The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel for NTU Games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 67-84

  Orshan, Gooni ^a   Zarzuelo, José M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY UPV EHU   (Spain)

Author keywords

NTU games; consistency; Nash bargaining solution; prekernel

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037620766     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.2000.0757     Document Type: Article

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