After the public interest prevails: The political sustainability of policy reform

Governance

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 203-234

  Patashnik, Eric ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037864491     PISSN: 09521895     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0491.00214     Document Type: Review

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