Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 1-24

  Dubey, Pradeep ^a   Haimanko, Ori ^b  

^a STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b BEN GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV   (Israel)

Author keywords

Multi period tournaments; Subgame perfect equilibria; Undominated sample sizes

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038405036     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00546-8     Document Type: Review

References (10)

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