On popper, probabilities, and propensities

Review of Social Economy

Volumn 54, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 465-485

  Runde, Jochen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Causality; Critical realism; Laws; Popper; Probability; Propensity

Indexed keywords

EID: 84976271290     PISSN: 00346764     EISSN: 14701162     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00346769600000029     Document Type: Article

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