Autonomy's end: Nuclear power and the privatization of the British electricity supply industry

Social Studies of Science

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 439-467

  Winskel, Mark ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Electricity generation; Liberalization; Nuclear power; Technocracy; Technological autonomy; Technological determinism

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038275887     PISSN: 03063127     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0306312702032003004     Document Type: Review

References (193)

1. David Edgerton, 'Tilting at Paper Tigers', British Journal for the History of Science, Vol. 26 (1993), 67-75.
2. The definition of technocracy is adapted from Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 17. Merrit Roe Smith has stated that 'the belief in technology as the governing force in society dates back at least to the early stages of the Industrial Revolution': see Merrit Roe Smith, 'Technological Determinism in American Culture', in Merrit Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds), Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 2-35, at 2. Technological autonomy and determinism were perhaps most prominently articulated by Jacques Ellul in The Technological Society (New York: Vintage, 1964), and by Herbert Marcuse in One Dimensional Man (London: Sphere, 1968). For more recent analyses of the concepts of autonomy, determinism, and technocracy see Larry A. Hickman (ed.), Technology as a Human Affair (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990); Bruce Bimber, 'Karl Marx and the Three Faces of Technological Determinism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May 1990), 333-51; Miguel Angel Centeno, 'The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy', Theory and Society, Vol. 22 (1993), 307-35; Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay (eds), Technology and the Politics of Knowledge (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); and Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999); Y.M. Carlisle and D.J. Manning, 'Ideological Persuasion and Technological Determinism', Technology in Society, Vol. 21 (1999), 81-102; James B. McOmber, 'Technological Autonomy and Three Definitions of Technology', Journal of Communication, Vol. 49 (1999), 137-53.
3. The definition of technocracy is adapted from Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 17. Merrit Roe Smith has stated that 'the belief in technology as the governing force in society dates back at least to the early stages of the Industrial Revolution': see Merrit Roe Smith, 'Technological Determinism in American Culture', in Merrit Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds), Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 2-35, at 2. Technological autonomy and determinism were perhaps most prominently articulated by Jacques Ellul in The Technological Society (New York: Vintage, 1964), and by Herbert Marcuse in One Dimensional Man (London: Sphere, 1968). For more recent analyses of the concepts of autonomy, determinism, and technocracy see Larry A. Hickman (ed.), Technology as a Human Affair (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990); Bruce Bimber, 'Karl Marx and the Three Faces of Technological Determinism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May 1990), 333-51; Miguel Angel Centeno, 'The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy', Theory and Society, Vol. 22 (1993), 307-35; Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay (eds), Technology and the Politics of Knowledge (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); and Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999); Y.M. Carlisle and D.J. Manning, 'Ideological Persuasion and Technological Determinism', Technology in Society, Vol. 21 (1999), 81-102; James B. McOmber, 'Technological Autonomy and Three Definitions of Technology', Journal of Communication, Vol. 49 (1999), 137-53.
4. The definition of technocracy is adapted from Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 17. Merrit Roe Smith has stated that 'the belief in technology as the governing force in society dates back at least to the early stages of the Industrial Revolution': see Merrit Roe Smith, 'Technological Determinism in American Culture', in Merrit Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds), Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 2-35, at 2. Technological autonomy and determinism were perhaps most prominently articulated by Jacques Ellul in The Technological Society (New York: Vintage, 1964), and by Herbert Marcuse in One Dimensional Man (London: Sphere, 1968). For more recent analyses of the concepts of autonomy, determinism, and technocracy see Larry A. Hickman (ed.), Technology as a Human Affair (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990); Bruce Bimber, 'Karl Marx and the Three Faces of Technological Determinism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May 1990), 333-51; Miguel Angel Centeno, 'The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy', Theory and Society, Vol. 22 (1993), 307-35; Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay (eds), Technology and the Politics of Knowledge (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); and Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999); Y.M. Carlisle and D.J. Manning, 'Ideological Persuasion and Technological Determinism', Technology in Society, Vol. 21 (1999), 81-102; James B. McOmber, 'Technological Autonomy and Three Definitions of Technology', Journal of Communication, Vol. 49 (1999), 137-53.
5. The definition of technocracy is adapted from Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 17. Merrit Roe Smith has stated that 'the belief in technology as the governing force in society dates back at least to the early stages of the Industrial Revolution': see Merrit Roe Smith, 'Technological Determinism in American Culture', in Merrit Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds), Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 2-35, at 2. Technological autonomy and determinism were perhaps most prominently articulated by Jacques Ellul in The Technological Society (New York: Vintage, 1964), and by Herbert Marcuse in One Dimensional Man (London: Sphere, 1968). For more recent analyses of the concepts of autonomy, determinism, and technocracy see Larry A. Hickman (ed.), Technology as a Human Affair (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990); Bruce Bimber, 'Karl Marx and the Three Faces of Technological Determinism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May 1990), 333-51; Miguel Angel Centeno, 'The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy', Theory and Society, Vol. 22 (1993), 307-35; Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay (eds), Technology and the Politics of Knowledge (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); and Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999); Y.M. Carlisle and D.J. Manning, 'Ideological Persuasion and Technological Determinism', Technology in Society, Vol. 21 (1999), 81-102; James B. McOmber, 'Technological Autonomy and Three Definitions of Technology', Journal of Communication, Vol. 49 (1999), 137-53.
6. The definition of technocracy is adapted from Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 17. Merrit Roe Smith has stated that 'the belief in technology as the governing force in society dates back at least to the early stages of the Industrial Revolution': see Merrit Roe Smith, 'Technological Determinism in American Culture', in Merrit Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds), Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 2-35, at 2. Technological autonomy and determinism were perhaps most prominently articulated by Jacques Ellul in The Technological Society (New York: Vintage, 1964), and by Herbert Marcuse in One Dimensional Man (London: Sphere, 1968). For more recent analyses of the concepts of autonomy, determinism, and technocracy see Larry A. Hickman (ed.), Technology as a Human Affair (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990); Bruce Bimber, 'Karl Marx and the Three Faces of Technological Determinism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May 1990), 333-51; Miguel Angel Centeno, 'The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy', Theory and Society, Vol. 22 (1993), 307-35; Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay (eds), Technology and the Politics of Knowledge (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); and Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999); Y.M. Carlisle and D.J. Manning, 'Ideological Persuasion and Technological Determinism', Technology in Society, Vol. 21 (1999), 81-102; James B. McOmber, 'Technological Autonomy and Three Definitions of Technology', Journal of Communication, Vol. 49 (1999), 137-53.
7. The definition of technocracy is adapted from Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 17. Merrit Roe Smith has stated that 'the belief in technology as the governing force in society dates back at least to the early stages of the Industrial Revolution': see Merrit Roe Smith, 'Technological Determinism in American Culture', in Merrit Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds), Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 2-35, at 2. Technological autonomy and determinism were perhaps most prominently articulated by Jacques Ellul in The Technological Society (New York: Vintage, 1964), and by Herbert Marcuse in One Dimensional Man (London: Sphere, 1968). For more recent analyses of the concepts of autonomy, determinism, and technocracy see Larry A. Hickman (ed.), Technology as a Human Affair (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990); Bruce Bimber, 'Karl Marx and the Three Faces of Technological Determinism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May 1990), 333-51; Miguel Angel Centeno, 'The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy', Theory and Society, Vol. 22 (1993), 307-35; Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay (eds), Technology and the Politics of Knowledge (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); and Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999); Y.M. Carlisle and D.J. Manning, 'Ideological Persuasion and Technological Determinism', Technology in Society, Vol. 21 (1999), 81-102; James B. McOmber, 'Technological Autonomy and Three Definitions of Technology', Journal of Communication, Vol. 49 (1999), 137-53.
8. The definition of technocracy is adapted from Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 17. Merrit Roe Smith has stated that 'the belief in technology as the governing force in society dates back at least to the early stages of the Industrial Revolution': see Merrit Roe Smith, 'Technological Determinism in American Culture', in Merrit Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds), Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 2-35, at 2. Technological autonomy and determinism were perhaps most prominently articulated by Jacques Ellul in The Technological Society (New York: Vintage, 1964), and by Herbert Marcuse in One Dimensional Man (London: Sphere, 1968). For more recent analyses of the concepts of autonomy, determinism, and technocracy see Larry A. Hickman (ed.), Technology as a Human Affair (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990); Bruce Bimber, 'Karl Marx and the Three Faces of Technological Determinism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May 1990), 333-51; Miguel Angel Centeno, 'The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy', Theory and Society, Vol. 22 (1993), 307-35; Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay (eds), Technology and the Politics of Knowledge (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); and Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999); Y.M. Carlisle and D.J. Manning, 'Ideological Persuasion and Technological Determinism', Technology in Society, Vol. 21 (1999), 81-102; James B. McOmber, 'Technological Autonomy and Three Definitions of Technology', Journal of Communication, Vol. 49 (1999), 137-53.
9. The definition of technocracy is adapted from Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 17. Merrit Roe Smith has stated that 'the belief in technology as the governing force in society dates back at least to the early stages of the Industrial Revolution': see Merrit Roe Smith, 'Technological Determinism in American Culture', in Merrit Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds), Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 2-35, at 2. Technological autonomy and determinism were perhaps most prominently articulated by Jacques Ellul in The Technological Society (New York: Vintage, 1964), and by Herbert Marcuse in One Dimensional Man (London: Sphere, 1968). For more recent analyses of the concepts of autonomy, determinism, and technocracy see Larry A. Hickman (ed.), Technology as a Human Affair (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990); Bruce Bimber, 'Karl Marx and the Three Faces of Technological Determinism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May 1990), 333-51; Miguel Angel Centeno, 'The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy', Theory and Society, Vol. 22 (1993), 307-35; Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay (eds), Technology and the Politics of Knowledge (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); and Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999); Y.M. Carlisle and D.J. Manning, 'Ideological Persuasion and Technological Determinism', Technology in Society, Vol. 21 (1999), 81-102; James B. McOmber, 'Technological Autonomy and Three Definitions of Technology', Journal of Communication, Vol. 49 (1999), 137-53.
10. The definition of technocracy is adapted from Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 17. Merrit Roe Smith has stated that 'the belief in technology as the governing force in society dates back at least to the early stages of the Industrial Revolution': see Merrit Roe Smith, 'Technological Determinism in American Culture', in Merrit Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds), Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 2-35, at 2. Technological autonomy and determinism were perhaps most prominently articulated by Jacques Ellul in The Technological Society (New York: Vintage, 1964), and by Herbert Marcuse in One Dimensional Man (London: Sphere, 1968). For more recent analyses of the concepts of autonomy, determinism, and technocracy see Larry A. Hickman (ed.), Technology as a Human Affair (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990); Bruce Bimber, 'Karl Marx and the Three Faces of Technological Determinism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May 1990), 333-51; Miguel Angel Centeno, 'The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy', Theory and Society, Vol. 22 (1993), 307-35; Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay (eds), Technology and the Politics of Knowledge (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); and Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999); Y.M. Carlisle and D.J. Manning, 'Ideological Persuasion and Technological Determinism', Technology in Society, Vol. 21 (1999), 81-102; James B. McOmber, 'Technological Autonomy and Three Definitions of Technology', Journal of Communication, Vol. 49 (1999), 137-53.
11. The definition of technocracy is adapted from Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 17. Merrit Roe Smith has stated that 'the belief in technology as the governing force in society dates back at least to the early stages of the Industrial Revolution': see Merrit Roe Smith, 'Technological Determinism in American Culture', in Merrit Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds), Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 2-35, at 2. Technological autonomy and determinism were perhaps most prominently articulated by Jacques Ellul in The Technological Society (New York: Vintage, 1964), and by Herbert Marcuse in One Dimensional Man (London: Sphere, 1968). For more recent analyses of the concepts of autonomy, determinism, and technocracy see Larry A. Hickman (ed.), Technology as a Human Affair (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990); Bruce Bimber, 'Karl Marx and the Three Faces of Technological Determinism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May 1990), 333-51; Miguel Angel Centeno, 'The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy', Theory and Society, Vol. 22 (1993), 307-35; Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay (eds), Technology and the Politics of Knowledge (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); and Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999); Y.M. Carlisle and D.J. Manning, 'Ideological Persuasion and Technological Determinism', Technology in Society, Vol. 21 (1999), 81-102; James B. McOmber, 'Technological Autonomy and Three Definitions of Technology', Journal of Communication, Vol. 49 (1999), 137-53.
12. The definition of technocracy is adapted from Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 17. Merrit Roe Smith has stated that 'the belief in technology as the governing force in society dates back at least to the early stages of the Industrial Revolution': see Merrit Roe Smith, 'Technological Determinism in American Culture', in Merrit Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds), Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 2-35, at 2. Technological autonomy and determinism were perhaps most prominently articulated by Jacques Ellul in The Technological Society (New York: Vintage, 1964), and by Herbert Marcuse in One Dimensional Man (London: Sphere, 1968). For more recent analyses of the concepts of autonomy, determinism, and technocracy see Larry A. Hickman (ed.), Technology as a Human Affair (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990); Bruce Bimber, 'Karl Marx and the Three Faces of Technological Determinism', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May 1990), 333-51; Miguel Angel Centeno, 'The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy', Theory and Society, Vol. 22 (1993), 307-35; Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay (eds), Technology and the Politics of Knowledge (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); and Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999); Y.M. Carlisle and D.J. Manning, 'Ideological Persuasion and Technological Determinism', Technology in Society, Vol. 21 (1999), 81-102; James B. McOmber, 'Technological Autonomy and Three Definitions of Technology', Journal of Communication, Vol. 49 (1999), 137-53.
13. British Energy, who now own most of the UK's nuclear stations, suggested that nuclear power provided 'a focus for a well established "technophobia" which has existed since the start of the industrial revolution': HC Trade and Industry Committee, Fifth Report, Energy Policy, HC 471 (1997-98), Vol. II, 186. Many contributions to energy policy debates in the 1970s and 1980s implicitly supported notions of autonomy and determinism, in that they diagnosed the energy crisis as almost entirely an outcome of mistaken technology choices. See, for example, Amory B. Lovins, Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace (Harmondsworth, Middx, UK: Penguin, 1977). Others, such as David Collingridge, whilst stressing that their adoption was a matter of social choice, discussed the 'dilemma of control', and 'unwanted social consequences' of technologies such as nuclear power: see David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (London: Pinter, 1980).
14. British Energy, who now own most of the UK's nuclear stations, suggested that nuclear power provided 'a focus for a well established "technophobia" which has existed since the start of the industrial revolution': HC Trade and Industry Committee, Fifth Report, Energy Policy, HC 471 (1997-98), Vol. II, 186. Many contributions to energy policy debates in the 1970s and 1980s implicitly supported notions of autonomy and determinism, in that they diagnosed the energy crisis as almost entirely an outcome of mistaken technology choices. See, for example, Amory B. Lovins, Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace (Harmondsworth, Middx, UK: Penguin, 1977). Others, such as David Collingridge, whilst stressing that their adoption was a matter of social choice, discussed the 'dilemma of control', and 'unwanted social consequences' of technologies such as nuclear power: see David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (London: Pinter, 1980).
15. British Energy, who now own most of the UK's nuclear stations, suggested that nuclear power provided 'a focus for a well established "technophobia" which has existed since the start of the industrial revolution': HC Trade and Industry Committee, Fifth Report, Energy Policy, HC 471 (1997-98), Vol. II, 186. Many contributions to energy policy debates in the 1970s and 1980s implicitly supported notions of autonomy and determinism, in that they diagnosed the energy crisis as almost entirely an outcome of mistaken technology choices. See, for example, Amory B. Lovins, Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace (Harmondsworth, Middx, UK: Penguin, 1977). Others, such as David Collingridge, whilst stressing that their adoption was a matter of social choice, discussed the 'dilemma of control', and 'unwanted social consequences' of technologies such as nuclear power: see David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (London: Pinter, 1980).
16. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, 'Introductory Essay', in D. MacKenzie and J. Wajcman (eds), The Social Shaping of Technology: How the Refrigerator Got Its Hum (Milton Keynes, Bucks., UK & Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press, 1st edn, 1985), 2-25, at 2.
17. Stewart Russell, 'Heating Networks', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 24, No. 3 (August 1994), 587-95, at 587.
18. Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society 1880-1930 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). My aim here is to focus on the persistency of autonomy and determinism as beliefs within technocratic organizations, themes in policymaking, and notions amongst analysts, and I have judged that Hughes's more subtle concept of 'technological momentum' would divert from this deliberately restricted scope. Hughes's work is discussed in a second paper by the present author: 'When Systems Are Overthrown: The Use of Gas-Fired Generation Technology in the British Electricity Supply Industry' (forthcoming).
19. Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977). Here Winner developed his own 'theory of technological polities', the central theme of which was an assertion of the autonomy of technology. See also: Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1986); Langdon Winner, 'Social Constructivism: Opening the Black Box and Finding it Empty', Science as Culture,Vol. 3 (1993), 427-52, also published as 'Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding it Empty: Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Technology', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer 1993), 362-78.
20. Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977). Here Winner developed his own 'theory of technological polities', the central theme of which was an assertion of the autonomy of technology. See also: Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1986); Langdon Winner, 'Social Constructivism: Opening the Black Box and Finding it Empty', Science as Culture, Vol. 3 (1993), 427-52, also published as 'Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding it Empty: Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Technology', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer 1993), 362-78.
21. Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977). Here Winner developed his own 'theory of technological polities', the central theme of which was an assertion of the autonomy of technology. See also: Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1986); Langdon Winner, 'Social Constructivism: Opening the Black Box and Finding it Empty', Science as Culture, Vol. 3 (1993), 427-52, also published as 'Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding it Empty: Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Technology', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer 1993), 362-78.
22. Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977). Here Winner developed his own 'theory of technological polities', the central theme of which was an assertion of the autonomy of technology. See also: Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1986); Langdon Winner, 'Social Constructivism: Opening the Black Box and Finding it Empty', Science as Culture, Vol. 3 (1993), 427-52, also published as 'Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding it Empty: Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Technology', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer 1993), 362-78.
23. Winner, Autonomous Technology, op. cit. note 7, at 252-53.
24. Langdon Winner, 'Do Artifacts Have Politics?', in MacKenzie & Wajcman (eds), op. cit. note 4, 26-38, at 27 (originally published in Daedalus, Vol. 109 [1980], 121-36). Other analysts have also drawn attention to the organizational conditions for nuclear power. Jane Roberts, David Elliot and Trevor Houghton suggested that 'the technological characteristics of nuclear power determine the institutional structures necessary to sustain a programme of reactors. If the structure is not sufficiently centralised, powerful, and well organised, the programme will falter': J. Roberts, D. Elliot and T. Houghton, Privatising Electricity: The Politics of Power (London: Bellhaven Press, 1991), 44.
25. Langdon Winner, 'Do Artifacts Have Politics?', in MacKenzie & Wajcman (eds), op. cit. note 4, 26-38, at 27 (originally published in Daedalus, Vol. 109 [1980], 121-36). Other analysts have also drawn attention to the organizational conditions for nuclear power. Jane Roberts, David Elliot and Trevor Houghton suggested that 'the technological characteristics of nuclear power determine the institutional structures necessary to sustain a programme of reactors. If the structure is not sufficiently centralised, powerful, and well organised, the programme will falter': J. Roberts, D. Elliot and T. Houghton, Privatising Electricity: The Politics of Power (London: Bellhaven Press, 1991), 44.
26. Langdon Winner, 'Do Artifacts Have Politics?', in MacKenzie & Wajcman (eds), op. cit. note 4, 26-38, at 27 (originally published in Daedalus, Vol. 109 [1980], 121-36). Other analysts have also drawn attention to the organizational conditions for nuclear power. Jane Roberts, David Elliot and Trevor Houghton suggested that 'the technological characteristics of nuclear power determine the institutional structures necessary to sustain a programme of reactors. If the structure is not sufficiently centralised, powerful, and well organised, the programme will falter': J. Roberts, D. Elliot and T. Houghton, Privatising Electricity: The Politics of Power (London: Bellhaven Press, 1991), 44.
27. Winner, 'Do Artifacts Have Politics?', op. cit. note 9, 30. Whilst proposing an autonomist thesis, Winner was cautious about determinist notions; Bimber (op. cit. note 2, at 339, 341) positioned him as presenting a weak 'unintended consequences' case for technological determinism, based on embedded social practices and beliefs, rather than a stronger 'logical sequence' case.
28. Thomas J. Misa, 'How Machines Make History, and How Historians (and Others) Help Them to Do So', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer 1988), 308-31. Merrit Roe Smith (op. cit. note 2, at 34) distinguished between Ellul's 'avowedly determinist position', and the 'more nuanced and carefully delineated stances of Mumford and Winner'.
29. For example, John Street has pointed out that whilst autonomy seeks to identify general patterns, it does not discriminate between the different ways political systems organize their technological systems: see John Street, Politics and Technology (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1992), 40.
30. The structural, regulatory and technological changes affecting the British ESI reflected a global trend towards liberalization and privatization. The British case, because it went further in the scope of its reforms and the degree of its consequences, can be said to lie at the radical end of a spectrum of change. For general reviews of British ESI privatization) see Roberts, Elliot & Houghton, op. cit. note 9; Andrew Holmes, Privatising British Electricity: Restructuring and Resistance (London: Financial Times Business Information, 1992); Alex Henney, A Study of the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in England and Wales (London: EEE Ltd, 1994); John Surrey (ed.), The British Electricity Experiment: Privatisation: The Record, The Issues, The Lessons (London: Earthscan, 1996). For a review of changes in the US ESI (which acted as a precursor to changes in Britain), see Richard F. Hirsh, Power Loss: The Origins of Deregulation and Restructuring in the American Electic Utility System (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
31. The structural, regulatory and technological changes affecting the British ESI reflected a global trend towards liberalization and privatization. The British case, because it went further in the scope of its reforms and the degree of its consequences, can be said to lie at the radical end of a spectrum of change. For general reviews of British ESI privatization) see Roberts, Elliot & Houghton, op. cit. note 9; Andrew Holmes, Privatising British Electricity: Restructuring and Resistance (London: Financial Times Business Information, 1992); Alex Henney, A Study of the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in England and Wales (London: EEE Ltd, 1994); John Surrey (ed.), The British Electricity Experiment: Privatisation: The Record, The Issues, The Lessons (London: Earthscan, 1996). For a review of changes in the US ESI (which acted as a precursor to changes in Britain), see Richard F. Hirsh, Power Loss: The Origins of Deregulation and Restructuring in the American Electic Utility System (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
32. The structural, regulatory and technological changes affecting the British ESI reflected a global trend towards liberalization and privatization. The British case, because it went further in the scope of its reforms and the degree of its consequences, can be said to lie at the radical end of a spectrum of change. For general reviews of British ESI privatization) see Roberts, Elliot & Houghton, op. cit. note 9; Andrew Holmes, Privatising British Electricity: Restructuring and Resistance (London: Financial Times Business Information, 1992); Alex Henney, A Study of the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in England and Wales (London: EEE Ltd, 1994); John Surrey (ed.), The British Electricity Experiment: Privatisation: The Record, The Issues, The Lessons (London: Earthscan, 1996). For a review of changes in the US ESI (which acted as a precursor to changes in Britain), see Richard F. Hirsh, Power Loss: The Origins of Deregulation and Restructuring in the American Electic Utility System (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
33. The structural, regulatory and technological changes affecting the British ESI reflected a global trend towards liberalization and privatization. The British case, because it went further in the scope of its reforms and the degree of its consequences, can be said to lie at the radical end of a spectrum of change. For general reviews of British ESI privatization) see Roberts, Elliot & Houghton, op. cit. note 9; Andrew Holmes, Privatising British Electricity: Restructuring and Resistance (London: Financial Times Business Information, 1992); Alex Henney, A Study of the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in England and Wales (London: EEE Ltd, 1994); John Surrey (ed.), The British Electricity Experiment: Privatisation: The Record, The Issues, The Lessons (London: Earthscan, 1996). For a review of changes in the US ESI (which acted as a precursor to changes in Britain), see Richard F. Hirsh, Power Loss: The Origins of Deregulation and Restructuring in the American Electic Utility System (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
34. The structural, regulatory and technological changes affecting the British ESI reflected a global trend towards liberalization and privatization. The British case, because it went further in the scope of its reforms and the degree of its consequences, can be said to lie at the radical end of a spectrum of change. For general reviews of British ESI privatization) see Roberts, Elliot & Houghton, op. cit. note 9; Andrew Holmes, Privatising British Electricity: Restructuring and Resistance (London: Financial Times Business Information, 1992); Alex Henney, A Study of the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in England and Wales (London: EEE Ltd, 1994); John Surrey (ed.), The British Electricity Experiment: Privatisation: The Record, The Issues, The Lessons (London: Earthscan, 1996). For a review of changes in the US ESI (which acted as a precursor to changes in Britain), see Richard F. Hirsh, Power Loss: The Origins of Deregulation and Restructuring in the American Electic Utility System (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
35. Leslie Hannah, Engineers, Managers and Politicians: The First Fifteen Years of Nationalised Electricity Supply in Britain (London: Macmillan, 1982), 3-4.
36. The early development of nuclear power in Britain is analysed by Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-45 (London: Macmillan, 1964), and Margaret Gowing (assisted by Lorna Arnold), Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-52, Vol. 1, Policy Making, Vol. 2, Policy Execution (both London: Macmillan/United Kingdon Atomic Energy Authority, 1974) On the subsequent development of the programme, see Duncan Burn, Nuclear Power and the Energy Crisis: Politics and the Atomic Industry (London: Macmillan, 1978); Roger Williams, The Nuclear Power Decisions: British Politics, 1953-1978 (London: Croom Helm, 1980).
37. The early development of nuclear power in Britain is analysed by Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-45 (London: Macmillan, 1964), and Margaret Gowing (assisted by Lorna Arnold), Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-52, Vol. 1, Policy Making, Vol. 2, Policy Execution (both London: Macmillan/United Kingdon Atomic Energy Authority, 1974) On the subsequent development of the programme, see Duncan Burn, Nuclear Power and the Energy Crisis: Politics and the Atomic Industry (London: Macmillan, 1978); Roger Williams, The Nuclear Power Decisions: British Politics, 1953-1978 (London: Croom Helm, 1980).
38. The early development of nuclear power in Britain is analysed by Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-45 (London: Macmillan, 1964), and Margaret Gowing (assisted by Lorna Arnold), Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-52, Vol. 1, Policy Making,Vol. 2, Policy Execution (both London: Macmillan/United Kingdon Atomic Energy Authority, 1974) On the subsequent development of the programme, see Duncan Burn, Nuclear Power and the Energy Crisis: Politics and the Atomic Industry (London: Macmillan, 1978); Roger Williams, The Nuclear Power Decisions: British Politics, 1953-1978 (London: Croom Helm, 1980).
39. The early development of nuclear power in Britain is analysed by Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-45 (London: Macmillan, 1964), and Margaret Gowing (assisted by Lorna Arnold), Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-52, Vol. 1, Policy Making,Vol. 2, Policy Execution (both London: Macmillan/United Kingdon Atomic Energy Authority, 1974) On the subsequent development of the programme, see Duncan Burn, Nuclear Power and the Energy Crisis: Politics and the Atomic Industry (London: Macmillan, 1978); Roger Williams, The Nuclear Power Decisions: British Politics, 1953-1978 (London: Croom Helm, 1980).
40. Ministry of Fuel and Power, A Programme of Nuclear Power, Cmnd 9389 (1955), 5.
41. Williams, op. cit. note 15, at 34-35. Since my interest here is on broad commitments to the nuclear power programme, I have avoided discussing reactor design alternatives in any detail.
42. Duncan Burn (op. cit. note 15, at 176, 287) has argued that the creation of the AEA represented the 'black-boxing' of the British nuclear programme; he was highly critical of the AEA's dual monopolistic responsibilities as policy advisor and technology developer.
43. Williams, op. cit. note 15, at 24. Gabrielle Hecht's analysis of the early French nuclear power programme has highlighted the similar institutional autonomy of the primary French nuclear authority (the CEA in France), and tensions between these authorities and the state monopoly generators (EdF in France). However, where Hecht observes French nuclear scientists and engineers openly engaging in wider 'technopolitics', their British counterparts were inclined to less explicit black-boxing: see Gabrielle Hecht, 'Political Designs: Nuclear Reactors and National Policy in Postwar France', Technology and Culture, Vol. 35, No. 4 (October 1994), 657-85; Gabrielle Hecht, 'Rebels and Pioneers: Technocratic Ideologies and Social Identities in the French Nuclear Workplace, 1955-69', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 3 (August 1996), 483-530; Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 1998). See also Tomas Hellström, 'Technoscientific Expertise and the Significance of Policy Cultures', Technology in Society, Vol. 22 (2000), 499-512.
44. Williams, op. cit. note 15, at 24. Gabrielle Hecht's analysis of the early French nuclear power programme has highlighted the similar institutional autonomy of the primary French nuclear authority (the CEA in France), and tensions between these authorities and the state monopoly generators (EdF in France). However, where Hecht observes French nuclear scientists and engineers openly engaging in wider 'technopolitics', their British counterparts were inclined to less explicit black-boxing: see Gabrielle Hecht, 'Political Designs: Nuclear Reactors and National Policy in Postwar France', Technology and Culture, Vol. 35, No. 4 (October 1994), 657-85; Gabrielle Hecht, 'Rebels and Pioneers: Technocratic Ideologies and Social Identities in the French Nuclear Workplace, 1955-69', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 3 (August 1996), 483-530; Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 1998). See also Tomas Hellström, 'Technoscientific Expertise and the Significance of Policy Cultures', Technology in Society, Vol. 22 (2000), 499-512.
45. Williams, op. cit. note 15, at 24. Gabrielle Hecht's analysis of the early French nuclear power programme has highlighted the similar institutional autonomy of the primary French nuclear authority (the CEA in France), and tensions between these authorities and the state monopoly generators (EdF in France). However, where Hecht observes French nuclear scientists and engineers openly engaging in wider 'technopolitics', their British counterparts were inclined to less explicit black-boxing: see Gabrielle Hecht, 'Political Designs: Nuclear Reactors and National Policy in Postwar France', Technology and Culture, Vol. 35, No. 4 (October 1994), 657-85; Gabrielle Hecht, 'Rebels and Pioneers: Technocratic Ideologies and Social Identities in the French Nuclear Workplace, 1955-69', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 3 (August 1996), 483-530; Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 1998). See also Tomas Hellström, 'Technoscientific Expertise and the Significance of Policy Cultures', Technology in Society, Vol. 22 (2000), 499-512.
46. Williams, op. cit. note 15, at 24. Gabrielle Hecht's analysis of the early French nuclear power programme has highlighted the similar institutional autonomy of the primary French nuclear authority (the CEA in France), and tensions between these authorities and the state monopoly generators (EdF in France). However, where Hecht observes French nuclear scientists and engineers openly engaging in wider 'technopolitics', their British counterparts were inclined to less explicit black-boxing: see Gabrielle Hecht, 'Political Designs: Nuclear Reactors and National Policy in Postwar France', Technology and Culture, Vol. 35, No. 4 (October 1994), 657-85; Gabrielle Hecht, 'Rebels and Pioneers: Technocratic Ideologies and Social Identities in the French Nuclear Workplace, 1955-69', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 3 (August 1996), 483-530; Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 1998). See also Tomas Hellström, 'Technoscientific Expertise and the Significance of Policy Cultures', Technology in Society, Vol. 22 (2000), 499-512.
47. Williams, op. cit. note 15, at 24. Gabrielle Hecht's analysis of the early French nuclear power programme has highlighted the similar institutional autonomy of the primary French nuclear authority (the CEA in France), and tensions between these authorities and the state monopoly generators (EdF in France). However, where Hecht observes French nuclear scientists and engineers openly engaging in wider 'technopolitics', their British counterparts were inclined to less explicit black-boxing: see Gabrielle Hecht, 'Political Designs: Nuclear Reactors and National Policy in Postwar France', Technology and Culture, Vol. 35, No. 4 (October 1994), 657-85; Gabrielle Hecht, 'Rebels and Pioneers: Technocratic Ideologies and Social Identities in the French Nuclear Workplace, 1955-69', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 3 (August 1996), 483-530; Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 1998). See also Tomas Hellström, 'Technoscientific Expertise and the Significance of Policy Cultures', Technology in Society, Vol. 22 (2000), 499-512.
48. HC Debates, Vol. 525 (1953-54), c407, 455.
49. Ministry of Fuel and Power, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Electricity Supply Industry, Cmnd 9672 (1955), 135.
50. HC Debates, Vol. 562 (1956-57), c938-1057. Forty years later the nuclear industry itself judged that the Suez crisis had 'made the case' for the British nuclear power programme: HC 471 (1997-98), op. cit. note 3, at 187.
51. HC Debates, Vol. 562 (1956-57), c940-941, 970.
52. Ibid., c962.
53. Ibid., c995-97.
54. Hinton's caution reflected his belief that a delayed expansion of the programme would allow use of more efficient reactor designs, particularly the fast breeder. See Hannah, op. cit. note 14, at 228-44; Williams, op. cit. note 15, at 86-89. Gowing stated that the early nuclear engineers 'had their feet firmly on the ground', talked little of 'national prestige' (unlike many politicians and journalists), and came to recognize that cheap nuclear power was unlikely (Gowing, op. cit. note 15 [1974], Vol. 2, at 299-301).
55. Hinton's caution reflected his belief that a delayed expansion of the programme would allow use of more efficient reactor designs, particularly the fast breeder. See Hannah, op. cit. note 14, at 228-44; Williams, op. cit. note 15, at 86-89. Gowing stated that the early nuclear engineers 'had their feet firmly on the ground', talked little of 'national prestige' (unlike many politicians and journalists), and came to recognize that cheap nuclear power was unlikely (Gowing, op. cit. note 15 [1974], Vol. 2, at 299-301).
56. Hinton's caution reflected his belief that a delayed expansion of the programme would allow use of more efficient reactor designs, particularly the fast breeder. See Hannah, op. cit. note 14, at 228-44; Williams, op. cit. note 15, at 86-89. Gowing stated that the early nuclear engineers 'had their feet firmly on the ground', talked little of 'national prestige' (unlike many politicians and journalists), and came to recognize that cheap nuclear power was unlikely (Gowing, op. cit. note 15 [1974], Vol. 2, at 299-301).
57. For example, a 1964 White Paper stated that 'although [nuclear] stations will produce power at a higher cost than was originally planned, the generation of nuclear power, from a technical standpoint, has achieved all that was expected of it': Ministry of Power, The Second Nuclear Power Programme, Cmnd 2235 (1964), 2.
58. By this time there was some scepticism among MPs about Government claims for the benefits of nuclear power, and the decision to initiate a second programme was met by repeated requests for more detailed information on the proposals. Alf Roberts, for example, stated that 'costing in the atomic energy industry is far from satisfactory': HC Debates, Vol. 713 (1964-65), c236-38.
59. Williams, op. cit. note 15, at 50. The 'lock-in' arising from the embedded commitments associated with nuclear technology was considered by Robin Cowan, 'Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-In', Journal of Economic History, Vol. 50 (1990), 541-67, and by William Walker, 'Entrapment in Large Technology Systems: Institutional Commitment and Power Relations', Research Policy, Vol. 29 (2000), 833-46.
60. Williams, op. cit. note 15, at 50. The 'lock-in' arising from the embedded commitments associated with nuclear technology was considered by Robin Cowan, 'Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-In', Journal of Economic History, Vol. 50 (1990), 541-67, and by William Walker, 'Entrapment in Large Technology Systems: Institutional Commitment and Power Relations', Research Policy, Vol. 29 (2000), 833-46.
61. Williams, op. cit. note 15, at 50. The 'lock-in' arising from the embedded commitments associated with nuclear technology was considered by Robin Cowan, 'Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-In', Journal of Economic History, Vol. 50 (1990), 541-67, and by William Walker, 'Entrapment in Large Technology Systems: Institutional Commitment and Power Relations', Research Policy, Vol. 29 (2000), 833-46.
62. Ministry of Power, Fuel Policy, Cmnd 3438 (1967), 17-18.
63. The problems of the AGR involved premature scaling-up from prototype, insufficient design work before construction, non-standard plant designs, and awarding contracts to weak manufacturing consortia: see Richard Eden and Nigel Evans, Electricity Supply in the UK (Aldershot, UK: Gower, 1986), 13.
64. HC Select Committee on Science and Technology, United Kingdom Nuclear Reactor Programme, HC 381 - XVII (1966-67), lxviii.
65. Sir Stanley Brown, The Next 25 Years in the Electricity Supply Industry (London: CEGB, 1970), 19.
66. In 1974, a NUM strike was thought responsible for the defeat of Edward Heath's Conservative Government: Michael J. Parker, Thatcherism and the Fall of Coal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 5-6. Thereafter, Conservative Government antipathy towards the NUM, particularly under Margaret Thatcher, was central to its support for nuclear power. Former Energy Secretary of State Nigel Lawson candidly recalled that 'the need for "diversification" of energy sources ... was code for freedom from NUM blackmail': Nigel Lawson, The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical (London: Bantam, 1992), 168.
67. In 1974, a NUM strike was thought responsible for the defeat of Edward Heath's Conservative Government: Michael J. Parker, Thatcherism and the Fall of Coal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 5-6. Thereafter, Conservative Government antipathy towards the NUM, particularly under Margaret Thatcher, was central to its support for nuclear power. Former Energy Secretary of State Nigel Lawson candidly recalled that 'the need for "diversification" of energy sources ... was code for freedom from NUM blackmail': Nigel Lawson, The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical (London: Bantam, 1992), 168.
68. Even at the height of technocentrism in the wake of the energy crisis, however, a number of industrial and political figures promoted a decentralized market-based approach to energy policy. See various contributions to the 1976 National Energy Conference: Department of Energy, National Energy Conference (22 June 1976), Vol. 1: Report of Proceedings; Written Communications, Energy Paper 13 (London: HMSO, 1976).
69. Even at the height of technocentrism in the wake of the energy crisis, however, a number of industrial and political figures promoted a decentralized market-based approach to energy policy. See various contributions to the 1976 National Energy Conference: Department of Energy, National Energy Conference (22 June 1976), Vol. 1: Report of Proceedings; Written Communications, Energy Paper 13 (London: HMSO, 1976).
70. Alternatives to the AGR were considered in the 1970s, particularly the Steam-Generating Heavy Water Reactor (SGHWR), developed by the AEA, and the PWR. In 1974, the Government announced the choice of the SGHWR. An initial programme was planned, but it became clear that the design was inadequately developed: see House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology, The SGHWR Programme, HC 89 (1976-77). In 1978, the Government announced the commissioning of two more AGR plants, whilst authorizing the AEA to undertake preparatory work on a PWR: HC Debates, Vol. 942 (1977-78), c1391-408.
71. Alternatives to the AGR were considered in the 1970s, particularly the Steam-Generating Heavy Water Reactor (SGHWR), developed by the AEA, and the PWR. In 1974, the Government announced the choice of the SGHWR. An initial programme was planned, but it became clear that the design was inadequately developed: see House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology, The SGHWR Programme, HC 89 (1976-77). In 1978, the Government announced the commissioning of two more AGR plants, whilst authorizing the AEA to undertake preparatory work on a PWR: HC Debates, Vol. 942 (1977-78), c1391-408.
72. Department of Energy, Energy Research and Development in the United Kingdom, Energy Paper 11 (London: HMSO, 1976), 5. For reaction to the energy crisis in the American ESI, see Hirsh, op. cit. note 13, and Chapter 8 of David E. Nye's Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
73. Department of Energy, Energy Research and Development in the United Kingdom, Energy Paper 11 (London: HMSO, 1976), 5. For reaction to the energy crisis in the American ESI, see Hirsh, op. cit. note 13, and Chapter 8 of David E. Nye's Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
74. Department of Energy, Energy Research and Development in the United Kingdom, Energy Paper 11 (London: HMSO, 1976), 5. For reaction to the energy crisis in the American ESI, see Hirsh, op. cit. note 13, and Chapter 8 of David E. Nye's Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
75. Department of Energy, The Structure of the Electricity Supply Industry in England and Wales, Cmnd 6388 (1976).
76. Ibid., 23. The Bill to integrate the industry was lost with the dissolution of Parliament in 1979.
77. Although its statutory supply monopoly was ended by the 1983 Energy Act, the CEGB continued to exert an effective monopoly in electricity generation; see George Yarrow, 'Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulatory Reform in Electricity Supply', in Matthew Bishop, John Kay and Colin Mayer (eds), Privatization and Economic Performance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 62-88, at 79.
78. See Hirsh, op. cit. note 13, and also John L. Campbell, Collapse of Industry: Nuclear Power and the Contradictions of U.S. Policy (Ithaca, NY & London: Cornell University Press, 1988); Joseph G. Morone and Edward J. Woodhouse, The Demise of Nuclear Energy?: Lessons for the Democratic Control of Technology (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989); Michel Damian, 'Nuclear Power: The Ambiguous Lessons of History', Energy Policy, Vol. 20 (1992), 598-607.
79. See Hirsh, op. cit. note 13, and also John L. Campbell, Collapse of Industry: Nuclear Power and the Contradictions of U.S. Policy (Ithaca, NY & London: Cornell University Press, 1988); Joseph G. Morone and Edward J. Woodhouse, The Demise of Nuclear Energy?: Lessons for the Democratic Control of Technology (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989); Michel Damian, 'Nuclear Power: The Ambiguous Lessons of History', Energy Policy, Vol. 20 (1992), 598-607.
80. See Hirsh, op. cit. note 13, and also John L. Campbell, Collapse of Industry: Nuclear Power and the Contradictions of U.S. Policy (Ithaca, NY & London: Cornell University Press, 1988); Joseph G. Morone and Edward J. Woodhouse, The Demise of Nuclear Energy?: Lessons for the Democratic Control of Technology (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989); Michel Damian, 'Nuclear Power: The Ambiguous Lessons of History', Energy Policy, Vol. 20 (1992), 598-607.
81. See Hirsh, op. cit. note 13, and also John L. Campbell, Collapse of Industry: Nuclear Power and the Contradictions of U.S. Policy (Ithaca, NY & London: Cornell University Press, 1988); Joseph G. Morone and Edward J. Woodhouse, The Demise of Nuclear Energy?: Lessons for the Democratic Control of Technology (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989); Michel Damian, 'Nuclear Power: The Ambiguous Lessons of History', Energy Policy, Vol. 20 (1992), 598-607.
82. In 1981, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission pointed to 'serious weaknesses' in CEGB's investment appraisal procedures: Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Central Electricity Generating Board, HC 315 (1980-81), 292-93.
83. John Baker, Nuclear Electricity - How Much is Needed? (London: CEGB, 1985), 2. Baker led the CEGB's representation at the Sizewell B public inquiry, and this paper summarized the Board's evidence to the inquiry.
84. Department of Energy, Energy Technologies for the UK: 1986 Appraisal of Research, Development and Demonstration, Energy Paper 54 (London: HMSO, 1987). UK ESI expenditure on RD&D at this time was (in £m): Nuclear: 373; Fossil Fuel 54; Renewables 16: see Department of Energy/Energy Technology Support Unit, Background Papers Relevant to the 1986 Appraisal of UK Energy Research, Development and Demonstration, ETSU R-43 (London: HMSO, 1987), B10.
85. Department of Energy, Energy Technologies for the UK: 1986 Appraisal of
86. Ibid., B31, B36.
87. Institute of Energy, Energy for the Future, 2nd edition (London: Institute of Energy, 1986). The Institute argued that the problems afflicting nuclear power were a reflection, not of any inherent technical and economic issues, but of political opposition and restrictive legislation.
88. Holmes, op. cit. note 13, at 15. See also Lawson, op. cit. note 34; Cecil Parkinson, Right at the Centre: An Autobiography (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1992); Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993).
89. Holmes, op. cit. note 13, at 15. See also Lawson, op. cit. note 34; Cecil Parkinson, Right at the Centre: An Autobiography (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1992); Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993).
90. Holmes, op. cit. note 13, at 15. See also Lawson, op. cit. note 34; Cecil Parkinson, Right at the Centre: An Autobiography (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1992); Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993).
91. Holmes, op. cit. note 13, at 15. See also Lawson, op. cit. note 34; Cecil Parkinson, Right at the Centre: An Autobiography (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1992); Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993).
92. HC Debates, Vol. 119 (1987-88), c689.
93. HC Debates, Vol. 121 (1987-88), c634.
94. Department of Energy, Sizewell B Public Inquiries, Vol. 1, Part 1, 37 (London: HMSO, 1987).
95. House of Commons Energy Committee, The Structure, Regulation, and Economic Consequences of Electricity Supply in the Private Sector, HC 307 (1987-88), Vol. II, 3.
96. Ibid., Vol. III, 11.
97. A number of independent analysts presented proposals for restructuring the industry. Alex Henney suggested that the fossil-fuel generating plants of the CEGB and SSEB (South of Scotland Electricity Board) be distributed between 10 competing generators: Alex Henney, Privatise Power: Restructuring The Electricity Supply Industry, Policy Study No. 83 (London: Centre for Policy Studies, March 1987). See also: Andrew Holmes, John Chesshire and Steve Thomas, Power on the Market: Strategies for Privatising the UK Electricity Industry (London: FT Business Information, 1987), 7; and Allen Sykes and Colin Robinson, Current Choices: Good and Bad Ways to Privatise Electricity, Policy Study No. 87 (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1987).
98. A number of independent analysts presented proposals for restructuring the industry. Alex Henney suggested that the fossil-fuel generating plants of the CEGB and SSEB (South of Scotland Electricity Board) be distributed between 10 competing generators: Alex Henney, Privatise Power: Restructuring The Electricity Supply Industry, Policy Study No. 83 (London: Centre for Policy Studies, March 1987). See also: Andrew Holmes, John Chesshire and Steve Thomas, Power on the Market: Strategies for Privatising the UK Electricity Industry (London: FT Business Information, 1987), 7; and Allen Sykes and Colin Robinson, Current Choices: Good and Bad Ways to Privatise Electricity, Policy Study No. 87 (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1987).
99. A number of independent analysts presented proposals for restructuring the industry. Alex Henney suggested that the fossil-fuel generating plants of the CEGB and SSEB (South of Scotland Electricity Board) be distributed between 10 competing generators: Alex Henney, Privatise Power: Restructuring The Electricity Supply Industry, Policy Study No. 83 (London: Centre for Policy Studies, March 1987). See also: Andrew Holmes, John Chesshire and Steve Thomas, Power on the Market: Strategies for Privatising the UK Electricity Industry (London: FT Business Information, 1987), 7; and Allen Sykes and Colin Robinson, Current Choices: Good and Bad Ways to Privatise Electricity, Policy Study No. 87 (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1987).
100. 'John Lyons' CEGB Entity Arguments Dismissed', Electrical Review, Vol. 220 (16-29 September 1987), 9-11; see also John Lyons, 'Privatising Electricity Supply Cannot Be Justified', Energy Policy, Vol. 17 (1989), 149-54. Lyons submitted these arguments to both the Department of Energy and the Energy Select Committee.
101. 'John Lyons' CEGB Entity Arguments Dismissed', Electrical Review, Vol. 220 (16-29 September 1987), 9-11; see also John Lyons, 'Privatising Electricity Supply Cannot Be Justified', Energy Policy, Vol. 17 (1989), 149-54. Lyons submitted these arguments to both the Department of Energy and the Energy Select Committee.
102. HC Debates, Vol. 121 (1987-88), c637. In private, Marshall made his case more forcefully, threatening the Government that any attempt to break up the CEGB would be met with the resignation of the entire CEGB board: Parkinson, op. cit. note 47, at 269.
103. HC Debates, Vol. 121 (1987-88), c637. In private, Marshall made his case more forcefully, threatening the Government that any attempt to break up the CEGB would be met with the resignation of the entire CEGB board: Parkinson, op. cit. note 47, at 269.
104. HC 307 (1987-88), op. cit. note 51, Vol. III, 9.
105. Ibid., 2.
106. Robert Peddie, 'Who Should Own the Grid?', Electrical Review, Vol. 220 (2-15 September 1987), 16-17, at 17.
107. 'John Lyons' CEGB Entity Arguments Dismissed', op. cit. note 54.
108. HC 307 (1987-88), op. cit. note 51, Vol. II, 19.
109. HC Debates, Vol. 124 (1987-88), c762.
110. HC Debates, Vol. 133 (1987-88), c3.
111. Department of Energy, Privatising Electricity: The Government's Proposals for the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in England and Wales, Cmnd 322 (1988); Industry Department for Scotland, Privatisation of the Scottish Electricity Industry, Cmnd 327 (1988). The two Scottish electricity boards were privatized without substantial restructuring as two independent vertically integrated generation and supply companies, known later as Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro Electric. It was intended that the Scottish nuclear assets be jointly owned by these two under a new holding company. This less radical plan reflected chronic over-capacity in Scotland, and the predominance of nuclear plant, leaving little scope for competition or new entry.
112. Department of Energy, Privatising Electricity: The Government's Proposals for the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in England and Wales, Cmnd 322 (1988); Industry Department for Scotland, Privatisation of the Scottish Electricity Industry, Cmnd 327 (1988). The two Scottish electricity boards were privatized without substantial restructuring as two independent vertically integrated generation and supply companies, known later as Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro Electric. It was intended that the Scottish nuclear assets be jointly owned by these two under a new holding company. This less radical plan reflected chronic over-capacity in Scotland, and the predominance of nuclear plant, leaving little scope for competition or new entry.
113. Cmnd 322 (1988), op. cit. note 63, at 10-14.
114. HC Debates, Vol. 129 (1987-88), c54.
115. HC 307 (1987-88), op. cit. note 51, Vol. III, 291. This transfer of power reflected the behind-the-scenes support Jones and the Area Board chairmen had given the Government in its efforts to confront the CEGB: Parkinson, op. cit. note 47, at 277.
116. HC 307 (1987-88), op. cit. note 51, Vol. III, 291. This transfer of power reflected the behind-the-scenes support Jones and the Area Board chairmen had given the Government in its efforts to confront the CEGB: Parkinson, op. cit. note 47, at 277.
117. Holmes, Chesshire & Thomas, op. cit. note 53; Henney, op. cit. note 53. At the same time, other independent experts argued that there were no intrinsic reasons why nuclear power could not be privatized along the lines of the White Paper proposals; see, for example, Dieter Helm, 'The Privatisation of Electricity', in Bill Robinson (ed.), Privatising Electricity: Impact on the UK Energy Market (London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1988), 1-24.
118. Holmes, Chesshire & Thomas, op. cit. note 53; Henney, op. cit. note 53. At the same time, other independent experts argued that there were no intrinsic reasons why nuclear power could not be privatized along the lines of the White Paper proposals; see, for example, Dieter Helm, 'The Privatisation of Electricity', in Bill Robinson (ed.), Privatising Electricity: Impact on the UK Energy Market (London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1988), 1-24.
119. Holmes, Chesshire & Thomas, op. cit. note 53; Henney, op. cit. note 53. At the same time, other independent experts argued that there were no intrinsic reasons why nuclear power could not be privatized along the lines of the White Paper proposals; see, for example, Dieter Helm, 'The Privatisation of Electricity', in Bill Robinson (ed.), Privatising Electricity: Impact on the UK Energy Market (London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1988), 1-24.
120. Cmnd 322 (1988), op. cit. note 63, at 12.
121. HC 307 (1987-88), op. cit. note 51, Vol. III, 72. Parkinson recalled that 'we accepted the view of our bankers and brokers that the nuclear industry could be privatized and that the new generation of PWRs could be funded in the private sector': Parkinson, op. cit. note 47, at 270.
122. HC 307 (1987-88), op. cit. note 51, Vol. III, 72. Parkinson recalled that 'we accepted the view of our bankers and brokers that the nuclear industry could be privatized and that the new generation of PWRs could be funded in the private sector': Parkinson, op. cit. note 47, at 270.
123. HC 307 (1987-88), op. cit. note 51, Vol. III, 4. Margaret Thatcher later conceded that the two-generator model was, in part, chosen to appease Marshall, to whom she felt indebted for keeping the lights on during the NUM strike of the mid-1980s; she stated that 'agreed with [Marshall] - as he knew I did - about the great importance of nuclear power'. Marshall gave her his commitment to try to make the two-generator structure work: Thatcher, op. cit. note 47, at 683-84.
124. HC 307 (1987-88), op. cit. note 51, Vol. III, 4. Margaret Thatcher later conceded that the two-generator model was, in part, chosen to appease Marshall, to whom she felt indebted for keeping the lights on during the NUM strike of the mid-1980s; she stated that 'agreed with [Marshall] - as he knew I did - about the great importance of nuclear power'. Marshall gave her his commitment to try to make the two-generator structure work: Thatcher, op. cit. note 47, at 683-84.
125. HC 307 (1987-88), op. cit. note 51, Vol. III, 272.
126. Ibid., 186-87.
127. Ibid., 278.
128. Ibid., Vol. I, xxiii.
129. Professor Peter Jones, 'The Benefits of Nuclear Power', Atom, No. 379 (May 1988), 12-17, at 12, 17.
130. HC Debates, Vol. 140 (1987-88), c5.
131. Parliamentary Bills, Electricity Bill, Bill 4 (1988-89), Clause 31. In later Standing Committee evidence, Parkinson stated that the NFFO would be set at a level which would allow the operation of four PWRs: HC Debates, Electricity Bill, Standing Committee 'E' (10 January 1989 to 16 March 1989), Sixteenth Sitting, c775.
132. Parliamentary Bills, Electricity Bill, Bill 4 (1988-89), Clause 31. In later Standing Committee evidence, Parkinson stated that the NFFO would be set at a level which would allow the operation of four PWRs: HC Debates, Electricity Bill, Standing Committee 'E' (10 January 1989 to 16 March 1989), Sixteenth Sitting, c775.
133. David Owen pointed to the historic break that the introduction of the Levy represented: '[no-one] believes that we shall in our lifetime again hear nuclear generation justified on economic or commercial grounds': HC Debates, Vol. 143 (1988-89), c813.
134. Ibid., c678-79.
135. HC Debates, Vol. 143 (1988-89), c669, 691. By this time the Government's exposition of the diversity case had become more overtly political - Parkinson invoking the threats of 'Mr Scargill' and 'oil price explosion', even though both were now greatly reduced.
136. Power in Europe, No. 44 (2 March 1989), 1-3.
137. Ibid., 2.
138. HC Debates, Vol. 150 (1988-89), c276.
139. Ibid., c277-78, 302.
140. An Energy Select Committee inquiry into BNFL's Annual Report and Accounts revealed that the company's assessment of its nuclear plant decommissioning liabilities had risen elevenfold in the past year, to over £4.6bn: House of Commons Energy Committee, British Nuclear Fuels plc: Report and Accounts 1987-88, HC 50 (1988-89), xvii. In June 1989, Lord Marshall stated that the cost of first phase decommissioning at Berkeley Magnox power station was now estimated at £200m, rather than the £30m previously quoted by the CEGB. The increase arose from the inclusion of activities previously ignored in decommissioning cost estimates: Atom, No. 380 June 1988); Power in Europe, No. 54 (20 July 1989), 9.
141. An Energy Select Committee inquiry into BNFL's Annual Report and Accounts revealed that the company's assessment of its nuclear plant decommissioning liabilities had risen elevenfold in the past year, to over £4.6bn: House of Commons Energy Committee, British Nuclear Fuels plc: Report and Accounts 1987-88, HC 50 (1988-89), xvii. In June 1989, Lord Marshall stated that the cost of first phase decommissioning at Berkeley Magnox power station was now estimated at £200m, rather than the £30m previously quoted by the CEGB. The increase arose from the inclusion of activities previously ignored in decommissioning cost estimates: Atom, No. 380 June 1988); Power in Europe, No. 54 (20 July 1989), 9.
142. An Energy Select Committee inquiry into BNFL's Annual Report and Accounts revealed that the company's assessment of its nuclear plant decommissioning liabilities had risen elevenfold in the past year, to over £4.6bn: House of Commons Energy Committee, British Nuclear Fuels plc: Report and Accounts 1987-88, HC 50 (1988-89), xvii. In June 1989, Lord Marshall stated that the cost of first phase decommissioning at Berkeley Magnox power station was now estimated at £200m, rather than the £30m previously quoted by the CEGB. The increase arose from the inclusion of activities previously ignored in decommissioning cost estimates: Atom, No. 380 June 1988); Power in Europe, No. 54 (20 July 1989), 9.
143. HC Debates, Vol. 157 (1988-89), c746. Labour's Energy Spokesman Tony Blair, suggested that the escalation in the cost of nuclear electricity reflected the changed interests of National Power: 'where it used to be in the interests of the electricity board to tell us that nuclear power was cheap, it is now ... in its interest to tell us that it is expensive, so that it can get more guarantees and more subsidies from the Government' (ibid., c771).
144. HC Debates, Vol. 157 (1988-89), c746. Labour's Energy Spokesman Tony Blair, suggested that the escalation in the cost of nuclear electricity reflected the changed interests of National Power: 'where it used to be in the interests of the electricity board to tell us that nuclear power was cheap, it is now ... in its interest to tell us that it is expensive, so that it can get more guarantees and more subsidies from the Government' (ibid., c771).
145. HC Debates, Vol. 157 (1988-89), c779.
146. In October 1989, Lord Marshall stated that National Power's accounting provision for Magnox waste treatment and decommissioning had risen from £2.8bn to £6.8bn: Power in Europe, No. 61 (26 October 1989), 4. At the end of October, a leaked presentation by Wakeham to the Cabinet stated that the cost of nuclear power in the private sector was at least double that from coal-fired generation: Power in Europe, No. 61a (31 October 1989), 1.
147. In October 1989, Lord Marshall stated that National Power's accounting provision for Magnox waste treatment and decommissioning had risen from £2.8bn to £6.8bn: Power in Europe, No. 61 (26 October 1989), 4. At the end of October, a leaked presentation by Wakeham to the Cabinet stated that the cost of nuclear power in the private sector was at least double that from coal-fired generation: Power in Europe, No. 61a (31 October 1989), 1.
148. HC Debates, Vol. 159 (1988-89), c1172.
149. The statement was immediately followed by one by the Secretary of State for Scotland, Malcolm Rifkind, announcing that the nuclear assets of the SSEB were to be transferred to a newly-created state-owned company, known later as Scottish Nuclear.
150. HC Debates, Vol. 159 (1988-89), c1172.
151. House of Commons Energy Committee, The Consequences of Electricity Privatisation: Minutes of Evidence, HC96 (1989-90).
152. The most important changes, Wakeham stated, were the use of 'current' rather than 'historic' costs, and the adoption of a higher required rate of return, or 'discount rate' (ibid., 6-8). Both of these made capital-intensive nuclear technology less competitive versus fossil-fuel technology. Other evidence to the Select Committee confirmed that National Power's reassessment of the price of nuclear electricity was the result of a change from cost plus to fixed price contracts with BNFL. Cost plus contracts had allowed cost increases to be easily passed on from BNFL to the CEGB to the Area Boards, and ultimately the electricity consumer. The RECs' proposed freedom of choice of bulk supplier forced the introduction of fixed price contracts, and, in order to minimize their risk exposure, BNFL massively increased their prices to National Power. In addition, plant decommissioning costs, always highly speculative, were increasing dramatically in the face of more stringent standards, and from the first early experiences of actual decommissioning. A detailed analysis of the changing economics of nuclear power in the course of ESI privatization is provided by Gordon MacKerron, 'Nuclear Power Under Review', in Surrey (ed.), op. cit. note 13, 138-63.
153. The most important changes, Wakeham stated, were the use of 'current' rather than 'historic' costs, and the adoption of a higher required rate of return, or 'discount rate' (ibid., 6-8). Both of these made capital-intensive nuclear technology less competitive versus fossil-fuel technology. Other evidence to the Select Committee confirmed that National Power's reassessment of the price of nuclear electricity was the result of a change from cost plus to fixed price contracts with BNFL. Cost plus contracts had allowed cost increases to be easily passed on from BNFL to the CEGB to the Area Boards, and ultimately the electricity consumer. The RECs' proposed freedom of choice of bulk supplier forced the introduction of fixed price contracts, and, in order to minimize their risk exposure, BNFL massively increased their prices to National Power. In addition, plant decommissioning costs, always highly speculative, were increasing dramatically in the face of more stringent standards, and from the first early experiences of actual decommissioning. A detailed analysis of the changing economics of nuclear power in the course of ESI privatization is provided by Gordon MacKerron, 'Nuclear Power Under Review', in Surrey (ed.), op. cit. note 13, 138-63.
154. HC96 (1989-90), op. cit. note 92, at 8, 9.
155. Atom, No. 400 (February 1990), 2.
156. 'The Future for Nuclear Power', Atom, No. 400 (February 1990), 5-13, at 7.
157. Ibid., 13.
158. CEGB, Annual Report and Accounts 1988/89 (London: CEGB, 1989), 4.
159. House of Commons Energy Committee, The Cost of Nuclear Power, HC 205 (1989-90). The report uncovered more details of National Power's reassessment of the cost of nuclear power. In evidence submitted to the Hinkley Point C public inquiry in 1989, the CEGB's National Power Division estimated the unit cost of electricity from the proposed PWR plant to be 3p/kWh. In its letter to the Department of Energy in October 1989, NP estimated the cost of power from a PWR in a privatized ESI to be 6.2p/kWh. NP's Chief Executive, John Baker, told the Committee that this doubling arose from different investment criteria under public and private ownership.
160. Ibid., Vol. I, 4-6.
161. Ibid., 56.
162. Ibid., 60-61.
163. In England and Wales, the NFFO and Levy provided Nuclear Electric with a guaranteed market and income. The Scottish Nuclear Energy Agreement, which extends to 2005, allows Scottish Nuclear to sell all its output to Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro Electric on a take-or-pay basis: House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee, Nuclear Privatisation, HC 48 (1995-96), Vol. I, xi.
164. The much greater availability of AGR plant after 1989 was in part due to fortuitous timing. A number of later AGRs finally became available for commercial operation in 1988 and 1989, and some gains would have been made irrespective of privatization.
165. Scottish Nuclear also asked to be privatized, so as to have 'the same freedom' as the privatized generators; it, too, anticipated the construction of a new PWR plant: Roger Dettmer, 'A New Deal for Nuclear?', IEE Review, Vol. 41 (September 1994), 213-16.
166. See, for example, Catriona Lyons, 'Pushing for Privatisation', Atom, No. 435 (August/September 1994), 14-15, and Nuclear Electric's advertisement, 'Nuclear Electric Racing Ahead', in the UK national press in mid-1994.
167. Robert Hawley, 'The Nuclear Review', Power Engineering Journal, Vol. 9 (April 1995), 61-68, at 62, 68.
168. Department of Trade and Industry, The Prospects for Nuclear Power: Conclusions of the Government's Nuclear Review, Cmnd 2860 (1995).
169. House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee, Nuclear Privatisation, HC 43 (1995-96), Vol. iii, 115.
170. For example, Simon Beavis and Ian King, 'Nuclear Dream Turns to Dust', The Guardian (12 December 1995), 18.
171. HC 43 (1995-96), op. cit. note 109.
172. For example, the evidence of John Reynolds of James Capel and Co.: ibid., Vol. II, 128.
173. Ibid., Vol. I, xiv.
174. Department of Trade and Industry, Conclusions of The Review of Energy Sources for Power Generation and Government: Response to Fourth and Fifth Reports of the Trade and Industry Committee, Cmnd 4071 (1998), 67.
175. House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee, Energy Policy, HC 471 (1997-98), Vol. I, xxx.
176. Ibid., Vol. II, 188.
177. Cabinet Office, Performance and Innovation Unit, The Energy Review (February 2002), 11, 93.
178. Centeno (op. cit. note 2, at 316) identified five key factors supporting technocratic control: task complexity, legitimation by reference to performance criteria, institutional autonomy, regime stability and a conducive world system.
179. Burn, op. cit. note 15. See also Donald MacKenzie's discussion of nuclear weapons technologies in his Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 387-88.
180. Burn, op. cit. note 15. See also Donald MacKenzie's discussion of nuclear weapons technologies in his Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 387-88.
181. Brian Wynne has argued that 'images of nuclear determinism' should be understood as rhetorical devices used by the nuclear industry for political lobbying and moral reinforcement: Brian Wynne, Rationality and Ritual: The Windscale Inquiry and Nuclear Decisions in Britain (Chalfont St Giles, Bucks., UK: British Society for the History of Science, 1982), esp. 33, 161. Gabrielle Hecht and Michael Thad Allen have also suggested that technological determinism be seen as a political practice, and noted that: 'Technology may not drive history, but the fact that influential people believe that it does has real consequences': Gabrielle Hecht and Michael Thad Allen, 'Authority, Political Machines, and Technology's History', in M.T. Allen and G. Hecht (eds), Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes (Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 2001), 1-23, at 5, 14-15.
182. Brian Wynne has argued that 'images of nuclear determinism' should be understood as rhetorical devices used by the nuclear industry for political lobbying and moral reinforcement: Brian Wynne, Rationality and Ritual: The Windscale Inquiry and Nuclear Decisions in Britain (Chalfont St Giles, Bucks., UK: British Society for the History of Science, 1982), esp. 33, 161. Gabrielle Hecht and Michael Thad Allen have also suggested that technological determinism be seen as a political practice, and noted that: 'Technology may not drive history, but the fact that influential people believe that it does has real consequences': Gabrielle Hecht and Michael Thad Allen, 'Authority, Political Machines, and Technology's History', in M.T. Allen and G. Hecht (eds), Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes (Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 2001), 1-23, at 5, 14-15.
183. Holmes, op. cit. note 13, at 16. Margaret Thatcher stated that she 'did not think [nuclear power's] prospects would be damaged by our plans': Thatcher, op. cit. note 47, 684.
184. Holmes, op. cit. note 13, at 16. Margaret Thatcher stated that she 'did not think [nuclear power's] prospects would be damaged by our plans': Thatcher, op. cit. note 47, 684.
185. See note 43.
186. Power in Europe (1989), op. cit. note 81, at 2.
187. In a personal interview (March 1994), AC, a senior programme manager in the AEA, referred to 'political reasons' for the difficulties experienced by the nuclear power programme associated with privatization. He described the programme as a 'successful operation in which the patient [the technology] died'.
188. Shortly after Cecil Parkinson's withdrawal of the Magnox stations, Marshall wrote to the former Secretary of State, saying that the withdrawal had gone 'a long way to meeting my original concerns', adding that he was 'still hopeful of a successful flotation': Parkinson, op. cit. note 47, at 281. For Nigel Lawson, a forceful proponent of liberalization, the 'moral of the whole episode ... is that Ministers can always be led astray by scientific experts': Lawson, op. cit. note 34, at 170.
189. Shortly after Cecil Parkinson's withdrawal of the Magnox stations, Marshall wrote to the former Secretary of State, saying that the withdrawal had gone 'a long way to meeting my original concerns', adding that he was 'still hopeful of a successful flotation': Parkinson, op. cit. note 47, at 281. For Nigel Lawson, a forceful proponent of liberalization, the 'moral of the whole episode ... is that Ministers can always be led astray by scientific experts': Lawson, op. cit. note 34, at 170.
190. Given that, on any realistic accounting terms, nuclear power had been revealed to be grossly uncompetitive against fossil-fuel generation, the Government's distinction between the underlying cost and actual price of nuclear electricity was spurious. The emergence of gas-turbine generation technology was a marginal factor compared to nuclear's huge cost increases. Indeed, if this escalation hadn't threatened ESI privatization, the PWR series would probably have progressed in parallel with investment in gas-turbine plant, as both Wakeham and Marshall suggested. The most significant rôle of gas-turbine technology in the withdrawal of nuclear plant was that of a face-saving ex post facto rationale for Government.
191. David Bodde has suggested that alternative nuclear plant and fuel-cycle concepts are needed to better respond to global ESI liberalization: David L. Bodde, 'Strategic Thinking about Nuclear Energy: Implications of the Emerging Market Structure in Electric Generation', Energy Policy, Vol. 26 (1998), 957-62.
192. Donald MacKenzie's remark that 'take away the institutions that support technological change of a particular sort, and it ceases to seem "natural" - indeed it ceases altogether', precisely describes this collapse: MacKenzie, op. cit. note 119, at 384.
193. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, Introductory Essay', in D. MacKenzie and J. Wajcman (eds), The Social Shaping of Technology (Milton Keynes, Bucks., UK: Open University Press, 2nd edn, 1999), 3-27, at 3.