Responsive Bureaus, Equity, and Regulatory Negotiation: An Empirical View

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 449-465

  Langbein, Laura I ^a  

^a AMERICAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037722894     PISSN: 02768739     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/pam.10054     Document Type: Article

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