Network Mechanisms, Informational Efficiency, and Hierarchies

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 79, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 106-141

  Marschak, Thomas ^a   Reichelstein, Stefan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038752763     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2375     Document Type: Article

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