Agent's liability versus principal's liability when attitudes toward risk differ

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 181-195

  Privileggi, Fabio ^a   Marchese, Carla ^b   Cassone, Alberto ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EASTERN PIEDMONT   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GENOA   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037678347     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(01)00055-2     Document Type: Article

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