Repeated proximity games

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 539-559

  Renault, Jérôme ^a   Tomala, Tristan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE   (France)

Author keywords

Folk theorem; Graphs; Imperfect monitoring; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038902130     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820050089     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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3. Fudenberg D, Levine D (1991) An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information. J. of Economic Theory 54:26-47
4. Kuhn HW (1953) Extensive games and the problem of information. In: Kuhn HW Tucker AW (eds.) Contributions to the theory of games, vol. 2, Annals of Mathematical Studies 28, Princeton University Press
5. Lehrer E (1990) Nash equilibria of n-player repeated games with semi-standard information. Int. J. Game Theory 19:191-217
6. Lehrer E (1991) Internal correlation in repeated games. Int. J. Game Theory 19:431-456
7. Mertens JF, Sorin S, Zamir S (1994) Repeated games, Part A, Background material. CORE Discussion Paper, 9420
8. Sorin S (1992) Repeated games with complete information. Aumann R, Hart S (eds.) Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, vol. 1, Ch. 4, North-Holland, pp. 71-107