More monitoring can induce less effort

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 113-123

  Cowen, Tyler ^a   Glazer, Amihai ^b  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Monitoring; Principal agent problems

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030186734     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(96)00845-1     Document Type: Article

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