Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets: Experimental evidence on firm-specific investment

Labour Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 407-425

  Anderhub, Vital ^a   Königstein, Manfred ^b   Kübler, Dorothea ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ERFURT   (Germany)

Author keywords

Experiment; Principal agent; Specific human capital

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037972318     PISSN: 09275371     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0927-5371(03)00019-8     Document Type: Article

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