The design of liability rules for highly risky activities - Is strict liability superior when risk allocation matters?

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 31-47

  Nell, Martin ^a   Richter, Andreas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Negligence; Risk allocation; Strict liability

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038692285     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(03)00012-7     Document Type: Article

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