Representative government and special interest politics (we have met the enemy and he is us)

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 299-319

  Lohmann, Susanne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Collective dilemma; Government spending; Information asymmetry; Mancur Olson; Special interests

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038168850     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951692803015003004     Document Type: Review

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