In-house competition, organizational slack, and the business cycle

European Economic Review

Volumn 47, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 505-520

  Kerschbamer, Rudolf ^a,b,c   Tournas, Yanni ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF INNSBRUCK   (Austria)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^d RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Capacity; Competition; Demand uncertainty; Organizational slack

Indexed keywords

BUSINESS CYCLE; COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK; QUOTA SYSTEM;

EID: 0038291761     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(02)00185-X     Document Type: Article

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