Another look at reasoning experiments: Rationality, normative models and conversational factors

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 1997, Pages

  Todorov, Alexander ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039386478     PISSN: 00218308     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5914.00049     Document Type: Review

References (130)

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