Trade as a strategic weapon: American and alliance export control policy in the early postwar period

International Organization

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 1988, Pages 121-150

  Mastanduno, Michael ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84972477276     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300007153     Document Type: Article

References (78)

1. Stephen Krasner, “United States Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness”, and Peter Katzenstein, “Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy”, in Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), pp. 51–88
2. J. P. Nettl, who notes the low level of American “stateness”, in “The State as a Conceptual Variable”, World Politics 20 (July 1968), pp. 559–92.
3. Krasner makes this argument in “U.S. Commercial and Monetary Policy”, note 2, pp. 52-
4. Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975);
5. Charles Maier, “The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy After World War Two”, in Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty, pp. 23–50;
6. Fred Block, The Origins of International Economic Disorder (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1977)
7. Michael Mastanduno, “Strategies of Economic Containment: U.S. Trade Relations with the Soviet Union”, World Politics 37 (July 1985), pp. 503–31.
8. Kennan's comments are found in the infamous “long telegram” of 1946, reprinted in Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), Vol. 6 (1946), pp. 696–709
9. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 9–17.
10. A more detailed discussion of the logic of these two strategies is found in Mastanduno, “Strategies of Economic Containment”, pp. 506–14.
11. This vision is most clearly articulated in Kennan's long telegram (see note 5) and in NSC 68: “Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary” 14 April 1950, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 1 (1950), pp. 234–92.
12. Telegram from the secretary of state to the U.S. Embassy in the United Kingdom, 22 August 1950, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 4 (1950), pp. 174–76.
13. the memorandum by the associate chief of the Economic Resources and Security Staff, undated, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 4 (1950), pp. 116–23, at 117–18.
14. “ Trade of the Free World with the Soviet Bloc”, report prepared by the Economic Cooperation Administration, February 1951, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 1 (1951), pp. 1042–45.
15. “ Vulnerability of the Soviet Bloc to Economic Warfare”, National Intelligence Estimate No. 22, prepared by the CIA, 19 February 1951, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 1(1951), pp. 1026-45.
16. W. M. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. 2 (London: Hmso, 1959), pp. 660–61.
17. Krasner, “External Strength and Internal Weakness”, studies that highlight the primacy of interest groups and Congress in trade policy include the classic by E. E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressure and the Tariff(Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1935)
18. James Cassing, et al., “The Political Economy of the Tariff Cycle”, American Political Science Review 80 (September 1986), pp. 843–62.
19. Bruce W. Jentleson, “From Consensus to Conflict: The Domestic Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade Policy”, International Organization 38 (Autumn 1984), pp. 625–60, at 635–36.
20. the statements of corporate officials in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Operations, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations East-West Trade, hearings, 84th Congress, 2d session, 15–17 February and 6 March 1956.
21. G. Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare, 1947–1967 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1968), p. 33.
22. Harold J. Berman and John R. Garson, “United States Export Controls—Past, Present and Future” Columbia Law Review 67 (May 1967), pp. 791-890, citation at 792.
23. Report of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee to the Secretary of Commerce, 4 May 1948, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 4(1948), pp. 536–42
24. the telegram from the secretary of state to certain diplomatic offices, 26 April 1950, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 4 (1950), pp. 87–93.
25. the comments of Commerce Secretary Sinclair Weeks in the memorandum of discussion at the 197th meeting of the National Security Council, 13 May 1954, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 1(1952–1954) pp. 1159–66.
26. West European preferences are discussed in a telegram from the U.S. Ambassador in France to the acting secretary of state, 19 January 1949, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 5 (1949), p. 69
27. William Diebold, “East-West Trade and the Marshall Plan”, Foreign Affairs 26 (July 1948), pp. 709–22.
28. On the origins of CoCom, see the telegram from the special representative in Europe for the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) (Harriman) to the administrator of the ECA (Hoffman), 15 October 1949, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 5 (1949), pp. 150–53
29. Telegram from the secretary of state to certain diplomatic offices, 15 February 1950, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 4 (1950), pp. 81–82.
30. The relationship between CoCom and NATO is discussed in a telegram from the U.S. Embassy in the United Kingdom to the secretary of state, 8 March 1951, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. I (1951), pp. 1056–58.
31. Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare, p. 45, italics added.
32. K. Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1975), p. 142.
33. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technology and East-West Trade (Washington, D.C.: Gpo, 1979), pp. 114, 154.
34. S. Stephen Woolcock, Western Policies on East-West Trade (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1982), p. 8.
35. G. Gary Bertsch, East-West Strategic Trade, CoCom and the Atlantic Alliance (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1983), p. 10.
36. Richard J. Ellings, Embargoes and World Power (Boulder: Westview, 1985), pp. 80–84.
37. Beverly Crawford and Stephanie Lenway, “Decision Modes and International Regime Change: Western Collaboration on East-West Trade”, World Politics 37 (April 1985), pp. 375–402.
38. Bruce W. Jentleson, Pipeline Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 71-72.
39. the telegram to the administrator of the ECA, 12 May 1949, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 5 (1949), pp. 113–14
40. the telegram from the secretary of state to the embassy in France, 13 April 1950, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 4 (1950), pp. 81–82.
41. the letter from Acheson to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9 June 1952, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 1 (1952–54), pp. 847–49.
42. the Senate debate over the Battle Act, see Congressional Record (Senate), 27 August 1951, pp. 10661–78, an 10700–15.
43. Ted Carpenter, America and the Transformation of NATO: The Great Debate of 1950 and 1951 (unpublished manuscript, 1986)
44. “ N.S.C. Determinations Under Public Law 843, Section 1304: The Cannon Amendment”, Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, undated, included in a note from the executive secretary of the NSC to the NSC and reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 4 (1950), pp. 249–55. The quotation is at p. 254.
45. Report by the N.S.C. Regarding a Review of its Determination under Section 1302 of the Third Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1951, 23 October 1951, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 1 (1951), pp. 1203–10.
46. Telegram from the U.S. Ambassador in Britain to the secretary of state, 16 July 1951, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 1 (1951), pp. 1148–49.
47. Memorandum to the executive secretary of the NSC, 22 September 1952, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 1 (1952–54), p. 882.
48. Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950 York: Columbia 1985).
49. See, for example, statement of policy by the National Security Council on Economic Defense (NSC 152/2), 31 July 1953, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 1(1952-54), pp. 1009–14, citation at 1010.
50. Robert Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 69.
51. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance, pp. 37, 68–69.
52. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 63-64;
53. Building Up the Defensive Strength of the West”, 3 May 1950, paper presented in the Office of European Regional Affairs, as background for the May North Atlantic Council Meetings, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 3 (1950), pp. 85–90, relevant discussion at 86.
54. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance pp. 40–41.
55. “ State Department Position with Respect to Export Controls and Security Policy”, report by the executive secretary to the NSC, 21 August 1950, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 4(1950), pp. 163—172
56. “ Report to the President on United States Policies and Programs in the Economic Field which May Affect the War Potential of the Soviet Bloc”, enclosed in a letter from Acheson to Truman, 9 February 1951, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 1 (1951), pp. 1026–35
57. The results are reported in an editorial note, printed in FRUS, Vol. 1 (1951), p. 1012.
58. Harold Stassen in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, East-West Trade, hearings, 84th Congress, 2d session, 15–17, 20 February and 6 March 1956, p. 450.
59. The U.S. position is described in the telegram from the Chief of Operations Mission in the U.K. to the Department of State, 10 November 1953, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 1 (1952–54), pp. 1039–49
60. Battle Act Reports, No. 5, 23 November 1954, p. 43.
61. Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare, p. 47.
62. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance, pp. 106–16
63. John Barton, Department of Commerce, in East-West Trade (note 59), p. 356.
64. “ East-West Trade Controls” (note 51), annex 4, p. 2.
65. Battle Act Reports, No. 5, 23 November 1954, p. 11.
66. On copper and petroleum, see East-West Trade (note 59), pp. 240 and 420.
67. the National Intelligence Estimate, “Consequences of a Relaxation of Non-Communist Controls on Trade with the Soviet Bloc”, 23 March 1954, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 1 (1952–1954), pp. 1121–35
68. “ United States Security Export Controls”, Report for the NSC by the NSC Planning Board, 11 June 1954, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 1(1952–1954) pp. 1191—1197
69. substantially comparable” to the CoCom list. Battle Act Reports, No. 5, 23 November 1954, 23.
70. Battle Act Reports, No. 5, 23 November 1954.
71. Battle Act Reports, No. 10, 24 January 1958, pp. 15–18.
72. Memorandum of Discussion at the 210th Meeting of the NSC, 12 August 1954, reprinted in FRUS, Vol. 1 (1952–1954), pp. 1235–39, citation at 1237.
73. “ The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory”, International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985), pp. 579–614.
74. David Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies”, World Politics 31 (January 1979), pp. 161–94.
75. Robert Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond”, in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 158–203, especially pp. 182–89.
76. Valerie Bunce, “The Empire Strikes Back: The Transformation of the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability”, International Organization 39 (Winter 1985), pp. 1–46.
77. Krasner, “External Strength and Internal Weakness.”
78. Jentleson, “From Consensus to Conflict” and Pipeline Politics.