. 2. Quotation translated by author.
49. There are two major Kurdish parties in Iraq: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Although they cooperated immediately after the 1991 Gulf War, this cooperation broke down in 1994, and intra-Kurdish fighting ensued. In September 1996, Saddam Husayn sent troops into northern Iraq to support the PDK in its fight against the KDP. Le Monde, 4 September 1996, p. 2. See also Michael M. Gunter, "The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq," The Middle East Journal 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 225-41.
50. There are two major Kurdish parties in Iraq: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Although they cooperated immediately after the 1991 Gulf War, this cooperation broke down in 1994, and intra-Kurdish fighting ensued. In September 1996, Saddam Husayn sent troops into northern Iraq to support the PDK in its fight against the KDP. Le Monde, 4 September 1996, p. 2. See also Michael M. Gunter, "The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq," The Middle East Journal 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 225-41.
51. Le Monde, 4 September 1996, p. 2.
52. Le Monde, 7 September 1996, p. 4.
53. In the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, the United States and its allies set up operation "Provide Comfort" and a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel to protect the Kurdish population in northern Iraq from Saddam Husayn's troops. In May 1992, a no-fly zone was set up over southern Iraq ("Southern Watch") that extended to the 32nd parallel to protect the Shi'ite population. On 31 December 1996, the mandate of operation Provide Comfort expired, and a new agreement ("Northern Watch") was signed, between Turkey, the United States and Great Britain, which was much more limited in scope. While France decided to continue to participate in Southern Watch (only to the 32nd parallel), it decided not to participate in Northern Watch. In its view, the oil-for-food agreement meant that air cover was no longer required to protect humanitarian aid. Moreover, the new mission no longer included a humanitarian dimension. Middle East International, 10 January 1997, pp. 11-12; and Le Monde, 29-30 December 1996, p. 2.
54. In the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, the United States and its allies set up operation "Provide Comfort" and a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel to protect the Kurdish population in northern Iraq from Saddam Husayn's troops. In May 1992, a no-fly zone was set up over southern Iraq ("Southern Watch") that extended to the 32nd parallel to protect the Shi'ite population. On 31 December 1996, the mandate of operation Provide Comfort expired, and a new agreement ("Northern Watch") was signed, between Turkey, the United States and Great Britain, which was much more limited in scope. While France decided to continue to participate in Southern Watch (only to the 32nd parallel), it decided not to participate in Northern Watch. In its view, the oil-for-food agreement meant that air cover was no longer required to protect humanitarian aid. Moreover, the new mission no longer included a humanitarian dimension. Middle East International, 10 January 1997, pp. 11-12; and Le Monde, 29-30 December 1996, p. 2.
55. Le Monde, 29-30 December 1996, p. 2.
56. Boston Globe, 16 December 1997, p. 1.
57. Ibid.
58. Le Monde, 5 April 1996, p. 4.
59. Le Monde, 31 October 1997, p. 2.
60. The New York Times, 5 November 1997, p. A6.
61. Le Monde, 31 October 1997, p. 2. Quotation translated by author.
62. Le Monde, 11 November 1997, p. 1.
63. Le Figaro (Paris), 11 November 1997, p. 1. Chirac clearly stated his opposition to "the use of force and brutal measures" against Iraq on 7 November during a visit to London. Quotation translated by author.
64. In September 1997, Chirac visited Russia and was presented with an award "For Services to the Country" by President Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin remarked in his speech on that occasion that "Franco-Russian relations have reached the level of privileged partnership." Chirac responded, "Like you, we want a grand partnership between Russia and France, Russia and Europe and a leading place for a strong and peaceful Russia in tomorrow's multipolar world." Arab News, 26 September 1997, p. 4.
65. Arab News, 2 November 1997, p. 5.
66. Libération, 21 November 1997, p. 8.
67. Ibid., p. 7. Quotation translated by author.
68. Le Monde, 20 January 1998, p. 3.
69. On 5 February 1998, during an interview on Europe 1 television, Védrine stated that France "had no intention of associating itself with military action against Iraq. "At the moment, France is attempting to obtain a solution by diplomatic means and political persuasion." Le Monde, 6 February 1998, p. 4. Quotation translated by author.
70. See comments by Chirac in Le Monde, 27 February 1998, p. 2.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid. Quotation translated by author.
73. Le Monde, 18 February 1998, p. 3.
74. Saddam Husayn declared these sites to be off limits to UN inspectors, arguing that the sites were part of presidential compounds and residences. According to a UN survey, the eight sites covered 12.2 square miles. The New York Times, 21 February 1998, p. A4.
75. The final accord signed by UN secretary-general Kofi Annan and Iraqi vice prime minister Tariq 'Aziz on 23 February 1998 included the French inspired plan for the creation of a special group to inspect the eight "presidential sites." For the full text of the accord, see Le Monde, 25 February 1998, p. 2.
76. Le Monde, 25 February 1998, p. 7.
77. In French, the phrase is "toute violation aurait de très graves conséquences," which has a slightly différent meaning. Le Monde, 6 March 1998, p. 3.
78. Ibid.
79. For an in-depth discussion of dual containment policy, see F. Gregory Gause III, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," Foreign Affairs 173, no. 2 (March/April 1994), pp. 56-60; and Anthony Lake, "Confronting the Backlash States," Foreign Affairs 173, no. 2 (March/April 1994), pp. 45-55.
80. For an in-depth discussion of dual containment policy, see F. Gregory Gause III, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," Foreign Affairs 173, no. 2 (March/April 1994), pp. 56-60; and Anthony Lake, "Confronting the Backlash States," Foreign Affairs 173, no. 2 (March/April 1994), pp. 45-55.
81. Le Monde, 1 October 1997, p. 2.
82. According to French prime minister Lionel Jospin, "No one accepts that the U.S. can pass a law on a global scale. The famous D'Amato Act is perhaps valid for Americans, but the United Nations has not decided to place an embargo on Iran, as it has for example on Iraq." Arab News, 30 September 1997, p. 1.
83. On 22 November 1996, the European Council adopted a proposal in response to the Helms-Burton Act and ILSA (D'Amato Act). It stated. "Concerning the Helms-Burton and D'Amato Acts, it was decided to take rapidly all the necessary measures to counter the extra-territorial effects of these laws. Concerning the Helms-Burton Act, a Council Regulation and a Joint Action together will provide protection, notably by prohibiting the recognition or enforcement of judgments or administrative decisions based on the contested US legislation . . . And, where appropriate, by prohibiting compliance with US legislation. To the extent that the D'Amato Act has specific relevant elements, the texts must take these into account . . ." European Commission, Bulletin of the European Communities, Brussels: ECSC-EC-EAEC, 10, 1996, p. 83.
84. Middle East International, 16 August 1996, p. 5.
85. Arab News, 30 September 1997, p. 1. See also Jospin's remarks quoted in Le Monde, 1 October 1997, p. 2.
86. Arab News, 30 September 1997, p. 1. See also Jospin's remarks quoted in Le Monde, 1 October 1997, p. 2.
87. In April 1997, a Berlin court ruled that members of the Iranian government were responsible for the assassination of four Kurdish dissidents in Germany. The EU members decided to recall temporarily their ambassadors for consultations, but clashed with the Iranian government when it refused to let the German ambassador return to Iran a few months later with the other EU ambassadors. The dispute lasted seven months, but due largely to French efforts, the European Union and Iran reached a compromise in November 1997 whereby the German and French ambassadors would return together to Teheran later than the other EU ambassadors. The EU approved the resumption of ministerial visits to Iran on 23 February 1998.
88. Le Monde, 20 May 1998, p. 3.
89. Le Monde, 9 January 1998, p. 2; and The New York Times, 8 January 1998, p. 1.
90. Le Monde, 9 January 1998, p. 2; and The New York Times, 8 January 1998, p. 1.
91. The Economist (London), 28 February 1998, p. 57
92. When asked if France would have had the same room to maneuver during the Iraqi crisis if a common European foreign policy had been in place, Chirac replied: "Yes I think so..An important country like France with its history, culture, its own genius, will always have a strong and leading foreign policy. The day that there is a European foreign policy, France will continue to take initiatives, but it will do so with Europe and will be all the stronger. We will conserve our own capacity of initiative and influence. A common foreign policy will take nothing away from us and will bring us added weight." Le Monde, 27 February 1998, p. 2. Quotation translated by author.