Cooperation for social protection: Explaining variation in welfare programs

American Behavioral Scientist

Volumn 45, Issue 5, 2002, Pages 901-918+763

  Rothstein, Bo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038047630     PISSN: 00027642     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0002764202045005010     Document Type: Review

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