Rationality, cooperation, and common pool resources

American Behavioral Scientist

Volumn 45, Issue 5, 2002, Pages 801-819+763

  Schlager, Edella ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038385978     PISSN: 00027642     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0002764202045005005     Document Type: Review

References (28)

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