The internationalization of industrial relations in Europe: Prospects and problems

Politics and Society

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 429-459

  Streeck, Wolfgang ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039066445     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329298026004002     Document Type: Review

References (87)

1. Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (London: Stevens & Sons, 1958).
2. Pace the "spillover" theories of practicing neo-functionalists from Monnet to Delors, who believed and still believe in state formation as an inevitable consequence of market integration, a practical theory that applies, if at all, only in a Shonfieldian world of "organized capitalism."
3. European integration is not the only cause of the liberalization and internationalization of European economies, certainly not since the 1980s. But given its early established institutional logic, it is much better suited to reinforcing than to counterbalancing external or internal liberalization pressures.
4. Wolfgang Streeck, "Public Power beyond the Nation-State: The Case of the European Community," in Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, eds., States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1996), 299-315. See also Bernhard H. Moss and Jonathan Michie, eds., The Single European Currency in National Perspective: A Community in Crisis? (London: Macmillan, 1998).
5. Wolfgang Streeck, "Public Power beyond the Nation-State: The Case of the European Community," in Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, eds., States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1996), 299-315. See also Bernhard H. Moss and Jonathan Michie, eds., The Single European Currency in National Perspective: A Community in Crisis? (London: Macmillan, 1998).
6. See Fritz W. Scharpf, "Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States," in Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Governance in the European Union (London: Sage, 1996), 15-39. The same can be said for liberalization generally. In an interdependent international economy, for a country to stay aloof if others are liberalizing their markets is likely to be costly. In fact, it may be enough to make all other countries liberalize if just one country does, like the United Kingdom in banking and telecommunications or the United States in labor relations during the 1980s. There are no comparable first-mover advantages in constraining markets; indeed, first movers are likely to be punished by "market forces." This asymmetry makes liberalization largely self-enforcing. See Adrienne Héritier, "Market-Making Policy in Europe: Its Impact on Member-State Policies: The Case of Road Haulage in Britain, The Netherlands, Germany and Italy," Journal of European Public Policy 4, no. 4 (1997): 539-555.
7. See Fritz W. Scharpf, "Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States," in Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Governance in the European Union (London: Sage, 1996), 15-39. The same can be said for liberalization generally. In an interdependent international economy, for a country to stay aloof if others are liberalizing their markets is likely to be costly. In fact, it may be enough to make all other countries liberalize if just one country does, like the United Kingdom in banking and telecommunications or the United States in labor relations during the 1980s. There are no comparable first-mover advantages in constraining markets; indeed, first movers are likely to be punished by "market forces." This asymmetry makes liberalization largely self-enforcing. See Adrienne Héritier, "Market-Making Policy in Europe: Its Impact on Member-State Policies: The Case of Road Haulage in Britain, The Netherlands, Germany and Italy," Journal of European Public Policy 4, no. 4 (1997): 539-555.
8. Susanne Schmidt, "Commission Activism: Subsuming Telecommunications and Electricity under European Competition Law," Journal of European Public Policy 5, no. 1 (1998): 169-184.
9. On Europe as a multilevel polity, see Fritz W. Scharpf, "The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration," Public Administration 66 (1988): 239-278. For a more comprehensive application of the concept, see Marks et al., Governance in the European Union, where the concept is, however, not used consistently by the authors.
10. On Europe as a multilevel polity, see Fritz W. Scharpf, "The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration," Public Administration 66 (1988): 239-278. For a more comprehensive application of the concept, see Marks et al., Governance in the European Union, where the concept is, however, not used consistently by the authors.
11. Where the central level of governance is an international arena of intergovernmental relations, functionally limited to the implementation and regulation of an international market, while politics and the social control of markets remain decentralized in a set of nation-states under market pressures and international obligations not to obstruct free trade.
12. Steven K. Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
13. Giandomenico Majone, Understanding Regulatory Growth in the European Community, EUI Working Paper SPS No. 94/17 (Florence: European University Institute, 1994).
14. T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship, and Social Development (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964).
15. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon, [1944] 1957).
16. Gosta Esping-Andersen, Politics against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).
17. Wolfgang Streeck, "Status and Contract as Basic Categories of a Sociological Theory of Industrial Relations," in Social Institutions and Economic Performance: Studies of Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalist Economies (London: Sage, 1992).
18. Remember the way Jacques Delors argued for the "social dimension" of the European Union by reminding skeptical national governments that "one cannot fall in love with a market."
19. Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, and Kermit Blank, "European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-level Governance," Journal of Common Market Studies 34, no. 3 (1996): 341-378, and Mark A. Pollack, "The New Institutionalism and EC Governance: The Promise and Limits of Institutional Analysis," Governance 9, no. 4 (1996): 429-458.
20. Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, and Kermit Blank, "European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-level Governance," Journal of Common Market Studies 34, no. 3 (1996): 341-378, and Mark A. Pollack, "The New Institutionalism and EC Governance: The Promise and Limits of Institutional Analysis," Governance 9, no. 4 (1996): 429-458.
21. Jelle Visser and Bernd Ebbinghaus, "Making the Most of Diversity? European Integration and Transnational Organization of Labour," in Justin Greenwood, Jürgen R. Grote, and Karsten Ronit, eds., Organized Interests and the European Community (London: Sage, 1992).
22. On this, see the appendix to my chapter in Marks et al., Governance in the European Union.
23. Michael Gold, The Development of EC Social Dialogue, Working Paper No. 12 (London: National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 1992) and Manfred Weiss, "Social Dialogue and Collective Bargaining in the Framework of Social Europe," in George Spyropoulos and Gabriel Fragnière, eds., Work and Social Policies in the New Europe (Brussels, Belgium: European Interuniversity Press, 1991).
24. Michael Gold, The Development of EC Social Dialogue, Working Paper No. 12 (London: National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 1992) and Manfred Weiss, "Social Dialogue and Collective Bargaining in the Framework of Social Europe," in George Spyropoulos and Gabriel Fragnière, eds., Work and Social Policies in the New Europe (Brussels, Belgium: European Interuniversity Press, 1991).
25. Jon Erik Dolvik, The ETUC and Development of Social Dialogue and European Negotiations after Maastricht, ARENA-Working Paper No. 2 (Oslo, Norway: Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation-State, 1997).
26. Michael Gold and Mark Hall, "Statutory European Works Councils: The Final CountDown?" Industrial Relations Journal 25, no. 3 (1994): 177-186, and Paul Marginson and Keith Sisson, "European Works Councils - Opening the Door to European Bargaining?" Industrielle Beziehungen 3, no. 3 (1996): 229-236.
27. Michael Gold and Mark Hall, "Statutory European Works Councils: The Final CountDown?" Industrial Relations Journal 25, no. 3 (1994): 177-186, and Paul Marginson and Keith Sisson, "European Works Councils - Opening the Door to European Bargaining?" Industrielle Beziehungen 3, no. 3 (1996): 229-236.
28. Jacques Pelkmans, "The Institutional Economics of European Integration," in Mauro Cappelletti, ed., Integration through Law: Vol. 1. Methods, Tools and Institutions, Book 1: A Political, Legal and Economic Overview (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1985), 318-396.
29. According to which member states can delegate the national implementation of a European directive to the social partners, provided these can ensure that they can achieve the results the directive prescribes.
30. In other words, they reflect the fact that in integrated Europe, national industrial relations systems are horizontally linked to each other through market relations and vertically linked to a supranational system through institutional relations.
31. Richard McKenzie and David Lee, Quicksilver Capital: How the Rapid Movement of Wealth Has Changed the World (New York: Free Press, 1991); Vivien Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation-State," Daedalus 124, no. 2 (1995): 75-106; John M. Stopford, Susan Strange, and John S. Henley, eds., Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
32. Richard McKenzie and David Lee, Quicksilver Capital: How the Rapid Movement of Wealth Has Changed the World (New York: Free Press, 1991); Vivien Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation-State," Daedalus 124, no. 2 (1995): 75-106; John M. Stopford, Susan Strange, and John S. Henley, eds., Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
33. Richard McKenzie and David Lee, Quicksilver Capital: How the Rapid Movement of Wealth Has Changed the World (New York: Free Press, 1991); Vivien Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation-State," Daedalus 124, no. 2 (1995): 75-106; John M. Stopford, Susan Strange, and John S. Henley, eds., Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
34. The possibility that increased chances of exit may make voice more effective has been pointed out by Hirschman in his analysis of the demise of the DDR. Albert O. Hirschman, "Abwanderung, Widerspruch und das Schicksal der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik," in Selbstbefragung und Erkenntnis (München: Hanser, 1995), 19-56.
35. Manfred E. Streit, "Dimensionen des Wettbewerbs - Systemwandel aus ordnungsökonomischer Sicht," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 44, no. 2 (1995): 113-134.
36. Gerda Falkner, "'Sozialdumping' im EG-Binnenmarkt: Betrachtungen aus politikwissenschaftlicher Sicht," Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 22, no. 3 (1993): 261-276.
37. On some of the functions and dysfunctions of regime competition in Europe, see Fritz W. Scharpf, Globalisierung als Beschränkung der Handlungsmöglichkeiten nationalstaatlicher Politik, MPIFG Discussion Paper 97/1 (Köln: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, 1997).
38. Wolfgang Streeck, "From Market-Making to State-Building? Reflections on the Political Economy of European Social Policy," in Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson, eds., European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 389-431.
39. For a general overview, see Mark Hall, Mark Carley, Michael Gold, Paul Marginson, and Keith Sisson, eds., European Works Councils: Planning for the Directive (London: Industrial Relations Services, 1995).
40. Wolfgang Streeck, Citizenship under Regime Competition: The Case of the European Works Councils, Jean Monnet Chair Paper 97/42 (Florence, Italy: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre, 1997). For more on this, see infra.
41. On the improbability of "best practice convergence," see J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Wolfgang Streeck, "Countries and Sectors: Concluding Remarks on Performance, Convergence and Competitiveness," in J. Rogers Hollingsworth, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Governing Capitalist Economies: Performance and Control of Economic Sectors (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 270-300. Also consider the succession of leading "national models" in industrial relations that other countries were supposed to emulate but never could or would: first the United States, then for a time "Modell Deutschland," later Japan, and now again the United States.
42. John Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958) and Clark Kerr, John Dunlop, Frederick H. Harbison, Charles A. Myers, and Roy Haddon, eds., Industrialism and Industrial Man (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).
43. John Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958) and Clark Kerr, John Dunlop, Frederick H. Harbison, Charles A. Myers, and Roy Haddon, eds., Industrialism and Industrial Man (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).
44. John Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism: Studies in the Political Economy of West European Nations (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1984).
45. This, incidentally, explains why the controversy between the proponents of divergence and convergence was never resolved: since both tendencies were simultaneously present, and had to be for the question to make sense in the first place, it all depended on which aspects of reality one was willing to include in the picture.
46. Franz Traxler, "Vom Nachfrage-zum Angebotskorporatismus?" in E. Tálos, ed., Sozialpartnerschaft: Kontinuität und Wandel eines Modells (Wien: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1993), 103-116.
47. On the postwar peace formula, see Stephen Bornstein, "States and Unions: From Postwar Settlement to Contemporary Stalemate," in Stephen Bornstein, David Held, and Joel Krieger, eds., The State in Capitalist Europe: A Casebook (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984), 54-90.
48. Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, "Transnationalisation and the Restructuring of Europe's Socio-Economie Order," International Journal of Political Economy 28 (1998).
49. Fritz W. Scharpf, "Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State," Journal of European Public Policy 4, no. 1 (1997): 18-36.
50. Daniel Drache and Meric Gertler, eds., The New Era of Global Competition: State Policy and Market Power (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991) and Susan Strange, "The Defective State," Daedalus 124, no. 2 (1995): 55-74.
51. Given the continuing importance of national sovereignty within the European multilevel system, this would appear to be more promising than supranational harmonization efforts. See Peter Behrens, "Die Konvergenz der wirtschaftlichen Freiheiten im europäischen Gesmeinschaftsrecht," Europarecht 2 (1992): 145-162 and Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia, "Judicial Politics in the European Community: European Integration and the Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 4 (1994): 535-561.
52. Given the continuing importance of national sovereignty within the European multilevel system, this would appear to be more promising than supranational harmonization efforts. See Peter Behrens, "Die Konvergenz der wirtschaftlichen Freiheiten im europäischen Gesmeinschaftsrecht," Europarecht 2 (1992): 145-162 and Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia, "Judicial Politics in the European Community: European Integration and the Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 4 (1994): 535-561.
53. Martin Rhodes, "Globalisation, Labour Markets and Welfare States: A Future of Competitive Corporatism?" in Martin Rhodes and Yves Mény, eds., The Future of European Welfare: A New Social Contract? (London: Macmillan, 1997).
54. Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) and Andrew Moravcsik, "Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation" (paper presented at the Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, May 1994).
55. Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) and Andrew Moravcsik, "Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation" (paper presented at the Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, May 1994).
56. On the following compare Peter A. Hall and Robert J. Franzese, Jr., Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage-Bargaining and European Monetary Union, unpublished manuscript (1996).
57. Colin Crouch, "Conditions for Trade Union Wage Restraint," in Leon N. Lindberg and Charles S. Maier, eds., The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), 105-139.
58. Jean-Jacques Danis and Reiner Hoffman, "From the Vredeling Directive to the European Works Council Directive: Some Historical Remarks," Transfer 1, no. 2 (1995): 180-187 and Mark Hall, Legislating for Employee Participation: A Case Study of the European Works Councils Directive, Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations No. 39 (Warwick: University of Warwick, Industrial Relations Research Unit, School of Industrial and Business Studies, 1992).
59. Jean-Jacques Danis and Reiner Hoffman, "From the Vredeling Directive to the European Works Council Directive: Some Historical Remarks," Transfer 1, no. 2 (1995): 180-187 and Mark Hall, Legislating for Employee Participation: A Case Study of the European Works Councils Directive, Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations No. 39 (Warwick: University of Warwick, Industrial Relations Research Unit, School of Industrial and Business Studies, 1992).
60. Streeck, Citizenship under Regime Competition.
61. Hubert Krieger and Pascale Bonneton, "Analysis of Existing Voluntary Agreements on Information and Consultation in European Multinationals," Transfer 1, no. 2 (1995): 188-206 and Pascale Bonneton et al., eda., Analysis of Existing Agreements on Information and Consultation in European Multinationals (Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, 1996).
62. Hubert Krieger and Pascale Bonneton, "Analysis of Existing Voluntary Agreements on Information and Consultation in European Multinationals," Transfer 1, no. 2 (1995): 188-206 and Pascale Bonneton et al., eda., Analysis of Existing Agreements on Information and Consultation in European Multinationals (Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, 1996).
63. Streeck, Citizenship under Regime Competition.
64. There is, in addition, the possibility of European union confederations at the intersectoral as well as the sectoral level, acting as promoters of institutional convergence by influencing the negotiations between management and labor on European representation arrangements at the company level. Establishing the importance of this factor requires detailed research.
65. This part of my argument is informed by current research by Ute Knaak.
66. John T. Addison and Stanley Siebert, "Recent Developments in Social Policy in the New European Union," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 48 no 1 (1994): 5-27.
67. Bernhard Bockmann, "Das Verhandlungsverfahren nach dem Maastrichter Sozialpolitischen Abkommen," in Peter Oberender and Manfred E. Streit, eds., Europas Arbeitsmärkte im Integrationsprozeß (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995) 193-211.
68. See the annex of the Council Directive on the Framework Agreement on Parental Leave Concluded by UNICE, CEEP, and the ETUC, COM (96) 26 final 31.1.1996.
69. See the annex of the Proposal for a Council Directive on the Framework Agreement on Part-Time Work Concluded by UNICE, CEEP, and the ETUC, COM (97) 392 final 23.7.1997.
70. Gerda Falkner, "The Euro-Agreement on Parental Leave: Towards Corporatism in European Social Policy?" (paper presented at the 8th International Colloquium of Politiques et Management Public, Paris, June 20-21, 1996).
71. Bernd Keller and Bernd Sörries, "The New Social Dialogue: New Concepts First Results and Future Perspectives" (paper presented at the 5th European Regional Conference of the International Industrial Relations Association, Dublin, Ireland, August 26-29, 1997).
72. Armin Höland, "Partnerschaftliche Setzung und Durchführung von Recht in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft", Zeitschrift für internationales Arbeits-und Sozialrecht 9 (1995): 425-451.
73. I am drawing here on work of Werner Eichhorst. "Posted workers" are temporarily sent ("posted") by their employer to a second country for work on behalf of their employer. Unlike migrant workers who take up employment in the country where they work, posted workers bring an existing employment relationship with them as they cross the border. In European law, the migration of workers is considered a matter of "freedom of movement" (which by now is basically unlimited within the European Union), whereas the postine of workers concerns the freedom for firms of service provision. Unlike migration the posting of workers raises fundamental questions regarding the territorial integrity of national employment regimes: do workers who work in a given country have to be paid "the wage of the land," or can they be paid under an exterritorial labor regime under which they are legally employed? If the latter was the case, construction firms from low-wage countries such as Portugal could win contracts in high-wage countries by moving workforces that are paid Portuguese wages from the former to the latter, preempting national legislation and undermining collective bargaining in the receiving country.
74. Directive 96/71/EC of December 16, 1996, on the Posting of Workers in the Framework of Provision of Services, EC Official Journal L 18, p. 1ff, of January 21, 1997.
75. Marco Biagi, "Fortune Smiles on the Italian EU Presidency: Talking Half-Seriously about the Posted Workers and Parental Leave Directives," International Journal of Comparative Labour Law 2, no. 2 (1996): 97-109.
76. Alain Desmazières de Séchelles, "Free Movement of Workers and Freedom to Provide Services," in Henry G. Schermers et al., eds., Free Movement of Persons in Europe (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Nijhoff, 1993), 472-484.
77. ECJ Judgements Seco/Desquenne/Giral and Seco/EVI of February 3, 1982, Cases 62/81 and 63/81; ECJ Judgement Rush Portuguesa/OMI of March 27, 1990, Case 113/89; ECJ Judgement Vander E1st/OMI of August 9, 1994, Case 43/93.
78. Law No. 93-1313 of December 20, 1993. IDS European Report 397, January 1995, pp. 18-19.
79. See also Bernd Sörries, "Die Entsenderichtlinie: Entscheidungsprozeß und Rückkopplungen im Mehrebenensystem," Industrielle Beziehungen 4, no. 2 (1997): 125-149.
80. Gesetz über zwingende Arbeitsbedingungen bei grenz berschreitenden Dienstleistungen, February 26, 1996, Bundesgesetzblatt 1996, Teil I, Nr. 11 vom 29.2.96, pp. 227ff. See Frank Lorenz, Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz (AEntG) - Gesetztestext und Materialien (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996) and Peter Hanau, "Das Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz," Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 49 (1997): 1369-1373.
81. Gesetz über zwingende Arbeitsbedingungen bei grenz berschreitenden Dienstleistungen, February 26, 1996, Bundesgesetzblatt 1996, Teil I, Nr. 11 vom 29.2.96, pp. 227ff. See Frank Lorenz, Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz (AEntG) - Gesetztestext und Materialien (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996) and Peter Hanau, "Das Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz," Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 49 (1997): 1369-1373.
82. Gesetz über zwingende Arbeitsbedingungen bei grenz berschreitenden Dienstleistungen, February 26, 1996, Bundesgesetzblatt 1996, Teil I, Nr. 11 vom 29.2.96, pp. 227ff. See Frank Lorenz, Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz (AEntG) - Gesetztestext und Materialien (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996) and Peter Hanau, "Das Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz," Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 49 (1997): 1369-1373.
83. See various editions of European Industrial Relations Report (EIRR), especially No. 267, April 1996, p. 7; No. 268, May 1996, pp. 14-15; No. 269, June 1996, pp. 6f.; No. 271, August 1996, p. 6f.; No. 273, October 1996, p. 5.
84. See various editions of European Industrial Relations Report (EIRR), especially No. 267, April 1996, p. 7; No. 268, May 1996, pp. 14-15; No. 269, June 1996, pp. 6f.; No. 271, August 1996, p. 6f.; No. 273, October 1996, p. 5.
85. See various editions of European Industrial Relations Report (EIRR), especially No. 267, April 1996, p. 7; No. 268, May 1996, pp. 14-15; No. 269, June 1996, pp. 6f.; No. 271, August 1996, p. 6f.; No. 273, October 1996, p. 5.
86. See various editions of European Industrial Relations Report (EIRR), especially No. 267, April 1996, p. 7; No. 268, May 1996, pp. 14-15; No. 269, June 1996, pp. 6f.; No. 271, August 1996, p. 6f.; No. 273, October 1996, p. 5.
87. See various editions of European Industrial Relations Report (EIRR), especially No. 267, April 1996, p. 7; No. 268, May 1996, pp. 14-15; No. 269, June 1996, pp. 6f.; No. 271, August 1996, p. 6f.; No. 273, October 1996, p. 5.