NATO in Russia's relations with the West

Security Dialogue

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 281-296

  MacFarlane, S Neil ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0038330727     PISSN: 09670106     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0967010601032003002     Document Type: Article

References (45)

1. The claim is made in The Alliance's Strategic Concept (Brussels: NATO, 1999), paragraph 10. NATO's consideration of wider roles in regional security dates back at least to the Oslo Declaration of 4 June 1992, in which the Alliance noted the need for an interlocking framework of security institutions, supported the intention of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to declare itself to be a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and stated its willingness to support CSCE peacekeeping materially. 'Oslo Declaration' (Brussels: NATO, 1992).
2. The claim is made in The Alliance's Strategic Concept (Brussels: NATO, 1999), paragraph 10. NATO's consideration of wider roles in regional security dates back at least to the Oslo Declaration of 4 June 1992, in which the Alliance noted the need for an interlocking framework of security institutions, supported the intention of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to declare itself to be a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and stated its willingness to support CSCE peacekeeping materially. 'Oslo Declaration' (Brussels: NATO, 1992).
3. Dmitrii Trenin, 'Russia and the West: Avoiding Complications', International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 42, no. 1, January-February 1996, pp. 30-38, on p. 30.
4. Oksana Antonenko, 'Russia, NATO and European Security after Kosovo', Survival, vol. 41, no. 4, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 124-144, on p. 124.
5. Soviet defence expenditure in 1990 was approximately $128.78 billion; in 1999, Russian defence spending was $56 billion (the defence budget being $31 billion). Manpower levels, meanwhile, dropped from 2.7 million active personnel in 1992 to 1.004 million in 2000. IISS, Military Balance 1992-1993 and 2000-2001 (London: Brasseys, for the IISS, 1992; Oxford University Press for the IISS, 2000). These figures reflect purchasing-power parity, rather than market exchange rates, because of continuing distortion of the relationship between market prices and exchange rates in many transition economies and because market exchange rates can result in 'excessively low dollar-conversion rates for GDP and defence expenditure' (Military Balance, 2000-2001, p. 11).
6. For a profile of Russia's economic decline during the 1990s, see World Bank, 'Russian Federation at a Glance', available at http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/ aag/russia/.
7. After a substantial contraction in 1998, the Russian economy resumed growth in 1999 at 3.2% (World Bank, note 5 above). In 2000, growth accelerated, reflecting increases in energy prices, but also import substitution owing to the depreciation of the rouble. The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade reported that Russia's GDP increased by 7.7% in 2000 (see documents in Russian at http://www.economy.gov.ru/ god2000/god2000.html); in the first quarter of 2001, the growth was only 4.9% compared to the same period of 2000 (see The Economist, 14-20 July 2001, p. 102).
8. After a substantial contraction in 1998, the Russian economy resumed growth in 1999 at 3.2% (World Bank, note 5 above). In 2000, growth accelerated, reflecting increases in energy prices, but also import substitution owing to the depreciation of the rouble. The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade reported that Russia's GDP increased by 7.7% in 2000 (see documents in Russian at http://www.economy.gov.ru/ god2000/god2000.html); in the first quarter of 2001, the growth was only 4.9% compared to the same period of 2000 (see The Economist, 14-20 July 2001, p. 102).
9. For a summary, see IISS, The Military Balance, 2000-2001 (note 4 above), pp. 109-110. In June 2001, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov noted, however, that 'in the most optimistic scenarios, the first fruits of this reform will be felt in 2004-5'. Agence France Presse, Moscow, 25 June 2001.
10. For a summary, see IISS, The Military Balance, 2000-2001 (note 4 above), pp. 109-110. In June 2001, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov noted, however, that 'in the most optimistic scenarios, the first fruits of this reform will be felt in 2004-5'. Agence France Presse, Moscow, 25 June 2001.
11. Pavel Baev, 'Selective Engagement and Permanent Crisis', in David Haglund, What NATO for Canada, Martello Paper No. 23 (Kingston: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, 2000), pp. 37-52, on p. 39.
12. See Anatol Lieven, 'The Weakness of Russian Nationalism', Survival, vol. 41, no. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 53-70.
13. See Vladimir Baranovsky, 'Russia: Insider or Outsider?', International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 46, no. 3, July 2000, pp. 443-459, on pp. 443-445.
14. Lev Gumilev, Ot Rusi do Rossii [From Rus to Russia] (Moscow: Svarog I K, 1998).
15. In my files, I have a copy (given to me by a Georgian official) of 'The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on Setting the Strategic Course of the Russian Federation Towards the Member-States of the Commonwealth of Independent States', 9(40) (14 September 1995), pp. 1-8. For an eloquent exposition of this theme, see 'Vozroditsya li Soyuz? Budushchee Postsovetskogo Prostranstva' [Will the Union Be Reborn? The Future of Post-Soviet Space], Theses of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 May 1996.
16. In my files, I have a copy (given to me by a Georgian official) of 'The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on Setting the Strategic Course of the Russian Federation Towards the Member-States of the Commonwealth of Independent States', 9(40) (14 September 1995), pp. 1-8. For an eloquent exposition of this theme, see 'Vozroditsya li Soyuz? Budushchee Postsovetskogo Prostranstva' [Will the Union Be Reborn? The Future of Post-Soviet Space], Theses of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 May 1996.
17. For an exposition of the official Russian view on NATO enlargement, see the remarks of Sergei Ivanov (then Secretary of Security Council and now Defence Minister) in 'Security Chief Restates Opposition to NATO Expansion' (Interfax, 30 January 2001), in BBC Monitoring, Summary of World Broadcasts: Former USSR, 31 January 2001, on p. 18.
18. For an exposition of the official Russian view on NATO enlargement, see the remarks of Sergei Ivanov (then Secretary of Security Council and now Defence Minister) in 'Security Chief Restates Opposition to NATO Expansion' (Interfax, 30 January 2001), in BBC Monitoring, Summary of World Broadcasts: Former USSR, 31 January 2001, on p. 18.
19. Andrei Kortunov, 'NATO Enlargement and Russia: In Search of an Adequate Response', in David G. Haglund, ed., Will NATO Go East? The Debate over Enlarging the Alliance (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996), pp. 69-92, on p. 69.
20. 'Opinion Analysis', Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA (24 January 1997) and Public Opinion Foundation Poll, 10-11 July 1999; as cited in Margot Light, Stephen White & John Lowenhardt, 'A Wider Europe: the View from Moscow and Kyiv', International Affairs, vol. 76, no. 1, January 2000, pp. 77-88, on p. 80.
21. 'Opinion Analysis', Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA (24 January 1997) and Public Opinion Foundation Poll, 10-11 July 1999; as cited in Margot Light, Stephen White & John Lowenhardt, 'A Wider Europe: the View from Moscow and Kyiv', International Affairs, vol. 76, no. 1, January 2000, pp. 77-88, on p. 80.
22. 'Opinion Analysis', Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA (24 January 1997) and Public Opinion Foundation Poll, 10-11 July 1999; as cited in Margot Light, Stephen White & John Lowenhardt, 'A Wider Europe: the View from Moscow and Kyiv', International Affairs, vol. 76, no. 1, January 2000, pp. 77-88, on p. 80.
23. Ibid.
24. 'The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation' (28 June 2000), p. 2; available in Russian at http://www.ln.mid.ru/website/ns-osndoc.nsf/osnvnpol.
25. S. Oznobyshev (sic), 'Discussions about NATO', International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 42, no. 3, 1996, pp. 133-140, on p. 137.
26. On this point see the European Council's Helsinki Declaration of 10-11 December 1999, in which the Union acknowledged the primary role of the UN Security Council in security matters (paragraph 26), but said nothing about the requirement for UN mandates for EU deployments in peace enforcement. Instead, although cooperation with other institutions is deemed desirable, EU documentation emphasizes the 'determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions' and to 'launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises' (paragraph 27). 'Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council (10 and 11 December 1999)' (Brussels: EU, 1999).
27. Trenin (note 2 above), p. 37.
28. See Steven L. Burg & Paul Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 146-288.
29. See 'Interview with Andrei Kozyrev', Radio Moscow, in FBIS-SOV-94-027, 9/2/1994.
30. Interviews with NATO officials and NATO mission personnel, Brussels, 2000.
31. See Leontii Shevtsov, 'Russia-NATO Military Cooperation in Bosnia: A Basis for the Future?', NATO Review, vol. 45, no. 2, March 1997, pp. 17-21.
32. Interviews at NATO headquarters, March 1999.
33. 'The Foreign Policy Concept' (note 17 above), p. 8. The document goes on to warn, however, that 'co-operation with NATO will depend on its compliance with key clauses of [the Founding Act]' and affirms that NATO guidelines 'do not coincide with security interests of the Russian Federation and occasionally contradict them'. In this respect, it cites those provisions of the strategic concept that permit the use of force outside the Alliance area without a mandate from the UN Security Council, and goes on to declare that cooperation is possible only on 'the foundation of a due respect for the interests of the two sides and the unconditional fulfilment of mutual obligations assumed' (p. 9).
34. For example, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov assessed the results of the December 2000 PJC meeting 'positively' and agreed that 'dialogue within the framework of Russia-NATO co-operation has generally been developing in a favourable way'. He noted, however, that 'productive co-operation' between Russia and NATO was possible only through strict observance of international law, US Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty obligations and the Founding Act. 'Transcript of Remarks by the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Press Conference on the Results of the Meeting of the Russia-NATO PJC, December 15, 2000', available at http://www.ln.mid.ru/website/brp_4.nsf/ e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/b3382641f7d9e133432569b9005b3ed9?OpenDocu ment.
35. Cooperation with China quickened in May and June 2000, both in the campaign against missile defence and on regional security in Central Asia, where Russia and China joined Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in forming the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to address the problem of Islamic militancy. See 'Shanghai Five Mulls Expansion in Search of Regional Stability', Eurasia Insight, 14 June 2001, available at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav061401.shtml. See also Andrew Higgins, 'Bloc Including China, Russia Challenges U.S. in Central Asia: Members Agree to Combat Islamic Groups and Share Intelligence', Wall Street Journal, 18 June 2001.
36. Cooperation with China quickened in May and June 2000, both in the campaign against missile defence and on regional security in Central Asia, where Russia and China joined Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in forming the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to address the problem of Islamic militancy. See 'Shanghai Five Mulls Expansion in Search of Regional Stability', Eurasia Insight, 14 June 2001, available at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav061401.shtml. See also Andrew Higgins, 'Bloc Including China, Russia Challenges U.S. in Central Asia: Members Agree to Combat Islamic Groups and Share Intelligence', Wall Street Journal, 18 June 2001.
37. For a succinct treatment of this point, see Sarah Mendelson, 'Russia: A Dangerous Place', Heritage Lectures, no. 690, 20 October 2000, pp. 4-5.
38. 'The Foreign Policy Concept' (note 17 above), p. 9.
39. Aleksei Pushkov, 'A Compromise with NATO?', International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 43, no. 3, 1997, pp. 13-22, on p. 19.
40. For a useful and succinct account of the difficulties surrounding the Kaliningrad exclave in the context of EU enlargement, see James Baxendale, Stephen Dewar & David Gowan, The EU and Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad and the Impact of EU Enlargement (London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2000), pp. 13-16.
41. The latest version of Russian military doctrine puts 'attempts to weaken (ignore) the existing mechanism for safeguarding international security (primarily, the United Nations and the OSCE)' at the top of its list of contingencies that exert a destabilizing impact on the state's military-political situation. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 April 2000.
42. See, for example, the interview with Igor Stroev (then Chairman of the Federation Council), 'Russia Is Moving towards a New Society', International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 43, no. 1, 1997, pp. 1-10, on pp. 7-8; and Boris Kazantsev (Deputy Director of the European Co-operation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 'NATO Moving East: An Aftertaste', International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 44, no. 1, 1998, pp. 32-38, on pp. 33-34.
43. See, for example, the interview with Igor Stroev (then Chairman of the Federation Council), 'Russia Is Moving towards a New Society', International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 43, no. 1, 1997, pp. 1-10, on pp. 7-8; and Boris Kazantsev (Deputy Director of the European Co-operation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 'NATO Moving East: An Aftertaste', International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 44, no. 1, 1998, pp. 32-38, on pp. 33-34.
44. Indeed, in the one remaining area of potential NATO intervention (Macedonia), Russian interests and policy largely coincide with those of NATO.
45. For a Russian argument along these lines, see Ambassador Yurii Rakhmaninov, 'The Reasons for and Possible Consequences of NATO Expansion', International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 42, no. 4, 1996, pp. 4-15, on p. 13.